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SUMMARY 
This PhD research examines institutional explanations for the use of performance 
information (PI) to learn and improve by government agencies. Despite widespread criticism 
of and disappointment with New Public Management (NPM) reforms, performance 
budgeting (PB) is credited with contributing to efficiency and effectiveness in several public 
sector agencies. The fact that an agency successfully uses performance information to 
realize improvements or efficiency gains may however be the result of a diversity of factors 
that bear little or no connection to the PB system itself. Corporate culture, public sector 
motivation, leadership commitment and discretionary power of managers have already been 
identified as important in this respect. Moreover, the causal relationship between successful 
PB adoption and the purposeful use of performance information (PI) by an agency may in 
fact be reversed. The central question posed in this research is therefore: How do underlying 
cultural and historical factors explain successful PB in government agencies? 
 
In an attempt to further explore the ‘DNA’ of agencies with a reputation of successful 
performance budgeting, this study turned to alternative explanations provided by neo 
institutionalism. More specifically, a number of indicators concerning an organization’s 
history and culture were explored as explanations for purposeful use of PI. Among these 
were: reflective openness, cognitive frames the impact of events and leadership.  
 
The research consisted of four qualitative case studies of four public sector agencies in the 
Netherlands and the US that share a reputation of purposeful use of performance 
information, that is, PI use that is consistent with PB reform objectives. Four indicators were 
used to assess the degree to which a case can indeed be qualified as a PB success. 
Subsequently specific institutional factors believed to be beneficial for PI use were tested by 
eight indicators. The primary source of evidence consisted of semi structured interviews with 
key organization members. Overall, 36 persons were interviewed who were selected to 
represent management, performance & budget staff and operations of each agency as well 
as staff tasked with oversight on the part of the agency’s principal. By means of triangulation 
the findings from interviews were compared with questionnaire results and findings from 
analysis of documents. 
 
The results indicate that in all agencies examined, deeply rooted cultural characteristics 
largely explain purposeful use of performance information. In two of the cases, events or 
leaders provide an additional explanation. Although one should be careful with 
generalization from a limited number of case studies, the results cast doubts on some widely 
held assumptions among budget reformists. As the cases studied were carefully selected to 
represent the relatively scarce good practices of PB implementation, the findings challenge 
the assumption that purposeful use of PI results from PB reforms.  
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While PB adoption may not provide the main explanation for purposeful performance 
information use by these agencies, it can be credited with positively impacting effectiveness 
and efficiency in the areas of goal alignment, capacity planning and stakeholder dialogue. 
The analysis from the case studies suggests that cultural and historical institutional factors 
are a necessary conditions for PB to work as envisaged Therefore anecdotal evidence of 
purposeful PI use by government agencies should not be mistaken for success of a NPM/PB 
recipe that can be reproduced elsewhere. For future attempts to advance this popular public 
financial management (PFM) reform, it is suggested that measurement and reporting 
systems should remain close to organization members’ own measures of professionalism 
and that reforms should simultaneously address aspects of organization culture associated 
with organizational learning. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit promotieonderzoek richt zich op institutionele verklaringen voor het gebruik van 
prestatie-informatie (PI) door publieke organisaties om te leren en te verbeteren. Er is 
momenteel veel kritiek op - en teleurstelling over New Public Management (NPM) 
hervormingen. Toch lijkt bij sommige organisaties performance budgeting (PB) te hebben 
bijgedragen aan meer doeltreffendheid en doelmatigheid. Het feit dat een organisatie 
prestatie-informatie succesvol gebruikt om verbeteringen of doelmatigheidswinst te 
realiseren kan echter het gevolg zijn van uiteenlopende factoren die geheel los staan van 
een PB systeem. Factoren als organisatiecultuur, intrinsieke motivatie, toegewijd leiderschap 
en de mate van autonomie zijn daarbij in eerder onderzoek al als belangrijk geïdentificeerd. 
Het zou zelfs zo kunnen zijn dat het vaak veronderstelde oorzakelijk verband tussen het 
succesvol invoeren van PB en het zinvol gebruiken van PI, in feite omgekeerd is. De centrale 
vraag van dit onderzoek is daarom: Hoe verklaren onderliggende culturele en historische 
factoren succesvolle toepassing van PB in publieke organisaties? 
 
In een poging het ‘DNA’ te ontrafelen van organisaties met een reputatie van succesvolle PB 
toepassing, kijkt dit onderzoek naar alternatieve verklaringen gebaseerd op het neo-
institutionalisme. Hiertoe wordt een aantal variabelen met betrekking tot de geschiedenis en 
cultuur van een organisatie getoetst als mogelijke verklaring voor het zinvol gebruik van PI. 
Deze variabelen zijn onder meer: analytische openheid, gedeelde overtuigingen, de gevolgen 
van ingrijpende gebeurtenissen en leiderschap.  
 
Het onderzoek bestaat uit vier kwalitatieve case studies van vier publieke organisaties uit 
Nederland en de VS die allen een reputatie hebben van zinvol gebruik van PI, dat wil zeggen 
dat zij PI gebruiken op een manier die overeenkomt met de doelstellingen van PB 
hervormingen. Vier indicatoren meten in hoeverre een case inderdaad kan worden 
beschouwd als PB succes. Vervolgens wordt met acht indicatoren de aanwezigheid getoetst 
van specifieke institutionele factoren die als gunstig worden beschouwd voor PI gebruik. De 
belangrijkste bron voor dit onderzoek zijn semi gestructureerde interviews met relevante 
organisatieleden. In totaal zijn 36 personen geïnterviewd die een afspiegeling vormen van 
het management, de uitvoering en de stafdiensten voor prestatie-management & begroting. 
Ook zijn toezichthouders van de principaal geïnterviewd. Door triangulatie zijn de 
bevindingen uit de interviews vergeleken met enquêteresultaten en schriftelijke bronnen.  
 
De resultaten wijzen er op dat in al deze organisaties diepgewortelde culturele kenmerken 
het zinvol gebruik van PI grotendeels verklaren. In twee cases vormen specifieke 
gebeurtenissen en leiders een plausibele aanvullende verklaring. Hoewel voorzichtigheid is 
geboden bij generalisatie uit enkele cases, werpen de bevindingen een nieuw licht op een 
aantal populaire aannames. Aangezien de bestudeerde cases golden al relatief schaarse 
voorbeelden van PB succes, trekken de resultaten de aanname in twijfel dat zinvol gebruik 
van PI volgt uit PB hervormingen.  
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Hoewel PB niet de belangrijkste verklaring vormt van zinvol PI-gebruik door deze 
organisaties, heeft PB wel positief bijgedragen aan effectiviteit en efficiency door middel van 
de afstemming van organisatiedoelen, een rationele capaciteitsplanning en de dialoog 
tussen stakeholders. Uit de analyse van de cases komt naar voren dat culturele en 
historische institutionele factoren noodzakelijke voorwaarden vormen om PB te laten 
werken zoals bedoeld. Om die reden is het onverstandig om anekdotisch bewijs van zinvol PI 
gebruik door overheidsorganisaties aan te zien voor generiek succes van een NPM/PB recept 
dat elders kan worden gekopieerd. Voor meer succesvolle toepassing van deze populaire 
begrotingshervorming wordt geadviseerd om meet- en rapportagesystemen te kiezen die 
aansluiten bij de wijze waarop organisatieleden succes beoordelen volgens hun eigen 
professionele maatstaven. Ook zouden prestatiegerichte hervormingen zich tegelijkertijd 
moeten richten op culturele aspecten die van belang zijn voor het lerend vermogen van 
organisaties.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys      
U.S. satirist and author and Patrick Jake O’Rourke 
 
The problem with government 
Government’s reputation to efficiently and effectively perform its tasks seems to always 
have been controversial at best. Many explanations have been provided as to why 
governments would be prone to wasting resources and be ineffective. Some of the popular 
ones are:  the absence of market competition for survival, an abundance of easy accessible 
resources, and the inertia and bureaucratic nature of its institutions. (e.g. Olson 1973: 355-
357). Other explanations, more mildly, refer to the nature of government tasks themselves. 
Providing public goods by definition means that there is no private party willing to buy or 
supply them voluntarily. This seriously limits comparison of cost prices and quality levels. 
Also the diversity of interests represented by democratic government, often rules out 
optimizing for financial efficiency (e.g. Kraan 2011: 6-7) 
 
Whatever the cause may be, the quest for solutions for a better performing government has 
been unremitting. Especially during the 1990s and early 2000s the New Public Management 
(NPM) agenda introduced many recipes that were meant to transform the public sector 
towards more result orientation and efficiency. Although its roots trace back further than 
NPM, performance budgeting (PB) gained worldwide popularity in the 1990s as part of the 
NPM reform agenda and is the subject of this research (OECD 2007: 11). 
 
Bringing performance data into the allocation debate  
Although it wasn’t until the 1990s that Performance Budgeting ideas piggybacked on New 
Public Management reform agendas worldwide, the ideas themselves were not that new 
(Redburn et al 2008: 7-12, Joyce 2003: 24). The optimal allocation of resources by 
government has been one of the most vital questions to all involved in politics and public 
service as well as to those in the scientific community studying the fields of public 
administration and economics. To a politician the right allocation may be an allocation 
representative of his or her ideological convictions or an allocation that rewards his or her 
constituency or large groups of voters in general. To those involved in public service this may 
be an allocation that rewards their specific organization or line of work or is in accordance 
with their professional assessment of prioritization. To those in the scientific community the 
right allocation can be one that maximizes utility according to an economic model or an 
allocation that has the largest support base in civil society. 
 
Performance budgeting has been another attempt to help solve the puzzle of allocating 
public resources in a more objective, systematic way. The notion that the quality of public 
goods and services should be a major factor in allocating public resources seems to have 
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slowly conquered the minds of all the aforementioned groups during the last decades 
(Breul& Moravitz 2007:2). Within government, promoting performance measures as an 
objective standard for allocating resources has in particular gained popularity with those 
tasked with budgeting within government. Understandably budget staff will welcome a tool 
that enables them to distinguish between rewarding a powerful budget claim from just 
rewarding a powerful claimant (Posner 2009: 18). Politicians have also discovered the appeal 
of PB as a way of promising more value for money to taxpayers or as a way to curtail public 
spending to find funds for their priorities. An increasing pressure to be accountable for 
results has been felt to a more or lesser degree for all those working for the public sector 
since. 
 
The results of reform 
There is a gap in literature when it comes to the studying the impact of performance 
budgeting reforms (OECD 2007: 58). An answer to the question whether PB has been 
successful as a reform or not cannot be answered without distinguishing between the 
different expectations that have been attributed to PB. Broadly, the two main reform 
objectives for governments around the world have been:  
1) To increase transparency of government spending and results 
2) A more effective allocation and management of resources 
Although PB initiatives have resulted in more transparency (Curristine 2005: 216/17, GAO 
2004b: 11-12, Van Nispen & Posseth 2006: 57), its effects on budgetary allocation by 
parliaments have generally been limited (Frisco and Stalebrink 2008: 11, De Vries& 
Bestebreur 2010: 237, OECD 2007: 66-67, De Jong et al 2013: 14-15). Operational efficiency 
gains and internal results orientation are effects that take place within government agencies 
and are therefore less visible and harder to substantiate.  At the same time, several authors 
have stressed that the benefits of PB reforms are most likely to occur at the agency level 
(Joyce 2003: 61, Posner 2009: 7-8, Van Dooren 2011: 429). The evidence on the effects of PB 
at the agency level is mostly anecdotal and often conflicting. That is why this research tries 
to determine whether PB delivered on some of its promises in managing efficiency in 
principal-agent relationships. 
 
The purpose of this study 
Despite widespread criticism of and disappointment with New Public Management reforms, 
PB is credited with contributing to improved efficiency and effectiveness in several public 
sector agencies. The general consensus seems nowadays seems to be that PB can only 
deliver results if certain other crucial management conditions are met or as Allan Schick 
already put it over a decade ago: governments that don’t manage for results will not budget 
for results’ (Schick 2003: 102). The fact that an agency successfully uses performance data to 
realize improvements or efficiency gains may however be the result of a diversity of factors. 
Corporate culture, public sector motivation, leadership commitment and discretionary 
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power of managers have already been identified as important in this respect (Mahler 1997: 
538 , Dull 2009a: 273, Moynihan&Pandey 2010: 14, Moynihan&Lavertu 2012: 599-600). 
Moreover, the causal relationship between successful PB adoption and purposeful PI use 
may in fact be reversed. In other words, did PB indeed modify public organizations and their 
steering relationships? Or did it merely codify existing behavior in just a few cases? If the 
latter is true, the potential of PB to change agency behavior should be seriously questioned. 
The general research question posed at the start of this research is therefore: Are result 
orientation of a government agency and operational efficiency gains achieved through PB? 
After taking a closer look at the characteristics of PB success in its most likely form, this 
question is operationalized into the central research question:  
 
How do underlying cultural and historical factors explain successful PB in government 
agencies? 
 
In an attempt to further explore the ‘DNA’ of agencies with a reputation of successful 
performance management, this study turns to alternative explanations provided by neo 
institutionalism. More specifically, a number of indicators concerning deeply rooted 
organizational traditions, the impact of events, reflective openness and cognitive frames 
were explored as explanations for result oriented behavior. After finishing the case studies, a 
conclusion is drawn on whether the use of PI was generally supported by coincidental 
historical and cultural circumstances in these cases. If so, this may provide a credible 
alternative explanation for the adoption of PB methodology thus weakening the universal 
claim that PB changes the way a public sector agency conducts its business. However, if the 
cases do not result in a convincing alternative explanation, the hypothesis that adopting PB 
does indeed alter behavior of agencies still stands.  
 
Relevance of this research 
Internationally, despite plenty of disappointing experiences, PB is widely advocated by 
institutes such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD as part of the core set of modern Public 
Finance Management (PFM) reforms along with Multi-Annual Frameworks (MTEFs) and 
Spending Reviews. Benefiting from recent research, the debate in these circles is increasingly 
turning to sequencing of reforms thereby acknowledging the necessity of accomplishing a 
certain base level as a foundation for modern PFM architecture. As a consultant, researcher 
and lecturer for amongst others the World Bank and the OECD, the author is a participant in 
this debate. Today, almost all experts in the field stress how non-technical factors heavily 
influence the design and the success of PFM reforms (Diamond 2011: 1). With regard to PB, 
the dominance of culture and traditions is increasingly acknowledged as a more important 
factor in agency management than budget allocation (Schick 2014: 20). The next step for 
increasing the impact of technical assistance in PFM reforms will therefore require the 
difficult task of identifying the relevant institutional factors for success and incorporating 
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these in approaches to reform. This includes explicit recognition of the variation that exists 
between, but also within national systems.  
 
In recent years, an increasing number of quantitative studies appeared that linked PI use in 
the public sector to a diversity of factors adding up to over 30 by 2012 (Kroll 2015: 470-471). 
As mentioned these include factors such as corporate culture, public sector motivation, 
leadership commitment, discretionary power of managers. Quantitative analysis of data sets 
can result in important clues on favorable characteristics and circumstances for PI use by 
public organizations but also has some obvious limitations. Working with a large N-size, 
inevitably requires simplifying complex variables in order to make them manageable. By 
relying on abstractions such as pre-determined cultural categories so they can be measured 
in multiple organizations, no attention is given to specific characteristics and nuances of 
culture nor to tracing these characteristics to actual PI use. Similarly, another limitation of 
quantitative work in this area is that it offers little historical perspective on the development 
of an organization and its PB efforts. Instead, the available cross-sectional analyses and 
experimental designs have a very short gap between treatment and observed response.  For 
these reasons, qualitative case studies can have added value in this field of research. 
Especially with complex and intangible factors like organizational culture and leadership, 
qualitative case study analysis such as this research, are a valuable if not necessary addition 
to make sense of some of the identified factors resulting in purposeful PI use. This research 
should be viewed as a step, (albeit a modest one) to bridge this empirical gap by offering a 
more specific narrative of the contribution of some of these factors.  
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CHAPTER 1  THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF PB – A PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
It was Winston Churchill who allegedly said that success is the ability to go from failure to 
failure without losing enthusiasm. Measured by this standard the performance budgeting 
(PB) movement should be credited with quite a successful history. Attempts of 
governments worldwide to structurally integrate their budgets with performance planning 
and reporting has, so far, not brought all the improvements that were envisioned by many 
reformers. At the same time the promise of objective performance informed decisions by 
public sector managers and politicians and occasional success stories have kept these 
reforms on government’s agenda’s worldwide for at least the last two decades. A long 
standing claim made by PB reformists has been that it can contribute to more efficient 
allocation of public spending and provide tools to cut wasteful ineffective spending. So far 
there has not been much evidence supporting major reallocation of spending as a result of 
PB reforms. Other than a lack of visible reallocation decisions, it remains to be seen 
whether PB reforms did deliver on some of the other promises they held. Results of PB in 
other areas such as increasing government transparency and agency management look 
somewhat more promising. This chapter explores the question what is meant by PB, looks 
at likely implementation difficulties and takes stock of worldwide experiences: 
disappointments as well as claims to success. The will lead to the central question for this 
research at the end of the chapter.  
1.1 What is meant by performance budgeting? 
A multitude of promises and expectations was communicated by performance budgeting 
reformers at the start of reforms. These can be generally classified into two broad aims. One 
is to increase transparency of government spending and associated results in order to give 
voters and the legislative branch better opportunities for accountability and oversight.  This 
requires integrating of performance data into budget documents and requires measuring 
and reporting of performance information. The other broad aim of PB reforms is to increase 
effective allocation and management of resources. This not only requires measuring and 
reporting of PI but also actually using this information to inform decisions made in the 
budgetary process. Both broad aims of PB are expected to contribute to solving the puzzle of 
allocating public funds in their own way. A transparent budget proposal is seen as a 
necessary precondition for making better informed choices. The use of performance data in 
the debate about different allocation options is expected to result in decisions that fund 
those programs and policy instruments that have shown adequate results while improving or 
saving on less effective ones. Savings generated by reducing the funding level of particular 
programs whilst retaining or increasing spending on performing programs are referred to as 
improvements in allocative efficiency. This can be expected to occur during budget 
resolution by parliament (OECD 2007: 66-67) 
 
Savings generated by changes in funding levels within a program are referred to as 
improvements in operational efficiency. Operational efficiency improvement as a result of PB 
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happens at the agency level in the budget preparation and execution phases and is therefore 
less visible than changes within authorized programs (OECD 2007: 66-67).   
 
Although not explicitly envisioned by many PB reformers, another reoccurring claim to 
success of PB is an increase in result orientation within government organizations. These 
have to do with providing a greater emphasis on tangible results (including setting of 
objectives, monitoring performance, planning) by government and improved transparency 
of planning and reporting documents for their users (GAO 2004b: 11-15, IOFEZ 2004: 41-42  , 
OECD 2007: 59-61). This type of success is hard to identify and substantiate for non-
organization members or distant stakeholders and is equally difficult to define precisely. In 
an attempt to do so anyway, result orientation by a public sector agency in this study will 
refer to the degree in which professionals, staff and management integrate information on 
strategic goals and measurable objectives in their daily actions and decisions.  
 
Although often more of a  ‘bycatch’ than a stated intention of PB reforms, increased result 
orientation of public sector organizations and its members can be counted as a separate 
type of result. Figure 1.1 shows a classification of potential contributions resulting from PB 
reforms. It can be argued that all of these contributions are to some degree interlinked.   
 
Figure 1.1 Potential contributions of PB reforms (De Jong et al 3013:6) 
 
 
Measuring, reporting and presenting the results of government programs, measures or 
activities is the key to PB achieving any of these aims. By communicating clear policy goals 
and targets and monitoring them during and after execution (much like the way this is done 
with financial information) it becomes possible to base future decisions on past measured 
performance and draw explicit lessons. Using the budget process as a vehicle, the 
information on policy results is presented simultaneously with the funding decisions thus 
making sure that the lessons can be learned during allocation decisions. 
 
Turning to PB, there are several ways of categorizing performance budgeting systems. A 
common way is to do so according to the degree to which PI is linked to funding. Allen Schick 
distinguished between two polar versions of performance budgeting using a broad and a 
strict definition: 
Intended 
results of PB 
reforms 
Increased transparency 
of government 
spending and results 
More effective 
allocation and 
management 
of resources 
Allocative efficiency gains 
Operational efficiency gains 
Internal result orientation 
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Broadly defined, a performance budget is any budget that presents information on what 
agencies have done or expect to do with the money provided to them. Strictly defined, a 
performance budget is only a budget that explicitly links each increment in resources to an 
increment in outputs or other results. The broad concept views budgeting in 
presentational terms, the strict version views it in terms of allocations. Many governments 
satisfy the broad definition, few satisfy the strict definition. (Schick, 2003: 101) 
 
Teresa Curristine used a three-fold typology to describe performance budgets in OECD 
countries (OECD 2007: 21, Congiano et al 2013:229). In some cases, a direct link between 
performance, resource allocation and accountability is in place (direct/formula performance 
budgeting). More often, the link is indirect, and planned performance targets and results are 
used for planning and accountability purposes only (performance-informed budgeting, or 
PIB). Finally, there are performance budgeting systems that have no link between 
performance and funding and that use PI for accountability only (presentational 
performance budgeting). It is not easy to identify a clear relationship between the form of 
PB system and the emphasis of its intended results. It is clear however that presentational 
PB is more likely to directly target transparency whereas direct performance budgeting is 
explicitly geared towards reallocation.    
 
Arguably, a fourth type might be described as a managerial performance approach which 
focuses on managerial impacts and changes in organizational behavior but may de-
emphasize a strong budget linkage (OECD/Von Trapp 2014:2). It should be noted that the 
line between performance based budgeting and performance management is becoming 
increasingly blurred. In fact PB today is seen more and more as a subset of performance 
management rather than a separate process (Schick 2014: 3).  Integrating performance into 
budgetary consequences in some form and at some level seems to remain as the main 
distinguishing feature of PB.  
 
Notwithstanding the diversity in PB definitions that emerged and transformed over time, 
using a PB system is commonly associated with the following activities (based on Schick 
2003, Robinson&Brumby 2005, OECD 2007, OECD 2015 and Schick 2014): 
x setting measurable objectives and performance indicators for government programs 
x presenting expected results alongside spending levels in budget documents 
x measurement and reporting of results during or afterwards program execution  
x evaluation of results and use of this information for strategic planning and budgeting  
 
The type of information that is actively generated, collected and disseminated as part of a 
formalized performance measurement and reporting system, can be contrasted with non-
routine PI such as ad-hoc feedback that is passively received (Kroll 2013: 265). This is an 
important notion when critically assessing the added value of adoption of PB systems and its 
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effects on the performance dialogue within and between organizations. As can be noted, 
this interpretation is broader that some of the older PB definitions in the sense that it not 
limited to direct use of PI for budgetary purposes and therefore does not distinguish sharply 
between performance management (PM) and performance budgeting. The problematic 
separation between PB and PM and has increasing been recognized by the PB community 
during the last decade or so (Schick 2014: 3).  
 
Insofar goal setting, performance measurement, analysis and reporting are part of the same 
formalized cyclical routines as the budgetary cycle, the term PB is being applied (as may PM 
at the same time). This is justified by the expectation that gains in efficiency or effectiveness 
resulting from such a system will, at some point find their way in the budgetary cycle at a 
certain level. The effect assumed by reformers is that reforms will lead to what has been 
labeled as a purposeful PI use, that is, use that is likely to result in efficiency and 
effectiveness gains (Moynihan&Lavertu 2012: 594). This could for example be the case 
where PI is used for intra program reallocation or rewarding or dismissing claims during 
budget preparation. 
 
Governments with an advanced PB system have found ways to translate political priorities 
into policy objectives that are translated into programs and activities. At one level these are 
associated with the budget plans as presented to parliament for authorization. This chain of 
accountability is typical to principal-agent relationships. The agent’s internal system of 
performance planning, monitoring and evaluation therefore usually reflects that of the 
principal as the agent is subject to reporting and oversight by the principal on the same 
policy goals. The relationship between strategic performance planning and budgeting as 
envisioned by most experts in the field PB is illustrated in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2 Strategic planning and budgeting cycle (source Redburn 2008: 13) 
 
Assessing 
Performance 
 
Strategic  
Planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budgeting 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation 
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PI is intended to play a role in all phases for planning, target setting, monitoring and 
evaluation respectively. Arguably the link between assessing performance and the 
subsequent phases of strategic planning and budgeting are the ones that have proven to be 
the most problematic as the latter two processes have their own politically driven dynamics 
in which perspective has to compete with other, often conflicting, considerations such as 
stakeholder interests and ideological convictions. 
 
As such, PB can be contrasted to the more ‘traditional’ way the budget process takes place in 
government. This was articulated well by Aaron Wildavsky when describing the various 
sources of information that agency staff takes into account when deciding ‘how much to ask 
for’ during budget preparation (Wildavsky 1992:90-94):  
 
x Estimates of what ‘will go’. As the agency is usually faced with more demand for 
funding than is available it will asking just below what will be considered ‘too much’ 
by the other players in the budgetary process. This way it remains credible when 
requesting funds for priorities in the future. 
x Informal reports on how its programs were regarded, especially last year’s  
x The letter from the budget bureau, which usually has some statement on how closely 
this year’s budget should resemble last year’s. 
x The interest of specialized publics in particular programs. Periodic reports from the 
field on the demand for services may act as an indicator. When the agency begins to 
notice connections between the activities of supporting interests and calls from 
parliament, it has a pretty good idea of the support for a program.  
x Interest of (influential) politicians in particular programs, mainly ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’ 
of influential politicians.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly none of these sources explicitly refers to performance indicators 
nor to any systematic form of assessment of effectiveness and efficiency like evaluation or 
spending reviews. In reality any government agency can be expected to demonstrate 
‘traditional’ budgeting behaviour to some extent as PI will never be the sole determinant of 
budgetary decisions in the public sector.  
 
1.2 PB as part of the New Public Management legacy 
Especially during the 1990s and early 2000s the New Public Management (NPM) agenda 
introduced many recipes that were meant to transform the public sector towards more 
result orientation and efficiency. Although its roots trace back further than NPM, 
performance budgeting (PB) gained worldwide popularity as part of the NPM reform agenda 
and is the subject of this research. 
 
This does not mean that the concept of PB is all that new. Records of the U.S. Federal 
government’s interest in performance budgeting go back to the early 20th century following 
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recommendations of the Taft Commission in 1912 (Redburn et al 2008: 7-8). Other U.S. 
initiatives in the previous century included chronologically: The Hoover Commission (1949), 
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act (1950), DoD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) in the mid-1960s, Management by Objectives (MBO) in 1973 and Zero Based 
Budgeting in 1977. The series of subsequent initiatives over the years inspired Allan Schick to 
cynically note that: ‘performance budgeting is an old idea with a disappointing past and an 
uncertain future’ (Schick 2003: 100). Nonetheless the question remains whether 
performance budgeting reforms so far have had a serious impact on the way government 
does business and if so what impact exactly.  
 
When PB gained worldwide popularity, thinking about public administration was dominated 
by New Public Management (NPM). It can however be argued that government performance 
and government efficiency was politically identified as a major problem in the period 
preceding NPM. In this period the roots for the broad popular appeal of PB may have largely 
been laid. NPM can be viewed as one of the three periods of public administration reforms 
since the 1980s in OECD countries (OECD 2105: 17-19):  
a. Receding government (1980-1990),  
b. New Public Management (1990- 2005), and  
c. Basic government (The current period from 2005). 
 
The notion that the lack of market incentives in the public sector lead to enormous waste of 
taxpayer’s money with no accountability for results, was starting to get used successfully by 
politicians. In the 2015 OECD report on Value for Money in government, this period is 
described as follows:  
 
The period of receding government is commonly associated with the Reagan 
administration in the US and the Thatcher Cabinet in the UK, but there were many 
governments in other OECD countries that subscribed to similar ideas and programs. 
Much emphasis was put on the reduction of government tasks, particularly the tasks of 
central government by deregulation, privatization, decentralization, expenditure reduction 
and fiscal alleviation. The idea was that private sector growth and prosperity was 
hampered by too high tax and expenditure levels. A popular saying of the period was that 
“government is the problem, not the solution”. Theoretical underpinnings of these ideas 
were partly found in supply side economics and partly in public choice economics. Supply 
side economics showed that essential incentives for growth in the private sector could be 
impaired by too high levels of taxation, public choice theory showed that without strong 
constitutional and legal constraints, the incentives motivating bureaucratic and political 
behavior, would lead to ever expanding public sector that would eventually overwhelm 
the private sector of the economy (OECD 2015:17) 
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As noted in the above quote, Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US 
were notable pioneers in verbalizing criticism on the functioning of government. This is 
illustrated by a number of quotes from former U.S. President Reagan in Textbox 1.1. 
 
Textbox 1.1 Quotes of President Reagan on government’s effectiveness and efficiency 
(source Adler&Adler 1998) 
 
It is important to note that the rhetoric and powerful sound bites about the way government 
is managing public funds has by no means lost their appeal throughout the years. Fueled by 
the popularity of this view of government and possibly the first wave of reforms, policies to 
shrink government, reduce its impact on society and increase accountability to taxpayers 
continued in the 1990s and the first decade of this century. In the UK, some claim that the 
subsequent governments that superseded Thatcher’s were in fact ‘on a Thatcherite 
autopilot’ (Jenkins 2006: 334). Textbox 1.2 shows quotes of the current and previous U.S. 
President on managing public spending with referral to reallocation using PB methods. 
 
‘Government is like a baby. An alimentary canal with a big appetite at one end and no sense 
of responsibility at the other’ 
‘No government ever voluntarily reduces itself in size. Government programs, once 
launched, never disappear. Actually, a government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal 
life we'll ever see on this earth’ 
‘Government's view of the economy could be summed up in a few short phrases: If it moves, 
tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops moving, subsidize it’ 
‘Government always finds a need for whatever money it gets’ 
‘Government does not solve problems; it subsidizes them’ 
‘The best minds are not in government. If any were, business would steal them away’ 
‘The most terrifying words in the English language are: I'm from the government and I'm 
here to help’ 
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Textbox 1.2 U.S. Presidential quotes on the use of PB methods to manage public spending 
 
The period of receding government was followed by New Public Management. The many 
studies that describe the contents of New Public Management share a number of central 
elements.  Other than PB these elements comprise (OECD 2015:18): 
x Separation of policy execution from policy development; 
x Stimulating competition among service providers, by allowing private suppliers to 
provide collectively funded services and through demand financing (consumer 
subsidies and vouchers); 
x Loosening of standards of operational management both in policy development and 
policy execution (“let managers manage”); 
x Financing executive agencies on the basis of output targets; 
x Outsourcing of intermediate production for both core ministries and executive 
agencies to the market. 
 
Theoretically, NPM is inspired by amongst others public choice and principal-agent theory 
(Van Kersbergen&Van Waarden 2004: 148). The NPM ideas were proposed and promoted by 
governmental commissions, task forces, public administration academics as well as private 
consultants. Many OECD nations introduced forms of PB in this period. New Zealand 
pioneered budgetary reforms in the 1980s and 1990s that in many ways have not been 
repeated since in terms of ambition and bluntness. In the US, Vice President Gore chaired 
the National Performance Review that was established in 1993 in an attempt to apply the 
ideas put forward in the book ‘Reinventing Government’, the classical NPM work by David 
Osborne and Ted Gaebler (Redburn et al 2008: 10-11). The U.S. Federal Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 drew on the lessons learned from earlier 
There comes a time when every program must be judged either a success or a failure. 
Where we find success, we should repeat it, share it, and make it the standard. And where 
we find failure, we must call it by its name. Government action that fails in its purpose 
must be reformed or ended.     
Presidential candidate George W. Bush in a campaign speech in Philadelphia in 2000 
 
We committed to change the way our government in Washington does business so that 
we’re no longer squandering billions of tax dollars on programs that have outlived their 
usefulness or exist solely because of the power of a lobbyist or interest group.  We can no 
longer afford to sustain the old ways when we know there are new and more efficient 
ways of getting the job done. Even in good times, Washington can’t afford to continue 
these bad practices.  In bad times, it’s absolutely imperative that Washington stop them 
and restore confidence that our government is on the side of taxpayers and everyday 
Americans…..Our problem is not just a deficit of dollars. It’s a deficit of accountability, a 
deficit of trust. 
President Obama January 7th 2009 when appointing his first Chief Performance Officer 
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experience. Under GPRA, whose requirements took effect in FY 1999, agencies are required 
to issue performance plans and reports that are loosely linked to the budget. The 
Netherlands joined the performance budgeting community at the turn of the century. From 
1999 onwards, the traditional structure of the budget was extensively modified into a 
performance budget under the acronym VBTB, translated as Policy Budgets and Policy 
Accountability.   
 
Many believers in the NPM ideas in general and PB in particular have since developed into 
their biggest skeptics as they became disappointed with the results of these reforms. In 
addition, an increasing amount of academic studies provided evidence of the limited or even 
counterproductive effects of NPM motivated measures. Confusingly, there also seems to be 
a broad consensus among practitioners that today’s governments, after the (partly 
unsuccessful) implementation of NPM ideas, are generally better off compared to the way 
government was run prior to these reforms. This may be why international organizations 
such as the OECD, World Bank and IMF remain convinced that NPM type of reforms are at 
the core of their advice to the nations they assist.  It is not yet clear what the post NPM era 
will look like exactly, but despite the universal appeal of many NPM ideas, it looks like NPM’s 
heyday is well behind us. In the post NPM public sector landscape however, many traces of 
NPM reforms can be found.  
 
One powerful idea in particular has been the separation of policymaking and policy 
execution as government was supposed to ‘steer and not row’. This has resulted in 
performance based (quasi-) contracting and monitoring arrangement with (semi) 
autonomous government agencies (e.g. Rhodes1997: 48-49). The introduction of PB 
supplemented the separation between policy design and policy execution introduced 
simultaneously in many countries. By introducing (quasi-) contracts that specified the 
agent’s production levels, performance standards and prices, NPM reforms aimed at giving 
the principal a better position to align resources and agency activities with its policy 
objectives and exert control over policy execution by agencies. This way, assumptions from 
principal agent theory have had significant impact on shaping the post NPM public sector 
landscape in many countries (Ter Bogt 1997: 53-55, Bell 2002: 11). Additionally NPM 
assumes that by substituting input controls for output and outcomes, like the PB recipe 
prescribes, managers gain discretionary power to achieve the results they are held 
accountable for.  
 
The current period from around 2005 is characterized by revising, adjusting or sometimes 
even abolishing some NPM reforms. Although still early to tell, a new trend may be an 
increased focus on front office tasks at the expense of back office activities. This may include 
separating financing of agencies from output or outcome controls (Kraan 2011: 5, OECD 
2015: 309).  The current economic and fiscal crisis is likely to overshadow any attempt to 
introduce new large scale reforms in the foreseeable future. As governments will find 
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themselves increasingly strapped for resources, the actual saving potential of the past 
reforms and lessons learned from these reforms may gain renewed interest.  
 
As for PB, its popularity may have reached its peak some years ago. Those countries who 
adopted it are continuing to struggle with ways to make PB work or improve on its results. 
Examples of this are the introduction of revisions of the earlier systems in which 
performance is increasingly decoupled from the budget process, such as in the US (GPRAMA 
2010 – Moynihan&Kroll 2015: 6-16) and the Netherlands (Accountable Budgeting from 2012 
– De Jong et al 2013: 19-28). A set of instruments gaining (renewed) popularity in recent 
years are performance based policy evaluations. Shaped to result in relevant options for 
budgetary decision making, performance based evaluations have been emerging in countries 
such as Chile, Canada, the Netherlands and South Korea (Robinson 2014:12-13, Van Nispen 
2015 forthcoming 2015). The latter adopted a version of the former U.S. Program 
Assessment Rating Tool, which despite lacking budgetary impact in the US, has been used 
with some success by the Koreans since its introduction in 2005 (Kim 2010: 183-4). In some 
cases these experiences build upon a long tradition with conducting spending reviews such 
as in the Netherlands (Schoch & Den Broeder 2013: 15) and Canada (Robinson 2014:21). 
Policy evaluation and spending reviews can be placed in the broad PB tradition as it attempts 
to combine funding and results (Schick 2014: 18). In addition the increased availability of 
information on performance allowed for more evidence based ex-post policy evaluations.  
 
1.3 Challenging PB theory 
In spite of PB’s logic appeal and its rapid expansion, anecdotal evidence from practitioners as 
well as several disciplines of social science offer a multitude of explanations why the 
predicted benefits of PB doctrine do and will not materialize. Much of this criticism also 
applies more broadly to systematic evaluation of policy effectiveness. Many assert the view 
of public policy as being sufficiently predictable and measurable to allow for the kind of 
systematic or even mechanical analysis that PB seems to assume.  For this reason PB, 
according to the traditional strict definition (that is, using performance information in the 
annual budgetary context), meets even more criticism than the contemporary more broad 
definition of PB that also accommodates performance evaluation and performance 
management. Nonetheless even these forms of performance information face some 
criticism for resting on shaky assumptions. 
 
To agency managers, who are usually busy battling unexpected crises that can only be cured 
by resources rather than strategic thinking, performance management is little more than a 
distraction (Moynihan 2008: 16). Faced with the complexity of real world policy dilemmas, 
bureaucrats understandably opt for other ways to select policy alternatives than 
comprehensive systematic analysis. It can be argued that their scientifically ‘flawed’ 
methods are often superior to any futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness 
(Lindblom 1959: 88). In this light, coupling complex and outlandish activities such as strategy 
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and policy analysis to the budget process may prove just too ambitious. In a critical appraisal 
of PPBS (one of PB’s important predecessors in the 1960s) Aaron Wildavsky stated that the 
shotgun marriage between policy analysis and budgeting should be annulled because policy 
analysis is hard enough to accomplish without having to meet arbitrary and fixed deadlines 
imposed by the budget process (Wildavsky 1969: 196).  
 
Neither should it be surprising that the political environment in which budget allocation 
takes place, does far from guarantee a predictable use of the PI that is generated. It would 
take a totalitarian regime to fully embrace a normative theory of budgeting, for this would 
imply the end of politics (Wildavsky 1992: 429). In order to be able to deal with 
unpredictability and complexity, political decision makers (and their staff) often prefer 
loosely formulating goals, redundancy in information sources and non-cyclical decision 
making (In ‘t Veld 1999: 76-82). The view that performance measurement is too simple an 
approach for the diversity and complexity in the public sector was expressed by Beryl Radin 
as she confronted six assumptions that constituted what she called the ‘unreal and naïve 
approach’ of the performance movement, with reality (Radin 2006:207): 
x Information is already available 
x Information is neutral 
x We know what we are measuring 
x We can define cause-effect relationships in programs 
x Baseline information is available 
x Almost all activities can be measured and quantified 
 
In summary, the assumption of linear cause and effect relations, as well as clear goals and 
planned change does not survive the reality check (Van Dooren 2011: 427). Apart from 
overcoming numerous technical challenges, studies attempting to explain a lack of success 
PB reforms have had so far, reveal that success is determined by some major factors that, as 
far as we know, remain largely unaffected by the reforms themselves. Many factors may 
affect decisions to integrate the results of performance assessment into a strategy and 
budget proposal by a government agency.  
 
In order to be capable to learn from performance assessments to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency, it is assumed that this type of learning is supported by well-functioning policy and 
management systems. These systems include: governance and accountability arrangements, 
political decision making, human resources, policy analysis and advice, performance 
management, budgeting, monitoring and reporting and evaluation. In many government 
organizations it remains to be seen whether these conditions are being met (Scott 2003: 57). 
The notion that PB can only deliver results if certain other crucial management conditions 
are met was articulated by Allan Schick as: governments that don’t manage for results will 
not budget for results’ (Schick 2003: 102) . But even if PB is accompanied by a set of tools 
such as balanced scorecards, internal contracts systems or even pay-for-performance, this 
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does not mean that these tools indeed play a serious role in decision making because the 
relational aspects are often valued more highly than the formal aspect (Schick 2003: 91).  
 
A rather obvious but nonetheless still often overlooked condition is formed by organizational 
culture. In government organizations a focus on compliance instead of performance can 
provide an additional obstacle result orientation and therefore learning behavior (Schick 
2003: 86, Osborne & Plastrik 1997: 258).  Generally, it seems that knowledge about result 
orientation and learning behavior of organizations was ignored when designing the new 
formal performance budgeting and performance management structures (Moynihan 2005: 
203). In a given government agency, displaying result oriented behavior by conducting 
assessing or debating effectiveness may be supported or punished by the organization’s 
leadership and culture. Cultural obstacles can prevent managers from using PI in a 
meaningful way. Examples are a lack of authority or interest in change and fear of ‘rocking 
the boat’ (Hatry et al 2003: 13). The cultural circumstances necessary for PB to work will be 
explored deeper in CH.4.  
 
Even if technical challenges are overcome and PB produces relevant information that is 
picked up within public organizations to learn and improve, the political environment in 
which they operate may not. The span of attention of any parliament is too limited to 
oversee all areas of public policy with the same level of scrutiny. Most policy decisions, 
including budget allocation, are therefore debated within the limited community of policy 
specialists, parliamentary commissions and political leadership. For these and other reasons, 
many have argued that policy process is incremental by nature, at least in a democratically 
run government (Lindblom 1959: 84-85, Wildavsky 1961:184-185, Wildavsky 1992: 436). This 
observation is easily confirmed by most practitioners. Others assert this view by claiming 
that longtime periods of calm, incremental policy adjustment are altered by short intervals 
of turbulence when a policy theory is subject to revising in the public arena (True et al. 1999: 
176-180).   
 
For political leaders who are committed to performance based decisions, the PI informed, 
specialist perspective competes with other perspectives that put issues on the political 
agenda such as interest groups, political party affiliation and public opinion (Posner 2004: 8-
14 , Conlan et al 2002: 4, 12-13). Formally, the agreed upon ideas and policy ideals might 
have been ‘frozen’ in principal-agent relationships and internalized in an organization’s 
management control and performance management systems. However one ought to 
acknowledge that this might only reflect a small portion of the relevant political rationality. 
Political pressure can not only lead to obstruction of gathering reliable and objective 
information by bureaucrats (Van Nispen 1993: 132-141), but can also result in the use of PI 
for cynical purposes where cherry-picking of successes replaces objective reporting 
(Diamond 2005: 15).  
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Unexpected results often associated with performance measurement and reporting are 
perverse effects, especially when financial rewards are directly at stake. In these cases the 
organizations complied with performance targets in ways that actually damaged the interest 
of their clients. This is illustrated by a multitude of cases worldwide that vary from selective 
presentation of results to data manipulation and fraught. A recent example was provided by 
the U.S. Department for Veteran Affairs, where a scandal was uncovered in 2014 that 
included data manipulation. In this painful case records were manipulated to keep patients 
off the official waiting list to meet performance targets of timely treatment. This resulted in 
dozens of veterans dying while waiting for medical treatment.  Ironically a comparable case 
of manipulation of hospital waiting lists was uncovered over a decade earlier regarding 
performance targets of the British National Health Service (Smith 1995: 90-92).  Another 
common unexpected result of PB goal displacement, meaning that measurable targets get a 
disproportionate amount of attention and resources. This gives quite another meaning to 
Peter Drucker’s1 popular NPM mantra ‘What gets measured gets done’. 
 
Regarding the relevance of PI use for budgeting, once it finds its way in critical performance 
assessments, there is some additional reason for discouragement.  According to the ‘Law of 
Policy Accumulation formulated by In’t Veld, policy makers tend to respond in the same way 
regardless an instrument’s effectiveness or ineffectiveness, namely by calling for more of the 
same (In ‘t Veld 1998: 153-161). In budgetary terms this means more funding for the same 
policy instruments even if they appear flawed. 
 
The previous paragraphs included many possible misconceptions underlying PB, and other 
reasons why reforms would be prone to failure. Paradoxically some of these reasons exactly 
reflect the reasons why, proponents claim, PB should be adopted in the first place. 
Summarizing the case against PB, four arguments appear as being central: 
x Politicians understandably prefer to express policies in loosely formulated goals 
x Policy success is too difficult to measure by a comprehensive set of indicators 
x Politicians and public sector managers are not interested in performance data 
x The implications that measured performance should have on funding levels remain 
unclear 
 
1.4 Assessing PB results 
Given the rather fundamental critique on PB in the previous section, it may not be surprising 
that, despite its intuitive appeal and widespread adoption, putting performance budgeting it 
into practice has proved challenging. While the budget provides a unique crosscutting 
mechanism to collect performance information, Schick notes that with few exceptions, 
performance budgeting has not become the government’s budget process (Schick 2014: 9) 
Rather, for most countries it is an accessory to the budget, adorning spending decisions but 
                                                 
1 Peter Drucker was a popular management author in the 1990s and was much quoted by NPM reformers during 
that decade. 
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not fundamentally changing the way they are made (OECD/Von Trapp 2014: 3). More 
specifically, experience in OECD countries as well as academic research demonstrates that 
although PB initiatives have resulted in more transparent budget documentation (Curristine 
2005 in Redburn 2008: 216-17, GAO 2004b: 11-12, Van Nispen& Posseth 2006: 57).  
When it comes to improving effectiveness and efficiency, the successes of implementing a 
result oriented budgeting system seem to be absent or at least less visible. There is no clear 
evidence that supports the claim that performance budgeting has had a direct impact on 
fiscal discipline or reallocation of funding (OECD 2007: 67). As policital priorities not agency 
performance, drive macro budgetary choices (Behn 2003: 590), its effects on budgetary 
allocation by parliaments have generally been limited (Frisco and Stalebrink 2008:11, De 
Vries&Bestebreur 2010:237, OECD 2007: 67, De Jong et al 2013: 14-15).  
In the Netherlands, after the evaluation of VBTB, not the budget structure but policy 
evaluation was presented as the main source for performance improvement. In New 
Zealand, some of the much-praised pioneering reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have been 
quietly modified or even reversed during the last decade (Chapman& Duncan 2007:21). The 
New Zealand Auditor General Kevin Brady reported that the use of PI by internal users to 
improve public service effectiveness has been disappointing (Brady 2008: 17). With regard to 
the U.S. Program Assessment Rating Tool, arguably the most ambitious comprehensive 
effort to link performance and budgeting of recent times (see Text Box 1.3), the results 
present a mixed picture. When developing funding proposals, it seems that the President’s 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) did take performance scores into consideration to 
some extent (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006: 747-748). When looking at program funding as 
authorized by Congress however, the role of the performance ratings seemed to have 
evaporated quickly. Moreover the role PART examinations played in debates about funding 
in Congress seemed to be limited at best (Frisco and Stalebrink 2008:11)2.  
 
                                                 
2 A 2008 study by Frisco and Stalebrink indicated that reference to PART by the 109th Congress was minimal. 
About 6% of congressional hearing reports having a PART related content, 4.74% of 1,033 for the House and 
7.79% out of 655 for the Senate.  Moreover, only a third of the cases where House members mentioned PART, 
they did so in the context of specific program results against about half of the cases of recorded use by Senators. 
Combining these data one can to conclude that performance data generated by PART were considered by 
Congress about 2.5% of the time. 
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Textbox 1.3  Explanation of OMB’s Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART,2002-2008)  
 
An explanation for the limited success in engaging Congress in the PART process was the fact 
that Congressional staffs were unlikely to accept conclusions about a program’s performance 
without seeing the detailed evidence to support it, something OMB’s summaries do not 
provide. This was especially true in those cases where OMB’s conclusions didn’t match their 
own assumptions (Brass 2006: 49/50) 
 
Although one can have serious doubts about the attempts to ‘rationalize’ budgetary decision 
making using PB, some claim that performance management reforms can change managerial 
behavior and PI does get used, be it at a different place and time. Several authors have 
stressed that the benefits of PB reforms mostly occur at the agency levels and in the budget 
preparation and budget execution phase and not in the budget approval phase (Joyce 2003: 
36-37, Hammerschmid et al 2013: 5, OECD/Von Trapp 2014: 4). With regard to operational 
efficiency, occasional success are reported. For example in his testimony to the U.S. Senate 
Budget Committee on October 29th 2009, Paul Posner asserts: 
 
‘The performance test for management reforms is whether they produce sustainable 
results in decisions and program implementation. From this vantage point, the federal 
agencies in fact have demonstrated real progress in using PI to manage their ongoing 
activities. Whether it be framing new ways of thinking about goals, or assessing and 
overseeing employees, contractors or grantees, performance data have given the agencies 
powerful new tools to reach their goals. For instance, federal agencies are using outcome 
data to allocate their own staff to areas needing greatest attention. Grant making 
agencies are using performance outcomes achieved by grantees as a basis for providing 
bonus funding rewarding those state and local projects achieving notable results. Leading 
examples illustrate the payoff from performance management and budgeting for agency 
effectiveness and accountability (…professor Posner continues by singling out 4 examples 
of federal agency that made improvements using performance metrics)’  
 
Examples of performance informed innovations by public agencies provide credible 
testimony for a more positive appraisal of the contribution of PB to efficiency and 
effectiveness of government. 
PART was introduced as an element of the more elaborate Presidents’ Management 
Agenda and within 5 years the effectiveness of 973 federal programs, representing 96% 
of total budget expenditure was assessed as being either ‘effective’, ‘moderately 
effective’, ‘adequate’, and ‘inadequate’ or ‘results not demonstrated’. The grade a 
program received by the OMB was based on the answers to a questionnaire that was 
standardized for seven different categories of programs. The program’s grade was one 
of the factors contributing to the proposed funding level of a program in next year’s 
budget, alongside political priority and the overall fiscal outlook. The results of PART 
reviews were posted on www.expectmore.gov for anyone to consult.  
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Less visible and even harder to substantiate are claims made that PB enabled better control 
of government agencies and installed result oriented behavioral incentives within agencies 
(GAO 2004a: 10-12, IOFEZ 2004: 42, OECD 2007: 59-61, Posner 2009: 7-8, MinFin 2011: 24-
25, Van Dooren 2011: 429). In his testimony, Posner also refers to the reoccurring claim that 
PB has the potential to increase result orientation within government organizations. This has 
to do with providing a greater emphasis on tangible results (including setting of objectives, 
monitoring performance, planning) by government. In some cases it is reported that PB 
adoption provides a necessary spark for an agency to critically assess its results while in 
others it seems to remain merely a compliance exercise that lacks real impact. In some cases 
a formal system of performance measurement and management seems to smoothly 
complement the way an agency conducts its business while in others it is claimed that such a 
system erodes professional commitment and ethics and may even hamper agency 
performance (e.g. Robinson&Brumby 2005: 48). Perhaps surprisingly, some note that the 
assumption that the NPM-ideal type agency model3 enhances performance of public sector 
organizations remains largely untested as the claim of an increase in quality and efficiency of 
service delivery has been often assumed but seldom well documented (Verhoest et al 
2012:4). With regard to using PB for agency management this is even more surprising since 
PB has been promoted as a solution to smooth if not solve information asymmetry, the 
central problem in agency theory4 
 
An answer to the question ‘Has PB worked or not?’ can necessarily only be given with a 
particular aim of this reform in mind. Not surprisingly, given the multitude of promises and 
expectations associated with PB at the time, only a subtle answer can be provided to this 
question. Summarizing, the evidence supporting success can be considered promising when 
it comes to transparency. With regard to efficiency the evidence is generally discouraging 
(allocative) or anecdotal (operational and result orientation).  This is illustrated in Figure 1.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 This NPM-ideal type agency model is considered to be a model based on performance contracting between a 
principal (e.g. a ministry or agency headquarters) and a public agent (agency or agency unit). The principal 
exercises performance control and uses PI for budgetary purposes while the agent is managed in a 
performance driven manner. 
 
4 Principal-agent theory is concerned with ways to get an agent to behave in the interest of a principal. The 
central dilemma in principal agent theory is information asymmetry that occurs when the agent has an 
information advantage over his principal. The agent thus has the possibility to serve its own interests at the 
expense of those of the principal. According to public choice theorists the agent can be expected to behave this 
way, leading agencies to behave inefficiently. 
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Figure 1.3 Aims of PB where evidence regarding effects is scarce and inconclusive 
 
 
 
Why PB is here to stay  
Regardless of the sparse evidence of agency management and politicians actually integrating 
PI and their strategic and budgetary decisions, the idea of PB seems powerful enough to 
keep an irresistible appeal on both politicians and agency leadership. To elected officials PB 
can have significant symbolic value because the ideas (systematic performance driven 
policies) and intended results (transparency, efficiency) just sounds too good to disagree 
with. This does not mean that they will engage in the tough labor of assessing effectiveness 
and efficiency and engage in the difficult choices that result from this. Political support for 
PB reforms has therefore more than once been characterized as ‘a mile wide and inch deep’ 
(quote Phil Joyce from interview in 2007).  
 
To central budgeting officers and agency budget staff, PB can be a valuable tool because it 
adds legitimacy to the budgetary process and their power over or within an agency. 
Moreover, one of the reasons PB is advocated by so many in politics and public sector 
leadership may be that politicians and budget staff both assume the information could be 
valuable to the other party (Moynihan 2008: 67).  In addition, as noted in Section 1.2, in 
spite of the disappointment articulated over the effects of NPM reforms, there seems to be 
little support to decisively roll them back either. Nor did a new comprehensive set of far 
reaching reforms appear at the horizon to provide an alternative to those seeking to reform 
government. Given the bumper sticker appeal of PB and institutional factors supporting its 
promotion, it seems justified to expect the concept of PB to remain dominant on many 
reform agendas around the world for some time to come. The challenge for practitioners will 
be to use this reform potential in a way that takes into account the lessons learned from 
past experience.  
 
The quality of performance assessment and the formal incentive structure have been the 
traditional focus of practitioners and scholars alike when studying the success of PB 
attempts in government. Studies attempting to explain the lack of the success reforms have 
had so far, reveal that, apart from overcoming numerous technical challenges, success is 
determined by some major factors that, as far as we know, remain largely unaffected by the 
Intended 
results of PB 
reforms 
Increased 
transparency of 
government spending 
More effective 
allocation and 
management 
of resources 
Allocative efficiency gains 
Operational efficiency gains 
Internal result orientation 
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reforms themselves and seem to have been largely ignored by the performance based 
budget community. This will be the further focus of this study. 
 
1.5 Towards a research question 
The degree of success of PB reforms can be viewed in terms of general flaws in its design and 
methodology but can obviously not be viewed entirely separate from differences in 
implementation. Despite seemingly similar circumstances, at some places at the agency level 
de facto adoption of PB doctrine seems to occur in addition to only de jure adoption 
elsewhere. In other words, there apparently are circumstances at play that determine the 
success of PB reforms. Whether these circumstances are a common factor among PB 
successes, let alone if they have any predictive value for de facto PB adoption is currently 
unknown. The important point to make here is, that the cause-and-effect relation between 
successfully implementing a formal result oriented budgeting system and an organization’s 
general result orientation and its tendency to use PI, might be confused.  
 
Given the expectation that PB will remain dominant on reform agenda’s around the world, it 
makes sense to look critically at those cases that might fit criteria for success and under 
which circumstances these occurred. When talking about the conditions for success of 
performance budgeting, Allen Schick noted in 2003: 
 
‘How much influence performance budgeting has depends on who else is at the table-that 
is, the orientation of the politicians and managers who make budget….Performance 
budgeting can thrive only when it is embedded in managerial arrangements that make 
results paramount. This writer is not aware of a single sustained implementation of 
performance budgeting that was not accompanied and reinforced by transformations in 
public management that enhanced performance. Governments that do not manage for 
results do not budget for results, even if they install the outward trappings in performance 
budgeting….. 
….Rather than being the locomotive that drives government to change, performance 
budgeting is the caboose that confirms the transformations that have been made. To 
achieve true reform, it may be better to follow the parade than to lead it’.  Schick, A. 
(2003: 102). 
 
If Schick’s observation is correct that PB usually fails when not embedded in broader reforms 
that enhance performance, what then is ‘atypical’ in those cases where success of PB reform 
is claimed and can seemingly be substantiated where others failed? Are there circumstances 
that coincidentally led to this success? More importantly was PB indeed a helpful tool under 
these circumstances? If so more knowledge about these particular circumstances could help 
budget departments readdress their requirements concerning PB and attain a more effective 
approach. 
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If, to the contrary, the contribution of PB cannot be determined in the cases where success 
is claimed, it appears we are facing a classical fallacy of circular justification with regard to 
the success of PB: Attempts to increase consideration of PI by public managers are successful 
insofar these managers work for data driven organizations with a high result orientation. 
Instead of modifying decision making in the budgetary process, the reforms may have 
merely codified existing practices.  In other words:  does successful PB implementation 
create favorable circumstances for purposeful PI use? Or can successful PB implementation 
only result from favorable circumstances for purposeful PI use? 
 
When assuming codification as the most plausible explanation for PB success, additional 
doubts should be cast over the usefulness of investing in PB reforms for the purpose of 
better budget allocation. Expanding on Schick’s observation that governments that don’t 
manage for results will not budget for results, the question seems justified: is there added 
value in adopting PB reforms for a government organization that already manages for 
results? If not, why should one invest in these tools at all? After all, we already know that if 
the right circumstances are absent, PB reforms don’t deliver the intended results. 
Additionally, if the right circumstances are present, the results sought for by PB would be 
likely to occur regardless of having these reforms. In that case a claim to successful PB would 
be similar to a claim of having a machine that is able to create sunny weather, but so far has 
only had encouraging test results in Sicily or Southern California. The general question to 
start this research is therefore: 
 
Are result orientation of a government agency and operational efficiency gains achieved 
through PB? 
 
This central question will be refined in the next chapters after taking a closer look at the 
potential value of PI use form a budgetary point of view. To understand the dynamics of the 
internal organization, theory on performance management, management control, the 
learning organization and organizational sources of power will be of assistance. Depending 
on the case studied, some theoretical knowledge regarding a specific policy field may be 
required in order to understand the expected relationship between objectives, means and 
results. Chapter 2 will elaborate further on this question to determine what exactly will be 
the right focus of this study. Since investigating this questions requires studying alleged 
cases of PB success, a better definition is required of what exactly constitutes PB success. 
This requires a further exploration of PB theory and its often implicit assumptions.  
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CHAPTER 2  BUILDING A MICRO MODEL OF PB 
 
As a wise yet unknown man once said: A cynical person is an idealist who, at some point, 
made the mistake of turning his ideals into his expectations. This seems to apply in 
particular to many in the performance budgeting community given the enormous 
expectations and in many cases disappointing results of this reform. But aside from some 
understandable bitterness, a serious question remains on how serious the problem of 
disappointing results of performance budgeting (PB) actually is. Did PB fall victim to 
unrealistic expectations? Have these reforms failed altogether? Did they succeed just 
partly or temporarily? Or do they just require more patience?  In the previous chapter the 
aims and results of PB reforms were addressed at a macro level. In this chapter PB theory 
will be further analyzed to more closely define what PB success would look like in its most 
likely form. Surprisingly this is a rather unexplored activity as noticed by Moynihan: 
 
‘Governments have never been so awash in performance data, mostly because they are 
required to collect and report it. The wealth of performance data contrasts with the 
poverty of the theoretical and empirical justifications for performance-reporting 
requirements. We have poor theories of PI use, largely informed by a combination of 
common sense, some deeply felt assumptions of how government should operate, and a 
handful of success stories’. (Moynihan 2008: 5).  
 
In this chapter the potential value of producing and disseminating PI is critically appraised 
by looking at the budget process, the possible role of PI in budgetary and policy decisions 
and the contribution these decisions may have to efficiency and result orientation. Often 
neglected in PB theory, the link between measuring and reporting PI and achieving gains in 
effectiveness and efficiency rests on a number of often unarticulated assumptions that 
form key elements of PB theory. By studying these potential links and making them 
explicit, a micro-model of PB will be created. This chapter ends with a refined research 
question and the identification of additional relevant factors that need to be taken into 
account when answering it. 
 
2.1 The budget process and its actors 
Chapter 1 demonstrated that the evidence supporting success of PB can be considered 
promising when it comes to transparency. With regard to efficiency, the evidence is 
discouraging (allocative) or scarce and inconclusive (operational efficiency and result 
orientation). As it was concluded that PB reforms will remain dominant for some time to 
come, this research aims to address those aims of this reform that are most underexplored 
(see Figure 1.3). To study PB’s possible contribution to generating operational efficiency 
gains and increasing result orientation in public sector organizations, the processes and 
relationships vital to PB success are to be addressed. As PB reforms are intended to provide 
tools for making budgeting decisions, a closer look at the major actors in the budget process, 
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the budget process itself and the corresponding levels of interaction will be helpful in more 
closely identifying where to look for success.  
 
Actors  
A number of key players can be identified as being relevant in the implementation of PB 
system in national government systems. Not surprisingly, these same actors are the ones 
that play a dominant role in the budget process5: 
 
x The Legislature consisting of Congress or Parliament usually under a system of 
bicameralism. Within these institutions permanent committees have usually been 
established to oversee particular policy areas and ministries. Of these the budget 
committee is of particular relevance as are the committees on which a particular 
policy field to which a performance budget applies. The Legislature is supported by 
one or several staff bureaus that have an important role in the selection of 
information and its presentation to elected officials.  
 
x Executive Leadership consisting of the Presidency, the PM or the Council of Ministers. 
This is the place were conflicting interests within the Executive Power are resolved 
like for example budget claims or overlapping responsibilities. The Executive 
Leadership is also supported by one or several staff bureaus. If one of these is tasked 
with budgeting in particular, like OMB in the U.S, it is treated as a separate actor in 
the budget process here (see National Budget Office). 
 
x The Political Principal can be a minister/secretary or any other political figure with 
formal responsibility for a particular policy area. His or her office acts as principal to 
the public sector organization that is tasked with policy design and overseeing policy 
execution. The Political Principal’s office will have a unit that is tasked with budget 
and performance issues. Therefore this unit maintain relationships with both policy 
units and the agents that execute their policies.  
 
x The National Budget Office consisting of the entity within government responsible for 
the PB guidelines and regulation. This is usually the Ministry of Finance or a unit for 
administrative reform directly under the President or PM as is the case with OMB in 
the US. The Budget Office or its equivalent often acts a second principal for a agency 
as its regulations need to be met in addition to the objectives of the policy principal 
whose policy it has to execute.  
 
                                                 
5 The exact definitions of these actors obviously vary per individual country. The terms here are abstracted 
based on the majority of OECD nations with especially the federal US and the Netherlands in mind as 
representatives of two different systems within this frame.  
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x The Government Agency (or agency) can be any public funded organization 
responsible for executing government policy including policy directorates, (semi) 
independent agencies or institutions performing public tasks at arm’s length of 
government. The agency acts as a direct agent to Political Principal and often to the 
National Budget Office as well. Therefore the agency headquarters will maintain a 
performance dialogue with these entities. Within the agency, units are tasked with 
the administrative rules of the budget office (budgeting, reporting, performance 
monitoring) and units tasked with the agency’s primary processes associated with 
execution of the principal’s agenda. In its turn the agency can act as an agent to 
other subordinate agencies or regional branches and be engaged in an internal 
performance dialogue with them.  
 
An agency’s budget department’s role in the budgeting process can be of a 
somewhat schizophrenic nature as it internally attempts to control spending and 
protect the interests of its principals while externally it may find itself acting as an 
advocate for increased spending on its organization. This can be justified by the 
counter-roles assigned to other players in the budgeting process as part of a system 
of checks and balances (Wildavsky 1992: 89). 
 
x An external auditor or evaluator can be tasked with assessing the performance of 
programs, sometimes linked to funding levels.    
 
As noted in Section 1.4, PB systems potentially increase the role of the budget office over 
policy and the involvement of policy units into budgeting. The role of the budget office as 
described here applies in particular to countries with more advanced PB systems that share 
a top-down system that is designed for comprehensive coverage of the entire budget. 
Examples are Canada, the US, the UK and the Netherlands. Top down PB reforms enable a 
more uniform and systematic approach and result in higher availability of information at the 
center of government and better coordination and monitoring whereas in bottom up 
systems individual agencies enjoy a greater degree of freedom in designing and executing 
their PB reforms. Problems associated with a top down approach are limited flexibility, 
bureaucracy and difficulty to gain support from agencies (OECD 2007: 33-34). For an agency, 
adoption of top-down PB reforms means that it has to deal with the reporting requirements 
of both its ‘regular’ agent (e.g. the spending ministry) and the ‘administrative’ principal (e.g. 
central budget office).  
 
The Budget process 
By linking expected (ex-ante) and measured (ex post) performance to budgeting, PB uses the 
budget cycle for performance planning and reporting. The logic behind integrating PI and 
budgeting is to attain an impact of demonstrated results on funding decisions instead of the 
historical input based approach that dominates government budgeting (e.g. Joyce 2003: 30-
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31, Breul&Moravitz 2007: 4-5, Posner&Fantone 2008: 92-93, OECD 2007:11) . As a 
consequence, performance planning will have to be squeezed into the timeframe of the 
budget cycle (usually a one year cycle). Because performance planning, especially with 
regard to policy outcomes often has a longer horizon than 1 year, this has proven to be 
problematic in many cases. To many in the PB community these problems should not be 
overstressed as long as performance reporting and evaluation is underdeveloped at many 
places in government anyway and PB can play a role in further strengthening this capacity 
and awareness.  
 
In Table 2.1 shows five subsequent phases in the budget process along with their key actors. 
For the federal US and the Netherlands the actors and the end product of the budget phase 
are specified. 
 
Table 2.1  Comparison steps in budget process US-NL (partly based on Joyce 2003: 32) 
Stage of Budget 
process   
(main actors) 
Key actors in  
US 
End Product 
US 
Key actors in 
NL 
End product NL 
Budget 
preparation I  
(Agency, Political 
Principal) 
Agency 
budget 
officers, 
agency 
subunits 
Budget  
request 
Ministry 
directorates/ 
subordinate 
agencies, 
budget office 
Ministry,  
Budget  
request 
Budget 
preparation II 
(Budget Office, 
Political Principal, 
Exec. Leadership) 
Agency head, 
agency 
budget 
office, OMB, 
President 
President’s 
budget 
Budget office 
Ministry, MoF, 
Council of 
Ministers 
Draft budget 
Budget approval 
(Political Principal, 
Exec. Leadership, 
Legislature) 
Agencies, 
congressional 
committees, 
President 
Budget 
resolution; 
Authorization 
bills; 
Appropriation 
bills 
(Presid. Veto?)  
MoF, Ministers 
(individually) 
Parliamentary 
commissions 
Approved  
budget 
Budget Execution 
(Agency, Budget 
Office, Political 
Principal) 
Agencies, 
OMB 
Administration 
of programs 
MoF and 
budget offices 
Ministries and 
Ministry 
Administration  
of programs 
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Generally PB systems are designed to affect all steps of the budget cycle and therefore are 
set to affect all players at least once a year. As PB attempts to integrate the policy cycle into 
the budget cycle (or vice versa), the moment where funds are allocated is envisioned the 
main linking pin between the two cycles. This can also be viewed as one of the important 
limitations of PB as the budget usually has a time horizon of just one year and is informed by 
past performance while the budget cycle has a longer time-span and focuses on long term 
outcome projections (Hatry 2008: 296-298) 
 
PB in the Budget Process 
When compared to the phases in the section on PB theory (Figure 1.2) the budget 
preparation phases and the budget approval phase correspond with the strategic planning 
and budgeting phases. The Budget execution phase matches the implementation phase 
while during the Audit and Evaluation phase, assessing performance takes place (although 
this does not take place in this phase exclusively). PB theory thus assumes that ideally, after 
a budget cycle is finished, the lessons from measured performance can be applied to the 
next round and therefore ought to play a role in the budget preparation and approval 
phases. Allocative (inter-program) efficiency gains are expected to occur as the budget 
accommodates shifting funds from ineffective programs to more effective ones. This places a 
heavy emphasis on the budget evaluation and budget approval phases (Redburn et al 2008: 
13, OECD 2007: 66-67).  
 
However, several authors suggest that successes with regard to actual use of PI and 
therefore the true potential for efficiency gains though PB, lies mainly at the level of the 
agency during the budget preparation and execution phases of the budget cycle (Joyce 2003: 
36-37, Hammerschmid et al 2013: 5, OECD 2014: 4). This corresponds with findings about 
the actual use of PI by managers for decision making purposes (OECD 2007: 52-53, Wang 
2000 as cited in Redburn 2008: 139 , GAO 2004a: 77, 123). Indeed the previous chapter 
showed disappointing results with regard to allocative efficiency gains at the macro level in 
the budget approval phase. The assumption that the NPM-ideal type agency model6 
                                                 
6 This NPM-ideal type agency model is considered to be a model based on performance contracting between a 
principal (often Ministry) and a public agent (often agency). The principal is exercises performance control and 
directorates/ 
agencies 
Budget 
Evaluation 
(Agency, Budget 
Office, Political 
Principal, external 
auditor/evaluator) 
Agencies 
evaluators 
and auditors 
(internal and 
external), 
OMB, GAO  
Audits and 
evaluations; 
recommen-
dations 
Internal 
Auditors 
Ministries, 
Central Court 
of Audit, MoF, 
Parliament 
Ministerial Audit 
reports, Report 
of Central Court 
of Audit, 
recommen-
dations 
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enhances the performance of public sector organizations is largely untested (Verhoest et al 
2012: 4). However there is evidence that increased autonomy and result control can lead to 
more innovative behavior or an increased use of result oriented management tools within 
agencies. Both can be considered as preconditions for better performance. (Verhoest et al 
2010 in Verhoest at al 2011: 28). Based on these observations this study will primarily focus 
on operational efficiency gains and result orientation manifested during the budget 
preparation and execution phases within an agency or in the interaction with its political 
principal(s). This is illustrated in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Focus of research in terms of interaction of budget actors and budgetary 
phases (based on Joyce 2003: 32) 
** PB expected to have most likely impact on efficiency and result orientation 
  *PB possibly having an impact on efficiency and result orientation 
 
In Table 2.2 phases in the budget process are contrasted with the hierarchical levels of 
interaction that occur during this process. The two budget preparation phases from Table 
2.1 are integrated into one phase here since the difference between them was in the level of 
interaction. The four cells that are the primary focus of this study and the five that will have 
a secondary focus are marked with two or one star respectively.  
 
The evaluation phase can result in valuable information to be used subsequently in the 
budget preparation and execution phases. Although performance evaluation can be viewed 
as a condition for obtaining performance informed efficiency gains or result orientation, it 
provides by no means a guarantee that lessons find their way in measures. As Bob Behn 
noted, using PI to systematically evaluate effectiveness assumes the presence of a clear 
coherent mission, strategy and set of objectives combined with a rationalized program 
                                                 
used performance evaluation for budgetary purposes while the agent is managed in a performance driven 
manner. 
Budget phase→ 
Level of interaction↓ 
Budget 
preparation 
(I&II) 
Budget 
approval 
Budget 
execution 
Budget 
evaluation 
Intra Agency  
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structure. However in the reality of political life, public sector managers often have to work 
with conflicting policy objectives, inadequate resources and unreasonable timetables (Behn 
2003: 589). In addition many evaluation mechanisms in place in government exist separately 
from the budget cycle, attending to different frequencies. Nonetheless the results of these 
evaluation may or may not find their way in budgetary decision making. Therefore the 
budget evaluation phase will receive a secondary focus in this study.  
 
The interaction between the National Budget Office and the Political Principal may also 
influence decisions in the principal-agent relationship between Political Principal and agency 
as was demonstrated by the dialogue on program improvements OMB lead with 
departments and agencies regarding its PART reviews. However, many intra program 
reallocations will often be decided on within agencies or in the agreements between an 
agency and its Political Principal without any interference of the National Budget Office. This 
is why the interaction between the National Budget Office and the Political Principal will also 
receive a secondary focus in this study.  
 
The relevance of the interaction between the Legislature and the Government’s Executive 
Leadership for operational efficiency gains and result orientation within an agency is 
expected to be limited. This is due to the limited role of PI generated by PB systems during 
budgetary debates with the Legislature as demonstrated with PART (Frisco and Stalebrink 
2008: 11) and with performance budgets in the Netherlands (De Vries&Bestebreur 2010: 
237) as well as other OECD countries (Curristine 2005: 222). An exception may be the 
occurrence of an efficiency related incident regarding a Agency in the media with significant 
political spin-off.  
 
2.2 For what purpose PI is being used 
As mentioned in CH 1.1, actual use of PI generated by a PB system is a precondition for 
intended efficiency improvements to occur. The contribution of PI to inform management 
decisions within a agency is a vital link to PB theory and has been studied by several authors. 
Patricia de Lancer Julnes (De Lancer Julnes 2008: 58) points out that proponents of 
performance measurement traditionally define success in terms of instrumental use (holding 
someone accountable, make decisions about program budgets or personnel, expanding, 
cutting back or terminating programs). This often leads to the conclusion that performance 
measurement has failed. She shows a broader perspective on use of PI by identifying five 
different uses of knowledge from performance measurement (De Lancer Julnes 2008: 66-
70): 
x Reassurance: Government shows it is doing what it is supposed to do with taxpayer’s 
money (e.g.  reporting PI about cleans streets or safe neighborhoods) 
x Compliance: Agencies demonstrate that they comply with performance 
measurement regulations (e.g. schools report test results to receive funding) 
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x Program learning: Learning from results may lead to program changes or maybe just 
to a better informed dialogue. 
x Enlightenment: Externally, enlightenment can lead to mobilization and put an issue 
on the political agenda (e.g. awareness of waiting lines in public service). 
Internally, enlightenment can lead to more informed decisions and better educated 
stakeholders. This can generate new insights and challenge previously held 
perceptions. 
x Legitimization: PI can be used to rationalize, justify or validate current, past and 
future course of actions and decisions (e.g. justifying budget requests, or defending 
oneself towards critics) 
 
Looking at these uses of PI and the classification of potential contributions of PB mentioned 
earlier, the use of PI for the purposes of program learning and enlightenment seem to be 
relevant for both operational efficiency and internal result orientation. Reassurance seems 
to address the transparency aim of PB. Success of PB regarding transparency will not be the 
focus of this study as explained in CH 2.1.  
 
Using PI to legitimize existing positions like budget claims is a phenomenon easily recognized 
by practitioners. As this merely adds to existing dynamics, use of PI for legitimizing purposes 
is doubtful as a claim to success of PB when looking at the contributions PB reformers 
intended to make. It is however possible that performance data, intended to legitimize a 
position, helps generate conflicting data from others and thus becomes a dominant factor in 
an advocacy based dialogue with other stakeholders in the policy process. In this case 
legitimization could contribute to operational efficiency and internal result orientation 
through enlightenment. Nevertheless it does not seem likely that the existing dynamics will 
shift easily as a result of adding PI alone, especially when this information is framed to serve 
the interest of the party reporting it. Compliance with PB regulations, whether this happens 
because of financial incentives or safeguarding a reputation (naming and shaming) can, for 
the purpose of this study, not be counted as PB success either. Doing so would indeed 
regard PB reform as a self-legitimizing exercise. 
 
So the role of performance information, when expected to contribute to efficiency and 
result orientation, would foremost be to contribute to program learning or enlightenment. 
Drawing a parallel with common literature on learning organizations, the difference between 
using PI for program learning and for enlightenment resembles the difference made 
between single loop and double loop learning respectively. According to the classic work of 
Chris Argyris with regard to learning organizations, single loop learning involves the 
detection and correction of errors given a particular goal or plan. Double loop learning 
involves questioning the underlying reasons and motives behind the facts such as norms, 
values and objectives (Argyris 1994: 78-79). When studying the lessons the NL government 
learned from policy evaluation, Peter van der Knaap applied a similar difference between 
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corrective learning and fundamental learning, the latter adding to the existing underlying 
policy assumptions (Van der Knaap, 1997:57-58). 
 
The use of PI for these purposes may eventually result in decisions that fit the more 
traditional definitions of PB success like holding someone accountable, make decisions about 
program budgets or personnel, expanding, cutting back or terminating programs. This may 
occur at different levels of interaction. Following a slightly different classification of PI use, 
Moynihan arrives at a similar conclusion when talking about purposeful use of PI, meaning 
that public employees use data to improve program performance through goal-based 
learning that gives rise to efficiency improvements, better targeting of resources and more 
informed strategic decisions or by tying indicators to rewards/sanctions in contract 
arrangements (Moynihan 2009: 588). Subsequently these performance informed decisions 
are supposed to contribute to more efficiency. This is the next link in PB’s micro model.   
 
2.3 How PI is being used by an agency 
Disregarding the use of PI for other purposes than targeting efficiency and effectiveness 
improvement is an important distinction as it narrows down the search for successful PB 
implementation to the use of PI by ministries and agencies to actually increase effectiveness 
and efficiency.  When exploring this question in even more detail, purposeful use of PI can 
be associated with a set of specific types of PI use that are likely to eventually result in 
budgetary consequences. 
 
 In the previous sections it was stated that the use of PI for purposes of organizational 
learning and enlightenment can lead to a better educated dialogue and performance 
informed decisions. At the agency level, this is expected to be able to contribute to greater 
operational efficiency and result orientation, most notably in the budget preparation and 
execution phases. Just to get a more accurate picture of how PB, according to its 
proponents, exactly contributes to increased efficiency, this paragraph further analyses the 
role that PI is expected to fulfil in the process of budgetary and performance planning and 
monitoring within a agency and in the interaction with its principal(s). 
 
The potential for the use of PI in the different phases of the U.S. federal budget process was 
explored by Phil Joyce for the budget preparation phases, the agency can use PI to (Joyce 
2003: 37-42): 
- To justify budget requests 
- To strategically re-allocate internal resources  
- To determine productivity of different agency components 
- To determine overlapping services 
- To decide on outsourcing decisions (make or buy) 
 
During the budget execution phase the agency can use PI to (Joyce 2003: 51-59): 
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- Understand the impact of external events on agency performance goals 
- Allocate funds internally 
- Allocate funds to third parties 
- Monitor cost and performance 
- Motivate staff to act consistent with agency goals 
 
The evaluation and audit phase, when including performance evaluation, can be expected to 
mainly contribute to decision making in an indirect way. This is because favorable conditions 
for direct are usually absent in this phase. These favorable conditions (that are usually 
absent) can be summed up as: clear and unambiguous results that are relevant to an issue 
up for decision and are understood by decision makers who are interested (Weiss& 
Bucuvalas 1980 as quoted in Van Nispen 1993:37). 
 
When asking government personnel what they use PI for, those who claim to do so mention 
a wide variety of things. When studying of the use of PI by U.S. counties, Wang found that 
the majority of counties that used performance measurement, used the results for (Wang 
2000 as quoted in Redburn 2008: 139): 
x Preparing departmental requests (78%); 
x Identifying service problems and evaluation (63%) and 
x Analyzing funding levels (58%)  
 
According to a 2003 GAO survey of U.S. federal managers the following management 
activities were mentioned as primarily involving the use of PI (GAO 2004a: 77)7: 
a) Allocating resources (60%) 
b) Setting individual job expectations for staff (60%) 
c) Rewarding staff (60%) 
d) Setting program priorities (59%) 
e) Setting new, or revising performance measures (58%) 
f) Adopting new program approaches or changing work processes (56%) 
g) Refining program performance measures (51%) 
h) Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external organizations 
(49%) 
i) Developing and managing contracts (41%) 
Comparable results were found at the U.S. state level by Melkers & Willoughby with the 
activities of reporting and strategic planning as notable additions to the uses mentioned so 
far (Melkers & Willoughby 2004 in Breul & Moravitz: 88). 
 
                                                 
7 The % mentioned present the 2003 percentages of those managers who indicated to use PI to a great or very 
great extent 
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A few conclusions can be drawn when looking at the ways in which PI is supposed to be used 
by an agency according to PB theory, it’s use in reality and relating this to the purposes for 
which the information is used. Firstly, the potential use of PI in ways that, theoretically, can 
contribute to efficiency and result orientation are broadly similar to the actual use. At least 
according to responses obtained from surveying agency staff. This suggests that in cases 
where PI is used by an agency, PB theory might indeed work as envisioned. This does not tell 
anything about whether the intended results, namely efficiency gains and increased result 
orientation, actually do occur. Besides, the fact remains that when PI does not get used, PB 
still cannot be expected to work. It is unclear how widespread the use or PI in these studies 
is and if so, how intensely or frequently. Practitioners can usually, without too much effort, 
name plenty of cases where this has not been the case.  
 
Secondly, to result in operational efficiency gains and increased internal result orientation, PI 
is used for the purposes of program learning and enlightenment. A number of activities that 
involve PI use seem to contribute in an indirect way at best to the end-goals of operational 
efficiency and result orientation. Justifying budget requests in the budget preparation phase 
refers to legitimization purpose of PI use. Preparing requests does not add to the purposes 
of PB either, except when it includes efficiency gains resulting from the other activities 
mentioned. Setting, revising or refining performance measures can be about program 
learning but in a rather instrumental way. When it is more about improving the PB system 
itself than about its intended results, namely program efficiency, it may actually refer more 
to the compliance purpose of PI use. As noted previously, having better or more 
performance measures can hardly be a goal at itself. The use of PI for reporting activities to 
increase accountability purposes can be associated with reassurance or compliance purposes 
more than with direct program learning. However reporting PI (or having to report it) may 
indirectly contribute to enlightenment either within an agency (internal accountability) or up 
the agency’s accountability chain (external accountability). Finally, using PI for the activity of 
strategic planning, just like preparing a budget request, may or may not contain lessons that 
improve efficiency from the other activities mentioned.  
 
In summary, four categories of activities stand out in which the use of PI can be considered 
as purposeful PI use by an agency and is likely to contribute to operational efficiency or 
internal result orientation:  
 
1. Major policy shifts and paradigm changes in public opinion can occur because of the 
insights PI can offer to vital stakeholders. Internal or external policy specialists can 
use PI to highlight successes or failure. If they use this information to convince other 
stakeholders, this can be a driver of major policy shifts. Replacing or adjusting 
unsuccessful policy measures is expected to eventually lead to better overall program 
performance and efficiency.  
The intention of the use of PI in this case is enlightenment. 
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Agency activities using PI that can contribute to this are: 
x Performance reporting for external accountability 
x Setting program priorities 
x Strategically reallocate internal resources 
x Understand the impact of external events on agency 
performance goals 
  
2. PI can be a major tool in managing principal-agent relationships. Performance 
reporting is crucial as a solution to the principal’s information asymmetry problems 
as he can get an accurate picture of the relative performance of an agency and the 
costs associated with its service delivery. This way a principal can negotiate better 
deals with its agent(s) leading to more efficient service delivery. The intention of the 
use of PI in this case is enlightenment as well as program learning. Agency activities 
using PI that can contribute to this are: 
x Deciding on outsourcing decisions 
x Developing and managing contracts  
x Monitor cost and performance and contract management 
x Allocate funds to third parties 
 
3. Availability of PI increases an organization’s learning capacity as it provides the 
results of previous efforts. Evaluative analysis of results and internal dialogue about 
relevant lessons through learning forums can be expected to lead to better decisions 
and thus promote efficiency. The intention of the use of PI in this case is program 
learning. 
x Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external organizations 
x Analyzing productivity and funding levels  
x Allocating internal funds 
x Identifying service problems and changing work processes 
x Adopting new program approaches following evaluation  
 
4. PI can be used to motivate staff to act in accordance with the goals of the agency 
targets and the principal’s strategic goals. This can be done by adopting formal 
performance management incentives but even without these being in place, 
repeated communication of vital results by agency leadership may have an impact. 
Increased result orientation of an agency is intended to indirectly support 
enlightenment and program learning as it is meant to unlock the organization’s 
learning potential. Agency activities using PI that can contribute to this are: 
x Motivate staff to act consistent with agency goals 
x Setting individual job expectations for staff 
x Rewarding staff 
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The expected contribution of PB to efficiency and result orientation through purposeful PI 
use is summarized in tables 2.3 and 2.4. Combined they form a micro model of PB. 
 
Table 2.3  Micro model of PB: Where to look for success 
 
Purposeful use of PI can be associated with a set of specific types of PI use that are likely to 
eventually result in budgetary consequences as illustrated in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4  Micro model of PB: purposeful PI use with potential impact on efficiency and 
effectiveness (based on  GAO 2004b, Joyce 2003, Melkers & Willoughby 2004, 
Moynihan 2008). 
Specific type of PI use for program learning and enlightenment… …may result in 
effectiveness and 
efficiency gains through: 
- Performance reporting for external accountability 
- Setting program priorities 
- Strategically reallocate internal resources 
- Understand the impact of external events on performance 
goals 
Goal alignment or 
adapting policy 
assumptions  
- Deciding on outsourcing decisions 
- Developing and managing contracts  
- Monitor cost and performance and contract management 
- Allocate funds to third parties 
Better resource 
management 
- Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external 
organizations 
- Analyzing productivity and funding levels  
- Allocating internal funds 
- Identifying service problems and changing work processes 
- Adopting new program approaches following evaluation 
Taking corrective 
actions  
PB is expected to lead to 
more 
Manifested during  In the interaction levels 
 
 Operational efficiency  
 Internal result 
orientation  
 
 The Budget 
preparation phase  
 Budget execution 
phase   
 
+ possibly: 
 Budget Evaluation 
phase (indirectly) 
 
 Intra agency 
 Agency vs. Political 
Principal 
 
+ possibly: 
 Political Principal 
  vs. National Budget    
Office 
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- Motivate staff to act consistent with government agency goals 
- Setting individual job expectations for staff 
- Rewarding staff 
Goal orientation and 
motivating staff  
 
Successful PB implementation at the agency level can be expected to show similarities with 
the model presented above. Now that a micro model of PB implementation has been 
defined, we know what successful PB would look like and where to look for success. 
Whether these dynamics actually occur is dependent upon a lot of factors that most PB 
theorists seem to have left out of their analysis. In the final part of this chapter, institutional 
and behavioral insights will be brought into the picture as a possible explanation for the use 
of PI to promote efficiency. First however we return to the research question introduced in 
Chapter 1.4 that can be further refinement using the model introduced here. 
 
2.4 Refining the research question 
In the previous sections PB theory with regard to its intended result of increasing 
operational efficiency and internal result orientation was refined to include more precise 
expectations of what successful PB would look like and where to look for it. We now know in 
which phases of the budget cycle and at what levels of interaction between its actors 
performance budgeting is most likely to deliver results. We also have a clearer 
understanding in which ways performance information, generated in a PB system, can be 
expected to contribute to more operational efficiency and more internal result orientation. 
Having gained more of a micro-perspective on PB theory, Schick’s observation that 
‘governments that don’t manage for results will not budget for results’ (see CH 1.4) deserves 
a second look (Schick 2003: 102). 
 
If it is true what Schick says, introduction of PB by an agency or its principal(s) would only 
deliver results if a number of other, independent factors, are present. As a consequence, PB 
successes that are reported from an agency or their principal(s) would, according to Schick, 
only have been made possible because ‘managerial arrangements that make results 
paramount’ were already in place or because PB was accompanied by other ‘transformations 
in public management that enhanced performance’ (Schick 2003:102). The fact that internal 
result-orientation of an agency has itself, also been reported as a consequence of adopting a 
PB system, points at a possible fallacy of circular justification regarding successful PB 
adoption:  Does successful PB implementation create favorable circumstances for purposeful 
PI use? Or can successful PB implementation only result from favorable circumstances for 
purposeful PI use? We therefore ended Chapter 1 with the general research question: 
 
Are result orientation of a government agency and operational efficiency gains achieved 
through PB? 
 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
38 
 
Finding an answer to this question can only proceed after the favorable circumstances for 
result orientation are identified and defined. The question what managerial arrangements 
and transformations are regarded necessary for PB to work remains undisclosed by Schick.  
He does refer however to the politicians and managers as actors in the budgetary process 
relevant factors to the results of PB. The focus of Schick on arrangements that result from 
transformations and reforms is somewhat surprising. An underlying fundamental question is 
whether centrally guided reform initiatives such as PB did make a lasting contribution to 
government agencies being transparent about their goals, measuring their results and using 
these results to learn and improve. While some early evaluations suggest that this was the 
case, recent studies increasingly assert this view and hint at a more complex reality (Dull 
2009b: 2-3, Moynihan& Lavertu 2012: 598, Posner& Mahler 2012: 3) as this quote 
illustrates: 
 
‘Top-down reforms always struggle, but they have the best opportunities for success when 
they amplify or encourage preexisting patterns of behavior. The same is likely to be true of 
the success of performance management routines. In organizations in which there is 
already some interest in performance management, reforms to encourage use will be 
more likely to succeed because they will face little opposition or link to preexisting 
operational routines (Moynihan& Lavertu 2012: 601) 
 
The importance of a fit between new routines of PI use called for by PB reforms and existing 
organizational routines, should make an institutional perspective an inevitable part of any 
exploration of purposeful PI use.  Building on the understanding of the micro model of PB 
and where to look for PB successes, the central research question can be further refined to 
this central research question: 
 
How do underlying cultural and historical factors explain successful PB in government 
agencies? 
 
To answer this question several sub questions have to be answered regarding a case of 
successful PB implementation in the relationship between an agency and its political 
principal:  
 
Sub question 1: What is considered a case of successful PB in a government agency? 
 
Since we are seeking to identify purposeful use of PI from a PB system in an a principal-
agency setting we can identify between use of PI in the interaction between the political 
principal and the agency and internal use of PI within an agency. Summarizing the 
specifications made so far, a ‘textbook example’ of PB implementation in line with the 
assumptions of NPM and agency theory is assumed combine four characteristics:  
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x PI is used in the budgetary process between agency and principal in addition to 
traditional budgeting 
x An intense performance dialogue exists between agency and principal  
x The agency has an ambitious and sophisticated PB system in place  
x PI from this system used internally by the agency for budgeting and performance 
management  
 
If these four characteristics are found to be present in a public sector agency and the 
interaction with its principal, PI is indeed used for budgetary purposes and may be expected 
to positively influence effectiveness and efficiency alongside micro model of PB introduced 
in Section 2.3. Before being able to test and compare these characteristics in real life cases, 
they will be further developed into more specific into indicators in Chapter 4. 
 
Sub question 2: What are considered relevant underlying historical and cultural factors?   
Answering this question will require a further analysis into institutional characteristics that 
are likely to be autonomous from PB implementation. Chapter 3 and 4 will identify relevant 
factors that may offer an explanation for purposeful PI use. 
 
Sub question 3: Does the presence of these cultural and historical factors offer a convincing 
alternative explanation for successful PB? 
 
This can only be answered if the results from sub questions 2 and 3 are tested empirically. In 
case of a positive answer there should be serious doubts about the added value of 
introducing a PB system because in those cases where PB did work, PI was likely to be used 
for planning and budgeting anyway. If not, introducing a PB system may have contributed to 
integrate PI into planning and budgeting and that way contributed to efficiency and result 
orientation. The approach to address these cases and the answer the general questions will 
take some further refinement and will be disclosed in Chapter 4.  After the results of the 
empirical part of this research are presented (Chapter 5-8), an answer can be provided to 
the central research question. 
 
As for now, the relevant underlying cultural and historical factors remain unidentified. To 
answer this refined research question, the conditions that influence the use of performance 
information, have to exist separately from adoption of the PB system itself. The quest for 
assessing the results of PB so far has revealed that the genuine success of reforms in public 
budgeting may quite heavily rely on ‘soft’ behavioral factors like leadership, culture and 
other autonomous factors that may be entirely out of the control of budget departments, 
their staff and their political leaders. The influence of these factors on the use of PI and 
therefore the success of PB will be addressed in this chapter’s last paragraph.  
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2.5 Explaining the use of PI differently 
The actual use of PI by an agency and its principal(s) for the purpose of enlightenment and 
program learning proved vital for PB to work according to theory as was demonstrated 
earlier in this chapter. It is by no means self-evident that performance information, once it is 
generated and disseminated, will be used in accordance with this refined PB assumption. 
The problems encountered with the use of PI by public sector organizations are summed up 
well by Moynihan in his Interactive Dialogue Model of PI Use (Moynihan 2008: 102). This 
model challenges PB theory at the micro level. The model’s central assumptions are: 
 
1. PI is not comprehensive,  
2. PI is ambiguous  
3. PI is subjective 
4. Production of PI does not guarantee use 
5. Institutional affiliation and individual beliefs will affect selection, perception, and 
presentation of PI 
6. The context of dialogue will affect the ability to use PI to develop solutions 
 
The first three assumptions reflect the idea that PI usually consists of one or more indicators 
of actual performance and as such never reflect a whole universal truth about performance, 
the existence of which can obviously be debated in the first place. For example, successful 
liberalization of a taxi industry in the Netherlands can be reflected by a number of conflicting 
indicators like prices for cab-rides, profit margins for taxi-entrepreneurs, pay for taxi-drivers, 
customer satisfaction, availability of taxis etcetera, depending on one’s perspective. The first 
three assumptions partly mirror the ‘misassumptions’ of PB as by Radin (Radin 2006 see CH 
1.2). The importance of these notions lies in the fact that once you accept that PI is not 
comprehensive, ambiguous and subjective, the rational basis for a performance informed 
dialogue between actors in the budget process, vital to PB theory, is largely gone. What 
remains is a dialogue in which behavioral and institutional factors play a large role and are 
even likely to dominate.  
 
The fourth assumption deals with problems regarding the use of performance data. 
Moynihan also notes that when PI is used, it is not always used in the way PB reforms 
envisioned it to be used (Moynihan 2008: 95 ) Since we focus on how PB theoretically is 
supposed to lead to efficiency gains, we disregarded the use for purposes of reassurance, 
compliance and legitimization. So, not only does production of PI not guarantee use, use 
itself may or may not contribute to efficiency depending on the purpose of use. Moynihan’s 
first four points are largely covered by the previous sections with regard to the potential 
contribution of PI to efficiency.  
 
Taking the fifth assumption a bit further, the consequences of institutional affiliation and 
individual beliefs may well exceed the selection, perception and presentation of PI It is not 
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hard to imagine that these factors will offer explanations of whether the efficiency gains 
according to PB theory do occur or not. It is true that PI is the central driver of the process 
that, according to PB theory, will result in efficiency gains. However it is possible to assume 
that selection, perception and presentation of PI, even if this is geared towards 
enlightenment or program learning, still does not result in the efficiency gains that PB theory 
expects. This is so because the conditions for internal learning may reflect only a small part 
of actual organizational behavior. There may be other organizational factors that may form 
impediments to actually harvesting on the performance informed lessons. 
 
The context of dialogue presented in the sixth assumption may itself be heavily influenced 
by institutional affiliation and individual beliefs as well. The way the organizational dialogue 
is conducted between those who measure performance and those who account for the 
performance measured can prove an obstacle to applying the lessons to be learned. A 
dialogue that involves a few of parties that maintain a close relationship offers the best 
guarantees for efficient exchange of information because much information can remain 
implicit because they are more homogeneous in several aspects (Moynihan 2008:19). PB can 
be viewed as an attempt to break open the policy dialogue to be able to involve others (the 
financial department, parliament) by making many implicit assumptions explicit. If a 
perceived outsider is forcing his insights into a policy dialogue, defensive routines are likely 
to occur on the part of the agency. This can result in a ritual dialogue in which referral is 
made primarily to a formal positions and documents rather than actual policy content (Van 
der Knaap 1997: 260-262).  
 
Attention to the influence of institutions on political and social outcomes is known as neo 
institutionalism and can be viewed as a wider trend of applying social theory to economic 
rationalist assumptions. What Moynihan expresses in his model is in fact an institutionalist 
critique on performance budgeting, whose very roots can itself be traced back to new 
institutionalism. Because the institutional context is a likely factor that could explain why PB 
does or does not result in the intended effects highlighted here, the next chapter will turn to 
neo-institutionalism and some of its schools of thought. In the next section neo 
institutionalism and the principal agency problem will be explored as they, in particularly 
bear relevance to the theoretical core for this research.  
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CHAPTER 3  AN INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
In 2010 a Chinese newspaper reported about the practice of publicly humiliating criminal 
offenders in the provinces of Hunan and Guangdong. This humiliation consists of parading 
criminals through the streets in prison outfits with signs around their neck explaining their 
crimes (be it theft, murder or prostitution). Large amounts of people, including the 
convict’s children, are forced to watch these parades and TV stations and newspapers are 
obliged to report on them. Although outlawed by Beijing, local politicians, media and law 
enforcement officials continue to support public humiliation campaigns. One party 
spokesman from the city of Loudi defied critics by explaining: this method may not be 
humane but it works well as deterrence and demonstrates results. Therefore this method is 
correct (Source: Article p.7 NRC next Aug 18th 2010). The debate about whether behaviour 
is shaped by following rules about what is considered appropriate or by simply rewarding 
what works well is an institutional one that divides many public policy issues. In this 
chapter these different approaches are explored and applied to the phenomenon of PB 
and its ability to shape and control agency behaviour. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that attempts of governments worldwide to structurally integrate 
their budgets with performance planning and reporting has, so far, not brought all of the 
improvements that were envisioned by many reformers. As explained in Chapter 2, a 
multitude of promises and expectations was communicated at the start of Performance 
budgeting (PB) reforms. Of the different criteria for success two stand out as having rather 
inconclusive evidence and are therefore in particular deserve further exploration. These are 
the claims of PB contributing to efficiency gains from operational allocation and increased 
internal result orientation. Evidence suggests this is most likely to appear during the budget 
preparation and budget execution phases. In order for PB theory to work during these 
budget phases as envisioned, PI is expected to be used in the principal-agent relationship for 
purposes of enlightenment and program learning.  
 
The question whether the dynamics to support the working of PB this way are present, is 
something that most PB theorists seem to have left out of their analysis. According to 
Moynihan’s Interactive Model of PI Use, these dynamics are largely shaped by institutional 
affiliation and individual beliefs as well as the context of the dialogue (Moynihan 2008: 102-
113). In line with Moynihan’s neo-institutional critique on PB theory, some relevant 
theoretical background will be explored to enrich the understanding of the dynamics 
underlying organizational behavior. These institutional insights will later be applied to 
assumptions regarding PI use.  
 
The linking of theoretical concepts treated in this chapter is schematically displayed in Figure 
3.1. Reading the chapter is probably necessary to make this figure make more sense. It does 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
43 
 
reveal however that PB’s assumptions towards PI use are associated with one neo-
institutionalist school of thought whereas the other two schools might offer alternative 
explanations for (a lack of) PI use. 
 
Figure 3.1 Linking of Theoretical concepts  
* IMPIU: Interactive Model of PI Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 The case of ‘old’ institutionalism: organizations matter 
Institutionalism can be traced back to the 18th and 19th century as some of its key notions 
were already discussed by classical philosophers in those days. For example, Rousseau 
stressed the difference between the public interest and the aggregation of individual 
interests and De Tocqueville saw in local political institutions an antidote for despotism 
(Immergut, 1998: 8-17).   
‘Old’ 
Institutionalism 
Neo 
Institutionalism 
Behavioralism 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Calculus 
approach 
Principal-Agent 
dilemma 
Conflicting 
goals 
Infor-
mation 
Competition 
Monitoring 
Incentives 
PB 
 
IMPIU* 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Asymmetries of 
Power 
Path dependency 
Alternative 
explanations 
PB Success? 
Cultural  
Appropriateness 
Cognitive frames 
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An institutional approach in British or American studies of the 20th century usually refers to 
investigating the complex impact of political systems on certain outcomes not commonly 
associated with these outcomes. The emphasis on these studies was more on description 
and normative evaluation and less on explanation or theory building. Insofar ‘old 
institutionalism’ turns to explaining phenomena; this tends to be done by focusing on formal 
rules of institutions (Bell 2002: 2, 13). An institution in these studies is an institutional 
arrangement such as for example a parliamentary or presidential system of government. 
Often institutions can also refer to the actual organizations that result from these 
arrangements. Old institutionalism is not dead as describing the impact of formal 
institutional arrangements can still shed some welcome new light on long standing 
problems. With regard to budgeting, contemporary examples of studying the impact of 
institutions in the classical sense are: studying the impact of legislatures on budgeting by 
Paul Posner and Chung-Keun Park (Posner&Park 2008: 2-5), the relationship between 
country’s governing situation and budget deficit reduction (Allen Schick 1993: 187-235, 
edited by Weaver & Rockman) or possible bias of a Republican Presidency on the outcome of 
performance measurement (Gilmour & Lewis 2006: 746).  
 
In their 1993 work Do Institutions Matter? – Government Capabilities in the United States 
and Abroad, Weaver and Rockman identify three tiers that explain differences in 
government capabilities: 
First Tier institutions: Presidential or parliamentary system. This affects the decision making 
system with regard to the level of party discipline, the recruitment of executives and the 
degree of centralization of power and accountability. 
Second Tier Institutions: Regime type or Government type. This affects the decision making 
process with regard to a number of decision making moments (veto points), the stability and 
cohesion of the government elites, their autonomy form electoral and constituency 
pressures and the level of influence of interest groups. 
Third Tier Institutions: To this ‘leftover category’ belong broad framework political 
institutions such as judicial review, federalism and bureaucratic autonomy and secondary 
institutional characteristics like voting rules and bicameralism. Besides these ‘classical’ 
institutional factors, Weaver and Rockman also include a number of other factors in their 
third tier category. Political conditions, policymaker’s goals, socioeconomic and demographic 
conditions and past policy choices reflect ‘an even broader array of non-institutional 
influences on capabilities’ (Weaver & Rockman, 1993: 7-37). After evaluating 10 cases, they 
conclude that although institutions do affect government capabilities, their effects are 
contingent (Weaver and Rockman 1993: 446).   
 
3.3 Perspectives in the institutional debate 
Although Weaver and Rockman recognize there is a ‘broader array of influences’ relevant to 
government capabilities, they deem these as non-institutional. This is a view not shared by 
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all institutionalist authors. Expanding the definition of an institution beyond the formal 
arrangement or organization, an institution can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of 
practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific 
situations. That way, institutions socialize individuals by legitimizing behavior associated 
with roles to be enacted or sanctioning behavior that differs from what is considered 
appropriate. Practices and rules are also embedded in resources and the principles of their 
allocation (March&Olsen 1998: 984). A more simple definition of institutions was given by 
William Ryker: rules about behavior, especially about making decisions (Ryker as cited in 
Ostrom 1986:1). Institutionalization refers to the emergence of institutions and individual 
behaviors with them. An institutional approach is one that emphasizes the role of 
institutions and institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an 
organization, social order or society (March&Olsen 1998: 984). 
 
At the heart of the institutional debate is a central notion on the drivers of human behavior: 
Are actions driven by expectations of consequences, also referred to as the ‘logic of 
consequence’ or are actions driven by rules that come with a particular role or identity, also 
referred to as ‘logic of appropriateness’? The answer to this question may affect one’s view 
on how political life is organized, to a considerable extent (March&Olsen 1998: 952).  
 
From a ‘logic of consequence’ viewpoint, organization of political life is a result of actions by 
rational self-maximizing actors with conflicting interests and varying resources that 
negotiate a set of contracts. These actions are consequence based and are of an 
instrumental nature. Although theories of bounded rationality have modified this 
perspective somewhat, the central notion that behavior is primarily driven by expected 
consequences that will maximize one’s benefits is left untouched (March&Olsen 1998: 950). 
 
From a ‘logic of appropriateness’ point of view, political life is a result of rules that are 
socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted. These actions are rule based 
and reflect a perceived identity of the actor. The central notion here is that people are role 
players and rule followers that will act out of duty or social pressure (March&Olsen 1998: 
952).  Behavior is therefore primarily driven by what people feel is appropriate behavior.  
 
These two logics are not mutually exclusive. Most actions are motivated by elements of both 
logics as decision makers tend to follow rules and calculate consequences at the same time 
(March & Olsen 1998: 949-954). A decision that makes sense from both logics may be more 
likely to be taken and implemented. This would imply that strategies based on maximizing 
benefits will be more successful when these strategies are considered appropriate by those 
involved. Vice versa, strategies that fit institutional rules and expectations may be more 
successful when individual benefits can be expected as well.   
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About the interaction between the two logics with other principles, several classifications 
have been suggested. March & Olsen refer to the issue of historical efficiency as another 
debate that divides institutionalism. At the one hand there are instrumentalists who view 
history as efficient because it rewards those who successfully compete for survival. Players 
are set to reach predetermined optimal equilibriums regardless of their specific 
characteristics other than preferences and resources (March & Olsen 1998: 954, March & 
Olsen 1984: 737). On the other hand there are those who view history as inefficient. They 
argue that pressure of survival is neither constant nor precise enough to influence outcomes 
and point out that an equilibrium may not exist or will never be reached. The latter can be 
the result of history responding more slowly than changes in the environment leading to 
new equilibria. Instead, the inefficient history perspectives stress an institution's origin, 
history, and internal dynamics as influencing eventual outcomes. (March & Olsen 1984: 737, 
March & Olsen 1998: 955). 
 
Combining these two institutionalist divides results in four perspectives on the dynamics of 
political order as shown in table 1. Studies in the functional rationality perspective assume 
calculating individuals striving for individual advantage. Preferences and interests are hardly 
affected by politics or institutions. Studies in the history dependent rationality perspective 
show that consequential history is unpredictable and path-dependent. History coevolves 
with its consequences. 
 
Following the logic of appropriateness, functional institutionalism stresses that rules, norms 
and identities shape behavior. Those rules however, are a product of an efficient history in 
which only those institutions survive, that are most fit to their environment. Just like 
functional institutionalism, history dependent institutionalism assumes that rules, norms and 
identities co-evolve with the worlds in which they act, but do so in an unpredictable, though 
path dependent way (March & Olsen 1998: 956-958).   
 
Table 3.1  The logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness coupled to two the 
notion of historical efficiency (Source: March&Olsen 1998: 957) 
 
 Efficient History Inefficient History 
Logic of consequence Functional rationality History- dependent rationality 
 
Logic of appropriateness Functional 
institutionalism 
History- dependent 
institutionalism 
 
 
When trying to place NPM and PB’s body of thought in this framework, PB with its 
underlying assumptions seem firmly embedded in the logic of consequence, PB shares 
elements of both functional rationality as well as history dependent rationality. As much as 
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PB theory assumes that individuals are motivated by individual advantage, it does not 
assume that the outcome of maximizing civil servants’ individual benefits has resulted in 
survival of the most efficient institutions. To the contrary PB and especially NPM are set to 
offer tools to steer the inefficient government inherited from history, towards more 
efficiency by using incentives that appeal to individual advantage. The PB analysis shares the 
conviction of history dependent rationality that the absence of a predictable pressure for 
survival has resulted in inefficient institutions. Installing competition among public service 
providers is therefore commonly presented as another approach to solve this problem in 
addition to PB. 
 
3.4 Neo institutionalism 
Neo institutionalism is neither a theory nor a consistent critique of one. It just argues that 
the organization of political life makes a difference (March & Olsen 1984: 747). As 
mentioned earlier, the roots of neo-institutionalist concepts can be traced as far back as the 
18th century. It can therefore be argued whether the term neo institutionalism is justified 
(Immergut, 1998: 8-17). Others stress that while new and old institutionalism are not 
identical, neo institutionalism blends elements of old institutional into non-institutionalist 
styles of recent theories of politics (March&Olsen 1984: 738). Where ‘old’ institutionalism 
primarily analyzed political institutions and their formal relationships, after World War II, the 
conviction grew that true political power is obtained by informal relationships within and 
beyond government institutions. The behavioral approach tried to fill this gap by explaining 
‘phenomena of government’ by observable behavior. Observed behavior was considered to 
indicate the true preferences of persons. Neo institutionalism8 is commonly viewed as a 
response to the political behavior movement in the 1950s and 1960s. The critique of neo 
institutionalism on behavioralism, centers around three main points (Immergut 1998:6-8) 
x Behavior does not reveal preferences 
x Preferences cannot be added up to become political preferences 
x Institutions are biased and collective decisions are normative 
 
Behavior does not reveal preferences9 
A vital notion that is implicit in both behavioralism and institutionalism is that an individual’s 
real preferences are hidden. To behavioralism, real preferences can be revealed by 
observing behavior (such as voting). The behavior displayed gives away the real preferences. 
Institutionalists add to this notion that individuals may opt for displaying other preferences 
than their real ones. This can be the case because people choose to satisfice rather than 
                                                 
8 Both the terms institutionalism and neo-institutionalism may at times be used in this section to illustrate 
institutionalist viewpoints used in the theoretical model. This is regarded tolerable as the borderline between 
both terms can be debated because of the continuity of elements shared by both. In addition the debate on the 
proper terminology is not felt to add sufficiently in illuminating the conflicting assumptions on agency behavior 
with regard to PI use.  
9 The difference between stated and revealed preferences is more widely acknowledged as a source of 
inaccurate research results in amongst others economics, marketing and sociology.  
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optimize for reasons of feasibility or because conflicting preferences force people to 
prioritize between them. There may be a difference between displayed and real preferences 
for exactly these reasons. Thus neo institutionalists argue that political behavior is 
insufficient for explaining phenomena of government for behavior can only be understood in 
the context of institutions in which it occurs. They claim that behavioralists fail to see that 
different circumstances may result in different displays of behavior by the same person, 
whose interests may not be clear in the first place. This is why exposure and analysis of 
discrepancies between potential interests and those expressed in political behavior are 
important to institutionalist theory. 
 
Preferences cannot be added up to become political preferences 
The behavioralist notion that individual behavior preferences or interests can be aggregated 
into political preferences is rejected by neo-institutionalists as far too problematic. Reasons 
for this are the complex nature of human interests themselves and the fact that the 
mechanisms for aggregations (e.g. discussion and negotiation) reshape the interests and 
preferences themselves. Because the summation of preferences is considered problematic, 
aggregated preferences cannot fully explain collective decisions. This notion is supported by 
theories of group behavior by public choice authors like Mancur Olson who demonstrated 
that large groups usually have no incentives for furthering collective interests (Olson 1965: 
48). 
 
Institutions are biased and collective decisions are normative 
Because political behavior and collective decisions are normative by nature, institutional 
configurations may privilege particular sets of interests and may need to be reformed.  
Recognizing a bias in institutions and their decision making processes suggests that political 
behavior is shaping decision making processes and their outcomes.  
 
The institutional critique on behavioralism stated that displayed behavior poorly reflects real 
political preferences and includes institutional biases that may or may not be known. This 
means observed behavior offers a poor explanation for the phenomena of government. 
Central to neo institutionalism are a number of phenomena that are easily observed but 
often hard to explain (March & Olsen 1984: 747). 
 
3.5 Different branches of neo-insitutionalism 
At least three branches of neo-institutionalism have been generally recognized. They all 
developed their own reaction to behavioralism by blending institutional approaches with 
existing political theories. These three schools are: Historical Institutionalism, Sociological (or 
Organizational Theory) institutionalism and Rational Choice institutionalism. The first two 
are shared jointly under Historical Institutionalism by some (Bell 2002: 5-8). Although 
Historical and Sociological Institutionalism share the logic of appropriateness, distinct 
differences can be made between both.  
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Out of criticism on the ability of these three branches of institutionalism to explain 
institutional change, discursive or constructivist institutionalism emerged in recent years as a 
fourth branch of institutionalism (Schmidt 2008: 304-305, Hay 2006: 61). Discursive 
institutionalism makes the point that political discourse is undervalued as an explanation for 
policy change or continuity. Contested by some for not moving substantially beyond 
historical institutionalism (Bell, 2011:1), this variant, as well as other forms of neo-
institutionalism that are distinguish by some authors, will be left out of the analysis in this 
chapter. The reason for this is that the seemingly continuous debate on the proper 
classification between neo institutional schools of thought goes beyond the deepening of 
the understanding of the interpretation of PI use sought after in this chapter. Therefore, the 
origin, characteristics and central concepts of only the three earlier mentioned variants will 
be shortly addressed.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
This branch of neo institutionalism originally sought to explain stability of outcomes of 
Congressional legislation given the instability of preferences and majorities. This was done 
by stating that institutions lower transaction costs for Congress and solve many of the 
collective action problems. Emphasis is placed on transaction costs, property rights and rent-
seeking. Although rationality is bounded, individual goals are achieved through institutions. 
Institutions are systems of rules and inducements. An especially relevant concept to rational 
choice institutionalism is agency theory. Organizational structure is explained by the way it 
minimizes transaction, production or influence costs. Rational choice explains the 
relationship between institutions and individual behavior with a highly generalizable set of 
concepts but with a simplistic image of human motivation. Politics are explained by 
management of uncertainty. Rational choice institutionalism demonstrates the importance 
of information flows for power relations and political outcomes as well as strategic 
interaction (Hall & Taylor 1996: 10-14). 
 
Historical Institutionalism  
Historical institutionalism is a response to group theories of politics and structural 
functionalism and developed notions of how, in the competition for scarce resources, some 
interests were privileged and others demobilized. Many historical institutionalists no longer 
saw the state as a neutral broker among competing interests but as a complex of institutions 
capable of structuring outcome of group conflict (Evans 1985 quoted in Hall & Taylor 1996: 
6). Historical institutionalism stresses asymmetries of power, path dependency, unintended 
consequences and inefficiencies of existing institutions. 
 
Historical institutionalists divide history in periods of continuity altered by ‘critical junctures’.  
When analyzing relationship between institutions and behavior, the interaction between 
institutions and individual behavior can be viewed in two ways according to historical 
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institutionalism. Two approaches have been distinguished within this branch of neo-
institutionalism, a calculus and a cultural approach. According to the calculus approach, 
institutions are shaped according to a sort of ‘Nash equilibrium’ maximizing each individual’s 
benefit from strategic calculation. According to the cultural approach, people behave 
strategically albeit bounded by their worldview, which includes moral and cognitive 
templates provided by institutions. Institutions are therefore resistant to reform because 
they reflect the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make. (Hall & Taylor 
1996: 5-10). In summary it seems fair to say that the calculus approach assumes that 
individuals shape an optimal organization that fits their preferences while the cultural 
approach assumes that an organization shapes individual preferences to fit its cognitive and 
moral templates. 
  
Sociological (or organizational theory) institutionalism   
Sociological Institutionalism began as a subfield of organization theory in late 1970s. It 
challenged the distinction between rationality and culture. Institutional forms and 
procedures are largely adopted because they are culturally specific (referring to myths and 
ceremonies) and not necessarily because they were most efficient. For example: 
departments of education show international similarities and companies producing 
comparable products have similarities because of diffusion of techniques and similarities in 
training. Institutions are defined in terms of symbol systems, cognitive script and moral 
templates. This determines how situations are recognized and responded to. A division 
between institutional explanations based on organizational structure and cultural 
explanations is challenged since the elements that make up a culture (symbol systems, 
cognitive scripts, moral templates) themselves define an institution.  
 
Comparing the three neo-institutionalisms 
Looking at some similarities and differences between these three branches of neo 
institutionalism, it can be said that both rational choice and sociological approaches suggest 
that people are purposive, goal oriented and rational. Sociological institutionalism stresses 
that rational action itself is socially constructed. Rational Choice institutionalism explains the 
existence of institutions by the assumption that they provide efficiency (a logic of 
consequence) while sociological institutionalism claims institutions are there because they 
provide legitimacy (a logic of appropriateness). The central notion from both historical and 
sociological institutionalism is that new institutions arise amidst existing ones. Sociological 
institutionalism claims that new institutions borrow templates from existing ones (Bell 
2002:8) while historical institutionalism stresses that a new institution is faced with set of 
existing power relations and path dependencies (Hall&Taylor 1996: 21).  
 
Historical institutionalism is the broadest variant of the three incorporating both a calculus 
and a cultural approach. Sometimes historical institutionalism is referred to as eclectic 
(Immergut 1998: 27). In table 2 some key differences between the three branches of neo 
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institutionalism are summarized. This table may simplify or magnify the complex differences 
between the neo-institutional branches somewhat for reasons of clarity. 
 
 
Table 3.2  Key differences between the three branches of neo institutionalism was based 
on Hall&Taylor (1996:17-21), Immergut (1998:18) and Bell (2002:5-8)  
 
 ‘School’ of Neo 
institutionalism 
(dominant logic) 
Assumption 
actors 
Preferences 
vs. Behavior 
Existence of 
Institutions 
Phenomena 
studied  
Methodology 
Rational Choice 
(logic of 
consequence) 
Rational, 
selfish, 
utility 
maximizing  
Suboptimal 
equilibriums 
chosen for 
strategic 
reasons 
Exist 
because 
they provide 
efficiency 
Transaction 
costs, Property 
rights, Rent-
seeking. 
Deduction 
form 
abstracted 
principles 
Historical 
(logic of 
consequence 
and logic of 
appropriateness) 
Self 
reflective  
Interpretation 
of interests 
shaped by 
institutional 
history 
Persistent in 
time, 
shaping 
history 
Asymmetries 
of power, Path 
dependency,   
Unintended 
consequences,  
Inefficiencies 
of existing 
institutions  
Induction 
from 
empirical 
observations 
Sociological 
(logic of 
appropriateness) 
Cognitively 
bounded  
Unaware of 
interests 
because of 
bounded 
rationality 
Exist 
because 
they provide 
legitimacy 
Symbol 
systems, 
Cognitive 
script and 
Moral 
templates 
Induction 
from 
empirical 
observations 
 
When looking at Performance budgeting and the neo institutionalist branches, it is clear that 
PB shares many assumptions with Rational Choice Institutionalism. More specifically, PB’s 
popularity can be explained by the fact that it is seen as a solution to a classical Rational 
Choice dilemma.  
 
3.6 Rational Choice Institutionalism and Agency Theory 
It has been noted that rational choice institutionalism developed at the same time as 
historical institutionalism but finds itself in relative isolation from it (Hall&Taylor 1996:10).  
Rational choice institutionalists in political science drew fruitful analytical tools from the 
‘new economics of organization’ which emphasizes the importance of property rights, rent-
seeking, and transactions costs to the operation and development of institutions. Agency 
theory, that focuses on the institutional mechanisms whereby ‘principals’ can monitor and 
enforce compliance on their ‘agents’ proved useful for analysis from a rational choice 
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institutionalist point of view (Hall&Tayor 1996:11). As the solutions that PB suggest 
particularly feed into the problems highlighted by this branch of neo-institutionalism, it can 
be argued PB draws heavily on the logic of consequence. By integrating planned activities 
and expected outcomes and budgets, the existence of a predictable causality in policy 
theories is explicitly assumed. The expectation that this information will be used in the 
oversight of government by parliament and in managing government agencies assumes that 
politicians and managers are to a great extent driven by the expected consequences of 
policy choices. Furthermore, the need to produce and report PI as a necessary precondition 
for managing government institutions and their relationships is an essential part of 
substantial theory building on the part of Rational Choice theorists. A well-known application 
of Rational Choice theory has been in Agency Theory. 
 
Agency theory and information asymmetry 
Agency theory deals with dividing decision making authority within organizations. It takes 
notice of information asymmetry and the behavioural consequences this can have. Agency 
theory is built around the relationship between two players in a hierarchical setting; an 
agent acting on behalf of a principal. To do so, decision making authority and resources are 
transferred from the principal to the agent. In reality principals are often represented by 
several agents and vice-versa. An agent representing a principal can itself be a principal to 
another agent. That way, chains of principal-agent relationship exist. An agent acting on 
behalf of several principals may face internal discrepancy between conflicting goals and 
conflicting incentives for behaviour. 
 
If both principal and agent try to maximize their utility, the agent is expected to not fully 
serve the principal’s interests as it will have competing preferences. In agency theory the 
agent is the expert in performing the tasks that the principal orders it to do. The principal 
operates at a certain distance from the vital processes and relations, necessary for 
performing these tasks. As a result the agent has an information advantage that it may use 
to maximize its own utility at the expense of that of the principal. This so called information 
asymmetry is the central problem in agency theory (Niskanen 1973: 16-17, Ter Bogt 1997: 
p.53-55). 
  
Two special cases of misusing information asymmetry are adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Adverse selection refers to a situation where the principal is presented incorrect or 
incomplete information by the agent. Given his inability to verify this information the 
principal may base his decisions on inadequate information. An example is an employer who 
relies on incorrect résumés presented by jobseekers. Moral hazard refers to a situation 
where the agent, who has a better awareness of risks and consequences, takes 
inappropriate risks in the knowledge that the principal will pay for their consequences. An 
example is a painter who is paid by the hour for a job and therefore decides to take it slowly. 
 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
53 
 
In both of these cases the interests of the principal compete with and are being sacrificed for 
conflicting interests of the agent. In order to align the agent’s interests with his own, the 
principal can use incentives and monitoring. In addition the agent can engage in activities 
that help convince the principal that it is acting according to his interest. The expenses made 
for this are referred to as bonding activities. Agency costs consist of both monitoring costs 
and bonding costs. The difference that still exists between the actual behaviour of the agent 
and maximizing utility for the principal, despite making monitoring and bonding costs, is 
referred to as residual loss.    
 
Bilateral monopoly 
In the public sector where the incentives of earning a profit and competition for survival are 
often absent, information asymmetry can be a major source of inefficiency. Rational Choice 
assumptions helped inspire some key critical notions on the effectiveness of government 
bureaucracies. These gained worldwide popularity by way of reforms in governance and 
financial public management from the 1980s onwards. The assumption of self-maximizing 
individuals gave way to assumptions of maximizations of budget and staff as primary 
explanation for the behavior of actors within government bureaucracies. Especially for 
agency theory, this notion has important consequences. According to principal agent theory, 
conflicting goals or preferences are a source of inefficiency. The principal’s management of 
its relation with an agent will be aimed at aligning the agent’s goals with its own. In doing so, 
the principal will try to install incentives to steer the behavior of the agent to serve its 
purposes. Another strategy can be to monitor the agent intensively. These strategies can 
take the form of direct financial rewards or punishment and varying the degree of 
autonomy.  
 
Although not considered part of neo-institutionalism, Rational Choice applied to public 
sector institutions follows similar assumptions as agency theory. Bill Niskanen (1971:24) 
speaks of a bilateral monopoly to describe the relationship between a public sector bureau 
(agent) and its sponsor (principal). The agent depends on the financial support of the 
principal and the principal depends on the agents as the sole provider of particular public 
goods and services. Each will try to advance its own interest. Sometimes a public sector 
bureau will advance its own interest without serving any public interest and thus increase 
the costs of public goods and services (rent seeking). Niskanen expects the relationship 
between a public sector bureau and its sponsor to result in overproduction of goods and 
services or overstaffing on the part of public sector agents because of the latter’s 
information advantage (Niskanen 1971:39-41, Ter Bogt 1997: 56-60). The notion of a 
bilateral monopoly takes the problem of information asymmetry a step further. Not only can 
a principal expect an agent to take advantage of his superior knowledge to advance his own 
interests instead of the principal’s. The principal’s options to do something about this are 
limited due to the fact that the agent is operating as a monopolist. As a solution, Niskanen 
suggests organizing competition to the monopolist in an attempt to create some market 
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conditions and incentives. In the absence of market competition, the principal is left to rely 
on financial rewards or punishment and gathering critical information by monitoring. Given 
the importance of information flows for power relations to rational choice theorists, it is not 
surprising that they engaged heavily in the debate over information asymmetry. 
 
PB as a solution for information asymmetry 
The idea of measuring and reporting performance, a core element of PB and PM, has been 
linked to public choice arguments to control bureaucracies and to principal-agent theory. By 
making organizational performance data more widely accessible, the information asymmetry 
between principal and agent is expected to be broken down (Walker et al 2013: 834). The 
worldwide decentralization of government tasks to (semi) independent agents in the 1980s 
and 1990s, fed the urgency felt by academics and governments to deal with the principal-
agent dilemma. The key question was how ministers can be enabled to better control self-
serving bureaucrats. The popular answer borrowed from the market economy was to use 
contracts that specified the agent’s production levels, performance standards and prices. By 
suggesting these kinds of solutions, applied rational choice institutionalism has had 
significant impact on the major reforms in public sector management in recent years (Bell 
2002: 11). Implementation of performance based contracts in the public sector was usually 
introduced as an element of broader performance budgeting (PB) and matched the adoption 
of performance standards for public services. These reforms can be seen as part of a broader 
package of NPM inspired reforms that include agentification itself (see Section 1.2). 
 
By translating political agenda’s into performance based policy plans and contracts with 
agencies, PB has become a tool to align the interests of political principals with those of 
agencies. An extensive performance monitoring structure was put in place to bridge the 
information gap of principals. Sometimes direct financial incentives are being tied to 
meeting performance targets in attempt to influence behavior of the agency and its 
members. If working as intended, the agency and its employees are expected to meet the 
principal’s targets in the most efficient and effective way. The expected behavioral effects 
from information asymmetry (rent seeking, adverse selection and moral hazard) are 
expected to be offset or prevented with the help of PB. It is worth noting that several 
authors have doubted the potential of performance information and performance incentives 
to reduce information asymmetry due to the complexity of many public services and 
unpredictability of agency responses. (Holmstrom&Milgrom 1991:50, Heckman et al 
1997:393-394, Dixit 2002: 697). Moreover, given the numerous occurrences of perverse use 
of PI by agencies (see CH 1.3) one may argue that, if anything, PB has smoothed this problem 
at most.  
 
3.7 Theoretical Model 
In Chapter Two the multitude of promises and expectations associated with PB was 
narrowed down to its contribution to operational efficiency and internal result orientation 
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through purposeful PI use as manifested in the interaction between a political principal and 
an agency or within an agency itself.  
 
The previous paragraph explained that agency theory highlights the possibility of 
information asymmetry to frustrate the principal’s effectiveness and efficiency by an agent 
pursuing its own interests instead. According to Rational Choice’s assumptions about agency 
behavior, this is even the general expectation. In the tradition of rational choice 
institutionalism, the tendency of dysfunctional behavior by the agent has to be offset by 
other incentives that fit the same logic of consequence. These are financial incentives to 
perform and monitoring of the agent’s performance by the principal. PB has been the 
weapon of choice by public sector budgeters worldwide to accomplish these tasks over the 
last couple of decades. If used successfully, PB would help the agent use its resources to 
achieve the results requested by the principal in the most efficient manner. This way PB is 
supposed to effectively offset the tendency of the agent to use resources for its own 
preferences and thus inefficiently or dysfunctional in the eyes of the principal. This reasoning 
consequently follows to the logic of consequence.  
 
Although there is anecdotal evidence that supports the idea that PB indeed contributes to 
efficiency this way, applying the principal-agent model to the public sector is considered 
problematic by some. In his description of the principal agent dilemma Wilson explains the 
difficulties of applying this model and its assumptions in the public sector (Wilson 1989:156): 
 
The difficulties of avoiding shirking in a government agency go well beyond the problems of 
meeting the prescriptions of the standard principal-agent theory. First the output of an 
agency may not only be unobservable, it may be unknowable. If the agency’s goal is so vague 
as to be meaningless ( for example: ‘advancing the interests of the United States’ ) the 
administrator often will not know what to do and thus cannot be expected to tell a 
subordinate what to do, much less judge the work after the fact. Second, every agent in a 
government bureau is likely to have many principals, not only a bureau supervisor, but also 
superiors in the Office of Management and Budget, the White House, the courts, and several 
congressional committees. Moreover the superiors will frequently change as elections come 
and go. Third, the agents will bring their own political preference, professional standards and 
prior experiences to their job. .. bureaucrats have preferences and these include definitions of 
how the job ought to be done as well as how much it ought to pay. For every manager who 
complains that an employee is doing too little (shirking), there is another one who complains 
that an employee is doing the wrong thing (subverting). 
 
This leads Wilson to conclude that: 
Under these circumstances of vague or conflicting goals, multiple principals, and bureaucrats 
with policy preferences, it is not surprising that economists have not made much progress in 
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finding theoretical solutions to the problem of shirking. What is surprising is that bureaucrats 
work at all rather than shirk at every opportunity.  
 
If the principal agent model and the tools to offset its presumed effects, namely PB, indeed  
fail to explain behavior in public sector agencies, an alternative way may be required to 
explain why some organizations and their members act in a result oriented way and use PI 
for this purpose. 
 
As shown earlier in this chapter, the logic of appropriateness assumes that organizations and 
organization members are primarily rule followers driven by social pressure instead of 
anticipating consequences in order to maximizing their own utility. This may offer an 
alternative explanation of a claim to success of PB. In fact, some recent studies suggest that 
PI use in the public sector is more likely to be driven by altruism and public sector motivation 
rather than self- interest among government officials (Moynihan 2010:14). The 
unpredictable volatile reality of political life in which an agency and its political principal 
operate may yet offer other additional explanations that may have to be considered. These 
contextual explanatory factors are factors beyond the institutional sphere of the agency 
itself.  In Figure 3.2, the theoretical model of this research as explained above is shown 
graphically. This is followed by a brief explanation of each of its consisting elements. 
 
Figure 3.2 Theoretical model of PB functioning according to logic of consequence and 
alternative explanations 
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Principal-agent theory is concerned with ways to get an agent to behave in the interest of a 
principal. The central dilemma in principal agent theory is information asymmetry that 
occurs when the agent has an information advantage over his principal. The agent thus has 
the possibility to serve its own interests at the expense of those of the principal. According 
to public choice theorists the agent can be expected to behave this way, leading agencies to 
behave inefficiently. The PB intends to help solve this problem by purposeful use of PI by the 
principal and the agent.  
 
Implementation PB System 
PB systems can be categorized according to the degree to which PI is linked to funding 
(OECD 2007: 21). In some cases a direct link between performance results and resource 
allocation and accountability is in place (direct/formula performance budgeting). More often 
the link is indirect and planned performance targets and results are used for planning and 
accountability purposes only (performance informed budgeting). PB systems that have no 
link between PI and funding and PI is used for accountability only (presentational 
performance budgeting).  
 
In government, adoption of formal tools like internal contracts systems or even pay-for-
performance does not necessarily mean that these play a serious role in decision making 
because the relational aspects are often valued more highly than the formal aspect (Schick 
2003: 88-91). Implementation of a PB can be merely de jure where PI is known by a small 
number of staff only and seldom shared and debated. When PB is implemented de facto 
managers actually use PI to control their agency or the relations between agent and principal 
and program learning occurs by critically assessing performance to learn and improve.   
 
Result oriented (re-)allocation 
Result oriented (re)allocation refers to budgetary decisions that are linked to the budget 
cycle and are consistent with results from a systematic performance measurement and 
reporting. These decisions result in proposed adjustments in an existing program and/or 
corresponding budget that increase efficiency and/or effectiveness from the viewpoint of 
the principal. Result oriented (re-)allocation can refer to input, output or outcome criteria, or 
all of them, as long as it falls within of the formal agreements between principal and agent. 
 
Presented so far is the traditional theory on PB helping to achieve result oriented 
(re)allocation by an agency. The expected causality between the three elements mentioned 
above is in accordance with rational choice institutionalism and the logic of consequence. 
This presumed causality can be challenged by taking into account some of the institutionalist 
notions presented earlier. As Allen Schick noted: successful organizations learn and adapt, 
changing what they do and how they work in response to both internal and external signals. 
But performance is only one of the drivers of change, and not always the most important one 
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(Schick 2003: 88). Two groups of alternative explanations of result orientated allocation will 
be studied. 
 
Institutional explanatory factors 
Several institutional factors may explain why a certain agency displays result oriented 
(re)allocation. In an attempt to contrast the logic of consequence that has been dominant in 
the PB approach, elements in other institutionalist schools of thought are identified that are 
able to explain a possible logic of appropriateness for purposeful use of performance 
information.  
 
The first two mentioned are motivated by sociological neo institutionalism:  
Cultural appropriateness: in a given agency, displaying result orientation behavior by 
conducting critical assessments or debating effectiveness may be supported or punished by 
the organization’s leadership and culture.  
Cognitive frames: The way (performance) information is selected, interpreted, presented 
and processed may be highly dependent upon shared cognitive frames that exist in an 
agency. These frames may have originated from a shared organizational or professional or 
educational background. Implementation of the PB idea of introducing accountability based 
on objective PI is likely to be heavily influenced by shared cognitive frames.  
 
Another two elements are studied more by historical neo institutionalism, notably the 
cultural approach within this form of institutionalism: 
 
Asymmetries of power: Some groups or interests have disproportionate influence on 
decision making process. This formal or informal balance of power may be inherent to a 
certain institutional setting that characterizes a policy field or an agency.  
Path dependency: A critical junction may be identified that created a branching point that 
explains the current path of the agency in many different respects including de facto PB 
implementation and result orientated allocation.  
 
Contextual explanatory factors 
The dynamics of the policy process can be an explanatory factor itself when the dominant 
policy paradigm is shifting (as described in Chapter 1.3). In this case enlightenment may 
occur simultaneously with, though not necessarily as a result of the availability of 
performance information. Likely alternative explanations are shifts in political leadership or 
preferences of political leaders. When a public agency is performing politically sensitive tasks 
or tasks with a high impact, de facto  political control may be strong regardless the 
organizational form of the steering relationship designed for agency management (Egeberg 
and Trondal 2009:6, Pollitt et al 2004 in Verhoest et al 2011: 23). This explains why there 
may be other explanations for choices of (re)allocation than the incentives provided by PB. 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
59 
 
These will be included in the study insofar they provide plausible alternative explanations for 
an apparent display of result oriented (re)allocation.  
 
Macro-economic factors and shifting political preferences may influence the allocation of 
resources. The occurrence of financial crises can be a powerful driver of policy changes 
affecting the principal-agent relationship. The pressure from these factors may lead principal 
and agent to (temporarily) behave according to PB expectations of result oriented 
(re)allocation. 
 
3.8 Epilogue 
In this chapter we saw that the classical notion that institutions matter to political outcomes 
and the conviction that political behavior can be explained by observed behavior rather than 
expressed preferences inspired the rise of neo institutionalism. Depending on the neo-
institutional branch, behavior of actors can be explained either by following rules about 
what is felt to be appropriate (historical/ sociological) or by calculation to maximize self-
interest (rational choice). The rational choice branch of neo-institutionalism highlighted the 
problem that a principal lacks adequate information to control its agent.   
 
The wave of New Public Management in the 1980s and 1990s (see CH. 1.2) reshaped 
governance relationships in governments worldwide. Performance measurement and 
evaluation was promoted as one of the tools of choice for implementing the NPM agenda 
and making government achieve better results at lower costs (Gore 1995: 44-46). Firstly this 
resulted in adopting public sector management methods and buzzwords like explicit 
performance standards, management by results, value for money etcetera. Second was an 
attempt to introduce incentive structures into public service. This meant disaggregating 
existing bureaucracies and contracting out to quasi markets (Rhodes 1997: 48-49). 
Performance reporting was presented as part of the solution for the principal-agent dilemma 
and has been advocated worldwide since the era of New Public Management. As we saw in 
Chapters 1 and 2, the results of performance budgeting (PB), including this key element, has 
far from met all expectations. PB theory itself has been accused of neglecting some 
important institutional variables when designed and implemented. It may therefore be 
worthwhile to turn to the other two branches of new institutionalism (historical and 
sociological) when looking for explanations for the success record of PB.  
 
These alternative explanations based on the logic of appropriateness may or may not 
provide plausible explanations why result oriented (re)allocation occurred in selected cases. 
This may support or disregard the notion that PB adoption is a likely decisive contributing 
factor to result oriented (re)allocation. In order to be able to test these cases, the relevant 
neo institutional factor of the model introduced will have to be refined so they can be 
applied to the cases. 
  
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
60 
 
CHAPTER 4  BUILDING A MODEL TO BE TESTED  
 
Having gained more of a micro-perspective on PB theory, Schick’s observation that 
‘governments that don’t manage for results will not budget for results’ (see CH 1.4) 
deserves a second look (Schick 2003: 102). If it is true what Schick says, introduction of PB 
by an agency or its principal(s) would only deliver the desired results if a number of other, 
independent factors, are present. As a consequence, PB successes that are reported from 
an agency or their principal(s) would, according to Schick, have been made possible only 
because of these factors that were already in place. He refers to these as ‘managerial 
arrangements that make results paramount’ or ‘transformations in public management 
that enhanced performance’ that accompanied PB reforms (Schick 2003: 102). Expanding 
on this observation, the question remains what the added value of PB has been in those 
public organizations that (already) did manage for results. In Chapter 3 neo-institutional 
factors were introduced that might offer an alternative explanation for purposeful PI use 
by such agencies. In this chapter the theoretical concepts and research questions will be 
operationalized into a model with indicators to assess purposeful PI use and institutional 
explanatory factors. Finally a methodological approach will be chosen and cases will be 
selected to apply this model.   
 
4.1 Revisiting the research questions 
In Chapter 1.4 the general research question of this study was introduced: 
 
Are result orientation of a government agency and operational efficiency gains achieved through PB? 
 
After introducing the micro model of PB, this question was specified further to focus on 
apparently successful cases of adopting PB as a tool to manage agency-principal 
relationships and for internal agency management.  
 
How do underlying cultural and historical factors explain successful PB in government agencies? 
 
Chapter 3 introduced the concepts of (neo) institutionalism in which two alternative drivers 
of human behaviour can be contrasted:  
x People act in order to maximize their benefits based on expected consequences 
(following the logic of consequence)   
or  
x People act out of duty or social pressure following rules and roles that are they feel 
are appropriate (following the logic of appropriateness)  
 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that PB in its roots, design and implementation dominantly 
follows the logic of consequence. In recent years an increasing number of authors have 
stressed that for successful PB implementation institutional and cultural variables outweigh 
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the importance of the incentives provided by the PB system (see CH.2).  If the observation 
that PB implementation in itself does not change behaviour is correct, it should be possible 
to explain successful PB implementation using alternative explanations. Instead of PB 
successfully providing an incentive structure aligning the organization’s formal goals with the 
benefit maximizing behaviour of its members, the displayed behaviour may have entirely 
different reasons. The result oriented behaviour associated with successful PB 
implementation may provide legitimacy or be viewed as appropriate by organization 
members. More specifically an explanation will be sought in four concepts from other 
branches of neo-institutionalism:  
 
Historical neo institutionalism incorporates both the logic of consequence and the logic of 
appropriateness (see CH 3.4). The historical branch views behaviour as being influenced by 
past choices that shape both the perceptions and strategies of actors. Lending from cultural 
more than a calculus approach, the two key concepts chosen are:  
- Path dependency  
- Asymmetries of power  
Sociological neo-institutionalism essentially broadens institutions to the whole range of 
informal cultural forces10 (Linsenmann et al 2007: 20-21). As one’s interests are shaped by 
the institutional context in which one operates, the very idea of pursuing rational interests 
to maximize one’s benefits is challenged. Relying firmly on the logic of appropriateness, the 
two key concepts chosen are:  
- Cultural appropriateness 
- Cognitive frames  
 
A causal relationship between the adoption of PB and occurrence of its desired outcome 
(result oriented (re)allocation) should be doubted if these factors are present and offer a 
plausible explanation for the result oriented behaviour displayed in the cases to be studied.   
 
General sub questions  
As mentioned in Chapter 2.4, several sub questions are to be to be answered regarding 
specific cases of successful PB implementation in a principal-agency relationship. By 
answering these questions the underlying question of how the use of PI might have been 
regarded as appropriate for the agency, is being addressed. 
1. What is considered a case of successful PB in a government agency? 
2. What are considered relevant underlying historical and cultural factors?   
a) From historical neo institutionalism?  
b) From sociological neo institutionalism? 
 
                                                 
10 As a result, according to the sociological branch, institutions can be defined differently than traditional 
boundaries of organization structures. When studying the behavior of agencies, it will be taken into account that 
characteristics found may apply to institutions that overlap organizational boundaries.  
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After a number of cases that share (seemingly?) successful PB implementation in an agency-
principal relationship, have been studied, the general question can be addressed: 
3. Does the presence of these cultural and historical factors offer a convincing 
alternative explanation for successful PB? 
  
To be able to answer sub question 3, the general questions have to be applied more 
specifically to each of the case studies so a synthesis of all cases can be created later on. 
 
Case specific sub questions 
A To what extent can a case be considered a textbook example of PB implementation? 
B To what extent are the identified conditions present? 
C Does context offer a likely explanation? 
Sub question C explores whether purposeful PI use demonstrated in a case can be explained 
by other dominant factors instead of the neo-institutional ones tested. This can obviously 
not be done with the same level of detail. Nonetheless, answering this question gives some 
assurance that obvious contextual explanations aren’t ignored and can be included in the 
answer to sub question 3. See Figure 4.1 for he order and repetitiveness of the subquestions. 
 
Figure 4.1  Chronological order of sub questions 
Questions for each case study: 
 
A.  To what extent is this a PB success? 
 
B  Are the identified conditions present? 
 
C.  Does context offer a likely explanation? 
Sub questions derived from central question: 
1: What is considered a case of successful PB in a government agencies? 
2: What are considered relevant underlying historical and cultural factors?   
3. Does the presence of these cultural and historical factors offer a 
convincing alternative explanation for successful PB? 
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4.2 Agency Theory and Rational Choice Neo Institutionalism  
Agency theory states that conflicting goals of agents and principals are a source of 
inefficiency. As discussed in Chapter 3.6, the agent has the upper hand in this relationship 
because of his superior knowledge about the particular business in which it operates. The 
agent will try to exploit this position, potentially leading to adverse selection and moral 
hazard. PB is introduced as a solution for this problem because performance measurement 
and reporting is expected to improve the information position of the principal. In addition, 
financially rewarding performance in budgeting decisions will create incentives for aligning 
the agent’s behaviour with the principal’s goals. In the search for potential cases, the 
likeliness of conflicting goals is assumed and the superiority of the information position of 
the agent is included in the analysis of the cases. After these assumptions of agency theory 
are found to be (potentially) present, the problem that PB is supposed to solve can be 
expected to exist in that particular case. Clearly this is a precondition for any case in this 
study. Because this study attempts to determine the actual contribution of PB methods on 
apparent PB success, cases are sought that could qualify as successful cases of PB 
implementation. Therefore the first sub-question has to be answered: 
 
Sub question 1: What is considered a case of successful PB in a government agency? 
 
After answering this question in general, for each case study an answer has to be 
determined to the associated sub question A: To what extent is this a PB success? 
 
In Chapter 2 the concept of purposeful PI use was introduced and translated into a model 
that classified ways in which PI could be expected to contribute to efficiency and 
effectiveness. Only if PI is used in a purposeful way and thus can be expected to contribute 
to operational efficiency and internal result orientation the way PB envisaged (see tables 2.3. 
and 2.4), a suitable case exists for trying to explain PB’s actual contribution. This PB ideal can 
be contrasted to the more ‘traditional’ way budget preparation takes place within an 
agency. This was articulated well by Aaron Wildavsky (Wildavsky 1992:90-94). In deciding 
‘how much to ask for’ agency staff takes into account various sources of information, none 
of them explicitly referring to measured performance: 
 
x Estimates of what ‘will go’. As the agency is usually faced with more demand for 
funding than is available, it will ask just below what will be considered ‘too much’ by 
the other players in the budgetary process. This way it remains credible when 
requesting funds for priorities in the future. 
x Informal reports on how its programs were regarded, especially last year’s  
x The letter from the budget bureau, which usually has some statement on how closely 
this year’s budget should resemble last year’s. 
x The interest of specialized publics in particular programs. Periodic reports from the 
field on the demand for services may act as an indicator. When the agency begins to 
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notice connections between the activities of supporting interests and calls from 
parliament, it has a pretty good idea of the support for a program.  
x Interest of (influential) politicians in particular programs, mainly ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’ 
of influential politicians.  
 
The ‘traditional’ way of budgeting fits the notion of public choice theory that agencies (or 
public sector bureaus), as a default setting, attempt to ‘overproduce’ and maximize their 
budgets. Only the way the budgetary process is shaped and competition from other agencies 
for scarce resources restrains an even higher bid for funding. According to the theory 
explained in CH 3.6 and 3.7, effective PB implementation is supposed to be one way to 
counter the budget maximizing incentives of an agency by handing a principal an additional 
tool to control its agent. This means that information on future or past performance will be 
used by the principal to lever funding requests.   
 
Any agency is expected to demonstrate ‘traditional’ budgeting behaviour to some extent. 
Neither does the PB ideal described here imply that PI can ever be the sole determinant of 
budgetary decisions. However, if an agency is making a budget request that refers to PI in 
addition to the traditional factors, PB will be claimed to have had influence. This goes in 
particular if the budget request is performance informed and largely disregards ‘traditional’ 
determining factors. If PI is used by the principal during budget negotiations, this particularly 
points to influence of PB. 
 
Since we are seeking to identify purposeful use of PI from a PB system in a principal-agency 
setting, we can identify between use of PI in the interaction between principal and agent 
and internal use of PI within an agency. Summarizing the specifications made so far, a 
‘textbook example’ of PB implementation in line with the assumptions of NPM and agency 
theory is assumed combine four characteristics:  
 
x PI is used in the budgetary process between agency and principal in addition to 
traditional budgeting 
x An intense performance dialogue exists between agency and principal  
x The agency has an ambitious and sophisticated PB system in place  
x PI from this system used internally by the agency for budgeting and performance 
management  
If these four characteristics are found to be present in a public sector agency and the 
interaction with its principal, PI is indeed used for budgetary purposes and may be expected 
to positively influence effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore these four characteristics will 
be developed further into indicators to form a model with the purpose of testing their 
presence in qualitative case studies.  
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PI is used in addition to ‘traditional’ budgeting (indicator PB 1.1) 
According to agency theory and NPM, effective PB implementation is supposed to be one 
way to counter the budget maximizing incentives of an agency. A principal can do so during 
budget preparation by using information on future or past performance to lever an agency’s 
funding requests. This requires that performance and funding levels are integrated for the 
purpose of internal budgetary allocation and for budget requests to the principal.  More 
specifically, PI use in a budgetary context can leads to more efficiency and effectiveness if: 
9 PI explicitly informs proposals prepared for the budgetary process;   
9 These proposals contribute to program learning or even enlightenment;  
9 The proposals result in decisions that demonstrate more efficient service delivery or 
even policy shifts. This should be recorded in documents related to the budgeting 
cycle or the principal-agent relationship.  
 
As noted earlier, any government agency is expected to demonstrate ‘traditional’ budgeting 
behavior to some extent. Neither does the PB ideal described here imply that PI can ever be 
the sole determinant of budgetary decisions. PB is however regarded to be applied, if an 
agency is making a budget request that refers to PI in addition to the traditional factors. This 
is the case even more so if budget requests are performance informed and if PI is used by 
the principal during budget negotiations. 
 
PI use by principal to control the agent (indicator PB 1.2) 
In addition to being used in budgetary decisions, PI offers a principal ways to help reduce 
information asymmetry and thus strengthening its relative position. Performance monitoring 
or even financial incentives are tools the principal may use to influence agency behaviour in 
a broader sense than the annual budgetary process. The principal’s performance monitoring 
and its performance dialogue with an agency may vary in nature and intensity. This will 
influence the principal’s ability to successfully use PB to strengthen its position in relation to 
the agent. PI use is expected to be a major influence in the relation of the agency with its 
principal if:  
 
9 There is clear alignment of the information monitored and the principal’s formal 
goals. 
9 Monitoring data are used frequently in a dialogue between the agency and its 
principal.  
9 This dialogue results in concrete consequences and actions.  
9 There are provisions for financial incentives related to performance 
9 These provisions are actually used when targets aren’t met.  
  
A high degree of de jure PB implementation (indicator PB 2.1) 
To assess the de jure implementation of a PB system, some questions regarding its level of 
sophistication and ambition apply. Although a plethora of theories and opinions exists about 
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what should make up a good PB system, a categorization that is often referred to 
internationally is the one introduced in CH 1.1 (OECD 2007: 21, Congiano et al 2013:229):  
 
9 Direct or formula performance budgeting. In some cases a direct link between 
performance results and resource allocation and accountability is in place. 
9 Performance informed budgeting. More often the link is indirect and planned 
performance targets and results are used for planning and accountability purposes 
only.  
9 Presentational performance budgeting. PB systems that have no link between PI and 
funding and PI is used for accountability only.  
 
Regardless the appropriateness of the type of PB system in particular circumstances, direct 
performance budgeting is seen as the most ambitious of these three forms and 
presentational as the least ambitious one. To further specify the level of sophistication, two 
additional relevant aspects of de jure implementation can be added: 
 
9 What is the frequency of performance measurement and reporting? This may occur 
only when the yearly budget or report comes around or as part of a monitoring cycle 
with a higher frequency. 
9 Are there measures taken to ensure the quality and impartiality of the reported 
performance information? Examples are organizational checks and balances or 
incidental or systematic auditing.   
A high degree of de jure implementation incorporates an ambitious form of PB with a 
monitoring cycle more frequent than the budget cycle and measures to ensure the quality 
and impartiality of information. 
 
A high degree of de facto PB implementation (indicator PB 2.2) 
Having a PB system that is designed in an ambitious and sophisticated manner does not 
guarantee that PI is used in an internal cycle of performance planning and monitoring and 
improvement. To measure de facto PB implementation, the generation of PI and its 
subsequent use are important indicators for the way the system works in practice. A high 
degree of de facto PB implementation is characterized by: 
 
9 Reporting of the required PI in a complete and timely manner. 
9 Implicit reference to PI and PB terminology in communication. 
9 Explicit reference to PI in communication and decision making. 
9 Decision-making matches formal conclusions and recommendations based on 
expected or demonstrated performance. 
9 Budgetary consequences are linked to performance based decisions. 
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Having defined more closely what successful adoption of a PB system would look like in the 
setting of a public sector agency and its principal, we are interested to see if our definition 
matches the situation in public sector agencies that have a reputation of successful PPB 
adoption and PI use.  
 
The PB result of staff motivation in alignment with agency goals will be considered a 
favourable by-effect of the other PB effects such as program learning and enlightenment and 
are expected to influence this aspect of result orientation an indirect way (see Chapter 2.3).  
 
4.3 Historical Neo Institutionalism  
This branch of Neo Institutionalism stresses the current influence of changes that occurred 
over time and, more in particular, the path shaping influence of precedent setting events 
(Linsenmann et al 2007: 20-21). Historical institutionalism studies asymmetries of power, 
path dependency, unintended consequences and inefficiencies of existing institutions. For 
the purpose of this study Historical Neo Institutionalism is used to find an alternative 
explanation for behaviour that is considered rational and result oriented. More specifically 
the sub question to be answered is: 
 
Sub question 2a:   
What are considered relevant underlying factors from historical neo-institutionalism?   
 
After answering this question in general, for each case study an answer has to be 
determined to the associated Sub question B: Are the identified conditions present? 
 
Two notions introduced in Chapter 3 define an institution’s ‘heritage’. This heritage is built 
upon by past decisions that shape current events. This might offer an alternative explanation 
for the result orientation and purposeful use of PI, attributed to PB introduction.  
 
Path dependency: A critical juncture may be identified that created a branching point that 
explains the current path of the agency in many different respects including de facto PB 
implementation and result orientated allocation. The presence and impact of such events 
will therefore be analyzed. 
Asymmetries of power: Some groups or interests have dominant influence on the decision 
making process. This formal or informal balance of power may be inherent to a certain 
institutional setting that characterizes a policy field or agency.  
 
Path dependency 
Historical institutionalists divide the flow of historical events into periods of continuity, 
punctuated by ‘critical junctures’. These are moments when substantial institutional change 
takes place, creating a ‘branching point’ from which historical developments moves onto a 
new path. The problem is to identify the underlying reason for this sudden change. Historical 
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institutionalists traditionally look for causes like the economy or wars (Hall & Taylor 1996: 
342). For the purpose of this study, the occurrence and the impact of such a rupture is, in 
itself, more relevant that its precise cause. After all an attempt is made to look for 
alternative explanations for the phenomenon of result oriented (re)allocation by an 
institution. The question is if there has been a branching point that explains the current path 
of the agency in many different respects including performance management and result 
orientated allocation. This branching point can be in the policy field in which the agency 
operates as well as the organizational arrangement in which it operates. 
 
A critical juncture in the accountability chain or policy field (Indicator H 1.1 & H1.2) 
As such, when embarrassments, scandals, or disasters occur, politicians and the media 
suddenly take an enormously detailed interest in organizational activities they have never 
asked about before. This interest includes performance data (Pollitt 2006:15). Therefore 
such events may provide valid explanations for an emphasis on PI use by organization 
members. For example it is quite imaginable that a scandal involving waste of funds or an 
attack in the media over the inability to deliver expected results can strengthen a culture of 
results accountability that may already have been present in a weaker form or only locally in 
certain organizational units.  Any type of event may qualify as a plausible explanation of an 
agency’s attitude towards PB but a distinction is made between two broad classifications: 
 
Junctures in accountability chain - One way is by looking at the chain of principal-agent 
relationships relevant to the agency in question. This chain will be referred to as the 
accountability chain.  A critical juncture somewhere up or down this chain might explain a 
need to adopt an instrument like PB or even make PB adoption seem unavoidable. This could 
have been anything but notably causes to look for may be severe financial or accountability 
problems or traumatic conflicts with political stakeholders about incidents involving 
performance reporting. If something like this happened, using PB is seen as a solution to a 
widely felt problem.  
 
Junctures in policy field - Critical junctures can also occur in the policy field in which the 
agency operates. As noted in CH 1.2, public policy, once implemented, is commonly seen as 
incremental. If policies are revised in the public arena, this tends to happen in short intervals 
of turbulence amidst longtime periods of calm (True et al 1999: 176-180).  Changed attitudes 
on the paradigm that traditionally dominated a policy area, might explain the adoption of 
PB. Again, these junctures may have been about anything but in particular reliance on 
evidence based policies or the need for collecting previously unrecorded policy information.  
 
Given this interpretation of path dependency it may appear as something hard to measure 
applied to a particular case. On a nominal scale however this comes down to finding the 
answer to two questions that can be answered with either a yes or a no (the answer 
obviously needing convincing argumentation): 
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- Has there been a critical juncture in the accountability chain or policy field? 
- If yes, has this critical juncture lead to a broadly felt problem to which PB was seen  
  as a solution.   
 
To investigate the possible contribution of the impact of events on PI use two indicators 
were chosen: 
- The occurrence of a critical juncture in the accountability chain or policy field (H 1.1) 
- Did a juncture lead to a broadly felt problem to which PB was seen as a solution (H 1.2) 
 
To assess the relevance of critical junctures in explaining the use of performance information, 
respondents are asked to name the most significant events that have affected their 
organization throughout the years. To prevent answers too close to one’s own specific duties 
respondents were asked to think of answers that they felt any colleague might give as well. 
Subsequently the events are ranked according to the relative importance and the frequency 
with which they were mentioned by respondents. In addition, the plausibility of their 
relevance as a possible explanation is assessed. 
 
Some authors stress the importance of keeping path dependence and critical junctures 
distinct as it is claimed that the former lays the foundations for the latter (Pierson 2000: 263, 
Pan 2014: 261). At the same time however the former can be punctuated by the latter which 
inevitable makes such a distinction somewhat arbitrary. As this study focuses on an agency’s 
result orientation and accountability, the criterion for qualifying an event as a critical 
juncture depends on whether the event can be linked in a plausible way to a major 
organizational shift in this area. 
 
In line with the sociological institutional tradition Mahler asserts that in a cultural based 
learning approach, the impact of events cannot be easily assumed in term of lessons for an 
organization. This is so because the meaning of an event to an organization, like for example 
a well-publicized failure, is shaped by organizational beliefs and myths (Mahler 1997, 528). 
However, the events themselves may also contribute to altering or strengthening the very 
organizational culture with regard to learning and PI use.  
 
Asymmetries of Power 
Not to be confused with the information asymmetry central to agency theory, asymmetry of 
power refers to some groups or interests having dominant influence on the decision making 
process. This formal or informal balance of power may be inherent to a certain institutional 
setting that characterizes a policy field or agency. 
 
An internal advocate or external champion of PB in a powerful position (Indicator H 2.1) 
Leadership is acknowledges by several authors to positively influence PI use, most notably a 
leader’s commitment to results and his or her support for performance management (Dull 
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2009a:258-261, Moynihan&Pandey 2010: 14). When the actors pushing PB reforms are in a 
crucial position within an agency, their agenda’s will be more likely to be dominant resulting 
in higher de facto PB implementation. When they are in relatively weak position, PB 
implementation will be more likely to be halfhearted or de jure at most. The actors actively 
supporting PB have traditionally been budget departments supported externally by the 
principal’s Budget Office. Occasionally these may also have been line managers from the 
strategic leadership, political leadership or external consultants. To determine the influence 
of PB advocates, the relative power of the budget office as well as the presence of dominant 
champions of PB in the agency (or up its chain of accountability) need to be explored. A 
finding that a dominant party has been successfully pushing PB reforms does not discredit 
causality between purposeful PI use and PB implementation. It does however provide 
credibility that, from a logic of appropriateness point of view, PB compliance provides 
legitimacy to organization members.   
 
Policy field in which specialists are dominant, relative to the other political actors (Indicator 
H 2.2) 
As policy fields are shaped by different groups or interests, the influence of a certain group 
may dominate the others. A way to analyze the way new issues reach the political agenda 
and take policy form, is the four fold typology of ‘pathways to power’ (Posner 2004: 8-14, 
Conlan et al 2002:4). This typology distinguishes between four different pathways by 
reference to two dimensions: the scope and scale of mobilization (whether specialized or 
mass) and the method of mobilization (whether interests or ideas were at play):  
x Pluralist pathway (scope=specialized, method=interest): policymaking is driven 
principally by the process of adjustment among contending interest groups 
x Partisan pathway (scope=mass, method=interest): policymaking is characterized by 
major involvement by political leaders 
x Expert pathway (scope=specialized, method=idea): professional knowledge and 
technical feasibility become the source of legitimacy 
x Symbolic pathway (scope=mass, method=idea): ideas and values of broad public 
appeal play a growing role in defining and legitimizing issues and actions  
 
As earlier mentioned in Chapter 1.3, presenting PI to inform decision making is typically 
associated with the expert pathway. This specialist perspective on policy competes with the 
other three dominant ways in which issues reach the political agenda. Although originally 
applied to political agenda setting, this framework can be used to assess the relative position 
of the expert pathway in a certain policy area. A policy area in which serving a special 
interest or providing symbolism for political leaders dominates decisions will be less likely to 
systematically include PI for decision-making. Once again, a powerful role of the specialist 
pathway in a policy area does not discredit causality between purposeful PI use and PB 
implementation. It does however provide credibility to the notion that, from a logic of 
appropriateness point of view, PB compliance provides legitimacy to organization members.   
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Although not widely acknowledged as a relevant factor for PI use in literature, this indicator 
does bear some resemblance to task specificity of leaders which, as opposed to generalist 
leaders, have been found to report more PI use (Moynihan&Pandey 2010:13). In addition, a 
high degree of goal clarity and mission orientation is also known to positively correlate with 
PI use (Moynihan&Landuyt 2009: 1101) and is commonly at odds with policy areas that are 
highly politicized or dominated by vested interests. Political conflict, as in conflicting 
interests of internal and external stakeholders, has been hypothesized as a factor limiting PI 
use in earlier studies but no strong correlation was found (Moynihan and Lavertu 2012: 595, 
Dull 2009a: 264). The quantitative analysis in both studies did not confirm a strong 
correlation either. Interestingly, political conflict was also found to foster PI use in another 
study (Moynihan&Hawes 2012: 101). 
 
4.4       Sociological neo institutionalism 
As discussed in Chapter 3.5 this branch of neo Institutionalism challenges the distinction 
between rationality and culture. Institutions are defined in terms of symbol systems, 
cognitive script and moral templates. While not denying the value to focus on preferences 
and interests, sociological neo institutionalism argues that rationality is bounded. The 
choices actors make are pre-structured by ideas, norms and beliefs about what is legitimate, 
appropriate or true given a certain conception of identity (Linsenmann et al 2007: 20-21). 
Sociological Neo Institutionalism is used for the purpose of this study to find an alternative 
explanation for behaviour that is considered rational and result oriented. More specifically 
the sub question to be answered is 
 
Sub question 2b:   
What are considered relevant underlying factors from sociological neo-institutionalism?   
 
After answering this question in general, for each case study an answer has to be 
determined to the associated Sub question B: Are the identified conditions present? 
 
A favorable culture with regard to result orientation in a particular case may offer an 
alternative explanation for purposeful PI use than the incentives provided by PB. Sociological 
institutionalism clearly refers to cultural aspects pointed to in PB studies as it stresses the 
existence and persistence of moral and cognitive templates resulting in the unwritten rules 
about what is viewed as appropriate behavior by members of organizations.  Cultural 
aspects have been regarded as an important factor for PB success but necessarily make for a 
somewhat vague variable in research. Two notions introduced in Chapter 3 define an 
institution’s culture incorporating ideas, norms and beliefs that may or may not conflict with 
the PB system introduced. These are: 
 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
72 
 
Cultural appropriateness: in a given agency, displaying result orientation behavior by 
conducting critical assessments or debating effectiveness may be supported or punished by 
the organization’s leadership and culture.  
Cognitive frames: The way (performance) information is selected, interpreted, presented 
and processed may be highly dependent upon shared cognitive frames that exist in an 
agency. These frames may have originated from a shared organizational or professional or 
educational background. Implementation of the PB idea of introducing accountability based 
on objective PI is likely to be heavily influenced by shared cognitive frames.  
 
Cultural appropriateness 
One clear element is the notion that in order to use PI for enlightenment and program 
learning, its culture is expected to resemble that of a learning organization. According to 
some of the more common literature on learning organizations this implies that internal 
political games that dominate many organizations need to be overcome as they often result 
in a dysfunctional culture with respect to organizational learning. Typical for this 
dysfunctional culture is that the question who issues a proposal is considered to be more 
relevant than what is in it.  
 
Absence of organizational learning disabilities (Indicator S 1.1) 
Peter Senge specified a number of ‘traditional’ learning disabilities in this respect (see 
Textbox 4.1). To measure the effect of organizational learning disabilities the response of 
organization members to these two statements is expected to provide an important clue: 
x If (the organization) is faced with problems, a good problem analysis is usually made 
before taking action. 
x If things go wrong in (the organization)’s field of work, lessons are usually learned as 
a result. 
In addition respondents will be questioned about permanent or temporary learning forums 
that existed and were asked to name examples of lessons that were learned from this for 
their line of work. The choice to combine cultural and structural approaches to assessing 
learning organizations acknowledges their mutual interdependency which seems inevitable 
when studying real life cases in depth (Moynihan&Landuyt 2009: 1097).   
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Textbox 4.1  Seven learning disabilities according to Senge (source: Senge 1990:18-25 ) 
  
Participative Openness and Reflective Openness (Indicators 1.2 & 1.3) 
A specific challenge to a learning culture may be deliberate denial or avoidance of certain 
information to avoid cognitive dissonance. An organizational culture characterized by hiding 
conflict and protecting management from criticism can block detection and correction of 
errors (Mahler 1997, 529). This can lead to ‘defensive routines’ which refers to the policies 
or actions we put in place to prevent ourselves and our organizations from experiencing 
embarrassment or threat. The unintended consequence of these defensive routines is that 
they also prevent anyone from identifying and thereby reducing the causes of the 
embarrassment or threat (Argyris 1994: 81). Yet failure (particularly in the public sector) is 
1.  I am my own position is when people focus only on their position within the organization and 
have little sense of responsibility for the results produced when all positions interact. For 
example: ‘I work as a budget advisor for the health department’ instead of ‘We try to control 
public health care costs’  
2. The enemy is out there syndrome is when we blame some external reason without focus only 
on our position; we do not see how our own actions extend beyond the boundary of that 
position. For example ‘politics is just an irrational business’ without adding ‘which I did not 
anticipate when making a policy proposal’  
3. The illusion of taking charge is that pro-activeness is really reactiveness in disguise. Instead of 
facing up to difficult issues and solving them before they grow into crises, people rely on more of 
the trusted ineffective recipes. Illustrative is the attitude ’What we need is a bigger hammer’. Real 
pro-activeness includes insight in your own contribution to the problem. This is a recognized 
phenomenon in public policy (see law of accumulation of policy CH 1.3). 
4. The fixation on events leads to “event” explanations that are true for now but distract us from 
seeing the longer-term patterns of change behind the events and understanding the causes of the 
patterns to events. Practitioners will easily recognize the dominant pattern of political leaders 
quickly responding to incidents by promising additional regulation and inspection before any 
deeper, long term analysis has taken place. 
5. The parable of the boiled frog is in relation to the maladaptation of organizations to recognize 
gradually building threats to survival; just as the frog placed in a pot of water brought to boiling 
temperature will not attempt to jump out of the pot but adjusts to the temperature and slowly 
dies. The lesson of this story is that we are better equipped to respond to imminent threats than 
to incremental ones.  
6. The delusion of learning from experience is when our actions have consequences in the distant 
future or are part of the larger operating system, which makes it impossible to learn from direct 
experience. The most powerful learning impulses stem from direct experience (e.g. tasting). An 
important notion in this respect is one’s learning horizon. The learning horizon is the limitation in 
time and space for judging one’s effectiveness. In time this is usually one or two years. Beyond 
that horizon lessons will have less of an impact. The learning paradox refers to the conclusion that 
our most important decisions are beyond our learning horizon. 
7. The myth of the management team because management teams tend to spend their time 
fighting for turf, avoiding anything that will make them look bad personally, and pretending that 
everyone is behind the team’s collective strategy. Solving urgent problems is usually regarded 
higher than asking difficult questions on current policies. This poses a problem for organizational 
learning from performance flaws 
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usually punished – and severely. Thus when a failure is revealed (or even presumed), people 
tend to hide the deviate data (Behn 2003: 597). The ability of an organization to critically 
self-assess its performance is therefore an additional important cultural variable for the 
explanation of purposeful PI use.  Senge identified two types of openness that are required 
for a beneficial culture for organizational learning (Senge 1990: 276-286). These were both 
tested as separate indicators by asking respondents to react to both associated statements:  
Participative openness:  Important issues are being discussed openly and fairly  
Reflective openness:     The ability to continually challenge one’s own thinking 
 
Whether this openness exists in an agency is determined by examining both by collecting the 
opinions of organization members and assessing the examples they present.  The analysis of 
documented meetings can shed some additional light on the attention paid to performance 
problems and other learning opportunities.  
 
Indicators S 1.1, S 1.2 and S1.3 combined were used as a proxy for cultural appropriateness 
of PI use. This set of indicators bears resemblance to the feature of a developmental 
organizational culture and the existence of learning routines by supervisors, two 
organizational characteristics that have both been associated positively with PI use 
(Moynihan&Pandey 2010: 14, Moynihan&Landuyt 2009: 1101, Moynihan&Kroll 2015: 22). 
 
Shared view of the meaning of measured performance (Indicator S 2.1) 
Another element that links culture to purposeful PI use is the notion that having a dominant 
single culture or sense of mission can be beneficial to the flow of information within 
government agencies as described by Wilson: 
 
Every organization has a culture, many have several. When a single culture is broadly 
shared and warmly endorsed it is a mission. The great advantage of a mission is that it 
permits the head of the agency to be more confident that operators will act in particular 
ways that the head would have acted had he or she been in their shoes. There are fewer 
distortions in the flow of information because sender and recipient of the message share 
common understandings. (Wilson 1989:109) 
 
As noted by Moynihan the way PI is selected, interpreted, presented and processed may be 
highly dependent upon shared cognitive frames that characterize an agency as an institution 
(see CH 2.5). These frames may have originated from a shared organizational, professional or 
educational background. Implementation of the PB idea of introducing accountability based 
on objective PI is likely to be heavily influenced by shared cognitive frames. This indicator 
relates to some of the factors associated with high use of PI in public organizations such as 
inclusion of organizational members in performance management processes 
(Melkers&Willoughby 2004: 95) and the ability to link performance measures to one’s own 
actions (Moynihan&Lavertu 2012: 599-600). The same goes, albeit perhaps more indirectly, 
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for public service motivation and the motivational nature of tasks (Perry&Hondeghem 2008: 
8, Moynihan&Pandey 2010: 11, Moynihan&Lavertu 2012: 599-600) as a large degree of 
similarity between organizational goals and one’s personal beliefs and convictions could well 
explain purposeful PI use by organization members.  
 
In her study of the influence of organizational culture on learning in public agencies, Mahler 
asserts that ‘culture plays role in organizational learning by filling in gaps in technological 
understanding with the collective wisdom of the organization’ (Mahler 1997, 536). Viewed 
this way, the dominance of organizational culture can affect the use of PI to learn and 
improve as it may heavily influence the way (performance) information is selected, 
interpreted, presented and processed. If there is a joint understanding across organization 
members about the meaning of performance data and this interpretation is shared by its 
principal(s) and other stakeholders, such a culture should be expected to be beneficial to PI 
use.  
 
However, on the same account, existing institutional knowledge can also ´color´ the 
perception or interpretation of data in such a way that the organization misses out on 
opportunities for learning Van der Knaap distinguishes between three results from cognitive 
framing that limit organizational learning from performance evaluation that also bear 
relevance to the use of PI by agencies in general (Van der Knaap 1997:62): 
 Distorting or blinding function of cognitive frames: existing knowledge ‘colors’ the 
perception of a phenomenon or causes organization members to totally miss out on 
a phenomenon. The result is that different people or groups see something different 
when observing a phenomenon. 
 Existing knowledge ‘colors’ the interpretation of a perceived phenomenon. The result 
is that although different people/groups perceive the same phenomenon, they give it 
another meaning.   
 In order to avoid cognitive dissonance a need for reflection that is felt, is deliberately 
denied or avoided. This response can lead to ‘defensive routines’ as described by 
Argyris (Argyris 1994:81) 
 
To assess the helpfulness of cognitive frames for explaining purposeful PI use, the official 
performance measures as reported by the organization are compared to the respondent’s 
own measure for doing a job successfully.  While PB ideally provides objective and relevant 
PI that is aligned with an organization’s goals, organization members may have alternative, 
often undisclosed, measures for success that they apply to their own work.  The fit between 
the formal performance measures that the PB system provides on the one hand, and the 
convictions of organization members about what is considered successful on the other hand, 
will provide a clue about the attitude of organization members towards using a formalized 
performance measurement system. If there is a large fit, the measured performance is easily 
recognized as being relevant by the organization and is likely to be used for decisions. If 
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there is a low fit, information is less likely to be used for decisions and collecting and 
reporting it is even viewed as irrelevant and too time consuming.  
 
It is likely that cultural appropriateness (indicators S1.1 to 1.3) can also help explain existing 
cognitive frames to some extent. When there is a taboo on reporting failures, results are 
more likely to be explained as a success or will be framed to stress only the successful 
elements. Similarly, in case of an open and self-reflective culture, the risk of denial, 
avoidance of misinterpretation of PI seems less likely. To avoid overlap, cases will only be 
studied for the occurrence of cognitive frames other than the ones easily associated with 
low reflective or participative openness.  
 
4.5        Explaining result oriented behavior 
The unpredictable volatile reality of political life in which an agency and its principal often 
operate may yet offer other additional explanations that have to be considered in addition 
to the neo-institutional ones considered here. For each case the presence of notable 
explanations beyond the neo-institutional ones will be assessed. If these are present, 
explaining result oriented behavior with neo-institutional conditions will be insufficient or 
maybe even invalid. The latter will obviously be the case if the conditions sought do not 
occur or only do so to a limited degree. This analysis will form the answer to sub question C: 
Does context offer a likely explanation? 
 
Contextual explanatory factors are factors beyond the institutional sphere of the agency 
itself as mentioned earlier in Chapter 3.7. This means that there are other explanations for 
choices of (re)allocation than the incentives provided by PB. These will be included in the 
study insofar they provide plausible alternative explanations for an apparent display of result 
oriented (re)allocation. Two notable ones stand out but are by no means limitative. 
 Macro-economic factors may influence the allocation of resources. The occurrence of 
financial crises can be powerful drivers of policy changes affecting the principal-agent 
relationship. The pressure from these factors may lead principal and agent to 
(temporarily) behave according to PB expectations of result oriented (re)allocation. 
 Shifting political preferences can also be an explanatory factor. The dominant policy 
paradigm can shift because of changed political preferences resulting in a change in 
political leadership. If this occurs suddenly, a changed policy direction may be 
marketed as lessons learned from performance measurement or evaluation.  
 
After the cases are examined the information gathered will be compared to formulate an 
answer to the last sub question:  
 
Sub question 3: Does the presence of these cultural and historical factors offer a 
convincing alternative explanation for successful PB? 
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The answer to this sub question will give away the most important clue for answering the 
central question to this research. An alternative explanation is considered convincing if it 
matches the findings from the cases. To determine this, a number of hypotheses, based on 
the central research question and its translation into indicators can be considered. The use 
of hypotheses for qualitative research concerning a limited number of case studies may be 
somewhat unusual but was seen as useful for clarifying the interpretation of results 
concerning concepts that by definition already seem have a tendency remain rather vague. 
With due observance of the limitations in terms of external validity that may apply to a 
qualitative assessment of a small number of cases studies, alternative institutional 
explanations for purposeful use of PI, were aggregated below into five hypotheses. 
 
If almost no evidence from case studies is found that supports the presence of the defined 
explanatory indicators, the alternative explanations from historical and sociological neo 
institutionalism will have to be rejected. This would mean that purposeful use of PI has little 
to do with the presence of these indicators and, indeed, the impact of PBB implementation 
may have been undervalued. At the very least it would imply that the proper alternative 
explanatory factors were not identified. As this would confirm the explanation of purposeful 
PI use from rational choice institutionalism this will be named the R-hypothesis. Obviously 
this can only be the case if PB adoption indeed fits the criteria for a good practice of PB 
adoption as determined by the indicators.  
 
Hypothesis R:  Purposeful use of PI is explained by the logic of consequence 
 
The refined central research question was: How do underlying cultural and historical factors 
explain successful PB in government agencies? As the institutional context is considered a 
likely factor that could explain why PB does or does not result in purposeful PI use, 
alternative explanations for PI use were borrowed from two different schools of neo 
institutionalism. These can theoretically be contradicted with the rational choice tradition in 
which principal-agent theory and PB can be situated. Alternative institutional explanations 
for purposeful use of PI, were aggregated below into four hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis H1: Purposeful use of PI is explained by path dependency 
Hypothesis H2: Purposeful use of PI is explained by asymmetries of power  
Hypothesis S1: Purposeful use of PI is explained by cultural appropriateness  
Hypothesis S2: Purposeful use of PI is explained by cognitive frames 
 
Hypotheses H1&2 and S1&2 have been proposed as alternative explanations to Hypothesis 
R. The contradiction between HR and the alternative hypotheses mirrors the observation 
that government agencies tend to be more beholden to their culture and traditions than to 
budget allocations (Schick 2014: 20). If almost no evidence from case studies is found that 
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supports the presence of the institutional factors, all four alternative assumptions have to be 
rejected. Figure 4.2 provides the theoretical model of this research in a simplified matter. 
 
Figure 4.2  Using institutionalism to provide alternative explanations of PI use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The indicators that were formulated in sections 4.2 to 4.4 can be linked to these hypotheses 
as can be seen In Table 4.1. It should be added that, given the design of the model tested, 
the PB indicators are a condition for plausibility of all hypotheses while do other indicators 
only test the plausibility of the alternative H and S-hypotheses.  
 
Table 4.1 Testing model with theoretical concepts and indicators 
 
Hypothesis and corresponding indicators* 
Absent Present 
to 
some 
extent 
Clearly 
present 
Hypothesis R: Purposeful use of PI is explained by the logic of consequence 
PB 1.1 PB is used by the agency in addition to 
traditional budgeting  
   
PB 1.2 PB is used by the  principal to control the 
agency 
  
   
PB 2.1 A high degree of de jure PB implementation    
Alternative explanations  
(following logic of appropriateness) 
Principal-Agent 
dilemma 
RATIONAL CHOICE 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
HISTORICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
SOCIOLOGICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
Traditional explanation  
(following logic of consequence) 
Cultural appropriateness  
 
Purposeful PI 
use in a 
principal-
agent setting 
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PB 2.2 A high degree of de facto PB implementation 
 
   
Hypothesis H1: Purposeful use of PI is explained by path dependency 
H 1.1 Critical juncture in the accountability chain or 
policy field 
   
H 1.2 Problem to which PB was seen as a solution  
 
   
Hypothesis H2: Purposeful use of PI is explained by asymmetries of power 
H 2.1 An advocate or champion of PB in a powerful 
position. 
   
H.2.2 A policy field in which specialists are dominant. 
 
   
Hypothesis S1: Purposeful use of PI is explained by cultural appropriateness 
S 1.1 Absence learning disabilities    
 
   
S 1.2 Participative openness 
 
   
S 1.3 Reflective openness 
 
   
Hypothesis S2: Purposeful use of PI is explained by cognitive frames 
S 2.1 Shared view of the meaning of measured 
performance  
 
   
* for further operationalization see the interview questions and the survey in Appendices 1 and 2 
If there is strong evidence in support of these alternative explanations, the impact of PB 
reforms should be seriously questioned. Moreover, the causal relationship between 
successful PB adoption and the purposeful use of PI that PB adoption was intended to 
achieve may be reversed.  This would imply that favorable institutional circumstances for 
purposeful PI use, are more likely to explain successful PB adoption than the other way 
around. If this clearly is the case, using PI may have been driven primarily by the logic of 
appropriateness. This would provide credibility to the idea that,  instead of modifying public 
organizations into PI users, PB reforms codified patterns of PI use that provide legitimacy to 
organization members.  
 
Although the H- and S-Hypotheses have been proposed as alternatives to the R-Hypothesis, 
this does not mean that they are mutually exclusive as a single one or all may be true. It 
should be noted that the dichotomy between the two types of logics was used here as a 
theoretical concept to shed some additional light on untested and often unarticulated 
beliefs on causality associated with NPM reforms and PB in particular. In fact the hypotheses 
formulated may overlap to some extent which may not be surprising as rational choice and 
sociological approach are both incorporated in historical institutionalism (Hall&Taylor 1996: 
17). Moreover, due to the complexity of causalities investigated, any comprehensive set of 
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explanations of PI use in a principal-agency setting will likely to interact to some extent. 
Therefore it is important to realize that the presence of the indicators investigated does not 
entirely discredit the possibility that PB implementation may have has some positive 
influence on purposeful use of PI at the same time. 
 
4.6 Methods 
To answer the central research question, the assumptions were tested in international cases 
that share successful PB implementation. This research was designed as a multiple case study 
because of this method’s potential to compare empirical results. The explanations for the 
phenomenon observed in each of the cases, formed the basis for analytical (rather than 
statistical) generalization based on the theoretical framework. As diverse cases were selected 
to explain a particular outcome, namely successful PB adoption, a most different systems 
design (MDSD) was chosen (source: Blatter&Haverland 2014: 49). In order to prevent that 
contextual variables would play too big of a role, an adjusted most different system design 
was chosen. The variety between the cases was restricted by limiting the diversity to two 
national institutional settings and two policy areas. The assumptions were tested by relying 
on literal replication from case to case. The choice for literal replication means that a certain 
degree of similarity between cases is desirable. The study was designed to determine 
conditions under which the central phenomenon is likely to be found. It does not try to explain 
contrasting results between cases for reasons that can be predicted form the theoretical 
model, as in theoretical replication (Yin 2003: 47).  
 
An alternative approach would have been to opt for a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) 
which is used more commonly in comparative studies in public administration. This would 
have required the selection beforehand of a number of cases that express strong differences 
with respect to the main independent variable of interest while being as similar as possible 
with regard to variables associated with other potential explanations (Blatter&Haverland 
2014: 25). This was not viewed as feasible as the complexity of the independent variables, as 
operationalized, practically rule out a careful selection of truly similar cases beforehand. This, 
combined with, the plural character of the dependent variable (the several aspects of 
successful PB adoption) made an MSSD approach unlikely to result in clear and reliable 
conclusions.   
 
Performance based reforms not only enjoyed worldwide popularity, the available evidence 
also suggests that their impact on performance did not distinguish significantly between 
national contexts (Gerrish 2015:20). As the phenomenon investigated refers to worldwide 
experience with result oriented budgeting, cases were sought in different policy fields in 
different countries. Even though this required additional analysis of relevant differences 
between countries in terms of political and budgeting systems, it does offer additional 
insights and prevents that overall conclusions are only associated with one particular policy 
area in one national context. To limit the number of independent variables, related 
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programs in terms of policy fields were sought in different countries. Although a larger 
number of cases or a choice for 4 different policy areas in 4 countries may have increased 
external validity to some extent, for reasons of limited time and capacity just four case 
studies were conducted. For the method of case selection see section 4.7 and Appendix IV.   
 
The primary method of data collection were semi structured interviews. This combined the 
flexibility to obtain unexpected relevant information while ensuring focus on the information 
required by the analytical framework. Interview candidates were selected to represent 
management, performance & budget staff and operations of each agency as well as staff 
tasked with oversight on the part of the principal (see Appendix II for exact functions). In 
addition several experts and senior government officials [see Appendix II for name and 
position) were consulted on particular issues. Each indicator was scored by the author on a 
qualitative 3-way scale (‘not present’, ‘present to some extent’ or ‘clearly present’). The 
rating of interview questions was done while re listening to the interview recordings and the 
result was recorded in an interview form for each interviewee. For some indicators a scale of 
criteria was used to identify between the 3 categories while in others a choice was made 
while referring to key remarks from the interviewee. In Appendix II the interview form used 
for each respondent can be viewed. Data were primarily processed by qualitative analysis 
although some quantitative analysis was used for comparing and aggregating results. These 
scores were aggregated for each case allowing for a qualitative comparison on an ordinal 
scale. After finishing each draft case study, the report was reviewed by a key informant from 
the organization involved.  
 
A specific risk to validity in interviews was responder bias. Translating this specifically to the 
subject of this study, it is notable that to many a system of PB is something that is 
theoretically hard to disagree with. Possible discrepancy between adoption of formal PB 
system and actual result orientation is specifically targeted in this study. This requires 
profound knowledge of signs hinting at such discrepancy before conducting interviews. 
Specific methods that were employed to promote accurate and completeness of newly 
acquired information from interviews were audio-recording, pre-coding of answers in 
interviews and recording data shortly after acquiring them. By means of triangulation the 
findings from interviews were compared with questionnaire results and findings from 
analysis of documents. For example this enabled a comparison between the descriptions of 
cultural openness as provided by the interviewees with the anonymous responses from 
questionnaires. Similarly, different accounts of the actual use of PI for budgetary purposes 
from documents, interviews and questionnaires could be detected. Appendix III shows the 
questionnaire that was used.  
 
Gaining access to key organization members was expected to pose a technical difficulty. 
Using a large professional network and support from the advisory committee was helpful in 
gaining the required access. However this also poses a risk of being associated with certain 
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interests or maybe even jeopardizing these unintentionally. Working in the field of budget 
accountability at the NL Ministry of Finance means that the author is subject to the apparent 
advantages and risks of being a practitioner/researcher. Apart from the obvious advantages 
of being a ‘pracademic’ in the same field (access to data, synergy, practical knowledge and 
experience) this combination is known to present a couple of risks of its own. These are: 
professional bias, lack of time and methodological expertise, a professional or hierarchical 
bias towards research results and the tendency of many organizations to value outside 
advice more highly (Robson 1993: 534-538). Earlier research experience of the author, a 
balanced committee in which both academics and practitioners were represented as well as 
frequently discussing results with colleagues and fellow researchers is expected to have 
contained these risks. 
 
4.7 Case selection 
The choice for the Netherlands and the US federal context results from the author’s 
familiarity with both from earlier research and work as well as the advantage of large 
accessible data availability that the U.S. government offers in this area. Case selection 
started with creating a shortlist of potential cases in the Netherlands based on government 
reports and academic papers as well as talks with academics and experts from the 
Netherlands Ministry of Finance and the Netherlands National Court of Audit. This resulted 
in a shortlist of thirteen principal-agent relationships (see Appendix II) in which output based 
funding and performance management are claimed to have been dominant in recent years. 
To control for obvious international differences in policy characteristics, consultations with 
experts in the US and the Netherlands resulted in a selection of five candidates out of 
thirteen (see Appendix II). These five were selected because the public services they 
provided were expected to be least affected by national policy context. For these 
candidates, the US federal counterparts were analyzed with help of the White House’s PART 
database11. All of these five sufficiently met the criteria for a suitable case study and 
although two other policy areas offered slightly superior opportunities on paper, forestry 
and air traffic control were selected on more pragmatic grounds after discussions with US 
and Netherlands experts. Factors determining the final case selection were the ability to 
acquire additional specialist knowledge and the availability of contacts with relevant 
professionals. Finally the occurrence of an extensive multi-year reorganization in one of the 
candidates, i.e. NVWA (Food Safety Administration of the Netherlands), discredited it as a 
practical candidate. The results of the final case selection are presented in Table 4.2.  For 
                                                 
11 PART stands for Program Assessment Rating Tool. This tool was used by the Office of Management 
and Budget during the Bush (jr) Administration. Under PART about 1.000 U.S. Federal programs were 
systematically rated in terms of performance. For this rating a standardized question list was used 
that heavily focused on the availability and use of performance information in the management an d 
budgeting processes.  
 
 
 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
83 
 
each case study organizational entities were chosen to represent the central principal and 
agent. Nonetheless additional principal-agent relationships were inevitably included like the 
ones between an agent’s (regional) headquarter and geographical unit. In Appendix IV more 
details are provided regarding the case selection process. 
 
Table 4.2  Results case selection 
 
 
4.8 Case description 
To enable a fair comparison between the cases studied, each will be described according to a 
similar format. After a general description of the case (paragraph 1) the question will be 
addressed to what extent the case represents a PB success (paragraph 2). Subsequently 
explanations provided by the selected neo-institutionalist concepts will be examined 
(paragraph 3). Then the analysis will turn to the context to see if it offers a likely explanation 
(paragraph 4). Finally a conclusion will be drawn considering the scores on the indicators and 
the question which hypothesis is supported by the case (paragraph 5). Each case will end 
with an epilogue that will look back on the key findings and additional observations as well 
as the data collection for the case. A more elaborate format for the description of each case 
is provided in Appendix V. 
 
 
 
 
Policy area  NL Principal-Agent US Principal - Agent 
Forestry  SBB:  Min. van LNV / EL&I –
Staatsbosbeheer   
USFS: USDA/HQ US Forest Service -  
Pacific Region 9 
Aviation (air 
traffic control) 
LVNL: Min. van VenW / I&M –
Luchtverkeers-leiding Nederland  
FAA/ATO: Dept. of Transport -  
FAA/Air Traffic Organization 
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CHAPTER 5  CASE STUDY STAATSBOSBEHEER   
(National Forest Service of the Netherlands) 
 
5.1  Description of the Agency and its Principal  
 
History and tasks SBB 
Staatsbosbeheer (SBB) is an agency that manages 260.000 hectares of public lands in the 
Netherlands on behalf of the national government. Although part of the public sector, some 
of the activities SBB undertakes also make it a player on private markets. As a hybrid 
organization, SBB and its political stakeholders have been attempting to balance the 
execution of public tasks with benefiting from commercial incentives.  SBB’s main principal 
has been the Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (Agriculture, Nature and 
Fishery) which was merged into the Ministerie van ELenI (Economic Affairs, Agriculture and 
Innovation) in 2010. In 2012 the Ministry van ELenI was renamed to Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken (Economic Affairs).  
 
In 1998 SBB was granted a semi-independent status by law. This was the result of a 
discussion about possible privatization that had already started in the early 1980s. The 
objectives of the 1998 law (‘Wet Verzelfstandiging Staatsbosbeheer) were twofold. Firstly 
SBB would be able to provide a better product at lower costs. These lower costs would have 
to result from efficiency gains, output steering, the introduction of accrual accounting and 
generating additional own revenues from commercial activities.  
Secondly, by gaining more of a separate identity, SBB would be better able to present itself 
to stakeholders in a recognizable way. This would help SBB to meet stakeholders’ wishes and 
amongst these notably those of citizens12. Or, as someone at SBB put it: forestry people will 
have to learn that people are no longer considered a harmful species in the woods  
 
SBB has long upheld a good reputation with regard to performance management. However, 
in the face of massive cuts envisioned by the current Dutch government (up to 80% by some 
accounts), this method of steering is beginning to lose some of its relevance. Therefore in 
the investigated period, the era before around 2008/2009 is by many accounts a different 
one that the years before. According to plans of the minority government lead by PM Rutte, 
the responsibility for the main national tasks that SBB performs on behalf of the national 
government, was to be transferred to the 12 provinces of the Netherlands.  
 
This case study takes into account the period from the mid-1990s up until now. SBB’s history 
however goes back a lot longer that. Staatsbosbeheer (SBB) was established in 1899 when 
                                                 
12 Schmitz, E.M.A. e.a. 2003:7, Commissie Evaluatie Staatsbosbeheer. Vooruit op Eigen Benen – Evaluatie van 
de verzelfstandiging van Staatsbosbeheer 1998-2003 (evaluatie vindt elke 4 jaar plaats uit hoofde van art.32 
van de Wet Verzelfstandiging Staatsbosbeheer) 
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the Netherlands was severely deforested and demand for wood was at a high. Also soil 
erosion was a major problem. In its early days, wood production remained SBB’s main 
emphasis, regulating wood supply by managing stocks of production forests. In the late 
1960s the Netherlands could no longer compete with timber producers in larger countries. 
Also, a change in thinking about nature and environment led to growing criticism of 
production forests. From then on, focus altered towards the development of natural, mixed 
forests.  
 
As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, protection of 'nature' and preserving 
'natural monuments' became more important issues. In 1928 conservation officially became 
SBB’s second task. The 1970s saw a more offensive approach to nature in the form of active 
nature restoration and development.  
 
Two more tasks were added in the early 20th century. From 1915 SBB advised the 
Department of Public Works on the planting of roads and waterways. This grew into a third 
task: landscape planning. As a result SBB has had a great deal of influence on the formation 
of the Dutch landscape for decades. As manager of large parts of the landscape, these days, 
SBB focuses on the preservation of scenic values, the regional identity of the cultural 
landscapes and historic elements.  
 
From the 1920s, people began to explore the recreational value of nature. Creating and 
maintaining recreational facilities and managing the growing flows of visitors became SBB’s 
fourth task. It is SBB’s policy to make their sites accessible to all Dutch public and offer a 
range of opportunities to experience nature.  
 
In response to the social developments, SBB today uses its experience in the management 
and development of multifunctional nature. Varied use of space requires versatile control 
that contributes to13:  
x the quality of living, working and recreation; 
x biodiversity; 
x the resilience of nature;  
x maintaining the unique identity of the Dutch landscape 
 
Size  
Headquartered in Driebergen, SBB currently employs around 1000 people. In 2010 SBB’s 
annual turnover totaled € 151.1 million. Around 60% (€89.5 million) was contributed by the 
Ministry of EL&I while some 30% was collected from own activities (€ 48 million) notably 
from timber sales which accounted for about half of this amount. The remaining 10% came 
from small subsidies. These figures have been fairly stable over most of the last decade, 
                                                 
13 www.staatsbosbeheer.nl 
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however under current austerity measures SBB’s contribution from the Ministry will be cut 
dramatically. In addition, national tasks would be passed down to the provinces. The level of 
funding to be transferred to the provinces as well as their commitment to these plans 
remains unclear at the time of writing. 
 
Organization 
SBB is divided into 4 regions that are primarily tasked with land management and services 
such as terrain management, recreation and education. In addition two separate branches 
work nationwide on specific tasks:  
SBB- BuitenZaken (Services) is tasked with service delivery from SBB activities to clients, both 
consumers and businesses. Beside lumber sales other commercial activities are delivery of 
biomass, potting soil and rental of cabins and rural houses. 
SBB-Grond en Gebouwen (Terrains and Buildings) advises regional SBB management about 
maintaining about 1700 buildings including cultural and historical buildings located in SBB’s 
terrains. 
 
Figure 5.1  Organizational Chart SBB (source www.staatsbosbeheer.nl)  
 
 
Each of the four regions is organized into several districts under which a number of business 
units like terrains and visitor centers resort.   
 
 
 
 
Advisory 
Board 
Supervisory 
Board 
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Figure 5.2 Organizational Chart of a SBB region (source: www.staatsbosbeheer.nl) 
 
 
Policy field and tasks  
The national tasks that SBB has been performing by on behalf of the Ministry are currently 
stated under a single program goal in the latter’s 2012 budget documents  
 
Article 18.3: Maintaining international and national biodiversity and strengthening our 
natural resources. 
 
In previous years a larger number of programs and objectives were used. These objectives 
have been altered numerous times over time. The land management objectives used to be 
part of the formal objectives in recent budget years but were dropped from 2012 in 
anticipation of decentralization of these tasks. In order to give an idea what the Ministry’s 
formal objectives looked like in previous years, the policy goals from the 2007 budget are 
listed in Appendix V.1 as an example of a typical year.  
 
In addition to the funds SBB gets from government, SBB BuitenZaken (Services) is generating 
revenue from commercial activities. These activities are undertaken with some cautiousness 
given SBB’s hybrid character. In 2012 the legal basis for SBB selling products and services 
was strengthened following a series of unsuccessful legal actions taken by competitors. Also 
it is expected that the diminishing relevance of the national government as a stakeholder, 
will mean less political intervention with initiatives undertaken by this branch of SBB. 
 
 
 
 Regional Director 
Districts 
Operational Units (terrains and visitor centers) 
Regional Controller 
Central Staff Planning Office 
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5.2 Degree of PB implementation 
As mentioned previously, SBB has maintained a certain reputation when it comes to 
performance budgeting and performance management. This reputation is largely based on 
its system of output funding. In this paragraph the characteristics of SBB’s performance 
budgeting system are analyzed both in its relationship with the Ministry as internally. 
 
5.2.1 PB in relationship Ministry - SBB  
The planning and reporting relationship between SBB and the Ministry fits typical NPM 
characteristics in the sense that policy execution has been separated from policy 
development and that SBB is funded on the basis of output targets. Each year SBB’s offers a 
proposal to the Ministry containing an activity program, funding levels and performance 
indicators. The primary goods and services SBB offers fall into several categories of output: 
x Management of terrains for maintaining Nature and Landscape  
x Management of terrains for Recreation  
x Representation of interests  
x Development of new natural areas 
x Hosting visitors 
 
The bulk of Ministry’s contribution to SBB is intended for terrain-management. The 
associated outputs are stated in number of hectares with a price per hectare dependent on 
the type of terrain. In addition some miscellaneous activities and financial arrangements are 
mentioned in the offer. After negotiation between both parties this results in an order on 
behalf of the ministry, the offer is made into an order from the ministry which forms the 
basis for SBB’s annual budget. It is worthwhile noting that the principle that the Ministry 
determines WHAT should be delivered and SBB determines HOW it should be delivered is 
mostly implemented in ecological targets and lumber production targets14.  
 
During the budget execution year, high level talks are held twice a year between SBB’s 
director and the State secretary. In spring the previous year’s account is discussed while in 
the autumn, next year’s offer is discussed. The Ministry’s Director Nature meets with SBB’s 
deputy director about every month. In addition there are meetings of a less formal nature 
between SBB and lower ranking civil servants that take place about once a month.  
 
The budget articles of the Ministry’s annual budget have sported a number of performance 
indicators on amongst others biodiversity, terrain management outputs, accessibility of 
terrains and land acquisition. In the Ministries’ yearly report the realization of these figures 
in relation to their target values are reported. In addition SBB provides external stakeholders 
                                                 
14 D’Hondt E.M. e.a. 2009: 78, Commissie Evaluatie Staatsbosbeheer. Ruimte in het Bos! - Evaluatie 
Staatsbosbeheer. 2009 (evaluatie vindt elke 4 jaar plaats uit hoofde van art.32 van de Wet Verzelfstandiging 
Staatsbosbeheer) 
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with two accountability documents. One is the financial annual report and the other one is 
about realization of policy objectives. The latter is quite specific on goal realization. For 
example the 2010 report stated that 78% of the nature goal types had been realized. Poor 
planning on the side of SBB was stated as being the cause for 41% of those goal types not 
realized. This displays a relatively high degree of critical self-reflection in the context of 
Dutch public administration.  
 
Actual use of PI in relationship ministry-SBB 
Despite the frequent contacts, SBB respondents indicated that they seldom got a response 
from the ministry regarding PI they reported. This is a development that has deteriorated 
over time and is explained by an increasing lack of specialist knowledge at the ministry. The 
quotes below illustrate the image SBB has of the ministry’s role as a principal: 
‘The ministry is not really interested in any output steering system, their management is 
mainly political’. 
‘In fact the Ministry has been granting us a lump sum without any further steering in the 
last couple of years’ 
 
During its existence as an independent agency, the relationship between SBB and the 
ministry has been subject to changes over time. Some legal conflicts have occurred regarding 
lumber sales and a critical appraisal of SBB’s role in society, claiming it was still too internally 
focused. On its part, SBB claimed the ministry often disregarded its specialized knowledge 
during policy development. Moreover SBB experienced that despite its newly gained status, 
Parliament and the ministry did still interfere with its business when politically sensitive 
issues were at stake. During the 2004-2006 period, tension rose about the output based 
system of funding (price per hectare). This led the ministry to hire an external party to do 
counter expertise on SBB’s offer15. In 2007 these conflicts were settled in an adjusted output 
based system that has been used since between the ministry and SBB. Ironically, upon 
completion of this system, the major budget cuts and decentralization were announced, 
undermining full implementation of this new methodology. It is likely however that in the 
relationship with its future principals, the provinces, the same methodology will be used.   
 
During times of underfunding of desired outputs (occurring from 2006 or so) the ministry 
and SBB yearly specify work that SBB would attempt to deliver but would not be held 
accountable for. This was put in annexes to the order. This implies that the output 
                                                 
15 D’Hondt E.M. e.a. 2009: 73, Commissie Evaluatie Staatsbosbeheer. Ruimte in het Bos! - Evaluatie 
Staatsbosbeheer. 2009 (evaluatie vindt elke 4 jaar plaats uit hoofde van art.32 van de Wet Verzelfstandiging 
Staatsbosbeheer) 
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management methodology is taken seriously by the ministry albeit in a way rather different 
or even inverse from the image of the principal controlling the agent.  
 
5.2.2 Performance management within SBB  
Ecological targets, required outputs and activities play a pivotal role in the PB’s intricate 
planning system. This system has been adapted over time to fit the ministry’s wishes as well 
as standardization with other (private) terrain managing organizations in the Netherlands. 
The result is a myriad of plans of different frequencies and levels of detail ranging from long 
term plans of up to 20 years to annual plans. These plans state terrain characteristics, target 
types of flora and fauna, and the activities needed to keep or attain the intended target 
types. During allocation, funding is directly based upon the activities in the plan with 
occasional adaptation to local circumstances.  
 
Monitoring of terrains takes place continuously by terrain managers. Every 3 months heads 
of districts and their regional director meet. In addition the SBB director and the regional 
directors also use quarterly meetings to take stock. On the agenda are mostly execution 
problems or current events as well as finance. Output information from monitoring is 
occasionally used in these meetings but not in a systematic matter. The Internal Quality 
system ensures that each year about 10% of SBB’s terrains throughout the Netherlands is 
scrutinized for goal realization with the help of external auditors. The variety of the terrains 
selected and the thoroughness of the evaluation results in lessons that are relevant to the 
entire organization. It is therefore reckoned that for their yearly monitoring, managers can 
rely on only a limited number of indicators.   
 
Terrain management and ecological goals as well as SBB’s commercial activities rely heavily 
on quantitative output information. For recreational policy this is less the case due to the 
diversity and volatility of policy objectives in this policy field. Ex post calculation is done only 
at the macro level at the national headquarter. Discussing accountability of outputs versus 
costs at a detailed level within districts is viewed as a pitfall to be avoided. This is felt 
because it takes up much time and the additional insights for steering purposes are limited.  
 
Having looked at the performance budgeting system as formally adopted, perhaps more 
interesting is the actual role PI plays in decision making. Over 75% of respondents at SBB 
confirm that they rely on PI in their work (32% regulary and 46% occasionally). Perhaps 
surprisingly, longer time SBB employees more often claim to be using PI regularly. Regarding 
the implementation and use of PB methods over time, several phases can be distinguished 
over the years: 
 
x Development (1980s to early 1990s) 
Prior to PB implementation money, people and content were treated as separated silos. 
Planning was a lengthy and costly process that actually had little relevance.  
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Exemplary for those days was the following anecdote shared by one of the respondents: 
 
‘According to planning, a sand road had to be improved by leveling it with a special device 
called a land grader. However, each year the available funds were spent on other things 
then buying a land grader. As a result this action just re-occurred in the planning year 
after year.’  
 
In the early 1990s a system was developed that was based around certain target types of 
nature (vegetation and fauna). For every type of landscape, the necessary actions were 
identified to bring it up to the desired standard to support that particular type of nature. 
Sometimes not much has to be done to attain a target whereas in other cases this is a costly 
affair because it requires more ‘artificial’ measures (e.g. keeping water-levels high or 
mowing grass regularly). That way an objective basis was created for coupling outputs to 
activities and costs. 
 
x Initial effects (1998-2004) 
The new system worked quite well at the start. Its internal effects were twofold. Firstly it 
stimulated efficiency by enabling managers and workers to creatively make use of their 
budget. For example the balance between doing work yourself and external hiring shifted. 
One respondent remembers: 
 
‘Prior the new system, the allocation of funds to districts was a yearly nightmare. Everyone 
brought on arguments that explained why they would require extra money. Having large 
numbers of steady personnel was seen as the best strategy for a district to safeguard a large 
part of the available funding. The objective output measures ended this at once. The terrain 
characteristics and target types of nature determined the funds needed. This meant that if 
you had few personnel, you would still get the money you required. This created an incentive 
to no longer base your number of employees on the yearly peak time but instead on the 
low-season. In peak time flexible workers were hired temporarily. This resulted in large 
efficiency gains.’ 
 
A second effect was that people became more aware of the intended results of their work. 
This awareness stimulated creativity that benefited efficiency and effectiveness. With regard 
to the ability to measure effectiveness, an ecologist tasked with collecting data from field 
observation recalls that: 
 
‘In the 1990s terrain managers lost the autonomy to collect the ecological data they 
wanted. Up until then this was largely a matter of personal preference. One terrain 
manager would monitor the number of a certain butterfly species, while the other would 
count his favorite type of flower. After implementation of the new system, the data 
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collected had to match the target types of flora and fauna attributed his terrain. This 
enabled implementing of a national policy for biodiversity.’ 
 
x Perfection the control system (2004-2007) 
In their attempts to further refine the system, technical experts overcomplicated the output 
based system with ever more subtypes of terrains. In the meantime professional controllers 
tried to use the system for continuous monitoring of targets. The result was that people 
from the districts and business units put too much trust in the system instead of thinking for 
themselves. The fun and creativity were slowly wielded out. This was not beneficial to 
attaining further efficiency gains.  
 
x Adjusted control system and large budget cuts (2007 - present) 
The system of output controls as agreed with the ministry in 2007 has been audited twice to 
check the validity of cost prices.  Despite this, the ministry’s annuals contribution only covers 
between 50 and 60% of these cost prices so far and this may be getting even worse. 
Obviously this may undermine the system of output steering at some point. Right now 
managers in the districts and terrains use their professional expertise to set their own 
priorities within the given budget level. Using a more pragmatic approach, the central 
control philosophy relies upon simplicity and consistence nowadays using PI only when 
useful to support the internal dialogue and learning processes.  
 
It is important to note that the SBB BuitenZaken (the commercial activities branch) has 
developed its own system of output monitoring without much interference from principals. 
For recreational activities the number of visitors, number of stays, occupation rates and 
customer satisfaction are monitored. Actual production of goods (e.g. lumber and soil) are 
monitored in conjunction with their cost prices and sales proceeds. This monitoring is 
characterized by a higher frequency than SBB’s other activities. 
 
5.2.3 Conclusion on PB implementation 
From the point of view of the ministry, quantitative planning and measurement of nature 
and terrain management is well developed by SBB. As mentioned earlier, more than three 
out of five employees claim that PI is used in their work. In the fields of nature and 
recreation this is less the case. Other than SBB Dienstverlening, quantitative targets are 
scarcely mentioned and are hardly used for steering and giving account in these two fields.  
 
Of the different uses of PI mentioned in CH 2.3, all uses were said to occur. Over 95% of the 
respondents was familiar with the actual use of PIfor at least one of the categories 
mentioned, with an average of 3.8 uses selected by each respondent. Most often mentioned 
were the utilization of PI for the purposes of external accountability and internally 
reallocating resources (see Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1 Utilization of PI by SBB according to respondents 
 
Utilization of PI for: % of respondents 
choosing this answer 
in the questionnaire 
Performance reporting for external accountability  70,6% 
Strategically reallocate internal resources 57,6% 
Setting program priorities 37,6% 
Allocating internal funds 29,4% 
Monitor cost and performance and contract management  24,7% 
Analyzing productivity and funding levels  24,7% 
Motivate staff to act consistent with goals 21,2% 
Deciding on outsourcing decisions 20,0% 
Adopting new program approaches following evaluation 16,5% 
 
The five categories printed in bold represent the five most frequently chosen categories 
given by SBB interviewees. A notable difference is that using PI to adopt new programs was 
mentioned more often by interviewees. This may be explained by the fact that management 
and bureau staff were relatively overrepresented in the interviews and are more likely to be 
involved in policy development.   
 
According to the micro model of PB introduced in Chapter 2, these uses of PI count as 
successful PB implementation if they contribute to the phenomena of enlightenment and 
program learning, leading to more efficient and effective ways policy execution. The 
examples reported from the era of initial effects (1998-2004) within SBB do seem to fit this 
criterion. 
 
The cyclical use of PI in the different evaluation cycles, most notably in SBB’s internal quality 
system, also hint at program learning. Without much effort an abundance of these types of 
program lessons can be named by respondents. The value of the evaluation results for 
financial planning however is not completely transparent. Although the link between 
ecological objectives (target types of nature) and financial consequences is a rather direct 
one, it is clear that the primary process is the dominant driver for cyclical performance 
reporting and evaluation and not the financial planning and control cycle. In other words: it 
occurs like finance has been linked to output rather than outputs to finance. Looking at the 
indicators for PB success, the evidence of actual use of PB by the ministry to control SBB is 
hardly convincing. However the internal effects of performance management and the role of 
outputs in the internal budget preparation are clearly visible.  
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Table 5.2 Presence of indicators of performance budgeting implementation 
 
Indicators Presence in 
SBB case 
 
PB 1.1 PB is used by the agency in addition to traditional 
budgeting 
  
Clearly 
present 
PB 1.2 PB is used by the  principal to control the agency 
  
Absent 
PB 2.1 A high degree of de jure PB implementation 
 
Present to 
some extent 
PB 2.2 A high degree of de facto PB implementation 
 
Clearly 
present 
 
5.3 Exploring Neo-Institutionalist  Explanations  
The main question of this research is to explain purposeful PI use by an agency, in this case, 
SBB. It is beyond doubt that SBB has been using performance measurement to enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness in performing its public tasks. However that does not 
automatically mean that this has occurred thanks to implementation of a PB system. Lending 
from neo institutional theory, several alternative explanations for this result oriented 
behavior are explored.   
 
5.3.1 Explanations from Historical Neo Institutionalism 
When investigating path dependency as an explanatory factor, important events with an 
impact the organization were sought that might explain PB implementation. This could be 
anything, for example a crisis with a principal or a series of bad press in the media. Moreover 
it is possible that, if adoption of PB is viewed as an appropriate response to such events, 
result oriented behavior should be explained by the logic of appropriateness rather than 
PB’s incentives doing their work. To put it differently: organization members are susceptible 
to unwritten rules and roles that demand compliance with a performance management 
system, regardless of the incentives of this system itself.  
 
In the interviews respondents were asked to name the top 3 events that have affected their 
organization throughout the years and were asked to think of answers that they felt their 
colleagues might give as well. The latter remark was added to prevent that respondents 
mentioned events too close to their own specific duties. When comparing the answers 
mostly mentioned were: 
x The shift towards more customer orientation to citizens and stakeholders  
x Gaining of independence status in 1998 and, not surprisingly 
x The budget cuts and decentralization plans of the current government 
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13 different answers were given with the most frequently mentioned event having been 
named by only half of the respondents. This alone does not support the occurrence of an 
event with the impact to qualify as a critical juncture for SBB. In addition these events most 
mentioned do not bear a clear connection with the introduction of SBB’s system of 
performance budgeting. At most it can be argued that a system of output funding has been a 
condition that helped enable the independent status.  
 
Another alternative explanation for adopting a PB system might be the dominance of a 
certain influential unit or person that acted as a champion of output measurement or 
performance management. It is quite common that the central financial unit pushes for 
adoption a PB system or that a particular director is keen on implementing such a system. 
Although the name of the SBB director at the turn of the century was named a couple of 
times, no single powerful champion of PB was found. In reality there is more evidence that 
the initiative for the output based budgeting system was system happened bottom up by 
specialists from different regions albeit supported by a few key figures at the central 
headquarters. More in general the position of control-units at SBB does not seem to be 
dominant relative to management. Their role in developing targets also seems to be 
relatively limited. 
 
Finally, a dominant role of specialists in a certain policy field may explain why objective 
measurement is regarded higher than other more political factors. To determine this, 
respondents were asked to choose between factors that are most influential to SBB policy in 
two subsequent questions16 : 
A) Vested interests    or   B) Policy ideas   
and 
A) Politics/public opinion  or   B) specialist expertise 
 
If for both questions answer B is chosen, this indicates that SBB’s policy area is run pretty 
much by experts and their policy ideas. Most respondents described that up until 2008/9 
this was indeed the situation for SBB. Specialist could do their work without much political 
intervention or even attention. Interests obviously did play a role, mainly during policy 
execution. It wasn’t until a few years ago that the policy paradigm of specialists was 
discussed at the national political level. This in particular applies to ecological policies. Based 
the questionnaire, the recent situation is reflected mostly in the answers as illustrated in 
Table 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Based on ‘Pathways to Power’ framework, (Posner 2004:8-14) 
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Table 5.3 Dominant factors driving SBB’s policy area 
 
Dominant role in policy 
area 
 
A) Vested 
interests 
 
B) Policy ideas 
A) Politics / public opinion 
31,9% 
(Partisan 
pathway) 
41,9% 
(Symbolic 
pathway) 
 
B) Specialist expertise 
11,3% 
(Pluralist 
pathway) 
14,8% 
(Expert pathway) 
 
It can be concluded that, unlike the other indicators from this category, the dominance of 
specialist in SBB’s field of policy may offer somewhat of an alternative explanation of the 
strong emphasis on measured performance. This assessment however may fit yesterday’s 
SBB better than today’s. 
 
Table 5.4 Presence of indicators historical neo-institutionalism 
 
Indicators Presence in 
SBB case 
 
H 1.1 Critical juncture in the accountability chain or policy field 
 
Absent 
H 1.2 Problem to which PB was seen as a solution  
 
Absent 
H 2.1 An  advocate or champion of PB in a powerful position 
 
Absent 
H.2.2 A policy field in which specialists are dominant. 
 
Present to 
some extent 
 
5.3.2 Explanations from Sociological Neo Institutionalism 
Sociological neo institutionalism introduced the concept of cultural appropriateness as a 
possible explanation of behavior, in this case behavior associated with the ideal of PB 
implementation. In organizations that are characterized by a culture that is open to 
organizational learning, more favorable conditions for using PI for enlightenment and 
program learning can be expected. This situation can easily be contrasted with many 
government organizations in which bad news and self-criticism are met with suspicion and 
defensive routines. The conditions for organizational learning were tested by letting 
respondents react to four statements: 
a. Within SBB, important issues are being discussed openly and fairly 
b. Within SBB, existing opinions are regularly challenged and discussed 
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c. If SBB is being confronted with a problem, a thorough problem analysis takes place 
prior to taking action 
d. If things don’t work out in SBB’s policies and execution, lessons are usually learned 
 
The responses to these questions in the interviews reveal SBB as an organization that is close 
to resembling an archetype learning organization. When looking at the answers from the 
questionnaire a somewhat different picture arises: 
 
Figure 5.3 Average of responses to the 4 statements on organizational learning 
 
 (0 = totally disagree, 0.5 = somewhat disagree, 1 = neutral, 1.5 = somewhat agree, 2 = totally agree) 
 
The average score on these statements contrasts with the responses from the interview. 
Despite the same guarantees regarding confidentiality, social desirability may have played a 
role in the responses given in the interviews. In addition the majority of interviewees worked 
held staff and management positions. It is possible that fostering learning culture is more 
actively encouraged at (regional) headquarters.  
 
Indeed the headquarters sees an active role for itself in stimulating the sharing of 
organizational knowledge. The reason for this has to do with the fact that the average 
forester is usually a dedicated professional who is used to working autonomously. Therefore 
he will, by himself, not easily visit a colleague to see if he can learn from him. Although well 
able to self-reflect and challenge existing positions, the commitment to decisions taken 
earlier is sometimes mentioned as a shortcoming the interviews do reveal that that there 
are some subjects that are characterized by somewhat more sensitivity or secrecy. 
Sometimes, sensitivity to outside developments and support for SBB’s policies is mentioned 
as still somewhat of a weak point.   
 
As a result of the idealism and intrinsic motivation that many employees share, the 
distinction between a person and his professional ideas can be somewhat more of an issue. 
This can sometimes prove to be an obstacle to learning behavior. Overall though, the 
willingness to share knowledge and learn seems to be strong according to the interviewees 
as is the ability to self-reflect. They also agree that these organizational capabilities have 
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1,50
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grown in recent years. This view is supported by the existence of several highly regarded 
learning forums within SBB. 
 
Another important factor that enables the use of a PB system for organizational learning is 
the absence of distorting cognitive frames. Distorting cognitive frames hamper a learning 
dialogue because the signals from, in this case performance management, are interpreted 
differently by members of the organization. This was investigated by asking respondents 
about their attitude towards performance indicators, their knowledge of SBB’s performance 
measurement and whether they believed it was beneficial to their organization. The answers 
from the interviews indicated that SBB’s performance management system was well known 
and seen as relevant by most. This indicates that results from performance measurement 
are quite undisputed and have a similar meaning to different people in the organization. 
Looking at the questionnaire, the average of the 4 questions measuring attitude towards and 
knowledge of SBB’s performance measurement system, varied according to the position 
held by the respondents: 
 
Figure 5.4 Attitude towards and knowledge of performance measurement system 
 
 
From a viewpoint of sociological neo institutionalism, the ability to openly discuss problems 
and reflect on existing positions make for an organizational culture in which using of PI for 
learning and enlightenment is regarded as appropriate behavior. This is especially more 
likely since SBB’s performance measurement itself is viewed as a legitimate assessment of 
relevant results.  
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Table 5.3 Presence of indicators sociological neo institutionalism 
Indicators Presence in 
SBB case 
S 1.1 Absence learning disabilities  
 
Present to 
some extent 
S 1.2 Participative openness 
 
Clearly 
present 
S 1.3 Reflective openness 
 
Present to 
some extent 
S 2.1 Shared view of the meaning of measured performance  
 
Clearly 
present 
 
5.4 Contextual factors 
Two contextual factors should not be ignored regarding the SBB case. First of all the impact 
of the fiscal crisis has landed particularly harsh on SBB leading to budgetary insecurity. In 
addition the move to decentralize most SBB tasks from the Ministry to the 12 provinces will 
lead to an increase of the number of primary principals to deal with. So far this has had some 
impact in the sense that the interest for output reporting from the side of the Ministry was 
reduced and the internal steering and quality assurance system is under increasing pressure.  
 
Secondly, the shift in political preferences regarding conservation of nature has seen a 
dramatic change. This was expressed by one of the respondents in a straightforward matter: 
 
‘10 years ago, you didn’t have to explain anybody why nature was beneficial for people. In 
those days SBB developed from a terrain manager to a protector of nature. Nowadays 
SBB’s policies do require explanation as managing terrains can also be done by private 
parties. I am surprised at the fierceness of these changes in recent years.’ 
 
It remains to be seen how permanent and irreversible these developments are for SBB. For 
all the impact they’ve had and undoubtedly will have, they do not provide likely explanations 
for purposeful PI use by SBB as they only occurred relatively recently.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The investigation of the indicators for SBB should provide answers to three questions to be 
answered for each case (see CH 4): 
 
A.  To what extent is this a PB success? 
 
B  Are the identified conditions present? 
 
C.  Does context offer a likely explanation? 
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The answer to the first two questions can be expressed when the numerical scores, obtained 
from the interviews are expressed in the range of 0-2 and applied to the different indicators: 
 
Figure 5.5 Numerical scores of the indicators from the interviews 
 
The figure shows that SBB does fit the criteria for a PB success in most respects except for 
the use of PB by the principal to control its agent (PB 1.2). The score on indicator PB 1.1 was 
confirmed by the questionnaire that only measured this PB indicator in a direct manner.   
 
The second question can be answered positive for an open culture and the absence of 
distorting cognitive frames (S 1.2 and S 2.1). Additionally, the relative dominance held 
traditionally by specialists in PB’s policy field (H 2.2) and a culture relatively favorable to 
organizational learning (S 1.1, S 1.3) are also present albeit less clear as these findings are 
only partly confirmed by questionnaire results.  
 
In response to the third question it can be argued that in recent years two significant 
contextual factors have affected SBB. However, during most of the period studied these 
have been absent.  
 
Summarizing these findings, from a neo-institutionalist point of view, SBB’s culture of openly 
discussing results and a commitment to learn and improve make it appropriate for 
organization members to actively engage in monitoring, evaluation and fully accepting 
funding based on outputs. In addition, the relative dominance (at least until recently) of 
specialists in SBB’s field of work did mean that the content of the work was hardly affected 
by political ideology or mobilization of mass interests. This meant that performance 
management system was able to develop undisturbed without many questioning its 
relevance. So it seems that in the SBB case the logic of appropriateness does offers 
explanations to the result oriented behavior displayed by its members. 
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Epilogue 
The intrinsic motivation of SBB staff may well be the key variable here. Although hard to 
come by in most ministerial settings, a passion for monitoring the results of one’s work 
perfectly fits any performance management system. It does not seem unlikely that an 
intrinsically motivated person who is interested in saving a particular endangered animal or 
restoring a type of landscape, is genuinely interested in the results of policy measurement 
and opportunities for policy improvement. The rather loose coupling between monitoring 
results and money except in the planning phase does fit this image. Why would an 
intrinsically motivated professional be interested in efficiency as long as this does not 
interfere with attaining his goals?  
 
Finally there is the Nature of SBB’s work. It is notable that in the fields of work of SBB, 
output measurement stems from a long standing tradition. In ecology, the presence and 
abundance of indicator species are traditionally used as an indication of the well-being of a 
larger group of species. Or, as one of SBB’s ecologists mentioned: 
 
‘Working with indicators is a phenomenon that comes with our profession.’   
 
In the lumber-industry and terrain management, quantitative planning methods have been 
around long before the modern concept of performance management. The existence of 
countable work output, quality standards and standardized lists of specific jobs as well as the 
needed amount of time to perform them, were already noticed by Herbert Kaufman in his 
classic study of the U.S. Forest Service (Kaufman 1960: 115). For SBB this was illustrated by 
an anecdote of one of the respondents: 
 
‘While researching the development of lumber prices with a colleague back in the early 
1990s, we came across stack of old year plans form the 1930s in a shack in the Veluwe17. 
It occurred to us that these had the same layout as the planning documents we used back 
then with virtually the same categories of types of terrains, activities and inputs’ 
 
The fact that SBB’s recreational tasks were the underdeveloped part of its performance 
management system may have to do with the fact that these activities seem to lack the 
idealistic or commercial component that seem to be present in SBB’s other activities.   
 
Given this background, it is hardly surprising that the system developed by SBB in the 1990s 
was largely a bottom – up effort by regional staff. Again, this somewhat contrasts the 
traditional idea of PB being introduced by the principal as a tool to control an agent.  
 
                                                 
17 Veluwe is the name of the largest national park of the Netherlands, located in the center of the country. 
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Some have argued that due to the nature of the tasks performed by a Forest Service, 
‘tendencies toward fragmentation’ such as geographic dispersion and varying local 
conditions pose extra challenges to attaining organizational unity, compliance and 
conformity (Kaufman 1960: 86-87, Tipple&Wellman 1991: 422). Admitting these factors are 
physically far greater for the U.S. Forest Service than for SBB, it may equally serve as an 
explanation of organizational culture of both organizations. Out of necessity, management 
will have to rely heavily on the autonomy and discretion of foresters to manage their own 
terrains. In such an organization it is not surprising that devoted and self-reliant (if not 
obstinate) individuals fare best. Intrinsic motivation and a clear and stable sense of purpose 
have had to make up for the absence of an intense system of monitoring and incentives by 
management because this was never a realistic option. If we were looking to define result 
orientation within public sector organizations, intrinsic motivation, self-reliance and a clear 
sense of purpose may be key elements.  
 
Although the institutional characteristics of SBB and its policy field may explain result 
oriented behavior for a great deal, it is not self-evident that new organizational goals will be 
smoothly adopted throughout the organization incorporated into the daily work of 
employees. To the contrary, professional autonomy may well prove to be an obstacle in this 
respect. We have seen that during the phase of ‘initial effects’ (se par 5.2.2) SBB’s PB system, 
including its financial incentives, may have played a role in goal alignment. So PB may have 
been successful in helping direct existing result orientation towards new organizational goals 
more than to actually stimulate result oriented behavior as such. One might even argue that 
NPM’s key premise of results accountability combined with decentralization (or steering 
instead of rowing if you will) more easily fits an institutional profile of self-reliance and 
intrinsic motivation.   
 
Data collection SBB case 
The primary method of data collection were semi structured interviews. Between December 
2011 and February 2012, ten persons were interviewed. Two of these worked at the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and were charged with oversight on SBB: one of them focusing on 
financial oversight, the other one on meeting policy objectives and performance goals. At 
SBB HQ four persons were interviewed: one representing each of the following units: central 
management, Services, Central Staff and Concerncontrol & Audit. At the Eastern Region HQ, 
3 persons were interviewed: the regional director, the regional controller and a chief-
forester (see Appendix II for more details). Data were primarily processed by qualitative 
analysis although some quantitative analysis was used for comparing and aggregating results 
(see section 4.6). These scores were aggregated for each case allowing for a qualitative 
comparison on an ordinal scale. After finishing each draft case study, the report was 
reviewed by a key informant from the organization involved. By means of triangulation the 
findings from interviews were compared with anonymous questionnaire results and findings 
from analysis of documents. For example this enabled a comparison between the 
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descriptions of cultural openness as provided by the interviewees with the anonymous 
responses from questionnaires. Similarly, different accounts of the actual use of PI for 
budgetary purposes from documents, interviews and questionnaires could be detected. 
Appendix III shows the questionnaire that was used.  
 
Sources 
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CHAPTER 6  CASE STUDY LVNL   (Air Traffic Control the Netherlands) 
 
6.1  Description of the Agency and its Principal  
 
History and tasks LVNL 
Luchtverkleersleiding Nederland (LVNL) is a agency responsible for managing the majority of 
air traffic to and from the airports in the Netherlands. The task of civil air traffic control (ATC) 
within the Dutch airspace is shared with the Royal Netherlands Air Force that handles civil 
aviation from military airfields and Eurocontrol for the en route air traffic that is just over 
flying the Netherlands. LVNL handles over 3000 flights daily, almost 90% of which take place 
at Amsterdam’s Schiphol national airport (based on 2011 figures). In addition to directing air 
traffic, other tasks of LVNL include maintaining and replacing technical systems, providing 
information to aviation stakeholders, training air traffic controllers and produce aviation 
related publications like aeronautical charts.  
LVNL operates amidst a number of dominant private, public and semi-public stakeholders. 
The most important ones are Schiphol airport, KLM-Air France, the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Environment and the European Commission. The latter two fulfil the role of principal in 
the principal-agent relationship regarding LVNL’s public task. The EC has started to act as a 
principal only in recent years following adoption of its policy in 2004 to bring about a Single 
European Sky (SES). As a result the European sky is divided into Functional Airspace Blocks 
(FAB). The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Germany and Switzerland agreed to 
form a single FAB in 2010 referred to as Functional Airpsace Block Europe Central (FABEC). 
LVNL and its counterparts in the other FABEC member states cooperate to meet 
performance targets that were agreed with the European Commission. 
The Ministry is chosen as the main principal in this case study because it has been fulfilling 
the role of principal during the entire time frame considered from the mid-1990s up until 
2012. In addition, the target setting, performance reporting and financial consequences 
brought about by the European agreements are integrated entirely in the principal-agent 
relationship between the Ministry and LVNL. 
The history of air traffic control in the Netherlands dates back to the 1920s. Initially air traffic 
control tasks were handled solely by the military. After the establishment of the first civil 
airports in the Netherlands in the early 1920s, civil air traffic control started operations in 
1923. After an aviation law took effect in 1927, the government established the 
Luchtvaartdienst, renamed Rijksluchtvaartdienst in 1930. In these days radio was the 
primary tool used to direct air traffic. After World War 2 radar was introduced to supplant 
the radio. Until 1992 air traffic control in the Netherlands remained a part of the 
Rijksluchtvaartdienst (RLD – national aviation authortity) called the Luchtverkeersbeveiliging 
(LVB). In 1993 the LVB gained a legal independent status within the aviation law. The LVB 
was renamed LVNL in 1998. Various reasons are given for granting the status of independent 
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government agency. Generally the desire for a more modest central government and for 
increased effectiveness and efficiency in performing public tasks played a role. The idea 
behind this construction was that this would largely immunize LVB for political interference 
in their business processes. Another consideration suggested for granting LVB an 
independent status in 1993 was the incompatibility of salaries of air traffic controllers with 
the restrictive salary regulations of civil servants (Volkskrant 1999, LVNL 2009). ATC salaries 
are largely driven by demands from this particular niche of the international labor market 
and in some cases LVNL’s salaries do indeed exceed the standards set for civil servant 
standards. Internationally however, LVNL does not seem to be out of line in this respect. By 
some the independent status was considered as a step towards full privatization, an 
intention that never got enough support to be materialized. Long after LVNL gained its 
independent status, European regulations, aiming to bring about a Single European Sky 
(SES), also demanded a functional separation between the air traffic service provider and a 
supervisory and policy department.  
 
Size  
LVNL employs around 900 people approximately 250 of whom are air traffic controllers. The 
number of employees was brought down from over 1000 following a reorganization in 2009. 
Annual turnover has been growing steadily each year to € 184,4 million in 2011. This is 
collected from tariffs paid by airlines that make use of LVNL’s services, most notably by KLM-
Air France, the major airline in the Netherlands. In terms of costs, about some 75% is made 
up by personnel expenses and about 10% on depreciation of LVNL’s assets. 
 
Organization  
LVNL delivers air traffic control services from four locations. The first and by far most 
important of these is Amsterdam Schiphol airport. The others are located at the airports of 
Rotterdam-The Hague, Groningen-Eelde and Maastricht-Aachen. Due to the close proximity 
between Amsterdam and Rotterdam both locations functionally resort under a single unit: 
Operations (Ops). The other two locations resort under the Regional Unit (RU). Besides these 
operational units there are a number of units that support LVNL’s primary process in a more 
or less direct way. The Strategy and Performance (S&P) unit is tasked with strategic planning, 
performance measurement, reporting and communication. Procedures and Systems (P&S) is 
responsible for designing and reviewing the air traffic control procedures as well as 
maintaining the technical systems LVNL employs. Legal Affairs (LA) and Corporate Services 
(CS) are responsible for more regular staff duties such as legal support, finance and 
operational management.  
 
LVNL’s management team consists of the CEO, the CFO (who jointly form the Executive 
Board), the directors of OPS and P&S and the managers of CS and S&P.  
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Figure 6.1 Organizational Chart LVNL 
 
 
Policy field and tasks  
The policy field of civil aviation is characterized by diverse interests of different stakeholders. 
Although most stakeholders can agree on the desirability to maximize the safety of air travel, 
doing so may mean compromising on other policy aims like maximize airport capacity,  
minimizing noise levels or minimizing tariffs for airlines. As a result the policy goals of the 
national government are also conflicting to a certain extent. This is well reflected by the fact 
that LVNL’s public tasks were stated under different program goals in the Ministry’s 2012 
budget documents: 
Article 33.3  In order to attain permanent safety improvement in the aviation industry, 
government sets preconditions for safe aviation operations - this program goal refers to the 
activities and funding for policy design and international coordination aimed at reducing the 
number of incidents 
Article 35.1  Strengthening the competitive position of Schiphol mainport as well as 
regional airports  - this program goal refers to the efforts to maximize capacity within the 
agreed noise levels 
 
Article 35.3  Strengthening connectivity to the international airline network - this program 
goal refers to the efforts to prevent delays and to minimize costs for airlines operating from 
Schiphol 
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Before a major reshuffling of programs and budget articles from 2006, LVNL’s policy field 
was to be found in a another set of articles. The government’s diverse objectives regarding 
safety, airport capacity and environment were also apparent in these previous budget 
articles.  
 
6.2 Degree of PB implementation  
LVNL is known as one of the agencies that integrated its performance dialogue with the 
Ministry of Transport with the budgetary cycle. In addition its internal system of 
performance management stands out as one of the most advanced in the public sector. In 
this paragraph the characteristics of LVNL’s performance budgeting system are analyzed 
both in its relationship with the Ministry as internally. 
 
6.2.1 PB in relationship Ministry – LVNL 
LVNL is funded by tariffs paid by airlines. Its budget however is due to approval by the 
Ministry of Transport. Determining the level of tariffs is a matter of national policy since it 
directly affects the competitiveness of the airports of the Netherlands and therefore has 
significant economic impact. Currently the national airport Schiphol ranks within the top 5 of 
largest airports in Europe.  
 
LVNL’s costs and performance are presented jointly in the annual plans and reports and are 
both monitored by the ministry.  Prior to issuing these plans to the ministry before 
November 1st,  LVNL discusses them with the other major stakeholders.  During November  
budget approval by the Ministry takes place including the tariff levels for the year to come. A 
set of performance targets and indicators are part of the  annual performance plan and are 
subject of monitoring by the ministry. Each quarter the financial results, the performance 
objectives and indicators are reported by LVNL to the Ministry and discussed in a bilateral 
meeting . It is fair to state that LVNL is continuously involved in a rather intense dialogue 
with the Ministry. In addition to bilateral contacts between LVNL and the ministry,  both 
meet frequently in structured multilateral meetings with  LVNL’s clients in the aviation 
industry as well as in specific improvement task groups. The efforts of the Ministry are 
primarily geared towards balancing the conflicting interests of the different stakeholders like 
controlling noise levels for citizens, reasonable tariffs for airlines, ensuring enough airport 
capacity and, of course, ensuring safety for air travellers.  Looking at the airline industry as a 
whole it should be noted that the goals of the ministry and LVNL are perceived to be more 
aligned with each other than with those of other parties (airports, airlines, citizens) who 
typically have a more single focused goal.  
 
From 2004 a system of formal performance steering was pioneered in anticipation of 
European ambitions regarding a Single European Sky.  Another reason to further formalize 
performance steering on the part of the ministry was criticism from the Court of Audit that 
the ministry was unable to assess LVNL’s functioning and  performance pointing to 
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significant risks regarding asymmetry in expertise and information (Algemene Rekenkamer 
2004). In accordance with the annual budgetary cycle a large number of performance 
indicators are reported by LVNL to the ministry, close to 40 in numbers according to the 
ministry’s 2005 evaluation.  From 2006 to 2010 an annual ‘order ‘ from the ministry to LVNL 
(beleidskaderbrief) was issued specifying expected performance levels. The set of 
performance indicators that LVNL reported to the ministry were picked by LVNL from 
existing measured data. The relation between cost and performance was however mostly 
limited to presentation.  The options the government has when it comes to controlling LVNL 
and its performance and costs are actually quite limited given the impact of international 
and commercial stakeholders. However, despite the fact that PI is not directly linked to costs 
it does play a vital role in the dialogue between the Ministry and LVNL. The performance 
dialogue became more serious as LVNL succeeded in intertwining its activities, procedures, 
outputs and outcomes using the so-called VEM methodology (see 6.2.2). Initially this system 
was meant for internal use but had clear potential for utilization in the dialogue with LVNL’s 
stakeholders (Ter Avest, 2005).  Indeed this framework did help to mature the performance 
dialogue with the Ministry in the sense that LVNL’s performance became less of  a ‘black 
box’ to the Ministry and the other stakeholders,  
 
From 2006, concerns about noise levels as a result of growth of Schiphol national airport saw 
the birth of a semi-permanent advisory board to the government. The so called Alders 
Conference (Alders tafels named after its chairman) work out detailed agreements about 
permitted noise levels. LVNL is an important party in these agreements because it has the 
knowledge to oversee the consequences for safety and airport capacity of proposals meant 
to limit noise to people living in the vicinity of Schiphol. Furthermore LVNL is expected to do 
its part in complying with these agreements by taking into account the noise impact when 
selecting the proper runway (of which Schiphol has five). The ministry’s Inspectorate is in 
charge of monitoring LVNL’s compliance with these politically sensitive agreements.  
 
In addition to reporting to the Ministry of Transport of the Netherlands, a more traditional 
PB relationship including financial incentives has been formed with the European 
Commission. This so called FABEC agreement replaces the previous bilateral system of 
performance setting and monitoring and is the result of efforts to integrate the airspaces of 
member states.  As mentioned, the ministry remains the major principal on behalf of the 
European Commission. The agreement has a complex provision that prescribes how financial 
shortages caused by underperformance on the part of LVNL have to be partly paid for by 
LVNL prior to being allowed to raise tariffs. Although this new agreement has gone into 
effect recently, it is too early to view the full impact this may have. In Box 6.1 some more 
information regarding the FABEC performance plans is provided. 
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Text Box 6.1 Performance management under FABEC (Source: Summary annual 
report LVNL 2011) 
 
The financial incentive tied directly to performance is a new element in the relationship with 
the ministry. In order to enable  LVNL to deal with the newly introduced financial risk, it was 
recently allowed to keep its own equalization reserve. The new performance framework has 
only partly gone into effect yet and suffers from some technical challenges regarding 
attribution of results and controllability of the indicators. These problems were also 
encountered earlier in the bilateral arrangements with the ministry. Nonetheless, some 
positive impact of the FABEC agreement is reported from both LVNL and the Ministry. The 
mere existence of a financial incentive and the possibility for LVNL to keep an equalization 
reserve does give the performance dialogue a more serious and less ritual character. It is 
important to realize that this is reported for the dialogue between the ministry and LVNL 
and that for an air traffic controller these agreements, like the previous ones, do not have 
much influence if any on their daily work. 
 
Actual use of PI in relationship ministry-LVNL 
Although the policy dialogue with the ministry is highly valued by LVNL managers, the 
performance reporting to the ministry is not seen by everyone as very valuable. When 
assessing the PI that is reported to the ministry, one of the LVNL respondents noticed that:  
 
In 2010 the so-called Performance Scheme (EC no.691/2010) was adopted. This EU 
council regulation forms a major pillar of the Single European Sky: a system of 
performance management. From January first 2012 performance management applies to 
the en-route services. From 2015 performance management will also apply to the 
terminal services. At a national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks, the 
member states are to develop performance plans with objectives that are consistent with 
the EU-wide targets. In 2011, the FABEC states have jointly drawn up the provisional 
FABEC performance plan. This plan gives an insight into the joint objectives of the FABEC 
members on performance areas as safety, capacity and environment. The performance 
area of cost effectiveness is addressed in the national performance plans. The Dutch 
performance plan for the first reference period was submitted and assessed by the 
European Commission in 2011. It was decided that the plan meets the criteria set.  The 
most important quantitative objectives for the years 2012- 2014 are: 
 
• Reduction of the average ATFM delay per en-route and terminal flight to 1 mn at most. 
• A capacity declaration at reliability of the first inbound peak (68 movements/hour at     
   Schiphol Airport) of at least 92.5% 
• Performance within the current standards of rules for enroute and runway operations. 
• Reduction of the fixed single rate for en-route air navigation services by 3.3%. 
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‘The introduction of key performance indicators for the ministry has not changed much 
since this is the information we traditionally used for our internal steering’ 
 
With regard to the FABEC performance targets and its financial incentive structure a 
respondent at LVNL noted:  
 
‘This will not affect our behavior in any way because we cannot influence the indicators, at 
least not on the short term. Maybe on a 8-10 year horizon one can.’   
 
The ministry perceives the information that is reported about the FABEC targets as well as 
information on the noise level (through the Alders Conference) as very valuable to monitor 
progress and compliance as well as for its political process.  In this sense performance 
reporting really does seem to fill (or at least ease) an information gap in technical expertise 
between principal and agent. The relevance of most PI for the actual budgeting process on 
the part of the ministry on a first glance seems to be rather limited. This results from the fact 
that virtually no public funds are transferred directly to LVNL. If one takes a second look 
however, the ministry, working closely with other stakeholders, has made a successful effort 
to curb spending of LVNL in support of the policy goals of the government.  In response to 
the looming financial crisis, LVNL’s projected incomes had to be adjusted downwards 
dramatically during 2009. Out of concern for the aviation sector in the Netherlands and the 
position of Schiphol airport, the Minister decided to restrict the tariff rate development for a 
number of years. This effectively prohibited LVNL from translating operating deficits 
resulting from lower operating volumes of air traffic, into higher tariff levels. To meet the 
reduced budget, LVNL set in motion an unprecedented cost cutting operation that resulted 
in the reduction of 128 FTE, over 12% of staff levels in 2008. The reduction in personnel did 
not affect the number of air traffic controllers as it was filled in entirely by the other LVNL 
units. Obviously the ministry did not bring about this efficiency operation at LVNL all by 
itself. Instead she was helped by other powerful stakeholders. On the other hand the 
ministry points at other member states that saw the costs of their air traffic service provider 
gone up in spite of the crisis.   
 
It is interesting to determine the role of PI in this specific case. In terms of performance 
indicators, the minister decided to freeze LVNL’s terminal unit rate at 2009 levels to control 
Schiphol airport’s international ranking in in terms of aeronautical costs while facing a 
decrease in expected traffic volume figures (the number of flights). The traffic volume 
figures and Schiphol Airport’s competitive ranking have thus been proven relevant PI in 
terms of the budgetary dialogue between LVNL and the ministry. One can argue that these 
figures are not that informative about the real performance of LVNL as an organization and 
that the ministry was just teaming up with other stakeholder to control cost prices, which 
happened to be in their joint interest.  Indeed, some of the other indicators from LVNL’s 
budget documents appear to be more relevant in assessing LVNL’s performance but bear no 
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direct relationship to the size of LVNL’s budget.  Examples of these are: availability of 
capacity and delays on LVNL controlled flights. These indicators do gain more budgetary 
relevance in the new FABEC performance budget regime. Maybe atypical as an example of 
using PI to improve effectiveness and efficiency, the ministry, unlike many of its foreign 
colleagues, did choose to use its power as a principal to pursue its interest of controlling cost 
prices. While doing so it was well informed about LVNL’s performance and seemingly 
successfully negotiated to make sure that performance levels would not suffer from the 
resulting budget cuts.  
 
6.2.2 Performance management within LVNL  
Internally, LVNL has performance measurement and reporting systems that belong to the 
most advanced in the public sector of the Netherlands. The most important systems include 
a framework that links LVNLs diverse outcomes such as safety, capacity and noise levels to 
its business processes. Operationally, the safety loop regarding incident registration and 
analysis is an important source for monitoring and improvement. The cascade of targets and 
indicators, both for internal management and for external reporting must be striking for 
anyone coming from outside the organization. This chapter will not offer a full description of 
LVNL performance measurement and management system. Nonetheless the most important 
elements will be described here briefly. 
 
The basis for monitoring daily operations happens on work floor level by air traffic 
controllers who electronically report incidents and irregularities on a daily basis. The reports 
may contain anything from a car crossing a runway (runway incursion), airplanes entering 
blocks of airspace without prior permission (airspace infringements), aircraft flying too close 
to each other (breaking separation norms) to just a control tower being out of coffee. Other 
air traffic controllers analyze these daily reports looking for serious incidents. The serious 
incidents are further analyzed to find out what exactly happened, how it could happen and 
why it happened. The results of this analysis form the input for a constant process of 
improving and refining the operating procedures for air traffic controllers. In addition to 
incidents, there is daily reporting of other figures for amongst others flight activity and 
delays. These are consolidated and projected against the targets set in annual and business 
plans.  
 
The incident reporting together with data logs from LVNL’s technical systems (like for 
instance radar tracks) form input for the VEM performance standard, which is regarded the 
most important source of management and stakeholder information. The VEM acronym 
stands for Safety (Veiligheid), Efficiency (referring to capacity use) and Environment (Milieu) 
as it specifies LVNL’s performance in these terms. In the VEM framework, the factors traffic 
demand, availability of airport infrastructure and weather conditions are taken into account 
as well as the interaction between them. LVNL uses the indicators and norms of its VEM 
framework to decide whether operations need to be adjusted as well as to inform 
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stakeholders about what they can expect from LVNL. On a monthly basis VEM reports are 
discussed in the management team. The framework originated at the turn of the century, 
when LVNL experienced that a useful dialogue with its critical stakeholders was hindered by 
the inaccessibility and technical complexity of LVNL’s line of work. Today it is regarded by 
both LVNL and the Ministry as a shared framework that integrates the interests and 
expectations of both parties in an objective matter. Cost efficiency is not integrated in VEM 
as but this is seen as the next refinement of the current framework.  
 
Of the different uses of PI mentioned in CH 2.3, almost all uses were said to occur according 
to respondents. The most frequently mentioned were: 
x Performance reporting for external accountability 
x Analyzing productivity and funding levels 
x Identifying service problems and  changing work processes 
 
These were followed by: 
x Setting program priorities 
x Strategically reallocate internal resources 
x Allocating internal funds 
When talking to organization members, it becomes evident that PI is widely used at LVNL to 
learn and improve processes. This was illustrated by this example from one of the 
respondents: 
 
‘Once every quarter the performance indicators of one process are discussed in detail in 
the Management Team. When looking at incident statistics over 2010 two types of serious 
incidents turned out to occur most frequently. One of these was the category airspace 
infringements, which is one that I can’t control by myself. After discussing with the 
Ministry an improvement task force with all relevant stakeholders was started to tackle 
this problem.’  
 
‘The other one was the category ground incidents. During our spring and fall courses for 
traffic controllers, we analysed each of these incidents to see precisely whether we made a 
mistake or another party did. Over 2011 this type of incident was no longer at the top of 
our list.’  
 
The financial impact of using PI remains less clear except maybe for capacity planning 
purposes. The evidence also suggests that PI plays a role when assessing investment 
decisions. An illustration of this was given by one of the respondents: 
 
‘Our investment plan is part of the substantiation of the tariff levels to our customers. For 
example say that to KLM, each minute of delay is worth € 50. By multiplying this with the 
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number of flights we can calculate that an investment of € 3 million is expected to be worth 
€ 20 million to KLM in delay of reductions. In that case the investment will be justified.   
Sometimes it is not. The initiative to replace the 1950s era Instrument Landing System by a 
modern Microwave Landing System. This did not prove to be feasible as it would cost KLM 
more in expensive modifications to their aircraft than it would save. That is why this 
initiative was abandoned after a short test phase.’    
 
Not all respondents agreed that each investment decision is subject to a systematic cost-
benefit analyses as this example suggests. In particular investments that benefit safety 
improvements seem to be analysed in this manner.  
 
While reporting information for a learning loop system  is considered a normal part of the 
job for air traffic controllers, this does not mean that at the indicators that LVNL uses are 
necessarily perceived as valuable to their daily work at the operational level. It is the 
expertise of air traffic controllers to apply the procedures in their daily operations. This is a 
complex activity where norms are sometimes conflicting and must be applied in a flexible 
way for the best overall results. One respondent put it this way: 
 
‘We are in a 24hr process and I plan 2 days ahead at a maximum. We are heavily dependent 
upon the weather when we are planning capacity at a given level of air traffic …’ 
  
‘…Good performance indicators for holding air traffic controllers accountable for their work 
are impossible to find.’ 
 
Holding individual traffic controllers accountable for performance indeed is not part of 
LVNL’s performance management system. Moreover the performance management is 
primarily aimed at continuous improvement of working procedures for air traffic controllers 
and at detecting and correcting possible performance shortfalls as early as possible. 
 
6.2.3 Conclusion on PB implementation 
At LVNL, an abundance of PI is used internally in a systematic manner to improve the 
organization’s effectiveness (notably safety) and, to a lesser extent, for managing financial 
efficiency.  However, performance is not coupled in a rigid or systematic manner to the 
budget. As mentioned output estimates like the number of flights do play a role in capacity 
planning and to some extent PI is used in business cases regarding investments. Although 
performance planning does seem to play a role in capacity planning and investment 
decisions, the bulk of LVNL’s costs are determined at collective wage negotiations that are 
heavily influenced by LVNL’s international peers.  
 
The relationship between LVNL and the ministry has known a system of target setting and 
performance reporting for some time. The ministry, as LVNL’s principal, uses PI reported by 
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LVNL to reduce information asymmetry and to actively monitor progress towards agreed 
performance targets. Although PI is not used in a direct manner to adjust LVNL’s budget 
upwards or downwards, the ministry has used its power to curb LVNL’s tariffs. For LVNL this 
meant that it was held accountable for the same performance levels in spite of lower 
incomes due to reduced air traffic. The dialogue preceding European target setting that 
resulted from FABEC agreements has ensured further professionalization of the performance 
dialogue between LVNL and the Ministry. Despite the provision of direct ties between 
performance and financial risks, under FABEC, it is too early to tell what the exact 
consequences will be for the performance dialogue with the ministry and the European 
Commission.   
  
The formal system of internal performance management and performance reporting in the 
budgetary cycle is well advanced and arguably has no peer within in the public sector in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, despite the dazzling amounts of measured data LVNL produces and 
processes, all of it seems to have a purposes and seems to get used to learn and improve 
There is however some difference between the de jure linking of performance and budgets 
and its de facto relevance for budgeting. The perceived value of certain performance 
indicators may differ according to one’s role within the organization. For the individual air 
traffic controller many aggregated data and performance indicators LVNL uses in its dialogue 
with stakeholders may not appear useful for their daily operations.   
 
Table 6.1 Presence of indicators of performance budgeting implementation 
 
Indicators Presence in 
LVNL case 
 
PB 1.1 PB is used by the agency in addition to traditional 
budgeting 
  
Present to 
some extent 
PB 1.2 PB is used by the  principal to control the agency 
  
Clearly 
present 
PB 2.1 A high degree of de jure PB implementation 
 
Clearly 
present 
PB 2.2 A high degree of de facto PB implementation 
 
Clearly 
present 
 
According to the micro model of PB introduced in Chapter 2, these uses of PI count as 
successful PB implementation if they contribute to the phenomena of enlightenment and 
program learning, leading to more efficient and effective ways policy execution. The 
examples reported from LVNL respondents do seem to fit this criterion. The continuous 
improvement of LVNL’s processes using PI should be regarded as program learning that is 
institutionalized to a high degree. Jasper Daams, in his 2011 study managing deadlocks in the 
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Netherlands aviation sector, offers a detailed description of several examples of double-loop 
learning by LVNL, or enlightenment in the model used for this research. One example is the 
handling of parallel departures after the introduction of a new runway at Schiphol airport in 
2003. This cases describes the sequence of events in the 1996-2009 of LVNL and others 
stakeholders struggling to meeting the dual objectives of capacity enlargement for Schiphol 
and diminishing environmental impact while guaranteeing airline safety at the same time. 
Key to this case were the detailed quantitative standards for environmental effects and the 
shared responsibility for them that was accepted by the joint aviation stakeholders. In his 
careful analysis Daams classifies 6 of the recorded events as cases in which double loop 
learning by LVNL and its stakeholders took place. (Daams 2011: 156-186) 
 
6.3 Exploring Neo-Institutionalist Explanations 
The evidence does show that LVNL has been using performance measurement to enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness in performing its public tasks. However that does not 
automatically mean that this has occurred thanks to implementation of a PB system. To 
answer this question the results of the alternative explanations from the model have to be 
taken into account.  
 
6.3.1 Explanations from Historical Neo Institutionalism 
When investigating path dependency as an explanatory factor, important events with an 
impact the organization were sought that might explain PB implementation. This could be 
anything, for example a crisis with a principal or a series of bad press in the media. Moreover 
it is possible that, if adoption of PB is viewed as an appropriate response to such events, 
result oriented behavior should be explained by the logic of appropriateness rather than 
PB’s incentives doing their work. To put it differently: organization members are susceptible 
to unwritten rules and roles that demand compliance with a performance management 
system, regardless of the incentives of this system itself. 
 
To determine the occurrence of possible critical junctures, respondents in the interviews 
were asked to name the top 3 events that affected their organization throughout the years. 
Just like in the previous case study, they were asked to think of answers that they felt their 
colleagues might give as well. The latter remark was added to prevent that respondents 
mentioned events too close to their own specific duties. When analyzing the answers that 
that were given, a number of events become apparent have had some viable impact on the 
organization including its attitude regarding performance reporting and measurement.  A 
total of thirteen events of a diverse nature were mentioned by respondents. Two of these 
were mentioned by five of the nine respondents:  
 
1) The crash of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 in 2009 at Schiphol airport while landing. The 
accident claimed nine lives. The investigation of the crash concluded that mechanical 
failure of the altimeter and the pilots’ inadequate response caused this incident.  
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2) The cost cutting operation that took effect in 2009. This was the first time that the 
organization was faced with lay-offs effectively eliminating the notion of life-long 
employment at LVNL that many employees had 
 
Another two events were mentioned by three respondents:   
3) The crash of El Al Flight 1862 on Amsterdam in 1992 while on approach to Schiphol 
for an emergency landing following mechanical failure. The Cargo Boeing 747 crashed 
into apartment buildings causing a massive outburst of flames. At least 43 people lost 
their lives including the 4 people aboard.  
4) An incident with a Delta flight aborting its take-off roll in 1998 when the pilots 
observed a towed Boeing 747 crossing the runway in front of them. This incident lead 
to legal prosecution of the air controllers on duty. All three were found guilty but a 
sentence was rejected after appeal to a higher court. 
 
At first glance, the large number of diverse events mentioned, may not offer strong evidence 
of a large impact of a single traumatic event.  When taking a deeper look however, that first 
assessment may require some adjustment. Firstly when applying a weighed score, corrected 
for the order of importance as ranked by the respondents, both crashes (events nr. 1 and 3) 
clearly do stand out. The reported impact of these crashes, although 17 years apart, was 
quite similar. In addition to heavily affecting professional pride of air traffic controllers, the 
aftermath of these disasters was characterized by critical appraisal of the performance and 
responsibility of air traffic control (LVB and LVNL respectively) in press, parliament  and 
public opinion. The El Al crash even resulted in LVB employees being suspended from their 
job. Although the investigations later on demonstrated that these allegations proved false, 
these events, according to respondents, did highlight the necessity for LVNL become more 
open and transparent and inform and involve stakeholders despite the fact that its job is 
difficult to communicate to outsiders.     
 
The impact of the austerity operation (event nr. 2), although possibly traumatic at the level 
of individual employees, does not seem uncommon for public organizations that are faced 
with massive cuts for the first time. An interesting aspect in the case of LVNL is that it will 
probably result in cost efficiency to be integrated into the VEM performance framework as a 
fourth element.  
 
The Delta incident (incident nr.4) is reported to have had far reaching consequences on the 
performance culture at LVNL. The fact that air traffic controllers could be legally prosecuted 
when doing a bad job had a severe impact. On the one hand defensive routines became 
visible by a dip in incident reporting. On the other hand it contributed to the awareness that 
one needs to feel safe in order to learn from mistakes. With this in mind several measures 
have been taken to ensure a ´just culture´ to report incidents or failures and preventing 
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unnecessary exposure of employees involved in reporting incidents (see CH 6.3.2). This 
incident is indeed reported to have played a major role in the process of developing a ‘just 
culture’ as the aviation sector in the Netherlands perceived the prosecution as the 
introduction of a stricter policy and the example of the Delta incident was brought forward 
in many discussions later on (Daams 2011: 229). 
 
When combining the consequences of these events for the organization and its attitude 
toward performance measurement and reporting, it becomes clear that incidents with 
airliners or near misses that got extensive media coverage dramatically emphasize the 
vulnerability of the individual air traffic controller. The response to this highlighted 
vulnerability has been twofold. Internally the events contributed to consciously protecting 
the vital process of incident reporting by meeting conditions like confidentiality and 
anonymity. Externally these events contributed to LVNL seeking a more proactive, fact based 
dialogue with stakeholders instead of being forced to respond from a defensive position. 
Most respondents agree that this strategy has been showing results as phrased by one 
respondent:  
 
‘LVNL used to get criticized more frequently because we were not dealing effectively with 
our environment. We can grow further by finding the optimal balance between self-
criticism and maintaining the safe environment that is required for learning. This safety is 
also required from external parties’ 
 
Another alternative explanation for adopting a PB system might be the dominance of a 
certain influential unit or person that acted as a champion of output measurement or 
performance management. When looking at dominant parties within LVNL it hard not to 
notice that the craft of air traffic controllers is highly regarded within the organization and 
that (former) air traffic controllers in that sense form some sort of elite within LVNL. The 
VEM system that has been in use for about a decade now, was developed by the current 
CEO of LVNL, Mr Paul Riemens.  Back in the 1990s when he was working as an air traffic 
controller he began modelling air traffic control for a thesis.  Later on he was responsible for 
initiating this system and grew to become LVNL’s current CEO. In 2011 Mr Riemens was 
appointed chairman of CANSO, the international board of ATC organizations.  The fact that 
LVNL’s primary performance management system was developed by the operational unit 
(and not by staff) as well as the career of the current CEO seem to offer a likely explanation 
for taking performance measurement seriously by organization members. One can argue 
that a system like this would only have made a serious chance of implementation if initiated 
from operations.  
 
Finally, a dominant role of specialists in a certain policy field may explain why quantitative 
measurement is regarded higher than other, more political, factors. To determine this, 
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respondents were asked to choose between factors that they regard as most influential to 
LVNL policy in two subsequent questions: 
 
A) Stakeholder interests   or B) Political ideas and policy goals    
and 
A) Politics/ public opinion   or  B) Specialist norms  
 
If for both questions answer B is chosen, this would indicate that LVNL’s policy area is run 
pretty much by experts and their policy ideas. However, no clear picture emerged when 
applying this framework to air traffic control. The distinction between interests and ideals as 
the basis for public policy turned out to be a difficult one to make as policy interests of 
stakeholders are more or less translated directly into the policies conducted by the ministry. 
It is however clear that, compared to for example SBB, the environment in which LVNL 
operates is traditionally more dynamic and politically sensitive. This has to do with the large 
financial interests of a number of major players that have to cooperate quite closely with 
LVNL (e.g. KLM, Schiphol). Instead of designing policies for an agency to execute, the 
ministry acts more like a referee continuously balancing conflicting interests of different 
parties. Although the processes of LVNL are to a large extent quite technical and inaccessible 
to outsiders, this does not withhold other parties from having opinions on the outputs and 
outcomes of LVNL. For this reason a dominant role of experts in LVNLs policy area may offers 
a likely explanation for utilizing performance information. This does not mean that 
development of performance targets and measures takes place relatively undisturbed from 
stakeholder attention.  
 
The overall presence of an internal champion of performance measurement in a powerful 
position does offer a likely explanation for the utilization of performance in formation as an 
agency. To a lesser extent this can be the case with the other historical neo institutional 
variables. 
Table 6.2 Presence of indicators historical neo-institutionalism 
Indicators Presence in 
LVNL case 
 
H 1.1 Critical juncture in the accountability chain or policy field 
 
Clearly 
present 
H 1.2 Problem to which PB was seen as a solution  
 
Present to 
some extent 
H 2.1 An  advocate or champion of PB in a powerful position 
 
Clearly 
present 
H.2.2 A policy field in which specialists are dominant. 
 
Present to 
some extent 
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6.3.2 Explanations from Sociological Neo Institutionalism 
It can be argued that LVNL displays an almost compulsive commitment to improving airline 
safety. To a certain extent this commitment can be attributed to the entire airline industry. 
The results of these continuous improvement efforts have been obvious to everyone since 
the birth of this industry in the form of a spectacular increase in airline safety. An open 
culture in which important and also painful matters can be discussed openly is obviously a 
key factor to the ability to keep LVNLs commitment to learning and improving. The 
conditions for organizational learning were tested by letting respondents react to 4 
statements: 
a. Within LVNL, important issues are being discussed openly and fairly 
b. Within LVNL, existing opinions are regularly challenged and discussed 
c. If LVNL is being confronted with a problem, a thorough problem analysis takes place 
prior to taking action 
d. If things don’t work out in LVNL’s policies and execution, lessons are usually learned 
 
According to the interviewees these characteristics do match the culture within LVNL. In 
addition, LVNL management is highly aware of the so called soft side of maintaining a 
corporate climate where learning from mistakes can take place and also takes measures to 
actively promote this. Examples of such measures are minimizing physical and technical 
barriers to incident reporting, safeguarding discreteness and anonymity and praising 
employees for reporting problems.  Again, this is something that goes back a longtime in air 
traffic control at an operational level and also in the airline industry as a whole. A lesson 
learned early on from analyses of airline incidents has been that crashes can occur when a 
pilot or controller refrains from disputing a superior’s inadequate assessment of a situation. 
One respondent reflects: 
 
‘Calling attention to someone’s behavior or mistakes has been rooted in the air traffic 
control culture for about 20 years. In the old days, the persons with the big mouth often 
got his way. This culture-shift has been going on for a long time at Operations. The rest of 
the organization lags a little behind in this respect’.  
 
Other respondents confirm that when it comes to perfection of the procedural and cultural 
learning mechanisms, operations is in the lead.  Insofar there is any hesitation this concerns 
the dominant position of the air traffic controller’s profession within LVNL and the LVNL’s 
occasional hesitation to open up to outside stakeholders. Some claim that due to the 
complexity of the job, one does need a certain level of knowledge to be fully accepted as a 
negotiating partner to an air traffic controller. Some critical reflections from respondents on 
LVNL’s openness are:   
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‘A downside of the self-critical attitude is that LVNL does not always accept outsiders’ 
criticism easily. LVNL is perfectly able to critically self-reflect but outsiders should not 
necessarily do the same.’  
 
‘There is some fear that openness to the outside world will be punished unfairly. I am 
convinced that LVNL is open but we also want to be conscientious. That is why LVNL 
sometimes may appear like a closed bastion to outsiders.’ 
 
‘This goes in particular for the outside world but, to a lesser extent also internally, when 
other units criticize Operations.’  
 
It should be noted that most respondents who point to these problems also claim they have 
improved over recent years.  
 
In contrast to the SBB case study, no opportunity existed at LVNL to conduct a large scale 
survey to validate the answers given in the interviews.  When looking at the SBB case, the 
results from the interviews had to be adjusted downward after including the questionnaire 
results.  It is possible that the responses from the interviews may also not be representative 
of the entire organization because of an overrepresentation of management and an 
underrepresentation of staff and operations.  Also social desirability can play a larger role in 
the interviews. For these reasons, additional independent sources were sought to complete 
the assessment of LVNL’s participative and reflective openness and culture with regard to 
learning behavior. One of these was found in the independent ISO quality assurance audit, 
conducted by Det Norske Veritas. In their audits for LVNL’s ISO 9001-certificate it is stated 
that: 
 
‘A strong focus exists on learning from experience, events and assessments. This can be 
found on several levels in the processes concerning Management, Change and Delivery. 
The Plan-Do-Check-Act mechanism is present.’  
 
‘Management was able to show how progress was measured and monitored from 
performance measurement.’ 
 
One of the other sources studied to gain additional objectivity were an employee 
satisfaction survey conducted bi-annually. Relevant statements for respondents from this 
survey were: 
x When I see an opportunity for improvement, I take the initiative to improve  
x LVNL encourages taking initiative 
x As colleagues we can call attention to each other’s behavior 
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The responses to these questions showed that LVNL employees in majority agreed with 
them, although LVNL did not score significantly higher than its benchmark organizations 
from the public and private sector.  
 
Combining these sources, the findings from the interview responses may indeed need some 
adjustment downwards. However this does not change the image of a corporate culture in 
which a high degree of reflective and participatory openness is clearly present.   
 
Another important factor that enables the use of a PB system for organizational learning is 
the absence of distorting cognitive frames. Distorting cognitive frames hamper a learning 
dialogue because the PI that is generated and reported is interpreted differently by different 
members of the organization. Ideally, the fit between the formal performance measures that 
the PB system provides on one hand and the convictions of organization members of what is 
considered successful on the other hand, is a complete one. This would mean that 
organization members hold a shared view of the meaning and usefulness of measured 
performance data. This was investigated by asking respondents about their attitude towards 
performance indicators, their knowledge of LVNL’s performance measurement and whether 
they believed it was beneficial to their organization.  
 
Given the abundance of performance data collected at LVNL, it is hard to imagine that each 
organization member is aware of each performance measure, let alone hold a shared view of 
their meaning. Indeed the individual air traffic controller’s interference with LVNL’s 
performance management system is limited to his or her contribution to incident reporting 
and periodical involvement process improvements. Based on the answers from the 
interviews however, the use of measured performance data is seen as very useful by almost 
everyone and seems to be quite undisputed. This goes in particular for the incident reporting 
statistics for air traffic controllers and the VEM framework for managers. Especially the 
performance reports produced by the Strategy and Performance unit are viewed as 
indispensable for LVNL’s managers. This does not mean that there is no criticism of some of 
the performance indicators LVNL has to report on. As one respondent explains: 
 
‘Working with indicators is widely accepted because the usefulness of some data is clear 
to everyone. This goes in particular for safety. This is somewhat different for 
environmental performance measures. If a single plane is in violation of the norms, it is 
impossible to attain your target for the entire year. This does not motivate air traffic 
controllers in their daily work.’ 
 
FABEC performance goals are also criticized by some for the inability of LVNL to influence 
certain outcomes as well as the opportunity that exists for moral hazard on the part of other 
air navigation service providers. 
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Concluding, the key elements of LVNL’s performance management system are well known 
and viewed as relevant by organization members. From a viewpoint of sociological neo 
institutionalism, the ability to openly discuss problems and reflect on existing positions make 
for an organizational culture in which using of PI for learning and enlightenment is regarded 
as appropriate behavior. In other words all the investigated indicators can offer a likely 
explanation for utilization of performance information. 
Table 6.3 Presence of indicators sociological neo institutionalism 
Indicators Presence in 
LVNL case 
 
S 1.1 Absence learning disabilities  
 
Clearly 
present 
S 1.2 Participative openness 
 
Clearly 
present 
S 1.3 Reflective openness 
 
Clearly 
present 
S 2.1 Shared view of the meaning of measured performance  
 
Clearly 
present 
 
6.4 Contextual factors  
The international community of the Air Traffic Management industry can be characterized as 
relatively cohesive and puts a strong emphasis on quality management and benchmarking. 
An example is the CANSO Fitness Check for Air Navigation Service Providers. This self-
assessment instrument is based on ISO 9004:2009 Quality Management Guidance Standards 
and measures progress towards the desired future situation of member ANSP’s on vital 
performance areas. Amongst the 19 criteria measured are: strength of safety culture, 
monitoring and measuring, improvement priorities, and improving competences.  LVNL is 
one of 30 member ASNP’s that use this instrument.  
 
The close interconnectedness with the competitive international market of civil aviation may 
also be a relevant contextual factor for this case. The financial crisis and the low margins of 
airline companies provide LVNL with strong external pressures. It can even be argued that 
the primary incentive for efficiency at LVNL is in fact the external pressure of the main 
carrier of the Netherlands (KLM) to keep tariffs internationally competitive. It is interesting 
to note that goal alignment between LVNL’s stakeholders (Ministry, KLM and Schiphol) 
brought it to adopt an extensive austerity program in 2008. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
The investigation of the indicators for LVNL should provide answers to three questions  
to be answered for each case (see CH 4): 
 
A.  To what extent is this a PB success? 
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B  Are the identified conditions present? 
 
C.  Does context offer a likely explanation? 
 
The answer to the first two questions can be given when looking at the numerical scores, 
obtained from the interviews are expressed in the range of 0-2 and applied to the different 
indicators: 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Numerical scores of the indicators from the interviews 
 
The indicators for PB show that LVNL does fit all the criteria for a PB success. This is most 
evident for the de facto use of PI and, to a somewhat lesser extent, for the use of PI for 
budgetary purposes.  
 
The second question should clearly answered positively for the presence of an internal 
advocate or champion of PB in a powerful position as well as for organizational learning, 
cultural openness and a shared view of the meaning of performance information. Less 
apparent but still present to some extent are the impact of events and the dominant role of 
experts in LVNLs policy area. Through the occurrence of sparse airline incidents in the 
Netherlands, the organization has been reminded of the vulnerability of the air traffic 
controller. It has responded by organizing more confidentiality in incident reporting while 
engaging in a more proactive dialogue with its stakeholders. The technical nature of LVNL 
work means that its recruitment results in a staff with a dominant ‘engineers mentality’ and 
a high tolerance for - and understanding of- quantitative measurement.  
 
Contextual factors that may explain the use of PI by LVNL are the airline industry’s 
commitment to safety improvement. This makes LVNL a major participant in an industry 
wide, data driven quest for improving its outputs and outcomes. It can be argued that the 
neo-institutional and contextual factors are likely to have interacted to a large degree here. 
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For example LVNL’s preoccupation with ‘just culture’ is shared with other players in the 
aviation industry.  
 
Looking at LVNL from a neo-institutionalist point of view, it can be characterized as an 
organization in which measurement performance to learn and improve and reporting 
performance to stakeholders are both regarded as appropriate behavior. This can partly be 
explained by traditions in the industry in which LVNL operates, its leadership and LVNL’s 
organization culture. There may however be additional explanations that deserve some 
attention. 
 
Epilogue 
Like the SBB case, the intrinsic motivation of the air traffic controller is an apparent 
characteristic that surfaces from this case-study. Not unlike the forester, the air traffic 
controller does his or her work in a great degree of autonomy and has to rely largely on self-
motivation. Further strengthening the professional autonomy of an air traffic controller is his 
or her extensive in-house education and a comparatively direct and dramatic impact of 
failure on the job. The autonomy aspects was illustrated by this quote form one of the 
respondents:  
 
‘Air traffic controllers are physically locked up during their work. They come in for their 
shift and immediately go home afterwards. That’s why they operate rather independently 
from the organization’s headquarters.’  
 
The dominance of the obstinate independent professionals poses both advantages and 
disadvantages to the organization. On one hand he or she can be trusted to perform the job 
relatively unmanaged and be held accountable for it. In addition the expert is often 
passionate about the job and is motivated to share to professional knowledge to 
stakeholders and management. On the other hand, professional autonomy can be at odds 
with efforts of management or an organization’s principal to control work processes or 
outputs, leading to occasional tension and claims of over controlling. Representative of this 
tension was this quote by one of the respondents: 
 
‘The aviation inspection is concerned about 10 general aviation incidents compared with 
about 400.000 departing commercial jets annually. Our job consists of 99% serious 
business and about 1% fun. If you take away that 1% of fun it will eventually have 
repercussions for the other 99%.’  
 
Besides the autonomy and job clarity of air traffic controllers, the profession also has a long 
standing tradition of performance reporting as was shared by one respondent: 
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‘Air traffic controllers have always known a self-learning norm. Nowadays we have a basic 
safety loop program, incident investigations and surveys to seek out opportunities 
improvement. In the old days there used to be a little hand written book in which the daily 
events were written down by the air controller on duty.’  
 
With regard to their main performance management systems, a striking similarity with the 
SBB case is the fact that these systems started out relatively long ago and were initiated 
within the primary process. Gradually the systems developed into being the tools for central 
planning and reporting by management and staff. Subsequently the performance 
management systems gained an additional role for external accountability to a principal and 
other stakeholders. This pattern does hardly fit the archetype top down use of PB systems 
for goal alignment by a principal. Indeed, the control of government as a principal over LVNL 
with regard to the nature of its job should not be overrated as one respondent tellingly 
expressed: 
  
‘Government has not urged us to be occupied with airline safety, it is rooted in our 
organization and in our job. We are able to answer questions, the ministry is not even able 
to ask.’  
 
Having read all of this it may appear as if institutionalizing the performance dialogue with 
the principal, performance based financial incentives and internal performance management 
have not have a significant impact on LVNL. The long standing tradition of performance 
monitoring and learning seem to come with the job of air traffic controller. Derived from this 
tradition are LVNL’s PB systems that, unsurprisingly, fit the organization well because they 
were initiated from LVNL’s primary process itself?  
 
Depicting the PB system of LVNL as an entirely autonomous development by the agent 
himself may however not tell the entire story. For example the ministry does claim to use 
the information reported by LVNL to reduce information asymmetry and has successfully 
imposed spending cuts on the organization without sacrificing performance goals. 
Meanwhile LVNL’s internal performance management has been developed into a framework 
that not only LVNL’s management, but also its stakeholders view as indispensable. 
 
So in spite of the presence of several favorable conditions explaining this PB success, 
formalizing the performance dialogue and performance management system may have 
added value for LVNL and its stakeholder. Both financially as in terms of the stakeholder 
dialogue.     
 
Data collection LVNL case 
The primary method of data collection were semi structured interviews. Between March and 
November 2012, ten persons were interviewed. Two of these worked at the Ministry of 
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Infrastructure and were charged with oversight on LVNL. At LVNL HQ eight persons were 
interviewed representing the Executive board and all executive and staff units except Legal 
Affairs (see Appendix II for more details). Data were primarily processed by qualitative 
analysis although some quantitative analysis was used for comparing and aggregating results 
(see section 4.6). These scores were aggregated for each case allowing for a qualitative 
comparison on an ordinal scale. After finishing each draft case study, the report was 
reviewed by a key informant from the organization involved. By means of triangulation the 
findings from interviews were compared with questionnaire results and findings from 
analysis of documents sometimes nuancing the findings from the interviews. As explained in 
Section 6.3.2, no opportunity existed at LVNL to conduct a large scale survey to validate the 
answers given in the interviews. As an alternative, internal questionnaires conducted for 
LVNL’s quality management were consulted on the scores on key variables.  
 
Sources 
Algemene Rekenkamer 2004, Toezicht op de Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland (Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004-2005, stuknr. 29 825) 
 
Algemene Rekenkamer 2007, Toezicht op de Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland – terugblik 2007 
(Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, stuknr. 29 825) 
 
www.canso.org Fit for purpose - Fitness Check provides roadmap to seamless ANS 
 
Daams, Jasper 2011, Managing Deadlocks in the Netherlands Aviation Sector, Delft Eburon 
 
LVNL, Annual report 2009 
 
LVNL, Annual report 2010 
 
LVNL 2012, Jaarverslag 2011 - Verantwoording aan de staatssecretaris van Infrastructuur en 
Milieu 
 
LVNL 2012, Factsheet 1 mei 2012 
 
LVNL 2012, VEM Performance Standard Winter 2012/2013 
 
www.lvnl.nl 
 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 2005, Evaluatie Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland LVNL 
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VEM Raamwerk - Evaluatie Performance Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland (LVNL) van het 
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CHAPTER 7  CASE STUDY UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE 
 
7.1 Description of the Agency and its Principal  
History and tasks USFS 
The Forest Service (FS) is a Federal agency that manages public lands in national forests and 
grasslands. The service was established in 1905 to provide quality water and timber. During 
these days, the influential first Chief of the Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot, summed up the 
purpose of the FS ‘to provide the greatest amount of good for the greatest amount of people 
in the long run.’ Over a century later the initial purpose still echoes in the Forest Service’s 
motto: ‘Caring for the Land and Serving People’. Throughout the years the public have been 
demanding the management of additional resources from national forests and grasslands, 
notably forage for livestock, wildlife and recreation. Today the area managed by the FS 
amounts to nearly 30% of US federally managed lands similar in size to the state of Texas. 
The FS is also the largest forestry research organization in the world providing technical and 
financial assistance to government and private sector parties at home and abroad. The main 
areas of activity can be summarized as:  
 
x Protection and management of natural resources on National Forest System lands.       
This includes a wide variety of activities by forest rangers such as treatment and 
restoration of habitat and watersheds, managing wildlife and protecting ecosystems 
against evasive species, prevention and suppression of wildfires, maintaining roads, 
trails and recreational facilities.   
x Research on all aspects of forestry, rangeland management, and forest resource 
utilization. 
x Community assistance and cooperation with State and local governments, forest 
industries, and private landowners to help protect and manage non-Federal forest 
and associated range and watershed lands to improve conditions in rural areas. 
x International assistance in support of U.S. environmental policy 
It should be noted that, like many public sector agencies, Forest Service’s activities have 
some degree of incompatibility. Examples are balancing the economic interests of local 
communities and logging companies versus sustainable use of forest resources or 
encouraging recreational use of forests and safeguarding natural habitats and preventing 
wildfires.   
Size 
The FS currently employs around 30.000 people at some 750 locations. Most numerous are 
those working for the National Forest System and in firefighting (each about one third of the 
workforce). In the summer months the workforce is augmented by a seasonal workforce of 
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temporary contractors and volunteers to deal with the annual peak in workload from 
recreation and wildfires. Quantitative assessments of the reliance on volunteers are hard to 
come by. In 2007, the number of hours worked by volunteers nationwide was estimated to 
be about 2.500.000 which would be around 1.500 full time workers (Absher 2007). The 
annual budget is about 5.5 billion US$ (enacted budget 2012 – see Figure 7.2 for a 
breakdown). Revenues amount to about 0,5 billion a year with timber, minerals and 
recreation being the largest contributors. 
 
Organization 
The FS operates under guidance of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Undersecretary for 
Natural resources and Environment. The Forest Service’s national headquarters are referred 
to as the Washington Office or WO. It is home of the of the politically appointed Forest 
Service’s Chief as well as to the Chief Financial Officer and four deputy Chiefs for:  
x The National Forest System – tasked with resource management on the public lands.   
x State and Private Forestry – tasked with cooperation with parties involved in the 
management, protection and development of forests that are not federally owned 
like private landowners and local government and forest industries.  
x Research and Development - provides the scientific and technical knowledge in the 
field of forestry. Research is conducted through a network of forest and range 
experiment stations and the Forest Products Laboratory. 
x Business Operations – responsible for staff activities such as acquisition, human 
resources and information resources 
 
A number of other organizational units charged with international and research activities 
reside under the WO. The bulk of the organizational activities however take place in regions, 
stations and areas located throughout the nation and generally referred to as ‘the field’. The 
field is organized into three hierarchical levels: 
The Region: The US is divided up into 9 regions that each have a regional forester in charge. 
The regional office (RO) staff coordinates activities between national forests, monitors 
activities on national forests to ensure quality operations, provides guidance for forest plans, 
and allocates budgets to the forests.  
National Forest: There are 155 national forests and 20 grasslands.. The person in charge of a 
national forest is called the forest supervisor. Forest supervisors of the national forests 
within a region report to the regional forester. The headquarters of a national forest is called 
the supervisor's office. This level coordinates activities between districts, allocates the 
budget, and provides technical support to each district.  
Ranger District: Each forest is composed of several ranger districts. The district rangers from 
the districts within a forest work for the forest supervisor. There are more than 600 ranger 
districts. That vary in geographical size (20,000 to 400,000 hectare) as well as number of 
staff (10-100) Many on-the-ground activities occur on the ranger districts, including trail 
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construction and maintenance, operation of campgrounds, and management of vegetation 
and wildlife habitat.  
Vital to understanding the rather complex organizational and management structure of the 
FS is its dual character. Apart from the hierarchy based on regional structure (Chief - 
Regional Forester – Forest supervisor – District Ranger) another line of authority exists that 
follows the programs within a particular policy area. (Deputy Chief - Program managers WO 
– RO manager for Strategic Objective – Program managers at National Forests).  
Policy field and tasks principal 
As mentioned the FS functionally resides under the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
The US Federal government has three other agencies that are primarily tasked with 
managing federal lands and natural resources. These are the National Park Service, the US 
Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Land Management. These three agencies all fall 
under the Department of the Interior.  
The FS formally responsible for executing strategic goal number 2 from USDA’s strategic plan 
2010-2015: 
Ensure our national forests and private working lands are conserved, restored, and made 
more resilient to climate change, while enhancing our water resources. 
 
This strategic goal is translated into 4 objectives and 15 associated performance targets:  
Objective 2.1  Restore and conserve the nation’s forests, farms, ranches, and grasslands 
Objective 2.2 Lead efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
Objective 2.3 Protect and enhance America’s water resources 
Objective 2.4 Reduce risk from catastrophic wildfire and restore fire to its appropriate place 
on the landscape 
 
Progress on these objectives is measured by 15 performance measures with associated 
baselines and targets, 10 of which are reported on by the FS. The other five are not directly 
address the FS responsibility as they refer to non-federal land (2.1 and 2.3), carbon 
sequestration (2.2) or flood prevention (2.3). Prior to the current strategic plan, the FS was 
tasked with strategic goal number 6 from the 2005-2010 Strategic Plan which stated a more 
or less similar set of goals and objectives.  
 
Although operating in a relatively stable policy area for the last two decades, the activities of 
the FS have been impacted by some major policy changes, notably in the 1970s and 1990s. 
First of all the arrival of federal environmental legislation in the early 1970s (National 
Environmental Policy Act, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act) saw a shift in focus to sustainable 
use the lands. The adoption of further legislation such as the National Forest Management 
Act of 1976 and elaboration of biodiversity legislation in the 1990s lead to disappearance of 
the controversial practice of massive clear cutting of forests. One of the controversies that 
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received quite a lot of media attention in the 1990s was the fight between loggers and 
environmentalist protesters for conservation of Spotted Owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest 
(also referred to as the ‘timber wars’). These events resulted in a significant drop in timber 
harvest volumes cut from National Forests as illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1  Decline in timber harvest (Source USFS, visualized by EcoWest, 
www.ecowest.org/2013/05/28/timber-harvest-falls-in-national-forests)  
 
It can be argued that the field of Forestry in the entire western world and beyond has 
experienced a similar shift in focus from timber to sustainability and more diverse uses of 
land.   
In response to these developments the character of the FS workforce also changed as 
specialists trained in other areas like for example wildlife biology started entering the 
workforce in larger numbers. In addition the FS has long had an image of being a service 
dominated by a white male culture that is consistent with stereotypes of lumberjacks and 
rangers. Promoting workforce diversity has therefore been a fairly consistent priority of top 
management throughout the previous decades. 
Combining these developments the FS has been on a long journey to change from a white 
male dominated organization primarily directed at harvesting timber to a multidisciplinary 
land management organization with a diversified workforce. Although this development has 
been going on for a long time, reflections of the old versus the new culture were provided by 
several organization members.  
Choice of principal and agent  
Due to the variation in character and size of units within the Forest Service, for this case 
study a more specific focus had to be chosen. Principal-agency relationship can be defined at 
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multiple levels in the case of the FS. As described the FS is the executive agency for one of 
the USDA’s primary objectives. In addition to the USDA acting as a principal towards the FS, 
both agencies are scrutinized by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) with regard to efficiency and effectiveness issues. Within the FS the WO manages 
relationships with all 9 regions to realize its goals. Within a region a number of National 
Forests report to the RO for accomplishing their tasks. A similar relationship exists between 
ranger districts and the supervisor’s office of a National Forest.   
Although the relationship between the FS WO and the USDA is taken into account in this 
study, most FS employees perceive ‘Washington’ as a single principal. Therefore the primary 
focus will be on the relationships within the National Forest System between the Forest 
Service’s Washington Office and one of the nine regions. For assessing the internal 
performance management, the relationship between regional headquarters and a particular 
National Forest was selected. 
For this purpose the regional Headquarters of Pacific Northwest Region 6 (R6) and the 
Gifford Pinchot National Forest (GPNF) were selected. Region 6 was selected because it had 
a good reputation with regard to performance budgeting according to the WO and was fairly 
representative for a region in other respects. The GPNF was selected because it is one of the 
major National Forests within Region 6 and for practical reasons because it was in close 
proximity to the RO Headquarters. In terms of size difference with the Netherlands Forestry 
case it is noticeable that the size of the GPNF alone equals more than twice the combined 
land managed by the Forestry Service of the Netherlands.  
7.2 Degree of PB implementation 
As the federal US never formally adopted a system of program budgeting, the Budget Line 
Items (BLI’s) of the FS form the backbone of the financial allocation of the Service. These 
have been pretty stable for at least the last decade and are visible in the budget documents 
at all levels of the organization. The allocation between these BLI’s has also been reasonably 
stable with the of exception Fire management which relative share continues to go up at the 
expense of Capital improvement and Maintenance (see Figure 7.2).  
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Figure 7.2  Relative allocation of funds to FS BLI’s  
* the 2012 Wildland Fire Management  BLI  includes the FLAME Reserve Fund 
that was introduced in 2010 as a transfer account to prevent borrowing from 
other BLIs during a severe fire season.   
 
The reliance on BLI’s for allocation instead of lump sum financing around policy objectives 
has long been considered somewhat problematic from the viewpoint of budgetary flexibility 
at the level of districts (Kaufman 1960:123). Several initiatives have been developed to 
integrate different budgets to support single set of goals and accomplishments. So far none 
of these has led to permanent changes.  
The budget process at the FS is characterized by a large degree of stability. Within the 
budgetary and performance planning process, both lines of authority mentioned 
(geographical and policy area) are involved as program and geographical managers jointly 
set targets and negotiate reallocation proposals. Several respondents who had been with 
the service for 30 years or more and who had served at different locations, made this point. 
Moreover, the description of the FS budget process in the late 1950s by Kaufman seems to 
be largely accurate of today’s budgetary process. In fact Kaufman refers to the Service’s 
output based budgeting system as performance budgeting, long before this term gained 
popularity in public sector budgeting (Kaufman 1960:112).    
7.2.1 PB in relationship WO – the Field 
The primary performance document for the Service the national level in recent years has 
been the FY 2007-2012 FS Strategic Plan. The Strategic Plan can be viewed as a detailed 
partial translation of one strategic objective on National Forests of the Service’s principal, 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). In this plan the FS identified 7 strategic goals and 
their intended outcomes. The 7 strategic goals were each divided into 1 to 5 objectives with 
associated measured performance measures with baseline and target values.  
To add to the complexity, there is another performance structure to report to with yet 
another time interval. These are the political priorities of both the President and the 
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Secretary of Agriculture. The current presidential initiative is America’s Great Outdoors 
which seeks to encourage grassroots conservation initiatives by local communities in order 
to make the federal government a better partner with states, tribes, and local communities. 
In 2009 the Secretary of Agriculture formulated his ‘All Lands’ vision for forest conservation. 
This vision stresses the role of healthy forests and grasslands in protecting water resources 
and increasing resilience to climate change. Although both initiatives certainly receive 
attention and resources by managers, they are less visible in the day to day set of 
performance measures and output funding on the district level. Largely in line with these 
national priorities, Forest Service’s politically appointed chief brings her or his own 
emphasis. The present chief, not surprisingly, stresses water integrity and the Great 
Outdoors objective to involve more urban population more actively in the nation’s forests. 
During the previous decade earlier Forest Services chiefs prioritized subjects like 
unauthorized vehicles, invasive species management, hazardous fuel and climate change. 
 
Like other US agencies performance accountability has recently focused heavily on the extra 
funds allocated as part of the ARRA, the Obama economic stimulus program. The complex 
cascade of performance planning and goal alignment as of 2012 is illustrated in Figure 7.3.  
 
Figure 7.3 Cascade of performance planning US Forest Service 
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In recent Budget Justification documents, the Forest Service’s budget was divided into the 
seven strategic goals from its strategic plan. Although both play a role in the performance 
planning and reporting structure, the BLI’s seem to be the more dominant entities used for 
this purpose. 
 
Figure 7.4 Division of FY 2012 budget into BLI’s and Strategic goals (source: USFS FY2013 
Budget justification) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the WO budget preparation starts with deputy chiefs setting directions for their areas of 
expertise with the deputy chief for the National FS typically taking the first shot at setting 
national and regional targets for the 9 regional foresters. Program directors at the WO and 
regional managers see if these targets are reasonable and proposals for adjustments go back 
and forth for a while. The agreed upon levels of funding and output are then put in the 
Forest Service’s budget request which is part of the USDA’s Budget request. The metrics tied 
to the line items are translated down to the National Forest level. It is not until the final 
budget resolution by Congress that the FS is sure about its definite spending levels and 
associated accomplishment levels. For most of the previous decade this wasn’t settled until 
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halfway the fiscal year or even beyond. When definite figures and possible adjustments to 
the proposed budget are known, the WO passes down the adjusted budget figures and 
associated output levels (referred to as accomplishments in the FS). The RO gets assigned a 
regional target for each of the accomplishment measures it has to report on. These are 
subsequently allocated to the Forests and areas that reside under the region. Awaiting 
budget authorization, the regions and National Forests have to work with conservative 
estimates based on previous years.  
Accomplishments are fed directly into databases from the project level using a variety of 
systems. The database can be accessed for monitoring progress against the targets by all 
levels of the Service and allows for a systematic drill down to regional and project level. 
Currently this system is being enhanced by introducing more visual geo spatial display 
possibilities. The vast majority of metrics used are on an output level although the number 
of outcome measures is slowly increasing (e.g. data on the condition of watersheds). From 
the point of view of the WO and the RO, foresters and forest supervisors are granted 
considerable freedom to negotiate target and funding reallocation as long as regions meet 
their targets. Each of the nine Regional Foresters provides an annual accomplishment report 
that is used in his or her yearly evaluation. This report is accompanied by a report in which 
the Regional Forester certifies that he or she has confidence in the data and that the 
controls used are valid. To safeguard data integrity an internal review process is in place at 
the Regional level. Under this system program managers in two forests each year have to 
prove that the numbers that were reported for a number of measures were actually 
accomplished. From the WO a more thorough review takes place every other year in a 
region. At all levels the general rule is that if a target is underperformed by more than 5% 
the manager will have to provide a written explanation has to be provided explaining why 
the target wasn’t met.    
 
Traditionally there has been a strong relationship between BLI’s and accomplishments in the 
FS which was already described by Kaufman in the late 1950s and still captures the essence 
of today’s budget formulation process (Kaufman 1960: 107, 115): 
 
‘The Forest Service budgeting is inextricably intertwined with a highly developed system of 
work measurement and planning….. There WO maintains a standardized list of all specific 
jobs – that is, discrete operations characterized by countable work output at specified 
standards of quality (perfection and intensity) – that must be done to perform all of the 
functions in national forest administration. It also keeps on hand records of ‘converting 
factors’ – the amount of time needed to perform one unit of work on each job. Finally, it has 
figures on the number of units of work on each job. Multiplying the volumes of business by 
unit time allowances yields the number of man-hours required to perform all the functions 
involved in managing the national forests. The man-hours are converted into dollar sums, 
and expenses for non-personal services (travel, supplies, communication etc.) are computed 
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as ratios of personal services. Thus, the estimates are formulated in terms of physical 
performance.’   
 
Standardized units of output, cost calculations per unit and volumes are still the building 
blocks that determine how much of which output can be realized for a particular amount of 
funding. 
 
The Forest Service’s complex strategic performance planning seems to be largely separated 
from the BLI’s centered budgetary process. The output planning tied to the BLI’s can 
however, to some degree, be considered as a common denominator between strategy and 
performance, resulting in a clear performance budgeting and accountability system. This 
goes in particular for those objectives and performance measures from strategic planning 
have a pretty straightforward relationship with accomplishments levels as funded with a 
BLI’s. This for example is the case with the target regarding timber sold (see Figure 7.5). 
 
It should be stressed that the relationship between strategy, targets and dollars is stronger 
in some areas than other. For timber and hazardous fuels it is quite strong. For some targets 
it is not because BLI’s can support a number of different accomplishments leading to 
complex cost attribution. A single accomplishment can also be funded by several BLI´s 
making it hard to specify the results of a specific type of expenditure The GPNF Work 
program for 2012 provides examples of both. Its recreation program is funded by nine 
budget line items and corresponds with different seven national accomplishment codes and 
associated targets. Only two of these national accomplishment codes which are linked 
directly to targets form both the FS Strategic Plan and the Budget Justification. From the 
remaining five, three are linked to targets from the Budget Justification while two aren’t 
linked to targets from either document. Another example is provided by the GPNF 
watershed and Invasive species program which is funded by 3 BLI´s and corresponds with 7 
accomplishment codes. 4 of these can be linked directly to the targets from both the FS 
strategic Plan and the FS Budget Justification. The other three to one of both documents 
only.  
 
Looking at the entire system of accomplishment codes monitored by the WO, a similar 
pattern can be found. The WO monitors about 300 quantitative performance metrics, 121 of 
which show up in the work plans at unit or project level. As illustrated in Figure 7.6 only a 
minority can be traced to both a specific budget line item and a strategic objective. 
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Figure 7.5 Planning, monitoring and reporting system for amount of timber sold based 
on BLI funding levels (CCF stands for hundred cubic feet) 
 
    
 
FY 2007-2012 Forest Service Strategic Plan: 
Goal 2: Provide and Sustain Benefits to the American People  
Objective 2.1: Provide a reliable supply of forest products over time 
that (1) is consistent with achieving desired conditions on NFS lands 
and (2) helps maintain or create processing capacity and 
infrastructure in local communities.  
Performance Measure 2.1.1 : Amount of wood fiber provided each 
year to help meet the Nation’s demand for forest products in an 
environmentally sustainable manner.  
2006 Baseline: 5.4 million CCF 
2012 Target: 8.0 million CCF, later reduced to 5,2 million CCF due to, 
amongst others, reduced demand because of the mortgage crisis 
FY 2012 Forest Service Budget: 
 
Budget Line Item: 
National Forest Service  - Forest products  
$ 335.511.000 
FTE: 2878  
 
Associated Target for Forest products: 
Volume of timber sold (CCF) 5,232,000  
 
 
PACIFIC NOTHWEST REGION 6 
Source: FY 2012 State of the Region report 
 
Objective 2: Provide and Sustain Benefits to the American People 
Objective 2.1.1. Forest Products 
 
FY 2012 target volume 1,214,750 CCF 
FY 2012 realization: 1,147,404 CCF  
 
94% target attainment accomplished with 14% fewer dollars 
GIFFORD PINCHOT NATIONAL FOREST 
Source: FY 2012 Program of Work review  
 
BLI Nation Forest System - Program Area Timber 
 
Planned budget: $ 1,725,000      Actual budget: $ 1,740,658 
Planned  FTE:     19.34               Actual FTE:      17.94 
Assigned target: 55,842 CCF      Accomplishment: 64,064 CCF  
 
115% of Target completed, accomplished with 101% of funds utilized 
WASHINGTON DC OFFICE Source: Performance Accountability System  
1 of 300 performance measures monitored: Vol. of timber sold (CCF), Accomplishment code:   TMBR-VOL-SLD  
Data 
reported 
daily at 
project  
level 
Perfor 
mance 
dialogue    
Input Input 
Perfor 
mance 
dialogue    
Annual 
Targets 
Annual 
Targets 
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Figure 7.6 FS wide performance measures and their relationship to the Budget and the 
Strategic Plan 
 
As much as some might like to see a comprehensive structure where all activities have 
targets that are strategically aligned and have a unique cost attribution, the reality of the 
forest ranger in the field does simply not always allow for such comprehensiveness. The 
activities undertaken by a forester to restore stream habitats may also serve other goals 
such as protecting water resources, reforestation or countering invasive species.  
For yet other goals there seems to be no good quantitative measure available. This is the 
case with goals like workforce diversity, recreation or community engagement following 
from the President’s initiative. This is expressed by one respondent: 
The targets are fair for what Congress appropriates dollars for. But there are also unfunded 
mandates, like are you an employer of choice or how we engage with communities. We just 
have to achieve those expectations.  
Nonetheless, the Forest Service’s immense and laborious system of codification, reporting 
and monitoring bears testimony to the fact that the Service attempts to make these links as 
explicit as possible.    
7.2.2 Performance management within the US Forest Service 
As described the WO can rely on a well-established system of measurement, reporting and 
analysis and, as a result, has a vast amount of information to its disposal to monitor regions 
and forests. The next question to address is to what extent this elaborate system is indeed 
used to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the FS in the way that was intended by 
performance budgeting reforms in the public sector. Of the different uses of PI mentioned in 
CH 2.3, all uses were said to occur according to respondents. Five of them were mentioned 
most frequently: 
55%
15%
22%
8%
30%
Measures not linked to
Strategic Plan or Budget
Justification
Measures linked to both
Budget Justification and
Strategic Plan
Measures linked to
Budget Justification only
Measures linked to
Strategic Plan only
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x Setting program priorities 
x Strategically reallocate internal resources  
x Allocating internal funds  
x Performance reporting for external accountability 
x Analyzing productivity and funding levels. 
 
This was followed by 
o Understand the impact of external events on performance goals 
o Rewarding staff 
 
Concerning the latter it should be added that there is no formal pay for performance scheme 
in place but an example from the field was mentioned were employees were rewarded cash 
amounts for over performing on already ambitious targets. For a further description of 
actual performance management a separation is made between the WO and the field. 
 
Performance management by the WO 
The regions regularly provide accomplishment reports to the WO but the most important 
one is annual one at the end of the year. Here the rule applies that underperformance in 
excess of 5% needs to be explained. Sometimes repeated failure to meet targets does lead 
to consequences like decreasing a target.  
 
The Forest Service’s external reporting consists of only a selection of the target levels that 
are managed by the WO and regions have to report on. There is indeed a distinction to be 
made between the targets that are reported externally and those that are used for internal 
steering, as one respondent reflects: 
 
‘We have 300 measures and only some 150 of those are shared externally. These are 
communicated in 4 places: in our budget justification, our annual performance report, 
USDA annual performance report and the USDA budget summary and performance plan. 
If you have a measure in those and you miss it there’ll be analysis what is going on.’  
‘If you’re not in there and you miss your target there is not much follow up. These other 
measures do serve a purpose for internal program management (have we done what we 
were hoping to do). ….We have been encouraging to limit these because it is a lot of work. 
There’s been a notion for a while that your program only matters when there are 
measures.’  
As Congress traditionally seems to be mostly interested in fire, timber and to a certain 
degree watershed, the other targets receive relatively little political attention. Fire obviously 
has a tremendous direct impact on local communities as does timber for its revenues partly 
go back to local communities to fund public services like schools. Watershed measures are 
important too but the complex causal relationship between for example water quality and 
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timber harvest is hard to communicate to the broader public. Special attention is paid to five 
key performance measures for USDA that are monitored and reported quarterly and also 
have quarterly targets. The quarterly reporting is a requirement from the recently 
implemented new federal performance management guidelines (GPRAMA 2010). 
Apart from a performance dialogue between the WO and the field, USDA and OMB also 
monitor the targets the FS albeit with different perspective and attitude as a respondent 
explains: 
 
‘We do get a lot of tough questions about efficiency and effectiveness. Mostly from OMB 
and sometimes from USDA ….There are questions about performance form the USDA but 
they seem geared toward sharing information versus trying to change the way we go 
about our day-to-day business. We inform them if we take measures out of the measure 
set. They help us coordinate with OMB and OMB helps coordinate towards Congress. We 
try to keep them aware about what’s going on the ground. USDA and FS keep each other 
posted to make sure that we do what the Secretary wants us to do. The USDA tries to get 
awareness in order to have a meaningful debate.’ 
The WO formally needs to approve every change in reallocation of targets but handles this 
with certain degree of pragmatism. Regional program and budget directors regularly make 
agreements and inform WO about this knowing that formal approval of reallocation will not 
be a big issue as long as national levels are attained. The WO’s priority is that national levels 
are attained and an auditable record is kept about reallocations. A special provision exists for 
funding firefighting. If one of the regions spends more than they were allocated to fight a 
fire the difference is covered by the Flame Reserve fund that was established in 2010. 
From the WO point of view, a consequence from the physical distance to the field is that 
local knowledge and data to analyze why a target is missed is often lacking. This leads to 
questions being asked to the field. One long serving respondent noted that the current 
advanced information systems did result in a reduced number of questions from Washington 
but did not reduce the total time spent reporting:  
 
‘Time spent on reporting is about the same as when I started 30 years ago. Back then if I 
wanted to see if a work was accomplished I literally had to go to a district’s office and look 
at their file.  Everybody believed what you reported because there was no really way of 
double checking. Now thanks to our big computers and our corporate database, someone 
at the WO can bring up a map of my forest and say ‘show me where they did all the 
thinning for the last 20 years and it’ll pop up and show him. As a result they don’t call 
anymore with questions. 90% of the information request they can pull from the computer. 
For some specific information you have to go back to your files, for instance to analyze the 
impact of a certain decision.’  
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More generally the relationship between the WO and the field often appears to be a remote 
one. One respondent from the field noted that Washington was like a black box to them half 
of the time. An additional limitation for using the WO’s databases for up to date monitoring 
is the timely entry of accomplishments. Throughout the FS the period from June until 
September is known as ‘field season’. This means that the WO, the RO and Forest 
supervisors will start looking closely for lacking accomplishments to figure out whether they 
were not accomplished or they were not reported yet. Indeed it is acknowledged that 
completeness of data can sometimes be an issue. One respondent notes: 
 
‘Historically in the Forest Service, performance data is entered in the 3rd and 4th quarter 
and mostly in the 4th quarter and mostly in the last week of the 4ths quarter. It is a lot of 
work and people are busy, especially in the summer months when fire season is busy.’ 
 
To motivate foresters to timely entry their accomplishments, the rule was introduced that 
forests and regions are not credited for accomplishments that are not entered in time. In 
addition it is hoped that development of geo spatial reporting and presentation system will 
be a stimulus to timely enter accomplishments. 
 
Performance management in the field 
The budget formulation process as described so far may appear to have a rather top-down 
character. This is only part of the story however. During budget preparation phase in Region 
6, the bottom up involvement in the process varies according to program manager as one 
respondent explains: 
 
‘We have 17 National Forests and 1 National Scenic Area. It varies by program and the 
program manager here at the RO. Some look at the target for the region and set targets 
based on what they think the region can accomplish. Some have conference calls, some 
have a more formal process where each forest would send their requests.’ 
  
Region 6 has a reputation of taking performance budgeting quite seriously. A reason for this 
is the development of a local performance budgeting process in which past results play a 
role in the distribution of next year’s budget among the region’s forests. According to this 
system, which was implemented in 2007, a unit can slowly increase its share of the total 
budget by repeatedly accomplishing more than their targets. Oppositely, continuous 
underperformance is punished by a decreasing share of the budget. The system is well 
balanced and can have a serious impact on forest management.  
For allocation of the timber dollars line item within R6, a model is used with 3 criteria: 
x Resource capability: the opportunities to do harvesting 
x Timber infrastructure: mills, harvest companies, clients. This is important because 
some regions lost theirs and as a result there’s no one to contract anymore. 
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x Past performance. This counts for 50%: a 4 year running average of real production 
against volume of financed target.  
On the use of this system a respondent explains: 
 
‘After 4 years of falling of timber component in a particular forest, the director and staff 
went to this forest to discuss the program direction to see if the function of the forest 
should be shifted from timber harvest towards recreation. Since a new Forest Supervisor 
had been hired, it was decided to continue the timber program at the same level for 
another year and then re-evaluate once again.’ 
 
It is important to also note that not all metrics in R6 have this performance component and 
that the opinions on the effectiveness of this system differ as expressed by some 
respondents:  
  
‘At the start everyone was really excited about it. As our budget started going down (also 
from 2007) this makes it harder to actually see there has been an increase. In addition the 
increase is only small increase over time. If someone improves in this year it may take a 
couple of years to see a significant increase.’ 
 
‘It works best in the timber area in my opinion. In some of the others like recreation they 
did not put in a performance element because they couldn’t come up with the right 
metric. So recreation gets its funding based simply on the number of acres they have to 
manage.’ 
 
‘In the last 5 years I exceeded targets in wildlife and invasive species by 50% and my 
budget is still going down because the overall budget cuts.’ 
 
Not surprisingly, the RO staff also has to deal with the technical performance measurability 
issues as they occur. It is up to the RO to explain the proper measurement methods to those 
doing the measurement following the guidelines provided by the WO. Two examples given 
by a respondent illustrate the kinds of issues at play here:   
‘We have stream habitat enhancement and lake habitat enhancement. One is measures in 
acres and the other in miles. If you improve land around a lake do you count the whole 
lake or a certain amount of feet around the area that is treated? We try to implement the 
best guidelines available.’  
‘How should landscape restoration be defined exactly?  What do you count? If you add up 
all the acres you end up with more acres than we manage because it is a layered 
treatment.’ 
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When it comes to monitoring at the regional level most units have program of work 
meetings where leadership will go over budget and targets. A month after the budget is 
published, forests have to put in their targets in the database. Sometimes it is more than the 
RO allocated and sometimes it is less .Depending on what that looks like the RO will monitor 
it. If it is much less, a conversation with the program manager may follow. There can be 
reallocation between forests during the year (so if one lags behind the other may take on 
extra work). In the early stages the monitoring is about what is planned. In the summer it is 
less about the planning but about reporting of the accomplishment.   
In January the State of the Region report is published in which the progress for each strategic 
goal is described including successes, key issues and challenges for the coming year. 
According to a respondent the presentation of this report is a very successful annual event: 
‘It is a celebration of all the good work that got done. Forest supervisors look forward to 
this. Each objective gets 5 minutes and 2 pages. It is not the gotcha kind of evaluation. The 
only thing that does not work is that some try to use it as a way to get more money.’ 
In addition to measurability issues and the administrative burden, another complicating 
factor for the performance budgeting system to work is the earlier mentioned fact that the 
field usually has to wait well into the fiscal year to know their definite allocation of budgets 
and targets. At the National Forest level the FS has learned to cope with budgetary 
uncertainty using an ingenious system that seems to have been in use throughout the 
regions for a long time (see Text Box 7.1) 
At the GPNF program managers usually look at the budget data every month or quarter but 
are more frequently involved in accomplishment reporting using a number of different 
systems. It is not uncommon that one particular employee uses four separate electronic 
systems for accomplishment reporting. Program managers also review the data others put in 
the systems. There is a strong incentive to enter targets timely into the system as only 
planned workloads are funded when it is queried by the RO at the start of the fiscal year. All 
accomplishment reports have to be loaded into the database by Oct 30th or the forest will 
not credited with the accomplishments. 
The incentive mechanism from the Region’s performance budgeting system has also been 
felt in the past for timber at the GPNF as a respondent explains: 
‘There are financial penalties for the forest if we don’t meet our targets. For example: 
several years ago we didn’t meet our timber targets 2 years in a row. Because of that our 
forest allocation went down from 4.5% of the regional allocation for timber for timber to 
around 3%. So there was a 33% drop in fund allocation but the targets stayed the same. If 
you perform very well you get a bigger share next time around.’ 
 
Text Box 7.1 Budget preparation procedure at Gifford Pinchot National Forest 
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Neither does the pressure from performance monitoring by the higher organizational levels 
go unnoticed at the Forest level. One respondent explains: 
‘Sometimes we have to talk to the region if accomplishments are lagging behind. In 
October I print out our target spread sheet including every target that is 5% or more 
behind. The supervisor has to write a report and may have to explain to the regional 
office.’   
But here also the matter of selective target monitoring and large administrative reporting 
burden is mentioned by respondents: 
‘We have 30 or so targets that we have to hit but there are only handfuls that are real 
showstoppers (like timber or restoration). Additionally, funding might follow our 
accomplishment of things in those areas. Other targets may get lost in the mix because 
they don’t have the necessary social pressure on them.’ 
National Forests have been facing a history of budgetary uncertainty with regard to 
delayed budget resolution and authorization by Congress, often halfway the fiscal year. At 
the FS the budgetary process at the local level has dealt with this uncertainty in a way 
consistent with the Services’ long standing performance budgeting tradition.  
x The overall budget baselines are calculated according to last year’s budget level 
minus 5% 10% or more depending on the outlook 
x First of all funding for necessary services such as permit administration and 
managing recreational facilities is estimated 
x A second layer of funding and activities is defined explaining what could be 
accomplished with a little more money. Usually these are things that don’t 
necessarily need attention each year like landscape or wildlife. 
x Thirdly program managers explain what special projects could be accomplished if 
they would get some more money on top of that. Program managers are 
encouraged to come up with their priorities and plan at least 25% above the 
funding baseline.  These projects are competitively presented to management 
who will decide on what projects to fund and prioritize. 
The underlying idea is that if the Forest receives more than the conservative estimate, 
management does not have to go back and figure out what to do with it. If the Forest gets 
less funding, the line just moves up to the most urgent priorities. Essential in this process 
is that management oversees that the projects presented fit within the given priorities 
and that cost estimates are not too optimistic. The particular procedure above is the one 
currently used at the Gifford Pinchot National Forest and may vary according to place and 
time. Generally however is reflects a methodology that has been common at many 
National Forests. 
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7.2.3 Conclusion on PB implementation 
The Forest Service’s system of linking outputs to funding and labor has been stable over 
decades and was used well before performance budgeting came into fashion across the 
federal government. Its level of detail and design astonishes new employees to the service. 
Drill down functionalities will be further enhanced by making more use of digital 
presentation options. The accomplishments that are tied to funding levels form an avoidable 
part of the work of virtually all employees and form a stable foundation under each year’s 
budgeting process. 
Although the formal role of the WO in the Forest Service’s budget preparation and results 
accountability seems to be strong in a formal sense, its actual performance management 
seems to concentrate on a selection of targets rather than overseeing comprehensive 
strategy implementation. More in general the WO seems to fulfill the role of the Service’s 
gatekeeper towards its other DC principals and guardian of the Service’s nationwide 
performance reporting system rather than micro-managing the regions and forests. It could 
be argued that the level of standardization of accessibility of PI combined with a disciplined 
workforce allows the Service to leave significant authority to the regions and forests for 
attaining their targets. For the internal management targets and data, the WO as well as the 
RO seems to rely strongly on the people in the field to make the right choices and will only 
intervene when national or regional targets are not met. The emphasis on decentralized 
authority has a long history in the Service as was noted by Kaufman half a century ago when 
citing a letter from 1905 by the Service’s first chief Gifford Pinchot (Kaufman 1960: 84): 
In the management of each reserve (now called National Forests) local questions will be 
decided upon local grounds…General principles… can be successfully applied only when the 
administration of each reserve is left largely in the hands of local officers, under the eye of 
thoroughly trained and competent supervisors. 
When looking at the Forest Service’s entire system of performance planning, reporting, 
monitoring and accountability, the goal alignment and monitoring intensity may look 
fragmented as it varies according to policy goal and field of activity. The WO does gather 
information on virtually all of the services activities and outputs in the field and has a solid 
accountability provision when targets are not met beyond a 5% margin. There is however 
reluctance towards intense monitoring and steering as this happens quite selectively. Indeed 
throughout the organization a rather clear distinguishing line exists between those activities 
that are reported externally and receive political attention (like fire, timber, watershed and 
USDA’s key indicators) and the others. From the principal’s perspective however the 
priorities seem to be covered quite comprehensively by the WO system. The overall image is 
one that the principal (the WO) uses its advanced PI and accountability system to control the 
agent (the field) regarding his priorities but is reluctant to use it for micro management of 
other outputs which are left to local managerial discretion. 
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Table 7.1 Presence of indicators PB implementation 
Indicators Presence in 
USFS case 
 
PB 1.1 PB is used by the agency in addition to traditional 
budgeting 
  
Clearly 
present 
PB 1.2 PB is used by the  principal to control the agency 
  
Clearly 
present 
PB 2.1 A high degree of de jure PB implementation 
 
Clearly 
present 
PB 2.2 A high degree of de facto PB implementation 
 
Clearly 
present 
 
The Forest Services’ PB system can be criticized in the sense that not all of the services’ goals 
seem fit well into its system. It seems like the method that worked well for timber has been 
adopted for all targets. For some this does not work out that well. For example a target for 
the completion of a land management plan is either reported as 0 or 100%. In addition the 
point can be made that more advanced performance measures linking outputs to outcomes 
seem to be underdeveloped and data integrity seems to be a reoccurring challenge. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been mentioning these points ever since the 
implementation of the Government and Results Act (GPRA) at the start of the century. 
Although this criticism is by no means pointless, it should be taken into account that given 
the level of sophistication and thoroughness of the Forest Service’s PB system and the 
consistency and discipline it requires, there are limits of what can be expected. The reality of 
the foresters’ work on the ground and the sometimes intangible wishes of political principals 
would provide formidable administrative and goal alignment issues for any good working PB 
system.   
 
7.3 Exploring Neo-Institutionalist  Explanations  
As dominant as performance measurement, reporting and PI use may be in the Forest 
Service, it is not obvious that adopting a well designed and implemented PB system forms 
the main explanation for this behavior. As we know there are many examples where such 
systems fail to make a lasting impact on organizational behavior. In an attempt to 
understand the Service’s preoccupation with performance budgeting and performance 
management the possible institutional explanations as introduced in Chapter 4 will be 
tested. 
 
 
 
7.3.1 Explanations from Historical Neo Institutionalism 
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When investigating path dependency as an explanatory factor, important events with an 
impact the organization were sought that might explain PB implementation. This could be 
anything, for example a crisis with a principal or a series of bad press in the media. Moreover 
it is possible that, if adoption of PB is viewed as an appropriate response to such events, 
result oriented behavior should be explained by the logic of appropriateness rather than 
PB’s incentives doing their work. To put it differently: organization members are susceptible 
to unwritten rules and roles that demand compliance with a performance management 
system, regardless of the incentives of this system itself. In this case events that affected the 
organizational attitude towards performance budgeting and performance management 
could be particularly revealing.  
 
To assess the relevance of critical junctures in explaining the use of performance 
information, respondents in the interviews were asked to name the most significant events 
that have affected the FS throughout the years. Just like in the other case studies, 
respondents were asked to think of answers that they felt any colleague might also give in 
order to prevent answers too close to one’s own specific duties. Subsequently the relevance 
of these events as possible explanation will be assessed. 
 
The analysis of the answers that were given learns that no single large event clearly stands 
out as the two most frequently mentioned events were named by only 4 out of 8 of the 
employees that were interviewed: 
 
1. Political appointees from 1990s – Under President Clinton, FS Chiefs (the head at the 
WO) became political appointees whereas traditionally they were promoted from the 
ranks of the Service itself. This has been feeding concerns of politicizing of the 
Service’s top management.  
2. Adoption of ecological laws in 1990s - This was preceded and followed by bitter 
confrontations between loggers and environmentalists also referred to as the timber 
wars or spotted owl controversy. This fell particularly hard on the FS in R6 as they 
had to navigate between maintaining national laws and their agreements with the 
timber industry and the local communities that dependent on timber revenues.  
 
Two events were mentioned by 3 respondents: 
 
3. Centralization of Human Resources. In 2006 the FS started to centralize 
administrative functions such as HR and IT into one shared service in Albuquerque, 
New Mexico. Apart from the impact on employees working in these functions and 
some initial start-up problems with service delivery, it also affected the sense of 
autonomy of units in the field.   
4. Environmental Legislation 1970s (clean air&water, NEPA ). This can be considered as 
the start of a process of more intense interference from Washington in the work of 
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foresters in the field including a rise in formal documentation and reporting 
requirements. 
 
Another eight events were mentioned by just one or two people. One should bear in mind 
that the second event (Adoption of ecological laws in 1990s) is likely to have had a 
disproportionate impact on R6 as the Pacific Northwest was at the centre of the 
environmental protests at the time. Nonetheless the fact that the Service’s policy execution 
was controversial and under public scrutiny is likely to have influenced the move towards 
increased public accountability as it has in the other cases. This is suggested by some 
respondents but may be considered a manifestation of a general trend more than an event 
specific to the Service.     
 
When adjusting for the order in which respondents ranked the importance, events 1 and 3 
stand out just slightly more. With regard to the first event (political appointees), extra 
emphasis of the priorities and initiatives of political leaders such as the Secretary or the 
President can be seen as one of the reasons for  the Service’s complex  strategic planning as 
was demonstrated in Section 7.2.1. The uncertainty over this development was expressed 
eloquently by one of the respondents: 
 
‘The Chief used to be a civil servant who grew up in the FS. That is not true anymore. Now 
we get Chiefs and WO staff who never set foot on a National Forest. The FS grew up with 
the message that all our eyes should be on the National Forest. Now there are so many 
eyes in the WO pointed in a different direction.’ 
 
For the third event, it is hard to see a direct impact on the Service’s PB system and the 
attitude towards is. For the environmental legislation of the 1970s, the broadening of the 
organization’s policy goals and, as a result, increased reporting requirements can be 
imagined as an impact. Overall however no large event stands out that provides a strong 
explanation for the use of PI by the Forest Service. In addition it seems that the current 
system used had been largely in use before these events occurred (see Kaufman 1960: 113-
118). 
  
Asymmetry of power is another institutional factor that could provide an explanation for 
taking performance budgeting and performance management seriously. There may have 
been a certain influential unit or person that acted as a champion of output measurement or 
performance management that may have gained an extra strong position for whatever 
reason. A first suspect when it comes to introducing a performance budgeting agenda in an 
organization, are financial or planning units. There is no evidence of this from the documents 
and interviews that indicates that this was the case at the FS. Performance planning, 
reporting and budgeting are dominant as an activity but not particularly as an organizational 
unit.  
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Neither does a particular leader arise that in the memory of respondents ought to be 
credited with the extensive use of performance information. Obviously it helps to have a 
leader who is interested in performance figures and evidence based policy. In fact the 
current regional forester of R6 is credited with such an attitude which fits the good 
reputation that R6 has with regard to performance budgeting. One respondent explains: 
  
‘Our current regional forester is a visionary. He has a doctor’s degree in forestry 
economics. He makes a difference because he gets it how it works (for example you 
cannot do faster forest restorations with less dollars). This helps in the communication. He 
supports the use of hard numbers, he likes facts.’ 
In explaining a service wide phenomenon, the current regional chief’s favourable attitude 
towards performance management does obviously not provide enough of an explanation. 
Looking back somewhat further in the Service’s history, a champion of performance 
measurement may be identified in the person of Gifford Pinchot. The energetic founder and 
first chief of the FS is generally credited with promoting scientific approach to forestry at the 
beginning of the 20th century. It remains unclear however to what extent the current 
method of performance budgeting that has at least been in place since the late 1950s, can 
directly be traced to his vision of how the service should be managed.  
 
Another way in which asymmetry of power can affect an organization’s emphasis on 
performance measurement is a dominant role of specialists in a certain policy field. This may 
explain why objective measurement is regarded higher than other more political factors. To 
determine this, respondents were asked to choose between factors that they felt were most 
influential to Forest service’s policy in two subsequent questions: 
A) Vested interests             or   B) Policy ideas   
A) Politics/public opinion or   B) Specialist expertise 
 
If for both questions answer B is chosen, this would indicates that Forest Service’s policy 
area is run pretty much by experts and their policy ideas. This is regarded as highly 
compatible with a performance based approach to management and budgeting. However, 
no clear picture emerged when applying this framework. The FS views itself as a specialist 
impartial institute that has to settle disputes over land use between different interests using 
scientific arguments or as one respondent put it: 
‘We’re supposed to be a science based organization’ 
Many of the Service’s activities go unnoticed by most and sometimes only receive the 
attention of specialists.  In other matters, the interests of local parties are quite apparent. In 
fact they are felt constantly by some people in the field. This seems to be inherent to the 
nature of the Service’s work as explained quite clearly by respondents:  
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‘Our work is noticed more by selected and interested parties than by masses (America has 
become urbanized). Firefighting does get national attention. Otherwise people mostly are 
tuned in because they have an interest in environmental issues, recreating or they live 
near a forest.’ 
‘Activities happen right there in people’s literal backyard, their communities. So a direct 
local political pressure comes to bear at the FS compared to a non-land management 
agency…..Politics extremely influence the Forest Service’s work but rightly so. Healthy 
tensions between political and social pressures are balanced with the science side of the 
Forest Service.’  
In addition to the coping with all kinds of local interests, Washington policies shape the work 
of people at all levels in the organization. Not unlike the situation with the forest service in 
the Netherlands, this has not always been the case. As one respondent assesses the 
introduction of the set of environmental laws in the 1970s: 
‘We are out there doing our thing, than there is a national umbrella of laws about how we 
do our work now and into the future.’  
The specialist nature of the Forest Service’s work may partly explains the advancement of 
performance management and performance budgeting. On the other hand, the role of 
objective, scientific data in decision making is constantly challenged by interests and 
sometimes political preferences, perhaps even more so than in other public sector agencies.  
Table 7.2 Presence indicators historical neo-institutionalism 
Indicators Presence in 
USFS case 
 
H 1.1 Critical juncture in the accountability chain or policy field 
 
Present to 
some extent 
H 1.2 Problem to which PB was seen as a solution  
 
Absent 
H 2.1 An  advocate or champion of PB in a powerful position 
 
Absent 
H.2.2 A policy field in which specialists are dominant. 
 
Present to 
some extent 
 
It can be concluded that the indicators identified from historical neo institutionalism only 
offer a modest and partly explanation for the Forest Service’s standing with regard to 
performance management and performance budgeting. Although the influence of the 
Service’s founder and first Chief did not come up in the interviews (under indicator H2.1), it 
may have been significant and may requires further study. 
7.3.2 Explanations from Sociological Neo Institutionalism 
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From a viewpoint of sociological neo institutionalism, the ability to openly discuss problems 
and reflect on existing positions make for an organizational culture in which using of PI for 
learning is regarded as appropriate behavior. This situation can easily be contrasted with 
many government organizations in which bad news and self-criticism are met with suspicion 
and defensive routines. The conditions for organizational learning were tested among others 
by letting respondents react to 4 statements: 
e. Within the Forest Service, important issues are being discussed openly and fairly  
f. Within the Forest Service, existing opinions are regularly challenged and discussed  
g. If the FS is being confronted with a problem, a thorough problem analysis takes place 
prior to taking action  
h. If things don’t work out in the Forest Service’s policies and execution, lessons are 
usually learned  
The answers to these statements portray the FS as a learning organization with an open 
culture in which results and improvements are discussed easily at all levels. The drawing of 
lessons after taking action seems to be strongly embedded in the Service’s culture.  
 
The FS spends a lot of effort on research and evaluation, arguably more than any other 
service thanks to the relative size of its research branch that takes up over 5% of the 
Service’s resources. Examples of applied lessons from PI and evaluation could be mentioned 
fairly easily by respondents. FS employees are aware of this as is evident from these quotes 
from respondents: 
‘In my opinion, the FS has highest degree of applied science of any federal agency.’ 
 
‘We do a lot of work with the R&D stations. We read their outputs and make changes. This 
happens continuously. We have a definite partnership with our scientists. The only time 
we have disagreements with them if we have to make a decision when there is a grey area 
and they want to study it more.’ 
 
The aspiration to be a learning organization is communicated consistently by management. 
On the other hand it is acknowledged that there can be some tension between the 
inclination to sit down and analyze what the best course of action is and the urgency in 
which some of the Service’s tasks need to get done as these quotes from respondents 
illustrate: 
 
‘We talk a lot about the learning organization. We have a big push to become learning 
organization. We are aspiring to that. There is a large awareness of the value of being a 
learning organization but the press of daily business sometimes moves you on to the next 
task at hand rather than learning form what you just did.’  
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‘There is a lot of good analytical work done form all scientific disciplines. Our work also 
requires the ability to drop what you’re doing and focus on something else (fires). We 
often have to make choices on external influences instead of analysis’. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly however, the strongest learning culture seems to be rooted in the fire 
management branch within the Service. In fire management lessons do result in changes. 
For example a recent national program called Safety Journey addressed the tragic reality of 
firefighters that keep dying in forest fires. In this campaign firefighters were educated about 
the psychology of being safe versus the can do attitude where firefighters are known for. 
This followed newly gained insights from an evaluation that showed the limited effects on 
prior measures that focused on beefing up rules and intensifying training. Some comments 
even suggest that the evaluation and learning routines from fire management have been 
influencing the learning culture in other areas:  
 
‘As a result form field work especially the danger form fires we often do after action 
reports. Some of this culture seeps out to the rest of the agency. Even in the budget and 
finance group we don’t really have day to day dangers but when things happen we often 
do a review to see what went well and what can be improved.’ 
 
‘I was involved in planning an orientation day for new employees. After it was finished the 
committee immediately got together and had this discussion on any problems that 
occurred. They made notes so the next time we did the same orientation, people would 
have a number of action reports to look into.’  
Insofar there is hesitation about learning routines this primarily concerns the Service’s ex 
ante problem analysis prior to taking action and the fact that some action is taken for 
political reasons disregarding the careful analysis that is done as expressed by these quotes 
from respondents: 
  
‘We are perceived as shooting from the hip. We are at the infant stage of doing this 
better.’ 
‘There is a lot of analysis done but a lot of action is taken for political reasons and is not 
related to the analysis.’ 
It could be added that at WO level, as noted earlier, there is not always a clear sight on what 
causes underperformance of certain targets because knowledge from the field is lacking to 
do a proper analysis right away.  
As encountered in the other cases, the culture at the FS too seems to encourage discussing 
results and addressing issues does not seem to be greatly hampered by differences in 
hierarchical levels or taboos on disagreement. The ability to critically reflect on their own 
policy choices and results was also noticed as a characteristic of the Forest Service’s culture 
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by Kaufman when writing about the accuracy of reporting by forest rangers and is affirmed 
by respondent’s comments today: 
 
..Reporting tends to be highly accurate, and field officers turn in information that sometimes 
reveals their own weaknesses and mistakes as well as their competence and their triumphs.  
(Kaufman 1960:130): 
‘We have a culture where it seems to be okay to disagree with one another. We have a lot 
of scientific disciplines working for the same organization. Obviously there is disagreement 
about what people think that the priority is for a given landscape. It is not seen at 
disharmonious not to agree on anything. So people feel comfortable to say that they don’t 
agree.’  
 
An example of the way of a constructive internal performance dialogue is the State of the 
Region event (see Chapter 7.2.2) where meeting or exceeding targets is celebrated and 
failure to meet targets is discussed jointly to address improvement measures.  
 
It is apparently risky to talk about the cultural openness of an organization as large and 
geographically dispersed as the FS as there will be and are differences between the different 
units and levels within the organization. 
  
The openness of the Forestry Service’s culture does not mean that there aren’t subjects that 
are more sensitive than others. In that sense the participative openness seems somewhat 
higher than reflective openness. This goes for example for the administrative burden and for 
contradictions between the old versus the new culture that sometime pop up as these 
quotes from some respondents show: 
 
‘Our organization tends to learn and progresses based on knowledge. For example we 
won’t even think about doing the approach to logging we did in the 1970s. But it is hard to 
question the red tape or change direction. We are still politically driven.’ 
 
‘As an agency we can be somewhat nostalgic. There is a lot of history, pride and tradition. 
It is OK to celebrate that but if you look back too much you you’re not looking at the 
future.’  
 
‘We do continually challenge our way of thinking and we continually bud up against the 
old thinking versus the new way.’ 
 
The matter of old versus new culture within the FS was already briefly mentioned in CH 7.1. 
Although somewhat intangible, the old culture seems to refer to the nostalgic image of the 
days when the Service was mainly about generating timber sales and the ideal forest ranger 
had an image of a masculine hero facing rough conditions in a remote area. What the new 
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culture exactly looks like is still remains somewhat unclear. One respondent reflected on the 
changes the Service went through in the last couple of decades:  
 
‘We have been going through a change for a while now.  When I began working for the 
Forest Service nearly 40 years ago, we made money for the Treasury through the volume 
of our timber sale receipts. We’ve been moving away from that since the 1990's and it is 
changing our culture. Although this began over 20 years ago, it takes a long time in any 
culture to completely move to something different. The old culture of just timber as our 
total focus has shifted to forest health and later to landscape restoration. When our 
timber program was reduced our workforce was reduced; primarily in smaller 
communities where the majority of work is accomplished.  Our workforce and budget have 
both been reduced by 50 percent over the past 20 years. This is changing the way we 
work.  In addition to the budget and workforce reductions, technology has also changed 
the way people do their work. Information is much more readily available. That changes 
our work and the way we think about things.’ 
 
An organizational culture can either help or hamper the use of PI as it may heavily influence 
the way (performance) information is selected, interpreted, presented and processed. If 
there is a joint understanding across organization members about the usefulness or even 
necessity of performance data and this interpretation is shared by its principal(s) and other 
stakeholders, measurement and reporting these data is will be considered an undisputed 
part of one’s job. This is expected to be beneficial to using this information to learn and 
improve. Respondent’s comments suggest that this may play a role at the FS too when it 
comes to performance measurement and reporting: 
‘We know the reason why. I think we understand why Congress gives us certain money in 
certain arenas.’ 
‘When Congress passes an appropriation for the FS, they don’t just pass the dollars, they 
pass the target. Our chief testifies for what he is going to achieve as a return for these 
dollars. Historically this is what we do, we are expected to perform. Some benefits are less 
measurable. Contacts with the communities not handled so much by budget but more by 
personnel.’  
 
‘There is a pride in the FS. People pride themselves on meeting their targets and do a 
tremendous amount of to meet them. It can send a mixed message to the Hill though 
when targets are met anyway in times of budget cuts.’  
People generally seem to be convinced of the usefulness of measuring and reporting PI for 
the sake of improving effectiveness as well as for accountability as one respondent 
summarizes quite clearly:  
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‘Because it is fed by local data and you get aggregated reporting, like for instance on 
watershed health and species diversity, it helps in the long term. In the short term as a 
manager it is often hard to see that benefit. If we weren’t doing that we wouldn’t be as 
accountable to taxpayers as we should be.’ 
 
That does not mean that every quantitative target is seen as equally useful. The extensive 
reporting requirements with in areas where there are soft targets apply and monitoring and 
results accountability is less rigid are questioned by some: 
  
‘There’s a whole bunch them that feel almost most like busy work. In recreation they 
would do al off these things if they didn’t have the targets. Like the formula that uses 
persons visiting recreation sites. Does that help us see that we should have more or less 
people come? This would happen regardless of whether there was anything written down 
about numbers.’ 
In conclusion however, the evidence found portrays the FS as a learning organization with an 
open culture in which results and improvements are discussed easily at all levels. Drawing 
lessons after taking action seems to be strongly embedded in the Service’s culture. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the activities that most require a prompt response (fire), are characterized by 
organization members as the field with the strongest learning routines. Performance 
measurement and reporting seems to be a rather undisputed part of the work of almost all 
organization members and is generally perceived as useful. At the same time also some 
tension remains with regard to discussing differences between the old and the new culture, 
administrative red tape. 
 
Table 7.3 Indicators from sociological neo-institutionalism 
Indicators Presence in 
USFS case 
 
S 1.1 Absence learning disabilities    
 
Clearly 
present 
S 1.2 Participative openness 
 
Clearly 
present 
S 1.3 Reflective openness 
 
Present to 
some extent 
S 2.1 Shared view of the meaning of measured performance  
 
Clearly 
present 
 
7.4 Contextual factors 
It is hard to ignore the difficult budgetary situation part of the time this case study was 
conducted as the federal government was running under a sequester meaning that all 
agencies were facing automatic spending cuts. This exceptional situation started after 
Congress failed to agree on budget resolution as well as on extending the nation’s debt 
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ceiling. Although it is interesting to think about the implications of a government running on 
systematically reduced inputs for the entire concept of goal based performance budgeting, 
the implications for the FS system of performance budgeting and management were not 
apparent. Although the sequestration certainly affects targets, when asked whether the 
sequester impacted FS strategy a respondent reacted that strategy states that in what 
direction you want to move and not necessarily in what pace you need to get there.  
Another development that feeds worries about the Service not being able to live up to 
future expectations in terms of performance levels are the rising costs of forest fires. As 
money necessarily is being shifted form fire prevention to fire suppression each year and 
total budget keeps shrinking, something will have to give at some point. This is a 
development that has been going on for quite some time however.   
Eventful as these developments may be they do not provide an apparent explanation for the 
level of PI use by the FS. In fact one can argue that the FS system of linking of outputs to BLI 
funding and the robust methods of budgeting in the field (see Box 7.1) prepare the Service 
relatively well for this kind of budgetary crisis. On the other hand one could imagine that a 
consistent system like the FS output based funding system may become increasingly 
vulnerable to political pressure in an environment of shrinking budgets and ad hoc priority 
setting.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The investigation of the indicators for the FS should provide answers to three questions to 
be answered for each case (see CH 4): 
A.  To what extent is this a PB success? 
 
B  Are the identified conditions present? 
 
C.  Does context offer a likely explanation? 
 
The answer to the first two questions can be given when looking at the numerical scores, 
obtained from the interviews and expressed in the range of 0-2 and applied to the different 
indicators (see Figure 7.7). 
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Figure 7.7 Numerical scores of the indicators from the interviews  
 
The indicators for PB show that the FS easily fits all the criteria identified for being a PB 
success. Performance budgeting is a pivotal element of budget formulation and plays a clear 
role in controlling activities undertaken by officers in the field working in the regions. 
Alignment of all goals with budgets and outputs is consistent but complex and may appear 
somewhat fragmented. The PB framework is well designed and de facto use is convincing 
though not equally so for all policy goals. 
The second question should be answered with a yes for the sociological neo institutional 
indicators. The FS fits the criteria for a learning organization, has an open culture with 
respect to discussing results and organization members seem to share a positive perception 
of the usefulness of measured performance data. The ability to critically self-reflect and 
innovate is there but can sometimes be bounded by nostalgic elements of the Service’s 
culture. There was little evidence on a strong presence of the indicators from historical neo- 
institutionalism. Some events may have intensified a certain development of the PB system 
but this system was in essence already when these events occurred.  
Contextual factors do not offer a likely explanation for the PB success found in this case 
although they could challenge continuation of this success in the future.  
 
Epilogue 
The variation in size and landscape and the remoteness of units to each other and the 
headquarters are clearly greater issues in the US case but were recognized as organizational 
challenges in the SBB case as well. But the similarities do not stop there. Intrinsic motivation 
and professional pride of FS employees matches those for SBB and may provide a logical 
explanation for the result orientation and purposeful PI use found throughout the 
organization. It has been suggested by some that PI use and performance positively 
correlate with intrinsic motivation of employees for the organization’s tasks or public service 
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motivation as it is often fashionably referred to these days (Perry&Hondeghem 2008:8, 
Moynihan & Pandey 2010: 11).  
Although the historical institutional indicators tested in this study do not score as plausible 
explanations, the FS’ beneficial culture towards PB can only be explained by looking at 
historical institutional factors. As Herbert Kaufman’s explains in his late 1950s study of the 
Forest Service (a work thankfully used for this study), the FS has traditionally relied heavily 
on training and indoctrination as a tools to of integration to counter the apparent tendencies 
for organizational fragmentation. This resulted in a strong cultural and professional identity 
and a strong sense of mission of the FS. Wilson noted that a dominant single culture or sense 
of mission can be beneficial to the flow of information within government agencies: 
When a single culture is broadly shared and warmly endorsed it is a mission. The great 
advantage of a mission is that it permits the head of the agency to be more confident that 
operators will act in particular ways that the head would have acted had he or she been in 
their shoes. There are fewer distortions in the flow of information because sender and 
recipient of the message share common understanding. (Wilson 1989:109) 
In the late 1980s Wilson even regarded the US Forest Service, along with the FBI and the 
Army Corps of Engineers, as a prestigious elite agency thanks to their strong sense of mission 
and highly developed professional culture.  It is therefore somewhat puzzling to find that in 
the 2012 employee satisfaction ranking all these three agencies rank well below average 
(http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings). This raises the question if a professional 
culture is that stable a characteristic from an institutional point of view. 
The strong professional culture and the highly standardized administrative procedures 
(including accomplishment reporting) makes for an organization where employees seem to 
find performance measurement and reporting to be a self-evident part of their job. In this 
respect Kaufman already reported a strong administrative reporting culture reinforced by 
technical development (Kaufman 1960: 127-9). Filling the extensive administrative system is 
indeed still an important part of a forest ranger’s job. Technological development is easing 
this task somewhat but increasing precision and a higher demand for accountability is 
requiring additional time as well. This was already described by Kaufman but still is true of 
today’s FS:  
IBM machines, for example have been installed in all the regional offices, and virtually all 
bookkeeping and accounting are performed on them. Data coming in from the field units are 
punched on cards and processed by regional office technicians, and the printed figures are 
distributed to the relevant officials in the regional offices, to the appropriate forest 
supervisors, and, by the latter, to the Rangers. A glance at running totals each month informs 
everyone what is happening on every district, and as a result, most Rangers, at one time or 
another, have had their attention called pointedly to some trend or imbalance requiring 
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redress. The load on field men is eased by the service, it is true, but the service also improves 
the detection of deviation from promulgated norms. (Kaufman 1960:134-5) 
‘Technical advancement also has a downside: a lot more analysis is required by the public 
that increasingly questions what we do.’ (respondent in 2013) 
 
Another similarity with the other case studies is that the essence of the PB system was 
developed long ago within the organization and was gradually applied more broadly to other 
organizational goals, products, and processes. In the case of the FS, performance planning 
and accountability clearly grew from the timber program as one respondent explained: 
‘From the very start there was interest in how much timber was produced and there has 
always been some level accountability. Our precision has gotten a lot better but the 
concept has not really changed.’ 
The gradual bottom up development of a PB system contrasts the reality of many public 
organizations that adopted a PB system which is built and adopted quite suddenly in 
response to a principal’s needs regarding goal alignment and result accountability or 
because of top down government wide regulations.   
The image of the wide array of objectives and measures being ‘poured down’ on a forester 
and his or her unit (see Figure 7.2), conflicts with the classical notion of organizational 
strategy portrayed as a pyramid in which overarching goals are broken down into partial 
tasks executed by the lower levels. Instead one can view policy execution at the Forest 
Service as well as the other cases studies as an inversed pyramid, or a funnel as Kaufman 
named it, with the forester at the lowest level having to make the difficult judgment 
between conflicting strategic goals that are demanded from his or her organization. An 
illustration of such a dilemma in this case was a decision to open up a forest road to 4x4 
vehicles. This would serve the President’s agenda of increasing the forest’s attractiveness to 
city dwellers but at the same time may increase vulnerability of nearby habitat of 
endangered species.     
The complexity of strategic and performance planning has proved to be an obstacle for 
linking funding to performance as was highlighted by several reports of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). On the one hand It would seem a fair assessment to state that 
the Service’s stable annual system of output funding and measurement has been able to 
accommodate and support increasing requirements of performance planning in the late 
1990s and political prioritization of recent years to a great degree. On the other it may be 
argued that the Service’s tradition reliance on output reporting and linking inputs to 
measured outputs slowed the accommodation of a more modern performance budgeting 
system that centers programs, policy outcomes and budgetary flexibility. As discussed, the 
traditionally strong professional culture of the FS traditionally is seen as a favorable 
circumstance for successful PB but may also have a downside as some respondents indicated 
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that they felt that innovation at times conflicted with the service’s nostalgic culture. In that 
sense the Forest Service, to some degree, may become the victim of the principle of the Law 
of the handicap of a head start18 in recent years.  
Finally, although not the primary focus of this study, the FS cases study also illustrated how a 
PB system can function under pressure from a chaotic input oriented budgeting process as 
we have recently seen in DC. The FS budgetary process seems reasonably well prepared for 
dealing with gradual shrinking of budgets and continuous uncertainty about authorized 
allocation. On the other hand the FS has also profited from temporary extra funding form 
the federal recovery program (ARRA). Due to years of underfunding actual targets, this 
money was spent at the forest level more or less in line with the metaphor the squeaky 
wheel19 as a respondent indicated: 
 
‘ARRA money was used to do some long overdue maintenance of the remaining volcano 
visitor center. But it didn’t really affect our overall facilities program.’ 
 
‘Priorities depend on leader’s focus areas. This depends on who’s the squeaky wheel at the 
time but a lot is also dependent upon what is knocking on the political door.’  
 
Squeaky wheel budgeting represents a fundamental different approach than the rational 
budgeting process based on realistic cost prices and workloads as developed by the FS 
throughout the years. As such it raises the question to what extent a well-developed PB 
system can be compatible with continuous reallocation process that characterizes a long 
period of fiscal consolidation  
 
Data collection USFS case 
The primary method of data collection were semi structured interviews. In 
September/October 2012  and June/July 2013, ten persons were interviewed with regard to 
the USFS case. Two of these worked at the President’s Office of Management and Budget 
charged with oversight on performance on key priorities and budgetary issues. At the FS 
Washington Office the branch Chief Performance Management was interviewed twice. At 
the regional HQ of Region 6 in Portland, Oregon three persons were interviewed 
representing budget and performance staff and program management. Within R6, 4 persons 
were interviewed at the Gifford Pinchot National Forest representing line management, 
budget & performance staff and program management. Data were primarily processed by 
qualitative analysis although some quantitative analysis was used for comparing and 
aggregating results (see section 4.6). These scores were aggregated for each case allowing 
                                                 
18 The Law of the handicap of a head start (original Dutch: Wet van de remmende voorsprong) or dialectics of lead is a 
theory that suggests that getting an initial head start in a given area may result in being a handicap in the long-term. The 
term was coined in 1937 by Jan Romein, a Dutch journalist and historian, in his essay "The dialectics of progress" ("De 
dialectiek van de vooruitgang"), 
19 The expression ‘the squeeky wheel gets the grease’ refers to the notion that the most noticeable (or loudest) problems 
are the ones most likely to get attention 
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for a qualitative comparison on an ordinal scale. After finishing each draft case study, the 
report was reviewed by a key informant from the organization involved. By means of 
triangulation the findings from interviews were compared with anonymous questionnaire 
results and findings from analysis of documents sometimes nuancing the findings from the 
interviews. Appendix III shows the questionnaire that was used.  
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CHAPTER 8 CASE STUDY U.S. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION -AIR 
TRAFFIC CONTROL ORGANIZATION  
 
8.1 Description of the Agency and its Principal  
 
History and tasks FAA/ATO 
The Federal Aviation Administration is a federal agency that resides under the U.S. 
Department of Transport (DOT). The FAA is tasked with overseeing U.S. civil aviation in all of 
its aspect as expressed by the agency’s mission: to provide the safest, most efficient 
aerospace system in the world. To achieve this, the FAA establishes and enforces aviation 
regulations, oversees inspections and certifications and maintains the integrity and reliability 
of the civil aviation infrastructure. However, in terms of people and budget, providing air 
traffic control services forms the largest part of FAA’s work. On a daily basis some 15.000 air 
traffic controllers handle around 100.000 flights in U.S. airspace, carrying about 2.5 million 
passengers. On average, that comes down to one take-off and one landing every second 
somewhere in the US.   
The history of the FAA goes back to the 1920s when the first aviation related legislation was 
passed (the Air Mail Act, followed by the Air Commerce Act). In 1958, Congress created an 
independent federal aviation agency and in 1966, the Department of Transportation was 
created, with the Federal Aviation Administration becoming one of the modes within DOT.  
Air traffic control operations began in 1936 with the Bureau of Air Commerce started 
operating 3 traffic control centers that employed 15 controllers in total. In December 2000, a 
presidential executive order directed FAA to create a performance-based organization that 
focused solely on efficient operation of the air traffic control system. The new organization 
was to be headed by a Chief Operating Officer and by 2003 Russell Chew was selected to 
become first COO of the newly formed Air Traffic Organization (ATO). The ATO consolidated 
FAA's air traffic services, research and acquisitions, and Free Flight Program activities into a 
smaller, more efficient organization with a strict focus on providing the best service for the 
best value to the aviation industry and the traveling public. The ATO officially began 
operations on February 8, 2004. 
Unlike its counterparts in many countries (including LVNL in the Netherlands), FAA/ATO was 
not separated from the transport ministry to operate as an agency at arm’s length from the 
Transport department funded directly by its customers. Actually, in the 1990s the Clinton 
administration, as part of Vice President Al Gore’s “reinventing government” initiative, did 
propose to do just that but this proposal was never adopted.  
 
Size 
The FAA currently employs close to 49,000 people (47,031 FTE in FY12). About 4,000 FAA 
employees work at FAA Headquarters in Washington D.C. Another 1,500 work at the 
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Technical Center in New Jersey and 3,500 work at the Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma. The 
remaining 40,000 people work at regional and field offices. The bulk of them are ATO 
personnel (33,315 FTE in FY12), located at airports across the US. ATO operates a total of 21 
En Route Air Traffic Control Centers, 166 terminal radar control facilities (TRACONs), and 
another 380 air traffic control towers operated by the FAA or contracted controllers. Besides 
the 15,000 air traffic controllers, the ATO’s workforce is made up by the technicians, 
engineers and support personnel. Around 9,000 technical employees make sure that more 
than 41,000 pieces of equipment operate daily. 
 
FAA’s annual budget is around $16 billion (enacted FY2011). About 70% of this is used to 
fund the ATO. Airports (ARP) make up another 20% of budget expenses. The FAA’s collects 
about $ 0.6 billion in revenues annually, mainly from service fees (e.g., landing, registry, and 
overflight fees) and through reimbursements for products and services provided to domestic 
and foreign governmental entities. 
 
Organization 
The FAA is led by a politically appointed administrator who heads a rather complex 
organizational structure. Although many of its tasks are performed across the many 
locations throughout the US, most major units reside in Washington D.C. Budgeting and 
performance issues are also handled primarily from the central headquarters. The FAA’s 
main tasks are divided into four so called ‘lines of business’: 
x Air Traffic Organization (ATO): provides air traffic control operations for commercial 
private and (to some extent) military aviation.  
x Aviation Safety (AVS): oversees safety of aircraft, competency of pilots and 
mechanics and provides safety rules and standards 
x Airports (ARP): provides grants to state and local governments to improve airport 
safety efficiency and environmental quality in addition to standard setting and 
inspection. 
x Commercial Space Transportation (AST): regulates the safety of U.S. commercial 
space transportation. This is a relative new line of business that gained importance 
after retirement of NASA’s Space Shuttle. The two main challenges for AST today 
consist of getting crewmembers to and from the International Space Station and 
regulating the growing potential for space tourism. 
 
The four lines of business correspond with four organizational units that are each lead by an 
associate administrator. In addition to these four units there are another 9 unit that provide 
central services at the headquarters such as communications, human resources and finance. 
These are headed by an assistant administrator. As mentioned, the ATO is by far the largest 
FAA unit. Eight service units make up the ATO. Of these, Air Traffic Services and Technical 
Operations are the most numerous in terms of personnel (combined these units employ 
over 90% of ATO personnel). Management Services is tasked with maintaining and managing 
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the performance management systems and inform management to make sure that 
performance stays on track. Within ATO’s core activity of air traffic control different types of 
facilities and functions can be distinguished as illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
Figure 8.1 Types of facilities and functions within air traffic control (FAA Workforce plan 
2012-2021) 
 
Regionally the National Airspace that FAA manages is divided into nine regions with a 
regional office each (see Figure 8.1). The region oversees local airport development, 
certification, and safety. Air traffic control operations and performance planning and 
monitoring however are highly centralized and are managed directly from the DC 
headquarters.  
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Figure 8.2 FAA’s nine airspace regions and regional FAA offices 
  
 
Policy field and tasks principal  
The FAA is one of thirteen agencies that are part of the Department of Transportation (DOT). 
As such the FAA is responsible for achieving the strategic goals DOT is set to achieve. The 
DOT strategic plan currently applicable has been the DOT 2012-2016 Strategic Plan named 
‘Transportation for a New Generation’. This plan contains five strategic goals, four of which 
touch (partly) upon the FAA’s responsibilities: 
  
x Safety: Improve public health and safety by reducing transportation related fatalities 
and injuries. This is translated into 14 performance measures, 3 of which are FAA 
related: 
- Reduce commercial aviation air carrier fatalities to no more than 7.4 per 100 million   
  persons on board  
- Reduce general aviation fatal accident rate per 100.000 flt hrs to no more than 1.06 
- Reduce category A&B runway incursions to no more than 0.395 per million  
  operations 
x State of good repair: Ensure the U.S. proactively maintains critical transportation 
infrastructure in a state of good repair. This is translated into 5 performance 
measures, 1 of which is FAA related: 
- 93% of paved runways should be in excellent, good or fair condition. 
x Economic Competitiveness: Promote transportation policies and investments that 
bring lasting and equitable economic benefits to the nation and its citizens. This is 
translated into 13 performance measures, 3 of which are FAA related: 
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- Maintain average daily airport capacity for Core Airports of 86,835 arrivals and 
departures. 
- Maintain operational availability of National Airspace System (NAS) at 99.7%  
- Maintain NAS on-time arrival rate at Core airports at 88%  
In addition a core goal without quantitative metrics is formulated:  
- replace a 40 year old computer system in 20 air traffic control centers with a new 
one (ERAM) 
x Environmental Sustainability: Advance environmentally sustainable policies and 
investments that reduce carbon and other harmful emissions from transportation 
sources. This is translated into 11 performance measures, 2 of which are FAA related: 
- Improve National Airspace System energy efficiency by at least 2% annually (from 
4.24 Tg/Bkm in 2010 to 3.73 in 2016) 
- Improve Aviation Noise Exposure from 307,420 persons in 2011 by at least 2% 
annually to 328,000 in 2016. 
 
A fifth strategic goal, organizational excellence, does affect FAA but is not translated into 
quantitative performance targets. This goal includes a number of initiatives to support 
workforce diversification, emergency preparedness, open government and financial 
performance. DOT’s sixth and final strategic goal strategic goal, liveable communities, 
concerns and involves increasing accessibility and transportation choices of communities 
and does not directly involve FAA targets and activities.  
 
So total of 10 quite specific DOT targets have to be realized by the FAA. The current DOT 
strategic plan falls in line with a tradition of quite specific quantitative target setting by the 
department and its major agencies. In aviation as well as other transport policy areas such as 
road safety, safety improvement has historically leaned heavily on quantitative 
measurement, analysis and evaluation.  
 
This has delivered spectacular results as illustrated by this statement by Thomas Hendricks, 
senior vice president for operations and safety of Airlines for America (Bloomberg 2012): 
‘The risk of a fatal accident in commercial aviation has been reduced to 1 out of 49 million 
flights over the past five years, from 1 in 1.7 million flights from 1975 to 1989, according to 
NTSB records. That’s a 96 percent decrease in risk.  Safety has improved since the late 1990s 
as the airline industry and regulators learned to analyze massive quantities of data for 
anomalies and voluntarily made changes to head off potential problems’  
Choice of principal and agent  
Like any other policy area, different principal-agent constellations can be chosen to assess 
the degree of PB implementation between organizational entities. In this case the ATO was 
chosen as the primary focus for the position of the agent. The reason for this is that ATO 
represents the dominant operational unit within FAA where most primary processes and 
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activities take place that are expected to fulfill the policy objectives and realize targets. In 
addition the ATO seems to share complete commonality in type of tasks with LVNL, the 
subject of an earlier case study. FAA as a whole makes for a less fit with LNVL because it is 
responsible for a broader array of tasks such as airport regulation, airplane inspection and 
pilot certification.  
  
Figure 8.3 Different principal-agent relationships  
 
When determining the ATO’s principal, several 
organizations qualify as illustrated in Figure 8.3. 
First there is FAA where the ATO formally resides 
under as a unit. Secondly there is DOT of which FAA 
the largest residing agency. DOT officially mandates 
performance targets to FAA and the FAA budget 
request is part of DOT’s budget request. Finally 
there is the White House’s Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) with whom DOT negotiates 
budget and performance targets and to whom DOT 
has to report its performance. When it comes to 
accountability and performance dialogue however 
these lines seem to be more blurred than they 
occur in Figure 8.3. The distinction between FAA 
and the ATO is not always easy to make in practice 
as the ATO forms the operational backbone of the 
FAA. As a result, the ATO’s performance targets are 
the subject of discussions by FAA management on a 
daily basis. The unclear distinction between the 
different principals to the ATO is not a too rigid one 
in practice is also illustrated by responses form the interviews with DOT and FAA employees 
(in that order below):  
 
‘For the most part they (FAA/ATO) take whatever information they have already 
generated…. and they just transfer it over into the departmental plan. To them it is not a 
big exercise. For the most part we adopt what they come up with’ (DOT) 
 
‘Because we are a big part of DOT and we are very visible, we have our own OMB people 
assigned directly and not through DOT, we keep them informed.’  
 
Nonetheless, DOT was chosen as the main principal to ATO in this case study because the set 
of targets mandated by DOT mainly apply to the operations as conducted by ATO. In 
White House / Office 
of Management and 
Budget (OMB) 
Department of 
Transportation 
(DOT) 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
(FAA) 
Air Traffic 
Organization  
(ATO) 
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addition there is a direct performance dialogue between ATO leadership and DOT as well as 
with OMB. 
 
Obviously Figure 8.3 could be made even more complete when including decentralized units 
answering to ATO headquarters in DC. These were not included because of the relative low 
level of discretion of these type of units (e.g. compared to the U.S. Forest Service case study)  
 
8.2 Degree of PB implementation  
The FAA has long been considered a leader among agencies when it comes to implementing 
data driven, performance management in the US federal government (Mills 2013: 27, IBM 
2011:2). In fact, when DOT was required to meet quarterly over performance issues under 
the revised federal performance management regulations issues in 2010 (GPRAMA), the ATO 
already had a weekly meeting with the DOT deputy secretary on performance issues making 
the new requirement seem somewhat redundant according to some of the staff involved.   
 
When it comes to the performance budgeting aspect, the FAA, like any other federal agency, 
is funded on the basis of line items. This traditional way of input funding provides a 
reasonable degree of stability but means that funding levels have to be aligned annually with 
productivity levels and the performance targets from departmental and agency strategic 
plans.  
 
The FAA is funded by four different appropriations (or budget line items): 
x Operations –This is FAA’s largest appropriation and finances the air traffic control and 
air navigation systems.  
x Grants-in-Aid for Airports (AIP) – funds various programs to improve airports 
x Facilities and Equipment (F&E) – funds modernizing and improving ATC and airway 
facilities, notably the NextGen program 
x Research, Engineering, and Development (R,E&D) – funds all kinds of aviation related 
research (e.g. propulsion, materials, safety, environmental, weather) 
 
The three capital investment appropriations (AIP, F&E and R,E&D) as well as about half of 
the Operations appropriation are funded by the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) that 
receives its revenues from taxes to airspace users. Therefore it is fair to say that, depending 
on the year, some 70-80% of FAA budget is funded indirectly by their clients, the airspace 
users. 
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Figure 8.4 Relative allocation of FAA appropriations 
As illustrated by figure 8.2 the relative share of FAA’s budget that goes to operations differs 
significantly between 2002 and 2012. Although the costs of operations have been growing 
steadily over the years in absolute terms, this percentage fluctuated roughly between 50 and 
60% during the 2002-2012 period.  
 
As personnel compensation makes up roughly half of FAA’s budget, the outcome of the 
budgetary process is largely dependent upon negotiations with the powerful unions. The 
investment budget is the more discretionary part of the budget although earmarked for 
capital investment by appropriation by three separate line items. The relationship between 
funding and performance therefore appears rather indirect as expressed by one of the FAA 
respondents: 
 
‘Some measures are more tied to funding than others. For safety, capacity, efficiency we 
basically track how well aircraft are moving through our system. There is not a lot of 
funding that directly supports these metrics.’ 
 
On the other hand, the FAA is the only federal agency that has had a consistent and large 
scale pay for performance system in place. That indicates that serious attempts have been 
made to link the largest component of the budget, namely personnel, to individual and 
collective financial incentives. Section 8.2.2 will go further into the whereabouts of this 
system.  
 
 
 
 
51%
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8.2.1 PB in the relationship DOT – FAA 
Just like the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan is the current strategic plan for DOT, the 2009-2013 
FAA Flight Plan has been the main official document concerning performance planning for 
FAA and therefore ATO. The plan contains four strategic goals:  
x Increased Safety, translated into 6 objectives and 8 performance targets 
x Greater Capacity, translated into 3 objectives and 7 performance targets 
x International Leadership, translated into 2 objectives and 4 performance targets 
x Organizational Excellence, translated into 5 objectives and 12 performance targets 
 
As an agency within DOT, the FAA is not required to issue a separate Performance and 
Accountability Report (PAR) but does so anyway. Up until 2011 FAA reported on the goals 
and targets from its 2009-2013 Flight Plan in its PAR. The performance planning in this 
document was based on the previous 2006-2011 DOT strategic plan.  
 
From 2012 however the FAA based its PAR on a new FAA strategic document named 
Destination 2025 (D2025) instead. This vision document as it is referred to, has five strategic 
goals that are translated into another 24 performance targets: 
x Next Level of Safety  
x Workplace of Choice  
x Delivering Aviation Access through Innovation  
x Sustaining our Future  
x Improved Global Performance through Collaboration  
 
Destination 2025 incorporates elements of an ambitious vision on a major overhaul of the 
National Airspace referred to as NextGen. NextGen revolves around the transition from 
radar- navigation to satellite based navigation resulting in greater airspace capacity, lower 
costs to airlines as well as drastic reductions in fuel emissions and noise levels. Although 
there are some overlapping safety targets with the DOT strategic plan, DOT acknowledges 
that FAA’s D2025 goals are not totally aligned with theirs. At the same time the issue in 
terms of goal alignment was downplayed by a DOT respondent:   
 
‘Their goals are different from the Departmental goals. Their 2025 plan differs from our 
plan: Their goals are more focused on delivering deliverables than the outcomes per se.  
Although they are slightly different, it is fairly easy to translate the data. There is no issue 
in terms of alignment. It’s a manageable tension. There are different audiences for both 
plans’. 
 
For FAA and ATO this means that they currently report on different strategic planning 
documents at the same time, the DOT Strategic plan 2012-16 and D2025. All performance 
measures in the DOT Strategic plan 2012-16 appear in the FAA annual business plan for 
2013. For each one of these an elaborate definition and explanation is provided (including 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
173 
 
data source, public benefit, external factors, reliability). In addition, goals from both plans as 
well as targets from Flight Plan 2009-2013 are integrated. The ATO Business Plan 2013 is a 
subset of the FAA business plan, and is a 200 page document that specifies activities and 
targets. ATO is involved in all five DOT strategic goals (see section 8.1) but bears most direct 
responsibility for the targets of the safety and economic competitiveness goals. As a result of 
the plural character of strategic planning, the goal alignment between the different planning 
documents of DOT and FAA from a multi-year perspective appears rather complex and 
somewhat fragmented as is illustrated in Figure 8.5. 
 
Figure 8.5 Strategic planning DOT, FAA and ATO 
Financial reporting is in line with the DOT guidance framework and FAA expenses are all 
attributed to DOT strategic goals. That is why DOT is able to present the FAA expenditure 
attributed to their strategic goals as illustrated for FY2012 in Table 8.1: 
 
Table 8.1 FAA spending FY2012 by DOT Strategic Goal 
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The budget preparation process at FAA follows guidance from DOT and managers in charge 
of each of FAA’s four appropriations will go out to the program managers in the offices to 
find out what their funding needs are. This is a process that goes back and forth constantly 
until the request is formulated and passed on to DOT to review. Following this there are 
several meetings with OMB and DOT policy and budget people who are assigned to FAA. This 
usually takes most of the summer months and results in the request that goes to OMB as 
part of DOT’s budget request.  
 
In every budget submission there also is a performance budget that goes along with the 
budget submission. One respondent described the FAA performance budget as follows: 
 
‘The performance budget tries to weave together a narrative treatment with dollars and 
exhibits like various Excel worksheets and the contribution to DOT’s outcomes.’  
 
Essentially, FAA prepares the aviation portion of the DOT annual performance plan. Because 
FAA has its own strategic plan in addition to being part of DOT’s strategic plan, the targets 
and activities in the internal FAA annual business plans have to be aligned with both plans. 
One FAA respondents explains: 
  
‘In their business plans everyone has to line up their plans with both Destination 2025 and 
the DOT strategic plan. After the strategic outcomes are aligned, we slice and dice them. 
Then we tie it with the dollars and the activities’. 
 
ATO represents 82% of the FAA budget and the pay to air traffic controllers represents its 
largest cost component. These costs are allocated to goals by the type of controllers; en-
route controllers to the safety goals, and terminal controllers to the capacity goals. 
 
Actual use of PI in relationship with principals 
The area of air traffic control comes across as a highly technical and specialized field of work 
where performance, results and funding seem hard to tell apart for a principal, let alone a 
Congressman or taxpayer. Despite this a critical dialogue between OMB and the FAA is 
reported on precisely these issues, especially during budget preparation and capital 
investments as one respondent explains: 
 
‘Despite the high level of technical details, we have a couple of OMB people assigned to us 
and scrutinize us on the relationship between funding and performance’.  
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‘When we talk to OMB we have to provide and quantify what we are going to do with the 
money. OMB comes back and says what if we only give you this much what are you going 
to cut. I think performance and money is pretty integrated in that sense’.  
 
Another example of PI-use in relation to funding is capital investments. According to OMB 
regulations, these require a business case with documentation that associate the investment 
with the impact on a performance measure like for example runway incursions. 
 
Congress however operates at significant distance from ATO’s work and mainly interferes 
when something directly affects their district such as a proposal to cut down on traffic 
control or close down a tower at a small airfield with little traffic. More in general it can be 
said that among FAA’s lines of Business, airports receive most attention from Congress. 
When there is a meeting with Congress staff, OMB usually accompanies the FAA delegation. 
 
Explaining FAA performance to Congress has not been easy as was illustrated in recent years 
when Congress scrutinized FAA after being alarmed with an increased number of reported 
operational errors by air traffic controllers. In fact the increased number of reported errors 
was the result of improvements FAA made in its incident reporting. This was viewed by FAA 
as good news because these incidents previously went undetected and provided valuable 
opportunities to learn. Besides, the number of serious incidents continued to diminish 
throughout the years. In an excellent analysis of this case, Mills suggests that the increased 
public scrutiny from stakeholders like Congress, OMB, GAO and the DOT IG may have lead 
FAA/ATO to rush into adopting alternative indicators that they cannot fully analyze and 
synthesize yet (Mills 2013: 32). 
 
Apart from coordination during budget preparation and during contacts with Congress and 
OMB, a formalized continuous performance dialogue takes place between FAA and DOT 
throughout the year. ATO management has a weekly meeting with the DOT deputy secretary 
on performance issues. In addition, the FAA administrator meets with the deputy secretary 
on a more or less quarterly basis. One of the issues they discuss is a scorecard at the 
departmental level that includes measures and targets from the DOT strategic plan. On the 
part of DOT, the attitude towards FAA and ATO when it comes to performance reporting and 
monitoring seems to be quite trustworthy and relaxed and usually does involve financial re-
allocation as expressed by a respondent:  
 
‘For the most part we adopt what they come up with. There are going to be a couple of 
instances where we’re adding new things in our strategic plan like management objectives 
(mostly financial and HR) that they haven’t done before and we need to obtain new data 
from them but it’s not really a challenge for them. I don’t worry about it too much’.  
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‘It’s more of a check because there is only so much the department can do. The 
administrator can ask for information to be put on a website or help the agency deal with 
outside partners like congressmen but there is no moving around of money or something’. 
 
8.2.2 Performance management within FAA  
As mentioned earlier, the main strategic performance planning document within FAA is 
currently the Destination 2025 plan. The 24 high profile measures from D2025 are more of a 
strategic nature and are monitored closely by FAA management. A few of the goals of the  
D2025 scorecard overlap with DOT Strategic Goals such as the number of severe runway 
incursions, or accident rates for commercial and general aviation.  
 
During a monthly meeting of the Performance Sub Committee, a performance measure 
scorecard regarding these goals is discussed. The scorecard rates the status of the targets in 
green, yellow or red based on the most recent available quantitative data or on the latest 
qualitative assessment from the manager designated as ‘goal owner’. The degree to which 
management has a direct impact in adjusting results varies from measure to measure. For 
example the target number for commercial air carrier fatality rate is set at no more than 6.2 
fatalities per 100 million persons on board, which equals about maximum of 60 fatalities a 
year. Luckily, nowadays commercial airplane crashes in U.S. airspace do not occur each year. 
When they do however this threshold may easily be exceeded. For other targets, 
management’s ability to act and take corrective or preventive actions is easier to imagine 
such as targets concerning implementation of interventions to mitigate top 5 hazards or to 
achieve initial operational capacity on the new ERAM system. One of the respondents 
reflected on this: 
 
‘A lot of what we do today does not impact today but may impacts tomorrow. But on this 
list there are certain things that we can largely control and can put the high level monthly 
focus on and it does have a direct impact’  
 
Much of the value of the performance subcommittee meeting is credited to the increased 
visibility of targets within the organization and the signal that goes out from active 
monitoring by management as explained by one respondent: 
 
‘If you have people in an underground parking garage collecting performance data and 
talking to each other it’s much less impactful than if it’s the top leadership in the agency 
sitting down regularly to talk about performance. The folks who are behind each of these 
measures know that that they are reporting on this monthly and it gets noticed and 
discussed all the way to the top of the agency’.  
 
There are approximately another 300 measures that are not in NextGen but do appear in the 
FAA business plan and the business plans of FAA, including the ATO business plan. These 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
177 
 
measures are mostly tactical and operational in nature and include daily operation metrics 
for day-to-day management. Some of these measures are tracked every day and add up as 
annual averages for which thresholds and targets are set in the DOT plans and the FAA 
Flightplan 2009-2013. The operational, tactical and strategic information is linked to identify 
trends or developments that may require corrective actions. These kind of metrics concern 
safety and capacity and largely fall under ATO’s responsibility with examples being:  
- The number of serious runway incursions (Category A&B) 
- Loss of standard separation (the required distance between airplanes in the air) 
- The number of operational errors reported and the % that is considered serious 
- % availability of systems that support core airports 
- Number of daily arrivals and departures (daily airport capacity) 
- % on time arrivals in national airspace 
 
At the heart of the data collection for the ATO’s performance metrics are a number of vital 
reporting systems. In table 8.2 four primary reporting systems are summed up: 
 
Table 8.2 Primary reporting systems FAA/ATO reporting systems  
(Source: Mills 2013: 18)  
 
 
ATSAP was created in 2008 and was fully implemented by 2010. It allows controllers to 
voluntarily disclose incidents to an Event Review Committee (ERC). Each Service Area’s ERC 
meets twice a week to review reports in order to determine if corrective actions such as 
Individual Reporting Systems  
Mandatory Occurrence Reporting 
(MOR)  
(1989–Present) 
An occurrence involving air traffic services for 
which the collection of associated safety-related 
data and conditions is mandatory, including a loss 
of standard separation on final approach. 
Air Traffic Safety Action Program 
(ATSAP)  
(2008–Present) 
A voluntary reporting program for air traffic control 
personnel that allows them to enter a qualitative 
self-assessment of an incident. 
 
Automated Reporting Systems 
Electronic Occurrence Reporting (EOR) 
(2012–Present) 
An alert identified by an automated system, such as 
the Traffic Analysis and Review Program (TARP) 
that automatically uploads into the Comprehensive 
Electronic Data Analysis and Reporting (CEDAR) tool 
Terminal Area Reporting Program 
(TARP) 
(2012–Present) 
An automated software system used to detect and 
quantitatively measure losses of separation at air 
traffic terminal facilities. 
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extra training or procedural changes have to be taken. Under FAA regulations the controller 
reporting an incident will be provided anonymity and is protected from disciplinary action 
(Mills 18-21). In fact the safety data reported by employees are gathered by a third party 
that removes personal identification information prior to sharing it with the FAA (IBM 
2011:18) 
 
TARP was implemented in all TRACONS in 2012 and has further been expanding to include 
en route traffic. A group of analysts, known as Risk Analysis Process (RAP) panels, is 
composed of ATO officials and former commercial pilots who validate the severity of the loss 
of separation, determine the closing rate of the aircraft, and determine the probability of 
incident repeatability by examining the state of the system at the time of the incident. RAP 
panels in each service area meet three to four times a week to examine and  validate the 
highest-risk incidents reported to CEDAR through electronic TARP detection, using a risk and 
severity matrix (Mills 2013: 24) 
 
The electronic occurrence reports (EORs) generated through TARP and matched with 
mandatory occurrence reports (MORs) from facility managers and employees provide a rich 
source of operational performance data. However, due to the confidential nature of the 
system, ATSAP data are not merged with other sources of FAA data. Both DOT and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) have raised some concern about not integrating 
ATSAP with other FAA safety data. They fear that the number of serious Operational Errors 
by controllers may be underestimated and opportunities are lost to pinpoint specific lessons 
to individual regions and controllers (Mills 2013: 18-22). One major player opposing this has 
been NATCA, the union of ATControllers which has been a vital partner in the successful 
implementation of ATSAP. 
 
A steady set of the operational data collected from these systems is discussed daily by ATO 
senior management as one respondent explained:   
 
‘Every morning at 10 am our senior management team gets on a 20 minutes videoconference 
with our command center in Virginia and we basically run through what happened yesterday 
in our airspace. We run through all the data daily like delays and how well did we do in 
managing US airspace given the characteristics of that day like weather.  How many delays 
we had and how well did the fixes that we applied work? That also includes feedback from 
the airlines. At the end of each day the airlines will tell us whether they thought we did a 
good job. We have 4 areas of metrics that we track every day: safety metrics, capacity 
metrics, efficiency metrics and community metrics. Within capacity we for example have 
daily airport capacity, airspace efficiency, departure delays and arrival delays. ‘ 
 
When asked for which purposes PI was used for within FAA/ATO, respondents indicated all 
16  types of use as identified in CH 2.3. Most frequently mentioned were: 
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x Performance reporting for external accountability 
x Setting program priorities 
x Analyzing productivity and funding levels  
 
There were followed by: 
x Strategically reallocate internal resources 
x Monitor cost and performance and contract management 
x Allocating internal funds 
x Identifying service problems and  changing work processes 
x Motivate staff to act consistent with organizational goals 
 
The most frequently mentioned types of PI seem to be consistent with the performance 
management as described to be in place at FAA. It should be mentioned however that due to 
the scope selected for this cases study, only interviews and questionnaires of people at 
FAA/ATO headquarters were used.  
 
Finally, the significance of PI for financial allocation use is not entirely evident. Although 
every dollar is accounted to one of DOT’s outcomes, the use of PI for financial analysis seems 
mostly limited to capital investment decisions and setting adequate staffing levels at 
facilities. For a large share of especially the Operations appropriation and FAA/ATO’s line of 
work, spending is tied to personnel payments as expressed by a respondent: 
 
‘We have the salary budget and the non-salary budget. We dive into productivity metrics 
for facilities. We also look at metrics that we look at in conjunction with the FAA finance 
office to efficiently spend our dollars regarding issues such as staffing, overtime, 
administrative issues’ 
 
‘We have a really small discretionary part of our Operations budget. Of the 7.5 billion US$ 
of operations, 85-90% is pay. We can do strategic planning with only about 5-10% of the 
Operations budget. The rest of it is negotiated pay.... So when the controller’s pay goes 
up, modernization programs are going to be pushed out. As a result things are going to 
get delayed.’ 
  
Although the largest part of the Operations budget may consist of people and pay, the FAA is 
the only federal agency that has had a relatively longstanding pay-for performance policy 
towards its personnel. Under a plan called Core Compensation, FAA, the FAA introduced two 
different programs at the turn of the century. First there is an Organizational Success 
Increase (OSI) of 1% if the organization meets 90% of 30 indicated OSI goals. This percentage 
was higher in the past (up to 4,5%) when it included an annual cost-off living upward 
adjustments but this was suspended due to the crisis. OSI covers most FAA employees. The 
other initiative in place is the Superior Contribution Increase (SCI) that individual employees 
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can receive when they exceed expectations and targets from their individual performance 
work plan. This can amount to an additional 0.8% or 1.6% depending on individual 
performance and covers about 20-25% of FAA employees.  
 
The incentive from OSI , at least at its current level, is downplayed by most respondents as 
illustrated by these quotes: 
 
‘Because of the budget situation everyone gets that 1%. That 1% isn’t going to make me 
do my work any better’ 
 
‘Right now we are running we’re in our third year without an annual increase. So if we get 
90% of our measures successful we get a 1% increase If you take off the tax and 
deductions we are talking about the difference between a grande or a regular latte at the 
store’. 
 
Others emphasize that the OSI incentive is more reputation-driven than financial because of 
the increased focus on OSI objectives at the executive level. On SCI the opinions expressed 
vary. On one hand it can obviously bring a certain amount of tension among organization 
members. Therefore it requires that managers formulate clear expectations as well as 
provide concrete ideas as how to exceed these. According to some it can co-exist or even 
reinforce an intrinsically motivated and professionally driven workforce as expressed by one 
respondent: 
 
‘My opinion is that employees are motivated by money and by leave because these are 
tangible. The non-tangible incentives, such as appraisal, are becoming more important as 
money gets tight. You got to have a passion for what you’re doing. If money was the 
reason our employees would not be in the government to begin with. When you come to 
work for the civil government you want to make a difference. Having said that, the money 
aspect really helps and can’t be ignored because I think it’s a motivator. If you go out to 
the workforce at the beginning of the year and say to people: nobody is getting a raise 
because there is no money but keep doing a good job, motivation would suffer. My morale 
will go down if I work hard and get the same pay increase as my colleague who isn’t’  
 
8.2.3 Conclusion on PB implementation 
The Operations budget forms the major part of FAA’s budget and an even larger part of that 
of the ATO. This ‘going concern’ expenditure seems rather immune from performance 
considerations, at least on an annual basis. Insofar PI plays a role in the budgetary process 
with FAA’s principal, it does so in the budget preparation phase in which OMB seems to be 
at least as important as DOT as a negotiating partner. All FAA expenses are allocated to 
DOT’s strategic goals up to the detailed level of activities. During budget execution, there are 
institutionalized performance dialogues between DOT and both FAA and ATO. These center 
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mainly on strategic goal realization but do not lead to financial reallocation. So although the 
goal alignment between DOT as a principal and ATO as an agent is quite specific and 
detailed, this does not seem to translate in direct financial consequences resulting from 
DOT’s management of FAA and ATO.   
 
Within FAA performance metrics do seem to come into play in assessing capital investments 
as well as staffing of facilities. Although the operations budget in itself has limited 
discretionary space, FAA has for a long time pioneered a rather comprehensive pay for 
performance system that ties a small part of personnel pay to organizational and individual 
performance. The limited discretionary space in a large part of its budget and the need for 
budget cuts has lead FAA to establishing the Strategy Budget and Performance Committee. 
The objective of this committee is to prioritize between FAA areas and as such gain an 
agency wide performance perspective on the possibilities for budget cuts. By cross-cutting 
the budgetary and organizational stovepipes it is hoped that incremental method to cut 
budgets, also referred to as salami-slicing, will be avoided.  
 
Table 8.3 Presence of indicators of performance budgeting implementation 
Indicators Presence in 
FAA case 
 
PB 1.1 PB is used by the agency in addition to traditional 
budgeting 
  
Present to 
some extent 
PB 1.2 PB is used by the  principal to control the agency 
  
Present to 
some extent 
PB 2.1 A high degree of de jure PB implementation 
 
Clearly 
present 
PB 2.2 A high degree of de facto PB implementation 
 
Clearly 
present 
 
The FAA has long been considered an exemplar of how agencies should implement 
performance management in the government (Mills 2013: 27, Partnership for Public 
Service/IBM 2011). The emphasis on its data driven safety management is easily noticed 
when talking to ATO respondents. Monitoring safety data to learn and improve is taken very 
seriously as illustrated by the daily routine of senior management of going through 
yesterday’s key metrics. The ATO’s active data driven performance management approach 
also extends to its performance dialogue with principals.  
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8.3 Exploring Neo-Institutionalist Explanations 
 
8.3.1 Explanations from Historical Neo Institutionalism 
When investigating path dependency as an explanatory factor, important events with an 
impact the organization were sought that might explain PB implementation. This could be 
anything, for example a crisis with a principal or a series of bad press in the media. Moreover 
it is possible that, if adoption of PB is viewed as an appropriate response to such events, 
result oriented behavior should be explained by the logic of appropriateness rather than 
PB’s incentives doing their work. To put it differently: organization members are susceptible 
to unwritten rules and roles that demand compliance with a performance management 
system, regardless of the incentives of this system itself. 
 
Both the media and the FAA website provide examples a number of important events from 
recent history that must have helped shape the current FAA as we know it. Deregulation of 
the airline industry in the late 1970 saw the beginning of an exponential increase in FAA’s 
workload both in terms of airline certification as in the volume of air traffic to be managed. 
In 1981 an extensively media covered event unfolded as air traffic controllers went on strike 
after unsuccessful contract negotiations by the PATCO labor union. This resulted in President 
Reagan firing over 11.000 controllers and handing over part of their activities to military 
controllers. This left a seriously understaffed agency for quite some time. Eventually it meant 
the end of the PATCO labor union which was replaced not until 1987 by NATCA, the current 
air controllers union. The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 when four airliners were 
hijacked and used as flying bombs to attack the Pentagon and the World Trade Center had a 
profound impact on many in society, not the least on the FAA as an organization. Apart from 
the extra safety measures that have been in place ever since, it meant that the aspect of 
aviation security was taken over by the newly formed Transportation Security 
Administration. This new agency moved from DOT to the Department of Homeland Security 
in 2003.  
 
Surprisingly these events were hardly mentioned by respondents when asked to name the 
most significant events that have affected the FAA throughout the years. To prevent answers 
too close to the respondent’s particular duties, respondents were asked to think of answers 
that they felt any colleague might also give. Ten different events were mentioned by 
respondents but none by half or even a large part of the respondents. This suggests that no 
single event is dominant in the collective history of FAA employees. Of the events 
mentioned, only three were mentioned by more than one respondent:  
 
- Public scrutiny of FAA for badly managed projects and cost overruns around 2002-3 
- The creation of ATO as a separate organization 
- Failure of the Advanced Automated System in 2000 resulting in enormous delays 
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Although not mentioned by a majority of respondents the first two events do provide a 
particularly plausible explanation for much of FAA/ATO’s emphasis on performance 
improvement and performance accountability. From the explanations given, it is clear that 
the first two events should not be viewed entirely separately. Regarding the first event, 
several respondents explained that the cost overruns, the badly managed investment 
projects and FAA’s bad press that resulted from it, provided the main driver of FAA’s current 
performance culture:  
 
‘Around 2002-3 we were getting beat up all the time by the GAO, congress and the 
Inspector General because they thought we couldn’t manage programs. We had 
acquisition programs that were way over budget and behind schedule….There was a real 
push in 2002-3 to raise the level of commitment and employ PMI20 certified program 
managers for big programs. Any program over $50 million had to have a PMI certified 
program manager. …As an agency we were just really tired of being nullified left and 
right. So we really put an emphasis on stabilizing requirements, building to requirements 
meeting costs and schedule. And there was a huge a culture shift at that time.’ 
 
 ‘Ten years ago we were fat and happy; the budget situation was not as grim as it is today. 
Our administrators regularly got dragged to the hill and had their head handed to them 
because we could not deliver capital programs on time and within budget. The numbers 
were really awful. She cut our 2.5 billion dollar capital program budget with 0.5 billon in 
one year because of our inefficiency. I asked all executives: What will be the impact on 
performance). After 72 hours they came back and most of them told me: we are unable to 
articulate what, if any, impact this will have on performance. Today we can do that in 
excruciating detail’.  
 
These stories seem to be confirmed by a 2003 GAO report that indeed is highly critical of 
FAA: 
 
‘Over the years, systemic management issues, including inadequate management controls 
and human capital issues, have contributed to the cost overruns, schedule delays, and 
performance shortfalls that FAA's major ATC projects have consistently experienced. These 
problems occurred, in large part, because FAA lacked the information technology and 
financial management systems that would have helped it reliably determine the projects' 
technical requirements and estimate and control their costs and schedules. In addition, 
organizational culture issues discouraged collaboration among technical experts and users, 
and frequent changes in FAA's leadership--seven different Administrators and Acting 
Administrators in the first 10 years--hampered the modernization efforts. (GAO-04-227T: 
Published: Oct 30, 2003. Publicly Released: Oct 30, 2003: FAA's Modernization Efforts--Past, 
Present, and Future) 
                                                 
20 PMI = Project Management Institute (www.pmi.org) 
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Respondent’s suggests that the long-time problems with investment projects to modernize 
the ATC system, not only explained a shift to performance management, but were one of the 
reasons for creating the ATO as a new organizational entity in 2003. The ATO was set up with 
result orientation and performance accountability as core values as one respondent 
expressed: 
 
‘The ATO was formed in 2003 from two groups within FAA. The genesis was to run the 
organization like a business. We need to do better with the dollars that Congress gives us 
and add value for airlines and passengers. Everyone had to justify every dollar that was 
spent’.  
 
The suggested causality between the troubled ATC projects at the beginning of the century 
and the creation of ATO as a performance based organization is confirmed by a 2005 GAO 
report:  
 
‘The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the 
nation's air traffic control (ATC) system has suffered from cost, schedule, and/or performance 
shortfalls in its system acquisitions for more than two decades and has been on our list of 
high risk programs since 1995. FAA's performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) was 
created in February 2004, in part, to address these legacy challenges. (GAO-05-331: 
Published: Jun 10, 2005. Publicly Released: Jul 11, 2005) 
 
An alternative explanation of a favourable attitude towards performance measurement may 
be found in asymmetry of power such as the dominance of a certain person or 
organizational unit. When in a powerful position for an extended period such a unit or 
person can leave a lasting mark on the organization that may include encouraging and 
promoting the use of performance information.  
 
As argued, claims of poor financial management at the start of the century may have 
provided an important drive for its current performance culture. Ten years on however, 
there is no indication that this resulted in an extraordinary powerful position of FAA’s Office 
of Budget or other financial units within FAA. Moreover, the analytic, performance oriented 
culture that characterizes most of FAA today seems to have started at ATO as component 
organization before it expanded agency wide (IBM 2011:18). A bottom up development of a 
performance culture and performance system instead of a top down introduction is not 
uncommon as this was encountered in other cases studies within this research. That does 
not mean that leadership of influential managers is to be ignored as an explanatory.  
 
At the level of FAA, the name of Marion Blakey is mentioned as having had a profound 
impact on establishing performance management at FAA. After taking office in 2002 as FAA’s 
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new Administrator, she made it one of her priorities to use performance metrics to monitor 
the agency’s strategic targets as one respondent explained:   
 
‘We have been doing the monthly performance meetings for over 10 years. In 2000/2001 
we used to have them but the administrator never participated and we only got a handful 
of executives together. The executives were polite and didn’t ask each other hard 
questions. Then they started getting cancelled. Then a new administrator came in (Marian 
Blakey) who said I want to run this agency based on metrics and our strategic plan. She 
was significant in reorienting the agency’s approach towards performance management.’ 
 
At the level of ATO its influential first Chief Operating Officer (COO) made performance 
management a clear priority right from the start of ATO in 2003 as he explained in an 
interview to Avionics Today in 2004 when asked about his personal performance goals: 
 
‘For one, I want data-driven decisions by FY2005. That means establish baseline performance 
goals for safety, service, cost and productivity.  
I also want more financial responsibility, which means establishing financial baselines and 
reports for all ATO components, using cost accounting and labor distribution reporting.  
I seek to establish organization excellence--in other words, implement 10 percent of the 
unfunded portion of the FAA strategic plan through cost savings, reprioritization of projects, 
and financial initiatives.  
And, finally, I'm looking for leadership and human capital management. By Sept. 30 [2004] 
we will develop Phase 1 of management training--budgets and costs--and ensure completion 
by applicable personnel’  
(Avionics Today, Q&A Russ Chew, September 1st 2004, interview by David Jensen) 
 
It can be argued that the analytical data driven approach to safety within the air traffic 
control community already provided a strong basis for his agenda. Nonetheless, Mr. Chew’s 
approach did represent a shift in emphasis that reinforced the reliance on a broad set of 
performance metrics as these quotes from respondents demonstrate. 
 
‘When I came in over 10 years ago it was always a focus on operational statistics. Not 
until Russ Chew came in, the efficiency metrics and financial measures were getting 
bigger. Like his successors, who also came from the airline industry, he wanted us to look 
from the customer’s perspective and spend money accordingly (the airline)’.  
 
‘When he came in he wanted us to look at the system from a different perspective as well, 
from the viewpoint of the operation, the efficiency, those things that actually provide 
direct benefits to the airlines who are our number one customers. Then we started 
growing, we got more and more metrics that we wanted to track’.  
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‘We had to tie the dollars to everything we did. When the ATO formed it was a 180 
degrees shift. Everybody had to re-justify every dollar that you were spending…How is the 
money that we are spending is going to move us forward. If you can’t do that we’re going 
to stop funding that program’. 
 
The emphasis on performance management by ATO’s first COO and the FAA’s administrator 
at the time should probably not be viewed separately from the poor reputation that the FAA 
suffered at the start of the century. As ATO was more or less formed to fix FAA’s problem of 
poor financial management and performance accountability, it is not coincidental that the 
new leadership promoted a stricter regime in these respects.  
 
There is another way in which asymmetry of power could help explain a strong emphasis on 
measured performance within an organization. A dominant role of specialists in a certain 
policy field may explain why quantitative measurement is regarded higher than other, more 
political, factors. To determine this, respondents were asked to choose between factors that 
they regard as most influential to FAA/ATO policy in two subsequent questions: 
 
A) Stakeholder interests    or B) Political ideas and policy goals   
and 
A) Politics/ public opinion    or  B) Specialist norms  
 
If for both questions answer B is chosen, this would indicate that the policy area is run pretty 
much by experts and their policy ideas. However, no clear picture emerged when applying 
this framework to FAA/ATO’s line of work. If anything the framework shows that FAA/ATO’s 
field is more stakeholder oriented than it is ideological. Generally the air traffic control 
system and its metrics are to a large extent quite technical and inaccessible to outsiders. This 
is reflected by the fact that the FAA workforce is a highly technical one that employs a lot of 
engineers. The latter point incidentally also explains why the FAA is one of the highest paid 
federal agencies.   
 
The highly technical nature of the work does however not prevent other parties from having 
opinions on FAA/ATO line of work. Especially politics is never far away as many citizens are 
witnessing and experiencing the outcomes of FAA/ATO’s work on a regular basis. That may 
be why, despite the high level of technical expertise required, the FAA has separate OMB 
people assigned to it to scrutinize the relationship between funding and performance. The 
experience with political stakeholders overseeing FAA’s work has been mixed from the 
perspective of respondents. On the one hand there is the somewhat unfortunate example of 
stakeholders misinterpreting the rising number of reported operational errors (see Section 
8.2.1). In addition examples were provided of programs and activities that Congress funded 
but were not in line with the agency’s own priorities. In other cases interference by 
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members of Congress was welcomed as an opportunity to help deliver agency goals. An 
example of the latter was provided by one respondent: 
 
‘Political interference is not necessarily a bad thing. A lot of time the priority also relates 
to our strategic plan.  A lot of people in Alaska got killed in general aviation. The chairman 
of the appropriations committee was from Alaska urged us to do something about it - 
congressmen obviously don’t like it when their constituents die. We succeeded in bringing 
fatalities down tremendously and could apply these lessons elsewhere.’  
 
Table 8.4 Presence of indicators historical neo-institutionalism 
Indicators Presence in 
FAA case 
 
H 1.1 Critical juncture in the accountability chain or policy field 
 
Present to 
some extent 
H 1.2 Problem to which PB was seen as a solution  
 
Clearly 
present 
H 2.1 An  advocate or champion of PB in a powerful position 
 
Clearly 
present 
H.2.2 A policy field in which specialists are dominant. 
 
Present to 
some extent 
 
Although not mentioned by a lot of respondents, the events at the start of this century that 
prompted the establishment of the ATO do provide a likely explanation for the ATO’s 
emphasis on performance management and financial and performance accountability. This 
emphasis has been reinforced strongly by agency management at that time. Moreover it 
reported that this emphasis has been spreading to the rest of FAA since. The dominance of 
specialists does provide some explanation of the dominance of performance measurement 
and management but at the same time political actors also leave a strong mark on the 
agency’s policies and actions.   
 
8.3.2 Explanations from Sociological Neo Institutionalism 
FAA/ATO comes across as an organization that invests heavily in measuring and analyzing 
performance data and learning from it. Partly this may be explained by the emphasis on 
safety improvement that seems to characterize the entire aviation industry and possibly also 
by the engineer mentality that comes with a highly educated technical workforce.  
Illustrative for this emphasis on performance informed learning are the learning loops for 
incident reporting, the emphasis on performance monitoring by FAA and ATO management 
and the active engagement in a performance dialogue with its stakeholders. Respondents 
could provide numerous examples of performance informed learning, seemingly without 
much effort. Below is an example of performance monitoring leading to corrective actions as 
shared by one respondent: 
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‘We are looking for trends based on monthly snapshots. If we get site specific we can track 
our metrics and keep drilling down to the root of the problem. For example when runway 
incursions turned orange we had the numbers broken down to specific airports. When we 
identify them, we send teams out to these airports to see what the problem is. For 
example North Las Vegas used to have 20, the highest number of incursions nationally 
although it was only a small airport. The team identified two major factors: there was a 
flight school and there was a very difficult taxi manoeuvre due to the runway structure. 
We could put down new markings. At a single intersection 18 of the 20 incursions took 
place. We marked it with a red circle and named it a hotspot put a description at the side 
and it was marked on the pilot charts.’  
 
Another example illustrates FAA adopting an agency wide learning approach concerning one 
of its strategic goals: 
 
‘Our general aviation fatalities goal was yellow. The head of our safety organization 
reported it was yellow and talked about the things they would do to get it to green. We 
had done scenarios with the administrator about how the performance meeting would go. 
She turned to the head of air traffic and airports and asked: what can you do to help the 
head of safety with this goal to get the measure to green. This was very startling because 
at that time executives who were responsible for a measure felt like this is my measure 
and you’re not going to help me.… Out of that we now run a grants program through our 
airports office and we were able to actually figure out how to provide grants to airports 
with the highest number of fatalities to bring them down by doing some improvements in 
lighting, signing and painting. ATO looked at some of the flight paths that they used, then 
starting redoing some of those to reduce fatalities. Other parties got engaged sharing 
accountability’.  
 
Throughout recent years FAA’s has seen a development where its data analysis has 
increasingly been used not only to solve accidents but also to predict them and make 
improvements in order to prevent them from taking place (IBM 2011:18). A key factor for 
enabling this pro-active learning cycle has been incident reporting as incidents and errors 
provide a rich source of risky situations or even near accidents that provide opportunities for 
learning. This enables ATO to adjust specific procedures or just take basis actions like 
sending out warning reports to all its personnel regarding a specific risk that occurred 
somewhere. The introduction of the Air Traffic Safety Action Program from 2008 (ATSAP, see 
section 8.2.2) was an important development in this respect as it provided strong safeguards 
to make incident reporting non-punitive for employees. Prior to implementation of ATSAP, 
reporting errors was much riskier process for an air traffic controller. In the old days, the 
incidents reported were investigated by the responsible air traffic personnel themselves to 
see if it was an operational error by the FAA controller or someone else (equipment failure, 
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pilot error). Subsequently a 25-page report on the incident was completed by the controller 
and his supervisor and sent to the ATO service center and FAA Headquarters in D.C. (Mills 
2013:16).   
 
This process obviously provided a larger barrier to reporting than entering an incident 
oneself electronically in the knowledge that the data will be treated confidentially like 
currently in ATSAP. In a 2011 interview FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt commented on the 
agency’s non punitive reporting initiatives:  
 
‘We also have programs where one can voluntarily report, without fear of reprisal, when 
something happens. Don’t just be silent about it. I’ll give you immunity. That’s a huge 
change in our culture, but it’s one worth pursuing’. 
 
The change to non-punitive reporting represented a cultural shift that has been challenging 
to air traffic controllers. The result of decriminalizing reporting was a strong increase in the 
number of reported incidents by 2010 (Mills 2013:22-23).  
 
More generally, organizational culture can provide a stimulus for organizational learning or 
provide barriers that prevent this. When favourable cultural conditions for organizational 
learning are present, using PI to engage in analysis and debate will be regarded as 
appropriate behaviour. If the opposite is the case, presenting bad news obtained from 
performance measurement will not be perceived as a learning opportunity but as 
threatening to management and to organization members, resulting in suspicion and 
defensive routines. The conditions for organizational learning were tested among others by 
letting respondents react to 4 statements: 
a. Within FAA/ATO, important issues are being discussed openly and fairly  
b. Within FAA/ATO, existing opinions are regularly challenged and discussed  
c. If FAA/ATO is being confronted with a problem, a thorough problem analysis takes 
place prior to taking action  
d. If things don’t work out in FAA/ATO’s policies and execution, lessons are usually 
learned.  
The answers to these statements show that respondents generally feel that FAA/ATO is as a 
learning organization that learns from mistakes and generally does so after a thorough 
problem analysis. An obvious exception can be made for tactical issues during operations 
where an instant response is needed and as is not preceded by a big analysis. From an 
organizational perspective lessons are often learned from analysis. Being a government 
organization however means some institutional limitations apply as to how quick lessons can 
be applied as one respondent indicated: 
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‘We do a lot of lessons learned both form hard data and we play back if there was an 
incident to see what the causes were and what we could have done differently…. There 
are some limitations to the how quickly you can implement things and how we are tied to 
budgets’.  
 
Regarding the cultural aspect of openness, FAA/ATO culture is perceived by respondents to 
have a reasonably open culture in which results and improvements are discussed easily at all 
levels. The aspect of reflective openness (challenging existing opinions) scores slightly higher 
than that of participative openness (discussing fairly and openly) as is illustrated by some of 
the quotes from respondents: 
 
‘In my own personal experience no one is particularly shy about telling what they think of 
any specific topic’ 
 
‘From a corporate perspective the worst thing you can do here (with respect to target 
realization) is to be green all year and then suddenly flip red. Then someone will ask: what 
is the matter with your assessment skills’  
 
‘The longer that you’re here the more open you are and the freer you are to express your 
opinion about what is working and what is not. In our meetings everything is said but 
people that are new to FAA or ATO are more reserved and shy. If I talk to them one on one 
they will give you some thought and ideas’. 
 
Others note that although that although things are progressing, the desired culture is not 
there yet entirely. Even if the conditions are there for a safe environment where employees 
can talk openly about everything some are still hesitant to do so because they feel seniority 
seems to be somewhat of a requirement to do so.   
 
Organizational culture can also have a beneficial influence on organizational learning if it 
provides a common understanding across organization members about the usefulness or 
even necessity of performance data. If this is the case, measurement and reporting these 
data will be considered an undisputed part of one’s job. The effort put into measuring, 
analyzing and reporting FAA/ATO’s metrics indeed seems to be quite undisputed as the 
elaborate set of measures generally seems to be perceived as relevant by organization 
members. This even goes for those metrics that are beyond the direct control of FAA itself. 
Not everyone however seems convinced that using performance measurement is indeed 
beneficial to FAA/ATO’s efficiency and effectiveness. In their answers respondents do 
confirm that they frequently use PI and are largely familiar with the indicators used for their 
work. It is important to note that these opinions reflect FAA headquarters were most of this 
case study was conducted. It seems likely that to the average Air Traffic Controller at an 
airport may have quite a different perspective as was confirmed by a respondent:  
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‘Air traffic controllers are very involved with their own performance. They move aircraft 
that is all they are concerned about, not so much our strategic goals. As an agency we 
make an effort to help individual controllers see how they affect the goals and better 
realize: this is how I touch the organization and make the FAA successful’. 
 
Finally the professional dedication of employees to FAA/ATO’s work should not be 
overlooked as a factor explaining why PI is regarded a relevant part of the job as expressed 
by one respondent: 
 
‘I have rarely if ever met program managers who didn’t fiercely care about their program. 
There is like a sense of pride, ownership and caring about what they do. It’s a sense that 
it’s incredibly important, like a dedication to it. These are ways to document and ensure 
that they are doing a good job. It is this sense of dedication and commitment, which is 
more of a cultural thing that is driving excellent performance. I’ve worked in many places 
and this is really striking’. 
 
In summary FAA/ATO’s culture can be described as one with a strong focus on learning and 
improvement that has developed even stronger in the last few years as the organization 
succeeded in utilizing an increasingly amount of PI at its disposal. Performance 
measurement, analysis and reporting seem to be a normal, integral part of everyone’s work 
and provide a common understanding of the organization’s effectiveness. Sharing 
knowledge that is useful for learning and improvement is being encouraged. Insofar there is 
any hesitance regarding the learning organization’s culture it concerns the perceived ability 
to speak out, especially for junior organization members. The organization still seems to be 
progressing in this respect.  
 
Table 8.5 Presence of indicators sociological neo-institutionalism 
Indicators Presence in 
FAA case 
 
S 1.1 Absence learning disabilities    
 
Clearly 
present 
S 1.2 Participative openness 
 
Present to 
some extent 
S 1.3 Reflective openness 
 
Clearly 
present 
S 2.1 Shared view of the meaning of measured performance  
 
Clearly 
present 
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8.4 Contextual factors  
Just like the U.S. Forest Service case, this case study was done during extremely difficult 
budgetary circumstances. Not only was FAA operating under continuing resolution21, later 
on the sequester also kicked in meaning the implementation of automatic spending cuts for 
all federal agencies starting with a 5.2% cut in FY13. As a consequence an 11 day furlough 
(unpaid leave) was implemented for employees resulting in part of the airspace being closed 
and causing delays at airports. On the other hand the sequestration did challenge some of 
the existing dynamics when it comes to allocating funding within FAA/ATO as one 
respondent explained: 
 
‘We haven’t been able to decommission old navaids, old equipment and old towers in the 
rate we would like to. There are institutional barriers to phasing out the old stuff. 
Sequestration helps us have a hard look at how to right size our system and make sure 
we’re investing in the future.’ 
 
‘We are looking at decommissioning old systems, slow down implementation of some of 
the new systems. We did not want to touch our workforce….Budgets used to be silo’s now 
we allocate more organization wide.’ 
 
Another example of a response by the agency has been the establishment of the Strategy 
Budget and Performance Committee (see section 8.2.3). The input based budget cuts from 
Congress has certainly obscured and further complicated the already difficult relationship 
between funding and performance in FAA/ATO’s case. The long term results for strategy and 
performance of these measures still remains to be seen.  
 
In comparison to LVNL, ATO’s smaller sister organization in the Netherlands, some important 
institutional differences exist as well as differences in the environment in which both 
organizations operate. First of all, in contracts to FAA/ATO, LVNL has been organizationally 
separated from the Ministry of Transport for a long time and is directly funded by airline 
fees.  
 
Schiphol, the main airport of the Netherlands has long been a capacity constrained airport 
and is situated in a crowded area. This makes capacity and noise exposure more dominant 
items for LVNL than for ATO. In addition ATO is part of FAA which also runs a large airport 
improvement grant program, does airplane inspections and manages the schedule times and 
slots. This arguably allows for a more integrated approach towards improving aviation 
safety. The confidence that FAA is the nation’s, if not the world’s leader in aviation safety 
was expressed by one respondent: 
                                                 
21 Operating under a continuous resolution means that there has not been political agreement on 
one’s budget although the fiscal year has already started. In practice this means that the available 
budget is a conservative estimate of last year’s and restrictions apply concerning new spending.  
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‘Maybe I am arrogant but I think we are not responding to the industry but rather we are 
driving the industry to be safer through inspection, regulating, and certification. From a 
safety perspective we collaborate with the aviation industry but we are the drivers.’  
 
None of these institutional and environmental differences has led to difficulties in applying 
the chosen model for this research or assessing the results of both cases studies.   
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The investigation of the indicators for the FS should provide answers to three questions to 
be answered for each case (see CH 4): 
 
A.  To what extent is this a PB success? 
 
B  Are the identified conditions present? 
 
C.  Does context offer a likely explanation? 
 
Figure 8.6 Numerical scores of the indicators from the interviews and questionnaire 
results 
 
 
The answer to the first two questions can be given when looking at the numerical scores, 
obtained from the interviews and expressed in the range of 0-2 and applied to the different 
indicators. For some of the questions the score was averaged with other results obtained 
from questionnaires slightly adjusting the final outcome.  
 
FAA’s performance budgeting system has some relevance during budget preparation but this 
relevance should not be overestimated. The reason for this is that there is little discretionary 
space in the largest part of the budget as it consists of personnel pay. Although expenses are 
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attributed to DOT’s strategic goals, the principals (DOT and OMB) hardly use this information 
for reallocation funding. It is used for decisions of capital investments. Internally, FAA and 
ATO use a highly developed system of integration of goals, activities and performance 
metrics. In this complex and elaborate structure, funding is attributed at the activity level. 
Under a pay for performance system, organizational and individual performance is both tied 
to a modest part of employee salaries. Performance metrics from this system are used quite 
intensively by FAA and ATO during several cyclical performance dialogues that result in 
corrective and preventive actions.  
 
At the start of this century FAA received fierce criticism by its stakeholders on its apparent 
inability to properly manage investment projects. As a reaction the President created ATO as 
a separate performance based organization within FAA. The emphasis of performance 
management by influential managers of both FAA and ATO at that time should also viewed 
as a response to this unfortunate episode in FAA history. This event and its aftermath 
provide a plausible explanation for the appropriateness of performance measurement and 
management within today’s FAA and especially ATO. 
 
The reputation of FAA and ATO as data driven learning organizations is confirmed by this 
case study. Different learning routines are coupled to performance monitoring and 
assessment.  
 
The emphasis of learning and improving maybe traced to institutional roots when looking at 
the history of the entire airline industry although FAA has been pivotal in many of these very 
developments in the US and abroad. Development towards a more pro-active learning cycle 
resulting in preventive actions has been enabled by successfully unlocking extra data from 
incident reporting. FAA’s professional and open culture seems to match the profile of a 
learning organization and provides a likely explanation for the appropriateness of PI use. 
One aspect that could still be developed further is the notion that everyone, including junior 
organization members is welcome to debate improvement of effectiveness. 
  
In summary  this study revealed evidence that neo institutional explanations indeed help 
explain the extensive use of PI to learn and improve. Notably important recent events and 
leadership provide explanations as well as cultural characteristics that largely match those of 
a learning organization. Contextual factors, notably the budgetary crisis in the U.S. federal 
government have some impact on the performance budgeting system but provide no likely 
explanations for PI use at FAA and ATO. 
 
Epilogue 
Although not part of the indicators directly tested in this study, James Q. Wilson made the 
case that a strong professional culture encourage result oriented behaviour as people 
generally do not need to be told what to do and the flow of information is facilitated by a 
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high degree common understanding (Wilson 1989:109). Agencies who share a strong sense 
of mission and a dominant professional culture were even referred to by him as prestigious 
‘elite agencies’ (Wilson 1989:99)  
 
Much of these characteristics seem to apply in particular to FAA culture as encountered in 
this study. It is therefore surprising to find that FAA ranked relatively low on employee 
satisfaction among federal agencies. In the 2012 ‘Best places to work in the federal 
government’ research FAA was ranked at place 114 out of 292 federal agencies in overall 
employee satisfaction with the aspects of leadership, strategic management and 
performance based rewards receiving particularly low scores (below place 240). In 2009 FAA 
was even ranked at the near bottom at place 214 out of the 216 agencies surveyed that year. 
In should be added that being an employer of choice has been an FAA strategic priority 
since. This seemingly has paid off as FAA today is among the top 40% of federal agencies. 
Nonetheless this image somehow seems to be somewhat inconsistent with a high 
performance culture. It should be noted that this case study, a performance culture was 
observed at FAA HQ and that therefore possible differences with the situation at local 
stations in this respect went unobserved. Some respondents suspected the pay for 
performance system was an important factor explaining employee dissatisfaction as the 
breakdown of today’s ranking indeed seems to confirm: 
 
‘You came here because you had heard we did a good job with using performance 
measures to achieve results and I think we do. However we also have a kind of a contrary 
indication in that we are in the bottom of agencies where employees are satisfied with the 
agency. So it’s like we’re dissatisfied but despite being dissatisfied we’re doing a great job. 
I personally believe pay for performance is a large part of this because it’s so complicated. 
So people kind of say may say the hell with it I still care about the mission and the 
programs and I am still doing a good job’.  
 
Interestingly, this response indicates that FAA employees do a good job in spite of the 
financial performance incentives provided by its pay for performance system, and not thanks 
to it. Other responses also indicate that the financial incentives do not affect employee 
motivation and performance at all: 
 
‘It is not about the money but about the mission and professional pride. Our salary freeze 
that we’ve had for three years now, has not impacted performance negatively’ 
 
In addition to the financial incentives paradox concerning FAA’s performance management, 
this case study also revealed another interesting paradox concerning external performance 
accountability as briefly explained in section 8.2.1.  
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Due to the introduction of a non-punitive incident reporting system (ATSAP) and 
improvements in automatic detection of errors (TARP) the number of incidents reported by 
FAA/ATO peaked in 2010 and 2012. Ironically, this better data collection initially alarmed 
external stakeholders—the traveling public and Congress as the number of reported 
Operational Errors (OE’s) was one of the major performance indicator that FAA reported 
annually to its stakeholders. To them, it seemed that there was a dramatic increase in the 
number of operational errors and the airspace had become dramatically less safe. In fact, 
the increased reporting of incidents that had previously been undetected or unreported led 
to a greater understanding of trends and causal factors, thereby allowing ATO to put in place 
corrective actions. While this led to a safer air traffic system, it created political problems for 
the agency (Mills 2013: 22-23).  
 
From the viewpoint of a learning organization these developments were interpreted rather 
differently by FAA than from the viewpoint of external accountability held by FAA’s external 
stakeholders as this responses illustrates:  
 
‘The press reported: runway incursions go up by 300. That is not necessarily a bad thing if 
there is more reporting. In fact it’s great that we get extra information that we never got 
before.’ 
 
To add to the irony, in retrospect, despite facing incomplete incident reporting in the old 
situation, FAA kept missing targets aimed at keeping the number of Operational Errors 
below a certain threshold. As a response to missing there targets FAA repeatedly made these 
targets easier to attain. All of this never alarmed FAA’s stakeholders. However when the 
improvement of systems finally disclosed higher reported numbers of incidents that were 
previously undetected, FAA started receiving a bad press. Throughout the entire period, the 
number of serious incidents kept diminishing so the extra incidents reported were primarily 
not severe ones that were nonetheless useful to prevent the serious ones from happening. 
 
Prior to introducing non punitive reporting, controllers’ reports indeed tended to be biased 
in a direction that would make their mistake’s severity look less than it may have been. 
Controllers would be hesitant to report incidents when approaching the annual threshold 
number set for their unit (Mills 2013: 19-20). Regarding this observation there is an 
interesting role for the financial incentives form FAA’s pay for performance system in this 
paradox as one respondent explained:  
 
‘Our learning system has definitely evolved. In previous years we tracked operational data 
because we wanted to reduce the amount of errors, runway incursions etc. . However 
these metrics were very public. And so the controllers knew that we had these metric and 
these also tied into how the performance based systems determined the pay through 
organizational success increase So we were finding that there was hesitation to report 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
197 
 
because they were reporting stuff that could turn around and negatively impact their pay 
in the end.’   
 
Following discussions between with DOT and OMB a new indicator was chosen to replace 
the metric of the number of Operational Errors. This new indicator is called the System Risk 
Event Rate (SRER) and measures the number of serious incidents regarding Loss of Standard 
Separation (aircraft flying too close to each other) against the total number of such incidents 
reported.  
 
Data collection FAA case 
The primary method of data collection were semi structured interviews. Between March and 
November 2012, ten persons were interviewed. Two of these worked at the President’s 
Office of Management and Budget and one at the Department of Transportation charged 
with oversight on performance on key priorities. At the FAA HQ seven persons were 
interviewed representing management, program analysts, budget and planning staff and 
ATO management (see Appendix II for more details). Data were primarily processed by 
qualitative analysis although some quantitative analysis was used for comparing and 
aggregating results (see section 4.6). These scores were aggregated for each case allowing 
for a qualitative comparison on an ordinal scale. After finishing each draft case study, the 
report was reviewed by a key informant from the organization involved. By means of 
triangulation the results from interviews were compared with the available questionnaire 
results and findings from analysis of documents sometimes nuancing some of the findings 
from the interviews. 
 
Sources: 
FAA documentation (site, budget ,annual reports administrative factbook June 2012) 
 
GAO-05-331: Published: Jun 10, 2005. Publicly Released: Jul 11, 2005 
 
GAO-04-227T: Published: Oct 30, 2003. Publicly Released: Oct 30, 2003: FAA's Modernization 
Efforts--Past, Present, and Future  
 
IBM Center for the Business of Government 2011. A Conversation with Randy Babbitt, 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, www.businessofgovernment.org 
 
Jensen, David 2004, Q&A Russ Chew, Avionics Today, September 1st 2004, interview by 
David Jensen 
 
Mills, Russel W. 2013, Incident Reporting Systems – Lessons from the Federal Aviaition 
Administration’s Air Traffic Control Organization. Publication of IBM Center for the Business 
of Government, Improving performance series. 
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Partnership for Public Service 2012, Best places to work in the federal government ranking  
(survey)  
 
Partnership for public service / IBM Center the Business of Government 2011. From Data to 
Decisions – the Power of Analytics  
 
Wall Street Journal May 2013: FAA Bonuses and the Sequester 
 
Wright, Cathy.  April 12, 2013, FAA Bucks Trend in Declining Employee Satisfaction 
(http://orginc.com/2013/04/12/faa-bucks-trend-in-declining-employee-satisfaction/) 
 
Zajac, Andrew 2012. Airline Crash Deaths Too Few to Make New Safety Rules Pay 
(www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-25/airline-crash-deaths-too-few-to-make-new-safety-
rules-pay.html) 
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CHAPTER 9 COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
 
The previous chapters 5 through 8 described public sector agencies that use performance 
budgeting in a way envisaged by New Public Management reforms. The claim to PB 
success for each case was verified in the first part of the analysis that looked at the 
agency’s internal performance management, the use of PI by principals to control the 
agency and at the way performance information is used in a budgetary context. Then the 
analysis of the case studies turned to particular organizational characteristics in each 
organization’s culture and history that may provide a plausible explanation for purposeful 
use of performance information. In this chapter the overall results from the cases will be 
presented compared and analysed. First an analysis will take place of the PI use, the neo 
institutional factors and the contextual factors across all four cases. Subsequently cross 
comparisons of results will be made between the policy areas (forestry versus air traffic 
control) and the two government systems (Netherlands versus US). This analysis provides 
the input for answering the central research question later on in Chapter 10. 
 
9.1 Recapitulation of results from cases 
Having conducted all four cases studies the results in terms of the indicators investigated can 
be compared across cases. To illustrate the variation between case studies and indicators 
more clearly, the answers from the interviews, which were measured on a three point scale 
(absent / present to some degree / clearly present), were converted into a 5 way scale in 
Table 9.1. 
 
Table 9.1 Indicators for presence neo-institutional explanations of purposeful PI use 
(average from interviews) 
 Indicator SBB LVNL USFS FAA/ATO 
PB 1.1 PB used in addition to traditional budgeting   +  +  +/+  +/- 
PB 1.2 
PB is used by the principal to control the 
agency  
 -  +  +/+  +/- 
PB 2.1 A high degree of de jure PB implementation  +  +  +  +/+ 
PB 2.2 A high degree of de facto PB implementation  +/+  +/+  +/+  +/+ 
H 1.1 
Critical juncture in the accountability chain or 
policy field 
 -  +  +  + 
H 1.2  Problem to which PB was seen as a solution   -/-  -  -  +/+ 
H 2.1 
An  advocate or champion of PB in a powerful 
position 
 -  +/+  -/-  +/+ 
H 2.2 
A policy field in which specialists are 
dominant. 
 +/-  +/-  +/-  +/- 
S 1.1 Absence learning disabilities     +  +  +  + 
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S 1.2 Participative openness  +  +/+  +/+  +/- 
S 1.3 Reflective openness  +  +  +/-  + 
S 2.1 
Shared view of the meaning of measured 
performance 
 +  +/+  +/+  + 
 
  -/-  No evidence of presence 
  -    Hardly any evidence of presence 
 -/+  Present to some extent 
  +   Present 
 +/+ Strongly present 
 
By looking at how the cases score on the PB indicators, it can be concluded that the 
characteristics of these agencies and the relationship with their principals do indeed qualify 
as cases of successful PB implementation. This goes in particular for the way PI is integrated 
in budgetary and management cycles and for the way PI is actually used by staff, 
management and professionals in their work. The relevance of performance information for 
budgetary purposes and oversight by the principal does not surface equally convincing from 
all the cases. While results vary per case, the cultural indicators from sociological neo 
institutionalism seem present quite consistently throughout the cases. In some of the cases, 
there is clear evidence for presence of indicators from historical neo institutionalism as well. 
In the next two sections, more specific observations for each of the formulated hypotheses 
and their underlying indicators are highlighted in the light of the central question posed at 
the start of the study. 
 
9.2 Degree of PI use and PB success in cases 
Although this study took a budgetary view on PI use it was noted that the line between 
performance budgeting (PB) and performance management (PM) becomes increasingly 
blurred when investigating the aspect of PI use by agencies for planning and reporting. Not 
surprisingly, purposeful use of PI is more likely to positively influence effectiveness and 
efficiency than situations where PI is not used to learn and improve. Even if no direct 
financial incentives are tied to performance targets and PI is simply included in budgetary 
documents for presentational purposes, purposeful PI use is likely to have budgetary 
consequences. These consequences often remain invisible as they may or may not directly 
show in budget documents. For example if efficiency gains as a result of program learning 
are offset by higher prices elsewhere, an outsider or maybe even a principal may not notice 
any change. The same goes for increased customer satisfaction or application of a more 
effective technique within a giving level of funding. However in the absence of purposeful 
use of PI for program learning or enlightenment, decreasing service delivery at the same 
level of funding or increased budget claims would have been likely to have occurred instead. 
Some claim that due to the lack of success of PB reforms, its definition has been stretched to 
include broader use of PI or that PB has in fact become a subset of PM (Schick 2014: 3). 
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Regardless of this debate this study adopts the view that insofar goal setting, performance 
measurement, analysis and reporting are part of the same formalized cyclical routines as the 
budgetary cycle, the term PB applies (as may PM at the same time). In doing so this study 
only focuses on the use of PI that is actively generated, collected and disseminated as part of 
a formalized performance measurement and reporting system. This can be contrasted with 
non-routine PI like ad-hoc feedback that is passively received (Kroll 2013: 265).  
 
An important part of the case study analysis was to verify to what extent the selected cases 
indeed lived up to their reputation of PB successes by demonstrating purposeful PI use in 
accordance with NPM and principal-agent theory. The result was that in all cases clear 
evidence of purposeful PI use was found although some variation existed (see Table 9.2)  
 
 
Table 9.2  Dominant types of PI emerging from case studies. The dark grey cells indicate 
that over 1/2 of the respondents were familiar with this type of PI use in their 
organization while the light shaded ones indicate that over 1/3 of them were. 
 
Use of PI for... SBB LVNL USFS FAA/ATO 
Goal alignment or adapting policy assumptions          
a.      Performance reporting for external      
         accountability     
b.     Setting program priorities     
c.      Strategically reallocate internal resources     
e. Understand the impact of external events on     
performance goals      
Better resource management     
e.     Deciding on outsourcing decisions     
f.       Developing and managing contracts      
f. Monitor cost and performance and contract    
management  
 
      
h.     Allocate funds to third parties      
Taking corrective actions     
i. Coordinating program efforts with other  
internal or external organizations     
j.      Analyzing productivity and funding levels      
k.     Allocating internal funds     
l.      Identifying service problems and  changing     
        work processes     
m.    Adopting new program approaches following  
              evaluation      
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Goal orientation and motivating staff       
n.     Motivate staff to act consistent with  
              organizational goals 
 
    
 
   
o.     Setting individual job expectations for staff     
p.     Rewarding staff     
Questionnaire forms filled out by interviewees were used for this analysis except for FAA/ATO 
where a set of forms was used filled in by a group of ATO lead planners and managers, two of 
which had been interviewees as well.  
 
As can be concluded from Table 9.2, PI is used most prominently by the investigated 
organizations in the areas of goal alignment, adapting policy assumptions and taking 
corrective actions and less for resource management at a more operational level. In addition 
the case appraisal revealed that the performance dialogue within the agencies was generally 
much more intense than the one with the principal. Although there is clear evidence of 
purposeful PI use by all organizations, it can be noticed that SBB does not seem to score as 
high as its US counterpart. To put the SBB findings somewhat into perspective, the SBB 
questionnaire (n=85) revealed that over 95% of respondents named at least one type of PI 
use with all categories being named by in between 6 and 60 respondents. More generally 
the results regarding PI use from the interviews were confirmed by the available 
questionnaire results. 
 
To qualify as a ‘textbook example’ of PB implementation, four indicators were tested 
regarding the linking of money and results, the performance dialogue, the de jure PB system 
as implemented and its de facto use. 
 
Table 9.3          Indicators for PB implementation (average from interviews, converted to 5  
 point scale) 
 
 
 
Combining the answers for each case to sub question A: To what extent is this a PB success?, 
based on the evidence from the cases, it can be concluded that the characteristics of these 
Score of the investigated agencies on indicators Average SBB LVNL USFS FAA/ATO
PB 1.1 PB is used by the agency in addition to traditional budgeting  +  +  +  +/+  +/-
PB 1.2 PB is used by the principal to control the agency  +/-  -  +  +/+  +/-
PB 2.1 A high degree of de jure PB implementation  +  +  +  +  +/+
PB 2.2 A high degree of de facto PB implementation  +/+  +/+  +/+  +/+  +/+
0.0<w<0.4   -/-  No evidence of presence
0.4<w<0.8   -    Hardly any evidence of presence
0.8<w<1.2  -/+  Present to some extent
1.2<w<1.6   +   Present
1.6<w<2.0  +/+ Strongly present
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agencies and the relationship with their principals do indeed largely match the assumptions 
that were made on successful PB implementation, more precisely: 
x PB is used as an integral in the agencies’ budgeting processes, most notably for 
internal allocation, prioritizing, monitoring and external accountability. 
x The use of PI by principals to control the agencies varies significantly, is often 
selective and usually lacks budgetary consequences;  
x The organizations have strongly embedded cyclical performance planning and 
reporting in their budgetary systems (de jure implementation) 
x The de facto use of PI by agencies for the internal performance dialogue and decision 
making is strongly present in all cases.  
 
A short summary of the PB indicators is provided below. These represent a small part of the 
overall findings for each case study as described in Chapters 5-8.  
 
Use of PB in addition to traditional budgeting (indicator PB 1.1) 
Both forestry agencies (SBB and the USFS) have designed an intricate system of linking 
funding, activities and outputs and in some cases even outcomes. The SBB framework was 
introduced in the 1990s and developed further subsequently. The USFS system dates back 
considerably longer. In fact in the late 1950s Herbert Kaufman in his classical work on public 
administration refers to the U.S. Forest Service’s output based budgeting system as 
performance budgeting, long before this term gained popularity in public sector budgeting 
(Kaufman 1960:112). The Service’s system of linking outputs to funding and labor has been 
quite stable over decades and in fact Kaufman’s description of the FS budget process seems 
largely accurate of today’s budgetary process. The systems of both SBB and the USFS play a 
clear role in budget preparation and internal allocation as annual work plans and their 
budgetary consequences are consolidated by headquarters. The monitoring and 
accountability structure at the USFS is somewhat more intense, as illustrated by the formal 
accountability provision that requires explanation when targets are not met beyond a 5% 
margin at all organizational levels. SBB’s relies more on annual comprehensive evaluation of 
a portion of its terrains. 
 
In air traffic control, output estimates like the number of flights do play a role in capacity 
planning and to some extent PI is used in business cases regarding investments. In budget 
presentation both financial and PI are presented jointly. Although performance planning 
does play a role in the activities of both organizations, the bulk of costs of both LVNL and 
FAA/ATO seem rather immune from performance considerations. 
 
Use of PB by principal to control agency (indicator PB 1.2) 
The evidence of actual use of PB by the ministry to control SBB is hardly convincing. Despite 
frequent contacts, SBB respondents indicated that they seldom got a response from the 
ministry regarding the PI they reported. This is a development that has deteriorated over 
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time and is explained by an increasing lack of specialist knowledge at the ministry. The 
intensity of monitoring in the USFS case appears fragmented as it varies according to policy 
goal and field of activity. In fact intense monitoring and steering happens quite selectively 
and concentrates on those activities that are reported externally and receive political 
attention such as fire, timber, watershed and a limited number of key indicators of the 
Strategic Plan of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Apart from a performance 
dialogue between the Service’s DC headquarters (also referred to as the Washington Office 
or the WO) and the field, USDA and OMB also monitor the Service albeit with different 
perspective. In the dialogue with the USDA the emphasis lies primarily on goal alignment and 
monitoring performance whereas OMB asks questions about effectiveness and efficiency.   
 
Working in a highly technical and specialized industry, performance, results and funding in 
the case of the air traffic control agencies seems hard to tell apart for a principal, let alone a 
Congressman or taxpayer. The difficulty of explaining FAA performance to Congress was 
illustrated in recent years when Congress scrutinized FAA after being alarmed with an 
increased number of reported operational errors by air traffic controllers. Ironically the 
increased number of reported errors was the result of improvements FAA made in its 
incident reporting. This increase of reported errors was viewed by FAA as good news 
because these incidents previously went undetected and provided valuable opportunities to 
learn and improve effectiveness (Mills 2013: 27-29). Despite the technical nature of its work, 
FAA/ATO engages in a critical performance dialogue with OMB, especially during budget 
preparation and capital investments. The institutionalized performance dialogues between 
DOT and both FAA and ATO mainly addresses strategic goal realization but do not lead to 
financial reallocation.   
 
In the Netherlands, the options the government has when it comes to controlling LVNL and 
its performance and costs, are quite limited given the impact of international and 
commercial stakeholders. Despite the fact that PI is not directly linked to costs it does play a 
vital role in the dialogue between the Ministry and LVNL. The ministry, as LVNL’s principal, 
uses PI to reduce information asymmetry and to actively monitor progress towards agreed 
upon performance targets. Although PI is not used in a direct manner to adjust LVNL’s 
budget upwards or downwards, the ministry has used its power and the available PI, to curb 
LVNL’s tariffs. For LVNL this meant that it was held accountable for the same performance 
levels in spite of lower incomes due to reduced air traffic, leading to significant cost cutting.  
 
‘De jure’ PB implementation (indicator PB 2.1) 
In both forestry cases the cyclical performance reporting and evaluation is well embedded in 
the financial planning and control cycle. The USFS system revolves around accomplishment 
levels that are set for virtually all activities and are tied to fixed funding levels per unit. 
Accomplishment reporting forms an unavoidable part of the work of almost all employees 
and forms a stable foundation under each year’s budgeting process. The WO does gather 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
205 
 
information on almost all of the Service’s activities and outputs. In addition tools are used at 
the regional level that reward over-accomplishment of targets with a larger share of the 
budget. The SBB system links ecological objectives (target types of nature) and financial 
consequences is a rather direct way resulting in a more outcome based system. The 
sophistication of both systems do make it prone to producing a significant bureaucratic 
burden as information becomes more detailed. Therefore a more pragmatic approach for 
monitoring is chosen at the headquarters’ level by both organizations.  
 
In air traffic control, an abundance of PI is used internally in a systematic manner to improve 
the organization’s effectiveness (notably safety) and, to a lesser extent, for managing 
financial efficiency.  At LVNL, performance is not coupled in a rigid or systematic manner to 
the budget and the relation between cost and performance is mostly limited to 
presentation. At FAA, all expenses are allocated to the strategic goals of the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) up to the detailed level of activities. In addition FAA has for a long time 
pioneered a rather comprehensive pay for performance system that ties a small part of 
personnel pay to organizational and individual performance. This does not take away the 
earlier mentioned fact that the budget of both organizations is rather immune for 
performance considerations.   
 
‘De facto’ PB implementation (indicator PB 2.2) 
The collection and reporting of PI forms a self-evident part of the job of employees in both 
forestry organizations. The timber and ecology fields build on a strong quantitative focus 
which is lacking somewhat in recreation. The cyclical use of PI in the different evaluation 
cycles in both forestry organizations clearly supports program learning. Without much effort 
a multitude of examples of these types of program lessons could be named by respondents. 
This goes for improvements in both efficiency and effectiveness resulting from learning 
forums, performance evaluation and structural methods of analysis.  
 
In air traffic control the emphasis on its data driven safety management is easily noticed 
when talking to LVNL or FAA respondents. The data driven quest for safety improvement 
easily explains why the FAA has long been considered an exemplar of how agencies should 
implement performance management in government (Mills 2013:27, Partnership for Public 
Service/IBM 2011). The sophistication of LVNL’s performance reporting and analysis system 
arguably knows no peer in the public sector in the Netherlands. 
 
Although this study focused on the use of PI in the budget cycle, it is clear that the primary 
process is the dominant driver for cyclical performance reporting and evaluation and not the 
financial planning and control cycle. In other words: it occurs more as if finance has been 
linked to output rather than outputs to finance. 
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9.3 Presence of neo institutional factors in cases 
The presence of relevant cultural and historical factors for purposeful PI use as identified in 
the model was tested in all four cases to provide an answer to sub question B: Are the 
identified conditions present? While results vary per case, the cultural indicators from 
sociological neo institutionalism (S1&2) seem present quite consistently throughout the 
cases. In some of the cases, there is clear evidence for presence of indicators from historical 
neo institutionalism as well.  
 
Explanations from an agency’s history were hypothesized into four specific indicators to 
investigate support for the two H-hypotheses. Some specific observation for each of the 
formulated assumptions and their underlying indicators are highlighted here for each of the 
H-hypotheses and corresponding indicators. The underlying observations are described in 
more detail in Chapters 5-8.  
 
Table 9.4 Indicators for presence historical neo-institutional explanations of purposeful PI 
use (average from interviews, converted to a 5 point scale) 
 
 
 
Hypothesis H1: Path dependency (indicators H1.1 and H1.2) 
The FAA/ATO case offers most evidence for the occurrence of critical events as an 
explanation for purposeful use of PI. As ATO was formed in 2000 as a performance based 
organization in direct response to the perception of ill financial management, it is no 
surprise that a strong emphasis was put on performance management, performance 
accountability and their relation to finance. This event and its aftermath provide a likely 
explanation for the appropriateness of performance measurement and management within 
today’s FAA and especially ATO. One FAA respondent reminisced:  
 
‘Ten years ago we were fat and happy; the budget situation was not as grim as it is today. 
Our administrators regularly got dragged to the Hill and had their head handed to them 
because we could not deliver capital programs on time and within budget. The numbers 
were really awful. She cut our 2.5 billion dollar capital program budget with 0.5 billon in 
one year because of our inefficiency. I asked all executives: What will be the impact on 
performance. After 72 hours they came back and most of them told me: we are unable to 
Score of the investigated agencies on indicators Average SBB LVNL USFS FAA/ATO
H 1.1 Critical juncture in the accountability chain or policy field  +/-  -  +  +  +
H 1.2 Problem to which PB was seen as a solution  +/-  -/-  -  -  +/+
H 2.1 An  advocate or champion of PB in a powerful position.  +/-  -  +/+  -/-  +/+
H 2.2 A policy field in which specialists are dominant.  +/-  +/-  +/-  +/-  +/-
0.0<w<0.4   -/-  No evidence of presence
0.4<w<0.8   -    Hardly any evidence of presence
0.8<w<1.2  -/+  Present to some extent
1.2<w<1.6   +   Present
1.6<w<2.0  +/+ Strongly present
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articulate what, if any, impact this will have on performance. Today we can do that in 
excruciating detail’  
 
The other cases also provided examples of relevant critical events but with a more indirect 
impact on PI use, primarily leading to more emphasis on performance accountability to 
external stakeholders. 
 
Hypothesis H2: Asymmetry of power (indicators H2.1 and H2.2) 
Evidence for this hypothesis was mostly found in the aviation cases, in particular for the 
presence of an internal advocate or champion of PI use in a powerful position. At LVNL 
introduction of the dominant performance management system and its further development 
were helped greatly by leaders in the person of the current CEO. Back in the 1990s, when 
working as an air traffic controller, he began modelling air traffic control for a thesis.  Later 
on he was responsible for initiating this system organization wide and grew to become 
LVNL’s current CEO. At FAA too, the influence of leaders that emphasized use measured 
performance data can be traced to certain individuals as this anecdote of a respondent 
shows: 
 
‘We have been doing the monthly performance meetings for over 10 years. In 2000/2001 
we used to have them but the administrator never participated and we only got a handful 
of executives together. The executives were polite and didn’t ask each other hard questions. 
Then they started getting cancelled. Then a new administrator came in who said I want to 
run this agency based on metrics and our strategic plan. She was significant in reorienting 
the agency’s approach towards performance management.’ 
 
At the USFS, like SBB, no clear champion of PB was mentioned in the interviews. When 
looking further into the organization’s history such a champion may have been present after 
all in the name of the Service’s influential first chief forester Gifford Pinchot. He is generally 
seen as responsible for the design of the Service in almost all of its aspects including the 
scientific approach to forestry and the system of output funded budgets.    
 
In both forestry and air traffic control, a relative dominant role of specialists was 
recognizable. The technical nature of work In air traffic control means that recruitment 
results in a staff with a dominant ‘engineers mentality’ and a high tolerance for - and 
understanding of- quantitative measurement. The nature of forestry work may not be as 
technical as air traffic control in all respects. However the audience for many of the activities 
(e.g. biodiversity) is rather small if no direct stakeholder interests are at stake. This could 
also explain a relative dominance of specialists. Although all cases do portray a picture of 
policy specialists at times being able to go at their business relatively undisturbed by politics 
and stakeholder interests, politics is never far away to interfere with work and seems to 
increasingly do so.  
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Cultural aspects have been regarded as an important factor for PB success and were 
operationalized into four specific indicators to investigate support for the two S-hypotheses. 
Some specific observation for each of the formulated assumptions and their underlying 
indicators are highlighted here for each of the S-hypotheses and corresponding indicators. 
The underlying observations are described in more detail in Chapters 5-8.  
 
Table 9.5 Indicators for presence sociological neo-institutional explanations of 
purposeful PI use (average from interviews, converted to a 5 point scale) 
 
 
 
Hypothesis S1: Cultural appropriateness (indicators S1.1, S1.2 & S1-3) 
In all case studies respondents could, without much effort, name examples where systematic 
use of PI or celebrated learning forums had led to corrections or new insights in recent 
years. The ability to critically self-assess organizational effectiveness claimed by interviewed 
respondents was backed up by evidence from documentation and questionnaires. Generally 
there was wide agreement in interview results on openness as was illustrated by this quote 
from a U.S. Forest Service employee:  
 
‘We have a culture where it seems to be okay to disagree with one another. We have a lot 
of scientific disciplines working for the same organization. Obviously there is disagreement 
about what people think that the priority is for a given landscape. It is not seen at 
disharmonious not to agree on anything. So people feel comfortable to say that they don’t 
agree’  
 
It should be added that the cases also showed that the inclination of employees to engage in 
an internal dialogue on performance was not entirely free of hierarchy or seniority. 
Questionnaire results showed slightly lower results on these indicators than the interview 
results. This may be explained by relative overrepresentation of central management and 
headquarter staff in the interviews and possibly to some degree of social desirability bias.   
 
 
 
Score of the investigated agencies on indicators Average SBB LVNL USFS FAA/ATO
S 1.1 Absence learning disabilities    +  +  +  +  +
S 1.2 Participative openness  +  +  +/+  +/+  +/-
S 1.3 Reflective openness  +  +  +  +/-  +
S 2.1 Shared view of the meaning of measured performance  +  +  +/+  +/+  +
0.0<w<0.4   -/-  No evidence of presence
0.4<w<0.8   -    Hardly any evidence of presence
0.8<w<1.2  -/+  Present to some extent
1.2<w<1.6   +   Present
1.6<w<2.0  +/+ Strongly present
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Hypothesis S2: Cognitive frames (indicator S2.1)  
A shared view of the meaning of measured performance was found to be clearly present in 
each of the cases, albeit in forestry somewhat more prominent than in aviation. To foresters 
performance measurement and reporting traditionally is a self-evident part of their job. 
Backed up by a highly developed professional culture and a strong sense of mission, the 
relevance of performance measurement is hardly contested as long as its bureaucratic 
burden stays within reasonable limits. To an air traffic controller the relevance of safety 
metrics that are directly impacted by his or her actions is more easily acknowledged than 
other targets within the myriad of analytical metrics that their organizations use for 
planning, analysis and accountability. A LVNL respondent commented on this: 
 
 ‘Working with indicators is widely accepted because the usefulness of some data is clear to 
everyone. This goes in particular for safety. This is somewhat different for environmental 
performance measures. If a single plane is in violation of the norms, it is impossible to 
attain your target for the entire year. This does not motivate air traffic controllers in their 
daily work’  
 
While evidence from the cases was adequate to answers questions A and B, an explanation 
of purposeful PI use is not complete without including potential contextual factors. 
 
9.4 Contextual factors  
In addition to answering sub questions A and B through the indicators investigated, sub 
question C: Does context offer a likely explanation? was answered for each case in order to 
explore whether purposeful PI use demonstrated in a case can be explained by other 
dominant contextual factors than to the neo-institutional ones tested in the model. As 
context is defined to be everything else not addressed by the model in particular, it would be 
absurd to claim comprehensiveness with regard to all contextual factors that may also be 
relevant for explaining the phenomenon investigated. Nonetheless this section will look back 
on some of the relevant contextual factors that played a role in interpreting the results from 
the case studies. First however some differences in national context between the US and 
Netherlands government systems will be addressed to make sure that these aren’t ignored 
when interpreting results for the studies.   
 
National differences  
Differences between the US and Netherlands agencies that came up in the case studies 
concern the national PB system in place, the organizational status of the agencies, the scope 
of their tasks and some features of the political systems in which they operate.  
 
Agencies in both nations face a requirement to report PI to a principal that has been in place 
since at least the 1990s. There are however differences in the way performance planning 
and reporting has a direct budgetary component. As the federal US never formally adopted a 
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system of program budgeting, the Budget Line Items (BLI’s) form the backbone of the 
financial allocation of both the Forest Service and the FAA. The reliance on BLI’s for 
allocation instead of lump sum financing around policy objectives has long been considered 
somewhat problematic from the viewpoint of budgetary flexibility and adds significantly to 
the complexity of linking outputs levels and strategic planning to funding. Indeed linking 
performance to funding was a lot more complex in the U.S. cases because the structure of 
budget line items largely disregards performance planning. 
 
Apart from the apparent differences in size and volume, the tasks performed by the Dutch 
organizations and their US counterparts are highly comparable. With regard to the forestry it 
should be noted that while fighting forest fires takes up a large part of resources in the US, 
this activity is hardly existent in the Netherlands, at least in comparison. In addition SBB is 
the sole government agency tasked with managing forests in the Netherlands whereas the 
USFS is one of four federal land management agencies. However, as the jurisdiction of these 
agencies is clearly drawn across geographical lines, no competition or additional complexity 
from this difference was encountered in the USFS case study.   
 
Organizationally, the two organizations from the Netherlands operated more independently 
from the ministry under which they resided. Unlike the FAA/ATO which organizationally 
belongs to the FAA and the Department of Transportation, LVNL has been separated from 
the Ministry of Transport for a long time and is directly funded by airline fees. This means 
that the efficiency incentive on LVNL to control its rates to airlines is felt more directly by the 
organization. Unlike the U.S. Forest Service, SBB also gained independence from the Ministry 
of Agriculture in the 1990s although SBB remained financially dependent upon the Ministry’s 
annual contribution.   
 
The difference between the political systems became apparent during the case studies in 
several ways. One noticeable difference was the more complex cascade of policy goals of the 
U.S. agencies due to the necessity of their performance planning to comply with 
comprehensive multi-annual departmental strategic performance plans as well as priorities 
of the President and other political appointees. As agency directors in the U.S. are politically 
appointed to realize a certain policy agenda, their appointment often directly influences the 
performance planning and reporting system to some degree. Another feature that 
distinguished the U.S. cases from the Netherlands is the dominant influence of local 
constituencies on members of Congress. While preferences of politicians can certainly 
influence prioritization of policy objectives in the Netherlands, the U.S. cases revealed a 
more selective political focus on those goals and targets that directly affect local 
communities. Summarizing these differences it can be argued that the political context in 
the Netherlands makes for a somewhat less politicized focus on performance issues and a 
larger influence of the technical perspective of civil servants. Although relevant for 
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interpreting some of the findings from the cases, none of these international differences led 
to difficulties in applying the chosen model for this research.  
 
Relevant contextual factors that may influence PI use 
In addition to the differences in national context, a few contextual factors were identified 
that may provide some explanation of purposeful performance use. Some of these are more 
or less in line with the institutional characteristics of the organizations involved. Others were 
more characteristic of the environment in which these organizations operate. A contextual 
factor potentially influencing purposeful PI use in both aviation cases was the observation 
that the airline industry appears to be a rather cohesive community that shares a clear 
commitment to safety improvement. This makes the agencies major participants in an 
industry wide, data driven quest for improving its outputs and outcomes. It can be argued 
that the institutional and contextual factors are likely to have interacted to a large degree 
here. For example LVNL’s preoccupation with ‘just culture’ for reporting errors across 
hierarchy lines is shared with other players in the aviation industry.  
 
A hard to ignore contextual factor affecting all case studies has been the financial crisis as 
the Great Recession kept unfolding during the period that this research was conducted. This 
resulted in significant budget cuts hitting the agencies involved. No conclusive pattern of 
coping with this crisis response emerged from the cases. Generally the crisis seemed to be 
rightly perceived as a return to input oriented budgeting where the ties between money and 
results are increasingly cut, or at least temporarily. Some respondents stressed that less 
funding only slowed the pace of performance planning but not fundamentally affected it 
otherwise. Others saw cuts as a welcome opportunity to critically assess effectiveness and 
goal contribution of some of the agency’s activities. A particular effect in both U.S. cases was 
that budget cuts did undermine tools that financially rewarded exceeding a performance 
target by employee or units. As performance rewards are based on a percentage of total 
funding, the performance-based increases in fact came down to less of a decrease rendering 
these tools less effective. Although effects on PI use were observed in the cases, the crisis 
does not provide a clear comprehensive explanation for an increase or a decrease of PI use. 
A more elaborate assessment of the responses on austerity with regard to PI use is provided 
in Chapter 11.  
 
9.5 Comparison results across countries and policy areas  
Having compared the individual case studies in order to provide an overall answer to the 
sub-questions posed, the evidence can also be used to look for similarities and differences at 
the level of the countries and policy fields studied. If distinct divides between the US and the 
Netherlands or between forestry and air traffic control do occur this could be informative for 
explaining successful PB implementation. 
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Comparing Forestry and Air Traffic Control 
Both policy areas are characterized by a complex detailed planning and reporting system 
that links outputs to funding and in many cases even to outcomes. In addition, the cases 
show that in both policy areas, important elements of performance reporting have gone 
largely unchanged for the last 50 years or so. For non-specialists, many aspects of 
organizational performance are quite inaccessible. In forestry the technical expertise of 
professionals has been increasingly challenged by public and political interests. In addition 
forestry has seen a diversification in disciplines from timber to ecology and recreation 
involving more stakeholders with conflicting goals. Although the different scientific 
backgrounds present in today’s forestry workforce may sometimes be at odds with each 
other, the strong scientific background of the work and a high degree intrinsic motivation 
are shared widely by organization members.  
 
Unlike the forestry agencies, both air traffic control organizations saw the use of PI being 
stimulated by a recent dominant leader who championed performance management. In the 
FAA and to a lesser extent at LVNL, the emphasis on measured performance can be 
explained as a response to specific accountability problems. Generally the development and 
further sophistication of performance management systems was a bottom up process that 
was initiated from the ranks of professionals.  
 
The cultural indicators (S1&2) do not show any notable divide between both policy areas. 
Both foresters and air traffic controllers were found to share a strong professional culture 
which is seen as a favorable condition for PI interpretation and use. This, combined with a 
large degree of openness and the presence of organizational learning forums, make for an 
organizational culture that fosters learning and improving using PI. Interestingly, air traffic 
control has been a leader in the public sector in both countries in developing methods of 
non-punitive reporting. Having experienced the distorting effect of performance incentives 
and the fear of legal prosecution on safety reporting, both organizations have proactively 
sought ways to safeguard maximum availability of data in order to learn and improve.  
 
Comparing the U.S. and the Netherlands 
Comparing the agencies in the Netherlands to those in the US can be risky for different 
reasons, the most obvious ones being the sheer difference in size and the difference in 
national context of politics and public administration. Although the scores on the indicators 
do not give rise to clear differences that can be traced back to national differences, they do 
enable a better understanding on some of the results, notably on those of the PB indicators.   
Some national contrasts were already noted in Chapter 9.4 across the cases such as the 
phenomenon of political appointees. A politicized policy emphasis that changes every few 
years is not known to SBB and LVNL in the way it is to the USFS or the FAA.  In addition the 
alignment between policy goals and funding is more complicated for the U.S. cases because 
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the agencies do not receive their funding based on programs but based on BLI’s. These 
factors make the alignment of goals with budgets a considerably more complex task.  
Another difference is the more decentralized structure of public administration in the 
Netherlands. This goes in particular for the larger degree of autonomy that the agencies in 
the Netherlands were formally granted in the 1990s. By relying on a model of decentralized 
financial stewardship of line ministries and agencies, agencies in the Netherlands are 
relatively immune to compliance with government wide performance initiatives from the 
core of government. Therefore their performance dialogue is more internally focused and is 
limited to the line ministry for external accountability.  
A more general appraisal of national contextual differences that surfaced from the cases was 
addressed in Chapter 9.4. In Chapter 11 further research is suggested on a number of 
notable similarities between the cases.  
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION  
 
A familiar sight for many high school students in Finnish schools have become the regular 
visits of foreign journalists, politicians and education professionals to their classrooms. The 
Finnish education ministry has staff permanently allocated to arranging school visits by 
foreign guests. In addition, commercial operators have started to offer trips to the 
country’s schools. The main reason for Finland’s popularity as a hotspot for education 
tourism is the fact that the country tops the international ranking of school performance 
according to the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). PISA 
measures worldwide performance of 15 year old students and has become a popular 
international benchmark for education performance over the last decade. When analyzing 
Finland’s PISA scores however, researchers form Helsinki University mainly identified 
ingredients for success that bear little relevance to education policy itself such as 
language, geography and history. Only energetic intervention for struggling pupils was 
identified as an element that may be replicable in other places (source: The Economist 
June 26th 2008).  
 
The surge in popularity of performance budgeting by governments and the worldwide 
replication of reforms that followed somewhat resembles the power of attraction that 
Finnish secondary education continues to enjoy. While conventional wisdom tells us that 
what works in one place, may or may not work in another place, this notion seems to have 
been largely lost to PB reforms (and indeed budget reforms in general). By providing 
answers to the sub questions and the central question of this research, this chapter will 
address the impact of institutional and contextual factors on successful adoption of 
performance budgeting reforms in the cases studies. Far from claiming a universal truth 
based on a limited number of cases, the results nonetheless bear relevance for assessing 
the added value of adopting performance budgeting reforms for public sector 
organizations.  
 
10.1 Back to the central question 
In Chapter 1 the international evidence was assessed regarding the mixed results of 
performance budgeting with regard to transparency (promising) and effective allocation of 
public spending (disappointing). It was concluded that the potential yield of this reform in 
terms of more efficiency and effectiveness is most likely to occur at the agency level where 
policy execution takes place. The general research question posed at the start of this 
research was therefore: 
 
Are result orientation of a government agency and operational efficiency gains achieved 
through PB?  
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This general research question addresses the more tacit and less visible potential results of 
this reform such intra program re-allocation and result orientation. In order to be able to 
assess the added value of PB in particular cases, a rather obvious requirement is that cases 
represent a good practice of having implemented this particular reform. With these 
considerations taken into account the central research question in Chapter 2 was refined to: 
 
How do underlying cultural and historical factors explain successful PB in government 
agencies? 
 
This research attempted to answer this question by means of a qualitative comparative case 
study of cases representing successful PB implementation in a principal-agent relationship. 
To obtain an answer to the central research question, several sub questions are to be 
answered. These sub questions are shown in their relevant order in Figure 9.1 and will be 
followed by brief explanation of the way they were answered: 
 
Figure 10.1 Set of sub questions to be answered 
 
 
 
Questions for each case study: 
 
A.  To what extent is this a PB success? 
 
B  Are the identified conditions present? 
 
C.  Does context offer a likely explanation? 
Sub questions derived from central question: 
 
1: What is considered a case of successful PB in a government agencies? 
2: What are considered relevant underlying historical and cultural factors?   
3. Does the presence of these cultural and historical factors offer a 
convincing alternative explanation for successful PB? 
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The first two sub questions were addressed in the first chapters: 
 
Sub question 1: What is considered a case of successful PB in a government agency? 
 
This question was answered in Chapter 2 with the development a micro model of purposeful 
PI use by a government agency, both internally and in the relation with its principal. 
Additionally, four indicators regarding PB implementation were identified in Chapter 4. If PI 
is used in a purposeful way and PB is implemented in accordance with the indicators chosen, 
a case qualifies as a case of successful PB implementation. 
 
Sub question 2: What are considered relevant underlying historical and cultural factors? 
This was answered by identifying alternative explanations for purposeful PI use by 
government agencies from sociological and historical neo-institutionalism in Chapter 3 in 
which four types of explanations were identified. In Chapter 4 these were operationalized 
into eight indicators to be measured in case studies. 
 
After a model was constructed in answer to questions 1 and 2, the sub questions could be 
answered for each of the case studies:  
 
A.  To what extent is this a PB success? 
B   Are the identified conditions present? 
C.  Does context offer a likely explanation? 
 
The model constructed directly targeted sub questions A and B through measuring of four 
and eight indicators respectively. Sub question C on contextual factors explored whether the 
result orientation demonstrated in a case could be explained by other dominant factors 
instead of the neo-institutional ones tested. This could obviously not be done with the same 
level of detail. Nonetheless, answering this question gave some assurance that some obvious 
contextual explanations aren’t ignored and are included in the answer to the final sub 
question. In Chapters 5-8 these questions were answered for each of the case studies. In 
Chapter 9 a synthesis across the case studies was provided regarding these answers.  
 
Sub question 3: Does the presence of these cultural and historical factors offer a convincing 
alternative explanation for successful PB? 
 
An affirmative answer to this sub question would indicate that purposeful use of PI can 
largely be explained by institutional characteristics and is not the result of successful the PB 
implementation. A negative answer to sub question 3 would imply the opposite, namely that 
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PB adoption itself should be credited with purposeful PI use rather than the institutional and 
contextual factors under which this adoption happened. 
 
With due observance of the limitations in terms of external validity that may apply to a 
qualitative assessment of a small number of cases studies, alternative institutional 
explanations for purposeful use of PI, were aggregated below into five hypotheses: 
 
If almost no evidence from case studies is found that supports the presence of the defined 
explanatory indicators, this would imply that purposeful use of PI has little to do with the 
presence of these indicators and the impact of PB implementation may have been 
undervalued. This would support the idea that the routines on the collection and 
dissemination of PI through PB may have modified organizations towards purposeful PI use.  
 
Hypothesis R Purposeful use of PI is driven by the logic of consequence 
 
Hypothesis R would be in line with the assumptions of the logic of consequence, rational 
choice institutionalism, (hence the ‘R’) the principal-agent dilemma and indeed New Public 
Management. At the very least it would imply that the proper alternative explanatory factors 
were not identified. 
 
Alternatively, if the cases offer convincing evidence that explains purposeful PI use, the 
systematic use of PI to improve effectiveness and efficiency has been dependent on a 
number of unique circumstances and characteristics of the organizations involved. This 
would be in line with the assumptions of the logic of appropriateness. Four alternative 
hypotheses were formulated based on the type of evidence to be found in the case studies: 
 
Hypothesis H1 Purposeful use of PI is explained by path dependency 
Hypothesis H2 Purposeful use of PI is explained by asymmetries of power  
Hypothesis S1 Purposeful use of PI is explained by cultural appropriateness  
Hypothesis S2 Purposeful use of PI is explained by cognitive frames 
 
If there is strong evidence in support of these alternative explanations, the assumed effects 
of PB reforms should be seriously questioned. Moreover, the causal relationship between 
successful PB adoption and purposeful PI use may be reversed.  Put differently, favorable 
institutional circumstances for purposeful PI use, are more likely to explain successful PB 
adoption than the other way around. If this clearly is the case, using PI may have been driven 
primarily by the logic of appropriateness. This would provide credibility to the idea that,  
instead of modifying public organizations into PI users, PB reforms codified patterns of PI use 
that provide legitimacy to organization members.  
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Hypotheses H1&2 and S1&2 have been proposed as alternative explanations to Hypothesis 
R. The contradiction between R and the alternative hypotheses mirrors the observation that 
government agencies tend to be more beholden to their culture and traditions than to 
budget allocations (Schick 2014: 20). This does not mean that the hypotheses are mutually 
exclusive as a single one or all may be true. It should be noted that the dichotomy between 
the two types of logics was used here as a theoretical concept to shed some additional light 
on untested and often unarticulated assumptions on causality associated with NPM reforms 
and PB in particular. In fact the hypotheses formulated may overlap to some extent which 
may not be surprising as, on a theoretical note, historical institutionalism incorporates both 
a calculus approach and a cultural approach (Hall&Taylor 1996: 5-10).  
 
In addition, the variables used to measure the hypotheses may interact as well to some 
extent. Therefore it is important to realize that even if the logic of consequence is dismissed 
as the primary driver of purposeful PI use (rejection of Hypothesis R), this does not entirely 
discredit the possibility that PB implementation may have has some positive influence on 
purposeful use of PI at the same time. It can be argued that interaction of variables is to 
some extent unavoidable when studying complex real life phenomena in social science. 
Nonetheless whenever interaction of variables was detected or suspected in the cases, this 
was mentioned explicitly in the case analysis. The cases where this occurred did not alter the 
conclusions regarding these particular cases. In Figure 10.2 the theoretical model of this 
research is provided in a simplified matter. 
 
Figure 10.2  Using institutionalism to provide alternative explanations of PI use 
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10.2 Result orientation: modification or codification? 
Before being able to investigate and explain PB success, this success has to be identified first. 
In section 9.2 the results from the individual cases on PB indicators were analysed and 
summarized. In general it was concluded from the findings that the characteristics of these 
agencies and the relationship with their principals do indeed largely match the assumptions 
that were made on successful PB implementation. Subsequently, in section 9.3 and 9.4, 
questions B and C were answered respectively. In short we have concluded that the previous 
chapter that: 
x Cases do generally qualify sufficiently as a PB success (sub question A) 
x The neo institutional factors are present in the cases, albeit the sociological ones more 
consistent than the historical ones (sub question B) 
x Contextual factors only offer a limited explanation of PI use in the cases (subquestion C) 
 
Combining the analysis on the four case studies an answer can be given for sub question 3:  
 
Does the presence of these cultural and historical factors offer a convincing alternative 
explanation for successful PB? 
 
The aggregated results from this study indeed indicate that the institutional characteristics 
of the agencies examined largely offer a plausible explanation for purposeful use of 
performance information. More specifically:  
x A culture that fosters learning and improving was present in all of the case studies 
x Internal systems of performance measurement and reporting are aligned with the 
professional focus on performance improvement and intrinsic motivation of agency 
employees at the operational level.  
x Institutionalization of a performance based learning system was sometimes 
reinforced by more or less coincidental events like preferences of a dominant leaders 
or a crisis regarding financial management or stakeholder accountability.   
 
Combining these findings it seems that purposeful use of PI in these agencies was clearly 
part of the ’organizational DNA’ long before government mandated performance planning 
and reporting. Looking more precisely at the hypotheses formulated, it becomes clear that 
evidence supporting assumptions S1 and S2, containing the explanations from sociological 
institutionalism, are more convincing and represents a more consistent pattern across cases 
and indicators. The evidence supporting assumptions H1 and H2 vary more between 
indicators and case studies and are therefore somewhat less evident as an overall 
explanatory factor. This is illustrated in Figure 9.3. 
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Figure 9.3 Evidence in support of alternative explanations for purposeful PI use from 
case studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was noted earlier in Chapter 3 that sociological neo institutionalism can be traced to 
historical neo institutionalism and is sometimes considered as one of its schools of thought. 
In accordance with this notion it can be argued that the cultural factors investigated 
represent a form of historical path dependency in itself as cultures are formed over an 
extended period of time by factors such as leaders, events and policy characteristics. For the 
sake of this study these factors were separated and measured as separate indicators.  
 
Now that the neo-institutional explanations for purposeful PI are found to offer a convincing 
alternative explanation for purposeful PI use, the (refined) central research question can 
almost be answered: 
 
How do underlying cultural and historical factors explain successful PB in government 
agencies? 
 
Section 9.2 showed that all four cases studies can indeed be considered good practices of PB 
implementation and display purposeful PI use. As far as favorable conditions are concerned 
there is evidence that the factors identified do provide a viable explanation. As stated in 
section 9.4, with the exception of the safety improvement culture in the aviation industry 
and possibly the necessity for budget cuts in some cases, no dominant contextual factors 
were observed that are likely to enhance purposeful PI use (sub question C).    
HISTORICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
SOCIOLOGICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Purposeful PI 
use in a 
principal-
agent setting 
 
+/-
+/-
+
+
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Combining these conclusions it can be affirmed that cases of successful PB implementation 
(and therefore purposeful PI use) can indeed be explained by favorable conditions that are 
independent from the adoption of the PB system. This may not surprise many practitioners 
and is also in line with observations made by earlier by several authors (e.g. Schick 2003: 
102, Moynihan& Lavertu 2012: 601). In fact it was Wildavsky who already argued in the late 
1960s in response to PPBS (an early PB initiative) that policy analysis and strategic thinking 
have tendency to thrive on their own and lean heavily on institutional factors such as the 
availability of capacity. Therefore initiatives to coerce a government wide PB system on 
government is likely to produce mixed if not very limited results (Wildavsky 1969: 196). 
 
Two notes of caution should be placed regarding the answer to the central question. Firstly, 
the limited number of qualitative case studies in this research does limit external validity 
which is why one should be careful when generalizing claims based on these results alone. 
The representativeness of and variety within the case selection will be addressed in the next 
section that discusses the lessons to be draw form this research for advancing PB reforms.   
 
Secondly it should emphasized that, due to the complexity of causalities investigated, any 
comprehensive set of explanation of PI use is likely to interact to some extent. Therefore it is 
important to realize that even if successful PB implementation may not have been the single 
driver of purposeful PI use, this does not discredit the possibility that PB implementation 
may have has some positive influence on purposeful use of PI at the same time. More 
generally, looking at the case studies, multiple paths to the success of PB seem to exist that 
might work independently or interact with one another. In one organization, a history of 
doing performance management might make current approaches more successful. A second 
organization might lack a strong history, but has a highly engaged leader that makes a 
difference. A third organization might have both. Therefore, one causal pathway does not 
necessarily exclude the other. Quantitative analyses generally treats these as independent of 
one another. A more in depth analysis of individual cases such as this study illustrates the 
possibility of multiple causal pathways. 
 
10.3 Relevance to performance budgeting ambitions 
After an answer was provided for the central research question in the previous section, the 
potential relevance of this answer to the ambitions of PB and its reform agenda will be the 
subject of reflection in this session. Let’s return therefore to the problem analysis and the 
general research question posed at the start of this research: 
 
Are result orientation of a government agency and operational efficiency gains achieved 
through PB?  
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Now that we know that in the successful PB cases studied, result orientation and operational 
efficiency did not result from having a PB system as such but rather from other institutional 
factors, what does this tell us about effectiveness of PB in general? The short answer would 
be: not much because what goes for these four agencies in two countries necessarily says 
little about the effectiveness of PB implementation in general. To address the issue of 
external validity, the potential representativeness of the cases will be discussed later on. 
Despite the limited representatives of qualitative case studies, these cases have been 
instructive for gaining insight in the dynamics of PI use for two reasons. Firstly, the case 
studies provide a clear narrative for the correlation between some of the institutional factors 
linked to PI use in the public sector by quantitative research. Secondly, despite being viewed 
as PB good practices, the development and appraisal of PB has at points been at odds with 
counterintuitive to traditional PB logic. 
 
The issue taken as the focal point in this study was that of modification versus codification 
(see CH 1.5). In other words, did agencies that do PB well, modify their behavior into one 
that focuses on data driven result orientation by adopting PB? Or did they codify their 
existing behavior patterns into routines just to comply with a formalized PB system? Looking 
at the evidence from the cases it seems more likely that adoption of PB at some point by the 
principal, codified existing patterns of purposeful PI use. A similarity across the agencies with 
regard to their main performance management systems, is the fact that these systems 
started out relatively long ago and were initiated from within the primary process. Gradually 
the systems developed into being tools for central planning and reporting by management 
and staff. Subsequently performance management systems gained an additional role for 
external accountability to principals and other stakeholders. This order of events somewhat 
contrasts the traditional idea of PB being introduced by the principal as a tool to control an 
agent. One may wonder what the added value of having a formalized PB system exactly was 
for these organizations. More generally, if case analysis of successful PB implementation 
reveals that PB did not modify these organizations but codified result orientation and 
extended it to include budgeting, what does this teach us about the potential of this type of 
budget reform? Before speculating about the answers to these question, it is necessary to 
discuss the representativeness of the cases studied.  
 
Representativeness of case studies 
The limited number of qualitative case studies done for this research does limit external 
validity which is why one should be careful with generalizing claims based on these results 
alone. Despite this, the results can be attributed some significance because the cases 
investigated were selected to represent a small subset of cases where PB seemed to largely 
function as was intended by NPM budget reformists. Looking at the case selection process 
there is reason to assume that these kind of examples are not that abundant. When looking 
deeper into the issue of generalization of findings, the representativeness of the cases 
studied amidst others in the public sector is obviously an important issue.  
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One popular classification of agencies is the one described by Wilson (Wilson 1989:158-171) 
who divided agencies according to the observability of the activities of operators (outputs) 
and of the results of these activities (outcomes). When looking at the agencies studied, 
foresters do much of their work in isolation with little opportunity for direct managerial 
oversight. Therefore the agencies involved rely on ethos and sense of duty to control the 
organization. As certain results of the forester’s work such as putting out fires or harvesting 
timber can be observed quite easily, the Forest Service could be characterized as a craft 
organization. Other forestry results however are really hard to observe (e.g. maintaining 
biodiversity and healthy soil conditions on the long term). In addition the link between these 
activities and their intended results such as restoring a habitat or improving water quality 
will only be observable to anyone with specialized knowledge. In fact Wilson referred to the 
Forest Service as a mixed case of a craft organization as the observability of the service’s 
outcomes varies greatly (Wilson 1989: 167).  
 
As in forestry, the work processes of air traffic controllers are mainly observed by the air 
controllers themselves when doing their job in physical isolation. The outcomes such as 
airspace capacity and safety incidents or noise levels are observable and measurable to a 
great extent. This would qualify air traffic control agencies as craft organizations. On the 
other hand the processes themselves are (made) highly predictable and highly standardized 
which is characteristic of a production organization. In addition one may argue that 
technological advancement has made both the activities of operators as the outcomes 
increasingly observable. In summary, application of the Wilson framework does not result in 
clear cut characterization of the investigated agencies. While all agencies seem to qualify 
primarily as craft organizations, they also have characteristics that resemble coping 
organizations and production organizations.  
 
Table 10.1 Classification of agencies according to observability of processes and 
outcomes (Source: Wilson 1989:158-171) 
 
 The activities of 
operators (outputs) 
can be observed  
The activities of 
operators (outputs) 
cannot be observed  
The results of the activities 
of operators (outcomes) can 
be observed 
 
Production 
organization 
 
 
Craft organization 
 
 
The results of the activities 
of operators (outcomes) 
cannot be observed 
 
Procedural 
organization 
 
 
Coping organization 
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Referring to Wilson’s framework, Pollitt noticed that work related variables have been 
widely recognized as important to organizational structuring.  For example, a ‘production’ 
task such as the issuing of driving licenses is standardizable, predictable, and measurable in 
ways that a ‘coping’ task such as mental health counseling is not (Pollitt 2006: 5). To what 
extent the nature of the task of an agency may intuitively be an important predictor of PB 
success has not been widely investigated. Forestry may have some distinct features that 
make a forestry agency a relatively suitable one for performance management. Mentioned is 
the fact that forestry is largely about tangible things as opposed to the application of 
abstract rules or social influencing social systems. Also the long term character of growing 
forests and the commercial element of timber sales are seen as favourable in this respect 
(Pollitt at al 2004: 188/189). Intuitively, the presence of a scientific, data driven tradition in a 
policy area seems to match quantitative performance management techniques. Both 
aviation and forestry fall into this category. 
 
Apart from Wilson’s framework the selected cases may have lacked some characteristics 
that intuitively hamper PI use. All agencies studied provide services directly (rather than 
monitor third parties), and their task is arguably easier to measure than some other 
functions (e.g. they are not dealing with “wicked problems”). In addition, forestry and air 
traffic control are not highly contested in a political ideological sense (at least not on a 
national level) and seem to rely heavily on technical expertise. Although the relative 
dominance of specialists versus politics in a policy field was assessed by indicator H 2.2, this 
measurement did not lead to clear conclusive results.  
 
As NPM is popularly viewed as an attempt by the public sector to copy private sector 
management techniques, PB is often believed to work best in agencies that resemble the 
classical object of scientific management: the private sector production factory with 
homogenous and stable products (Jansen & de Waal 2004: 6-7, MinFin 2011: 25,27).  
However appealing the comparison, this can turn out to be problematic because efficiency in 
the public sector more often has to compete with various other goals like equity or 
treatment of politically privileged clients and efficiency may not even be the ultimate goal 
(Wilson 1989: 175, MinFin 2011: 23).  
 
It can be argued that NPM’s key premise of results accountability combined with 
decentralization (or indeed steering instead of rowing) more easily fits an institutional profile 
of self-reliance and intrinsic motivation. As a consequence, purposeful PI use and PB may 
have a ‘natural’ fit with craft organizations as it traditionally advocates a goal orientation and 
output and outcome controls instead of input controls. Maybe PB works best in agencies 
where managers are used to steering instead of rowing, that is, have to leave operators with 
a great degree of discretionary power and judge them on results afterwards. It is not 
surprising that successful craft organizations often have a traditional focus on performance 
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evaluation as a control mechanism, simply because managers and stakeholders can observe 
outcomes afterwards more easily than processes and outputs of operators.  
 
It may or may not be coincidental that agencies with certain characteristics such as those 
mentioned surfaced as good PB practices during the case selection in both countries. A more 
deliberate selection of diversity on characteristics related to policy areas would require a 
more elaborate analysis beforehand of these characteristics and their predictive value 
regarding PB success, using one or several frameworks. For now however it is relevant to 
note that craft organizations appear more likely to share some of the institutional 
characteristics that explain purposeful PI use. Therefore, when trying to apply the results of 
this study more widely, this could probably be done most easily for other craft organizations 
and possibly production and coping organizations. For generalization of the model used in 
this study, it would be interesting to examine agencies with a successful PB reputation that 
belong to other categories of Wilson’s framework (notably procedural agencies). On the 
same account it would be interesting to study agencies whose tasks are subjected to 
perpetual political battles, require little technical expertise or consist of hard to measure 
results delivered by third parties.  
 
These limitations put aside, the alternative explanations for purposeful PI use as identified 
and observed in these cases can be instructive with respect to future claims to PB success. As 
argued previously, the cases investigated were all selected to represent PB successes in the 
sense that existence of a PB system, purposeful PI use and budgetary consequences all 
occurred and could be linked to each other in a plausible way. As such these cases represent 
the vanguard of evidence that PB reformists could use (and indeed did use at times) to 
demonstrate the effect of PB implementation. If purposeful PI use in these cases can largely 
be traced to institutional origins of the organizations involved, this would imply that it 
cannot be easily transferred to other organizations, let alone the entire public sector. In 
other words anecdotal evidence of purposeful PI use by government agencies should not be 
mistaken for success of the NPM/PB recipe and does certainly not imply that this recipe can 
be applied successfully elsewhere. In fact this recipe to modify organizations into more 
efficient and effective ones may not have been much more than a placebo.   
 
10.4 Reflection on research approach 
The approach chosen for this research adds an additional perspective to the knowledge 
about PI use by government agencies. As asserted in the introduction at the start of this 
book, a qualitative approach to researching PI use may offer an explanation and better 
understanding of some of the quantitative work done in this field. In recent years, an 
increasing number of quantitative studies appeared that linked PI use in the public sector to 
a diversity of factors adding up to over 30 by 2012 (Kroll 2015: 470-471). Corporate culture, 
public sector motivation, leadership commitment and discretionary power of managers were 
already identified as important in this respect (Mahler 1997: 538, Dull 2009a: 273, 
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Moynihan&Pandey 2010:14, Moynihan& Lavertu 2012: 599-600). Quantitative analysis of 
data sets can result in important clues on favorable characteristics and circumstances for PI 
use by public organizations but also has some obvious limitations. Working with a large N-
size, inevitably requires simplifying complex variables in order to make them manageable. By 
relying on abstractions such as pre-determined cultural categories so they can be measured 
in multiple organizations, no attention is given to specific characteristics and nuances of 
culture nor to tracing these characteristics to actual PI use. Similarly, another limitation of 
quantitative work in this area is that it offers little historical perspective on the development 
of an organization and its PB efforts. Instead, the available cross-sectional analyses and 
experimental designs have a very short gap between treatment and observed response.  For 
these reasons, qualitative case studies have added value in this field of research.  
 
Especially with complex and intangible factors like organizational culture and leadership, 
qualitative case study analysis such as this research, are a valuable if not necessary addition 
to make sense of factors resulting in purposeful PI use. This research should be viewed as a 
small step to bridge this empirical gap by offering a more specific narrative of the 
contribution of some of these factors. For example, data availability has been identified by 
quantitative work as an important factor for performance information use (Moynihan 
&Pandey 2010: 13, Hammerschmid et al 2013: 7). By using the analysis from this research, it 
is plausible that data availability itself is a function of organizational history or task.  
 
The theoretical framework  
The sociological neo-institutional explanations add a more specific narrative to the widely 
adopted view nowadays that culture matters, also to purposeful PI use. The historical neo 
institutional explanations such as the presence of a champion of PB and the occurrence of 
critical events have hardly, if at all, been the subject of specific exploration in this area22. 
Looking back the choice for neo institutionalism as a searchlight for alternative explanations 
for purposeful PI use proved quite useful as the contrast between its schools of thought 
corresponds to a divide in the debate between practitioners. Indeed the division highlighted 
between rational choice neo institutionalism and its other variants echoes the debate on the 
limitations of the principal-agent theory and alternative visions such as the stewardship 
model which was left out of this analysis (Davis et al 1997: 21). Van Thiel 2008: 11). The 
referral to neo institutionalism may appear a little artificial to some as it is seems to be used 
primarily to justify the choice for a radically different perspective on the drivers of 
organizational behavior than the one principal-agent theory offers. Having finished this 
research does certainly not make the author much of an expert in neo-institutionalism as 
this, seemingly ever expanding, family of theories seems to comprehend all but the entire 
                                                 
22 Broadnax and Conway (2001: 162/3 ) do refer to some aspects of agency history and leadership when 
explaining successful implementation of the 1997 Government’s Performance and Results Act (GPRA) by the 
U.S. Social Security Administration. 
 
500980-L-sub01-bw-deJong
227 
 
universe. The use of hypotheses may be unusual for qualitative research of this type but was 
seen as useful for clarifying the interpretation of results concerning concepts that by 
definition seem destined to remain rather vague. 
 
The research design 
The choice for triangulation is seen as an absolute necessity with qualitative research such as 
this. Especially when discussing cultural concepts like reflective or participative openness, 
the risk of social desirable answers in interviews is a real one as was mildly confirmed when 
interview results were compared to questionnaire results. The same effect was observed for 
the level of de facto PB implementation from documents when compared to the testimonies 
from interviewees.   
 
The international perspective chosen is viewed appropriate as the PB reform agenda was 
and is promoted and adopted worldwide with little regard to national context. The 
differences between political systems and the organization of government were taken into 
account when interpreting results. This proved to be a manageable obstacle, partly due to 
the familiarity of the author with the political systems in both countries from earlier 
research. In an earlier design the study was to contain six cases studies in three different 
nations. Although this may have given the results some additional substance it would 
probably not have meant a significant difference in terms of external validity. Nonetheless it 
would be interesting to repeat the analysis for a broader variation of international cases.  
 
The indicators used 
Had the research been initiated at a more recent date, the base of knowledge from 
quantitative analysis would have been taken as a more explicit starting point for the model 
for qualitative analysis. This way more of the results could have been linked more explicitly 
to the quantitative findings and the underlying data used. It should be noted that many of 
the factors identified by quantitative analysis were published during or after the empirical 
part of this research. Nonetheless most of the indicators chosen are believed to shed 
additional light on selected quantitative research results. The choice of the indicators 
themselves could in retrospect have included some of the factors that did not became 
prominent until during the case studies such as professionalism, motivation, physical 
isolation and longevity of performance reporting tradition. In section 11.2 these factors will 
be explained more elaborately. The indicator of relative dominance of specialists in a policy 
field was expected to produce clearer results. One of the limitations of this indicator as 
operationalized for this research proved to be the fact that some respondents found it hard 
to apply the corresponding questions to their daily work. This may be explained by the fact 
that this indicator was based on a framework designed to explain the way issues enter the 
political agenda and are subsequently decided upon (Conlan et al, 2002: 4). Notwithstanding 
these somewhat unclear results, the author is convinced that the dominance of specialists in 
a policy areas versus the influence of things like special interests, political ideology and 
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media attention contains an important clue for explaining the ability for performance 
management to develop, grow and mature.  
 
As mentioned earlier, another limitation is interaction of the variables chosen. Related to 
this issue, and noted earlier in Chapter 4.5, the use of hypotheses for qualitative research 
concerning a limited number of case studies may be somewhat unusual. This was seen as 
useful nonetheless for clarifying the interpretation of results concerning concepts that by 
definition already seem have a tendency remain rather vague. Much of the issue of 
interacting variables can easily be downplayed by claiming this is unavoidable to some 
extent when studying real life phenomena in social science. Nonetheless in a few cases a 
direct connection between different indicators became apparent such as in the FAA/ATO 
case where indicator H2.1 was likely to interact some with the indicators H1.1&H.1.2. In 
those cases where a clear interaction was suspected this was explicitly mentioned. 
 
Research method and data collection 
Overall, 36 persons were interviewed resulting in over 42 hours of recordings. Interview 
candidates were selected to represent management, performance & budget staff and 
operations of each agency as well as staff tasked with oversight on the part of the principal. 
In addition several experts and senior government officials were consulted on particular 
issues. Data was primarily processed by qualitative analysis although some quantitative 
analysis was used for comparing and aggregating results. Each indicator was scored by the 
author on a qualitative 3-way scale (not present, present to some extent or clearly present) 
while re listening to the interview recordings. These scores were aggregated for each case 
allowing for a qualitative comparison on an ordinal scale. After finishing each draft case 
study, the report was reviewed by a key informant from the organization involved. To limit 
the risk of biased interpretation by the author even further, it would have been valuable if 
the interview results would have been scored by several others to see where noticeable 
differences occurred. Unfortunately there was no opportunity to do this. 
 
By means of triangulation the findings from interviews were compared with questionnaire 
results and findings from analysis of documents. The availability of questionnaire results did 
vary significantly form case to case, limiting the ability to use these results for other means 
than collecting additional opinions as a mean of comparison to the answers given in the 
interviews. Overall 98 questionnaire results were obtained for 3 out of the 4 case studies. In 
the fourth case study no permission was granted for issuing a questionnaire. Instead, 
relevant internal questionnaires were available for consulting on specific results. The 
reluctance of public organizations to allow this is understandable as employees are 
sometimes already burdened by questionnaires. Given this reluctance, an alternative 
approach may have been more effective such as a smaller set of questions than the current 
17 and incentives to make participation more attractive.    
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CHAPTER 11   RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRACTITIONERS AND SUGGESTIONS  
      FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
A rich array of empirical evidence was gathered from the four case qualitative studies. As 
the evidence was collected with the theoretical model and its indicators in mind, it 
enabled answering the sub questions and finally the central question. The answers to the 
questions posed at the start of this research give rise to some lessons and 
recommendations for those seeking to advance performance based reforms. Additionally, 
the cases that shared successful PB adoption also shared some other similarities that were 
not explicitly investigated as part of the model used. Although speculative for this reason, 
these similarities may provide additional relevant insights on performance management 
and performance budgeting form a policy point of view and deserve further study. 
Therefore they are included in this chapter. Finally, as the case-studies were executed 
while the Grand Recession unfolded, the effect of the fiscal crisis on the working of 
performance based budgeting and governance systems is also addressed in this chapter.   
 
11.1 Lessons and recommendations for advancing PB reforms  
Although purposeful PI use by these agencies may have been more a matter of codification 
than of modification, depicting the PB system of these organizations as an entirely 
autonomous development by the agent himself may however not tell the entire story. When 
applying the evidence from this study to the unrefined research question (see start of this 
paragraph) it becomes clear that PB’s effects on result orientation should be clearly 
doubted. At the same time, given a result oriented culture and tradition, PB seems to have 
been helpful with regard to some efficiency gains.  At the very least, formalizing the 
performance dialogue around measured data and linking it to budgetary and management 
cycles can be credited with several positive effects on efficiency and effectiveness in the 
organizations investigated. In the cases investigated, PB can be credited by broadly four 
types of positive effects on effectiveness and efficiency: 
 
1) Goal alignment enabled effective execution of agency wide priorities 
First of all organizational effectiveness was helped by aligning the agency’s activities to the 
goals of the principal and those of regional and local units to those of agency headquarters. 
For all the result orientation and intrinsic motivation that may have been present at the 
operational level, having a mechanism for systematically linking activities to national policy 
goals, simply proved to be a necessary precondition for execution of a national policy in the 
first place. An example of this was for instance the introduction of a national policy for 
biodiversity in the SBB case.   
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2) Through an organization-wide PB system, the systemic use of PI already common in 
one area could be expanded to other, new areas.  
Secondly, although the institutional characteristics of these organizations and their policy 
fields may explain their result oriented behavior for a great deal, it is not self-evident that 
new organizational goals of a principal will be smoothly adopted throughout the 
organization incorporated into the daily work of employees. To the contrary, professional 
autonomy may well prove to be an obstacle in this respect. A particular challenge to public 
organizations with a strong professional culture is the phenomenon of ‘policy stepchildren’ 
which refer to tasks that are not done with the same amount of energy and resources 
because they are not part of the dominant culture (Wilson 1989: 99). This seems to perfectly 
reflect the situation as observed in the four cases. For air traffic controllers for example, the 
environmental and capacity goals appear to be secondary to the professional drive to 
guarantee air safety. On the same account recreational tasks in both forestry organizations 
bear little connection to the dominant professions of timber harvesting and ecology. It may 
therefore not be surprising that performance measurement and results accountability was 
relatively underdeveloped in these fields. Far from solving the goal ambiguity that faces 
most public organizations, PB did help integrate new policy goals making use of the structure 
and result orientation already present in (parts) of the organization.  
 
3) Significant efficiency gains can be realized by allocating capacity according to output 
data. 
Thirdly, having a formalized PB system did add to efficiency by offering a rational basis for 
capacity planning. Of course one can rightfully argue that sound capacity planning does not 
require a sophisticated PB system. However the pressures on public organizations to allocate 
in a more irrational, if not political, manner are sometimes large. As roughly 75% of average 
agency costs consist of personnel pay, the costs of an internal allocation that is disconnected 
from production levels can be significant. The effects of rationalizing capacity planning on 
efficiency was observable in all four cases, with the SBB case in particular offering convincing 
evidence. 
 
4) Specifying outputs, outcomes and their relationship can smoothen the stakeholder 
dialogue 
Finally the cases show that in terms of stakeholder dialogue, having a common specification 
of output and performance levels is quite helpful. It is fairly self-evident that a performance 
dialogue between different parties is helped by a common understanding of, and agreement 
on performance. Nonetheless the availability of this common basis can be credited to the 
external accountability aspect of PB adoption. The LVNL case provided a clear example of 
this.  
 
So summary, in the areas of goal alignment, capacity planning and stakeholder dialogue, PB 
was intended to play a role and the cases confirm that it can. A formalized performance 
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dialogue through PB adoption is however unlikely to be a substitute for a lack of purposeful 
PI use or a low level of non-routine use of PI altogether. Put differently, the good news is 
that PB can sort effects that benefit effectiveness and efficiency of public organizations. The 
bad news is that this isn’t likely to benefit just any public sector organization. Moreover it 
seems that, as argued before by others, those organizations that need it least (e.g. have a 
professional result oriented culture) are most likely to benefit and those that need it most 
(lack such a culture) are least likely to benefit from PB. The important notions to take away 
from the results in terms of implications for policymakers and practitioners in the areas of PB 
and PM in government are two additional points of caution when assessing good practices 
summarized below: 
 
5) A PB good practice may not tell teach us much about successful reform 
implementation  
A claim of a PB good practice should be met with a healthy degree of suspicion and should 
not go without an assessment of autonomous favorable preconditions in the areas of 
organizational culture and institutional history 
 
6) Good practices of performance budgeting are unlikely to be transferrable to others 
Formalizing PI and linking it to funding can have beneficial effects on goal alignment (and 
therefore effectiveness), efficiency and stakeholder dialogue in some organizations. 
However these effects may not be likely be reproduced in organizations lacking a data driven 
performance oriented background and an organizational culture that supports learning. 
 
A call for more caution towards the assumed universal potential of PB good practices and 
should not be misunderstood as a total disregard of the potential benefits of PB. In the 
author’s opinion academic studies often fail to avoid the pitfall of presenting PB evidence in 
an advocacy manner. Some of these studies cynically portray ill-advised politicians and civil 
servants who willingly follow the naïve yet lucrative ideas of consultants or fellow 
bureaucrats that have been proven wrong over and over again.  ‘Believers’ on the other 
hand employ scientific methods to lend credibility to their claim that PB as a method has the 
capacity to change the political process of allocating funds and things as obstinate as 
organizational culture. It is this author’s opinion that the debate on the usefulness of 
methods to advance evidence based public management would be helped if practitioners 
would adopt some more skepticism and academics would show some less cynicism.  
 
Implications for the potential of government wide performance based reforms 
Performance oriented reforms such as GPRA, PART and GPRAMA in the U.S. system and 
VBTB, agentification and the introduction of quasi contracts with ministries in the 
Netherlands all share the notion that mandating performance planning, measurement and 
reporting would make government more effective and efficient. Additionally NPM assumes 
that by substituting input controls for output and outcomes, as the PB recipe prescribes, 
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managers gain discretionary power to achieve the results they are held accountable for. 
Perhaps surprisingly, some have noted that the assumption that the NPM-ideal type agency 
model23 enhances performance of public sector organizations remains largely untested as 
the claim of an increase in quality and efficiency of service delivery has been often assumed 
but seldom well documented (Verhoest et al 2012:4). With regard to using PB for agency 
management this is even more surprising since PB has been promoted as a solution to 
smooth if not solve information asymmetry, the central problem in agency theory24. 
 
Where should the evidence from this research be placed amidst other assessment of the 
impact of PB reforms regarding agencies in a principal agent setting? First there is some 
evidence from quantitative research that PI use is positively linked to a number of 
organizational features that are clearly reflective of the NPM/PB ideal. Among these are the 
requirement to report to a parent ministry (Laegreid, Roness& Rubecksen 2008: 52), 
decision flexibility from managerial autonomy (Moynihan&Landuyt 2009: 1101) and 
availability of performance data (Moynihan&Pandey 2010: 13).  A recent survey among 
continental European governments even suggests that PI availability was the most relevant 
variable for manager’s use of PI out of eight organizational factors tested (Hammerschmid et 
al 2013: 7).  Therefore it can well be argued that a consistent government wide PB reform 
can help strengthen these characteristics and may positively influence PI use. 
 
On the other hand, the fact that PI use correlates with availability does obviously not imply 
that availability will therefore lead to use. Indeed there is ample evidence that production of 
PI is not the same as using PI, let alone using PI in a purposeful way as envisaged by 
reformers. Most practitioners will easily confirm that much of the PI that is produced 
remains unused, which was phrased accurately by Moynihan: 
 
‘Governments have never been so awash in performance data, mostly because they are 
required to collect and report it. The wealth of performance data contrasts with the poverty 
of the theoretical and empirical justifications for performance-reporting requirements. We 
have poor theories of PI use, largely informed by a combination of common sense, some 
deeply felt assumptions of how government should operate, and a handful of success stories’. 
(Moynihan 2008:5). 
                                                 
23 This NPM-ideal type agency model is considered to be a model based on performance contracting between a 
principal (e.g. a ministry or agency headquarters) and a public agent (agency or agency unit). The principal 
exercises performance control and uses PI for budgetary purposes while the agent is managed in a 
performance driven manner. 
 
24 Principal-agent theory is concerned with ways to get an agent to behave in the interest of a principal. The 
central dilemma in principal agent theory is information asymmetry that occurs when the agent has an 
information advantage over his principal. The agent thus has the possibility to serve its own interests at the 
expense of those of the principal. According to public choice theorists the agent can be expected to behave this 
way, leading agencies to behave inefficiently. 
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In fact not everyone agrees that formally mandating PI production is at itself as beneficial as 
one may intuitively think. Some argue that central government initiatives may even absorb 
the scarce existing capacity from data analysis to compliance with reporting requirements 
(Posner&Mahler 2012: 3). This way it is even imaginable that the emphasis of PI use may 
shift form purposeful use to compliance. The latest federal US initiative, the 2010 GPRA 
Modernization Act (GPRAMA), introduced a series of routines to encourage PI use by 
agencies. For example GPRAMA mandates agencies to engage in quarterly data driven 
reviews of performance information for assessing priority objectives (Moynihan&Kroll 2015: 
9), not unlike the routines that existed in the organizations investigated in this study. In a 
2014 evaluation of GPRAMA, GAO claimed that PI use by agency managers was down 
compared to their 2007 survey (GAO 2014: 9). Interestingly Moynihan and Kroll, using the 
same data-set, demonstrate that while overall PI use may be down from 2007, GPRAMA did 
positively influence PI use and that purposeful use in fact was affected positively 
(Moynihan&Kroll 2015: 24-26).  So with regard to the impact of adopting mandatory top 
down PB systems and introducing routines for PI use, conflicting views exist that can both be 
backed up by evidence. 
 
When looking at the conclusions of this research one may wonder why central governments 
seem to be investing heavily in performance routines to nurture purposeful PI use if PI is 
largely embedded in the nature of public organizations. Taking into account that one should 
be modest with generalizing from a few case studies as well as the availability of evidence 
that links PI use to PI production and reporting, a few recommendations do come to mind:  
 
7) The goals and indicators of a performance system should reflect the professional goals 
and ambitions of agency members   
To harvest fruits of purposeful PI use by government agencies, any attempt to formalize PI 
use in a cyclical system should remain close to the sense of professionalism and the 
measures of success of organization members at the operating level. It does not seem like a 
coincidence that the most successful and long lasting performance systems encountered in 
the cases were created bottom up by agency professionals from the work floor and not 
coerced upon an agency or unit in a top down matter. 
 
8) Simultaneously address aspects of organization culture associated with learning 
culture 
While cultural variables such as reflective and participative openness were major 
explanatory factors for PB success in these cases, it seems not very useful to just assume 
that these will be there in any given agency. Although organizational culture cannot be 
organized or altered easily on the short term, it may be worthwhile to investigate what 
existing cultural elements may be useful for, or may provide an obstacle to purposeful PI 
use. In addition it is instructive to closely observe the response of managers to introducing 
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elements of a performance culture such as learning forums or challenging employees to 
discuss performance with their superiors. This may give away useful early signs for the 
likeliness of PB success in a particular institutional setting.  
 
11.2  Discussion and suggestions for further research 
As this research was intended to be partly exploratory and resulted in rich empiric material, 
a number of striking similarities between the cases surfaced and are worth mentioning. 
These were not tested directly in the model used and may be considered ‘by-catch’ from this 
research. Nonetheless they may provide viable explanations for purposeful PI use and 
therefore may hint to additional relevant explanatory factors as they were shared by all four 
organizations. These explanatory variables may partly be intertwined and are identified as: 
long term reporting tradition, physical isolation of operators and intrinsic motivation. As 
these three factors have not been the subject of systematic analysis one can only speculate 
about their true value as an explanatory factor for purposeful PI use in these and other 
cases. In future research these factors do deserve further exploration and testing. The 
section will end with an assessment of the impact of the crisis on PI use in the investigated 
cases. 
 
Long term reporting tradition 
It is notable that in forestry and air traffic control, output measurement and performance 
reporting stems from a long standing tradition. Although the learning system has evolved 
significantly over time in terms of sophistication, respondents indicated that the air traffic 
control profession has known a long standing tradition of performance reporting and self-
learning.  In forestry quantitative planning methods in the lumber-industry and terrain 
management have been around long before the modern concept of performance 
management. In ecology, the presence and abundance of indicator species are traditionally 
used as an indication of the well-being of a larger group of species. The continuity of output 
measurement was confirmed by respondents of both SBB and the USFS. Regarding the latter 
Herbert Kaufman, in his classic study of the U.S. Forest Service in the late 1950s, already 
noticed the existence of countable work output, quality standards and standardized lists of 
specific jobs as well as the needed amount of time to perform them (Kaufman 1960: 115). 
Moreover, the description of the USFS budget process in the late 1950s by Kaufman seems 
to be largely accurate of today’s budgetary process.  
 
Physical isolation of operators 
In an assessment of the PI use by Norwegian state agencies, Laegreid et al expected to find a 
lower degree of performance steering in agencies with a territorial component (Laegreid et 
al 2008: 52). The reasoning was that such an agency operated more autonomous as it was 
more heavily embedded in regional and local networks. As a result its principals were 
expected to exercise less control over its activities. This relationship turned out to be 
inversed in his study although the relationship was discredited as weak when controlled for 
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other variables. The reasoning may however be valid when applied to the relationship 
between an agency’s administrative headquarters and isolated territorial operating units. In 
fact Wilson (1989) has characterized such an agency as a craft organization where outputs 
cannot be observed by distant managers. It may only be logical that performance reporting 
has a long standing tradition is such an agency to solve this very problem. Adding of a top 
down component of performance reporting to a line ministry may therefore result in a 
relatively smooth fit. This has been observed in all four cases.   
 
Some have argued that due to the nature of the tasks performed by a Forest Service, 
‘tendencies toward fragmentation’ such as geographic dispersion and varying local 
conditions pose extra challenges to attaining organizational unity, compliance and 
conformity (Kaufman 1960: 86-87, Tipple&Wellman 1991: 422). Admitting these factors are 
physically far greater for the U.S. Forest Service than for SBB, it may equally serve as an 
explanation of organizational culture of both organizations. Out of necessity, management 
traditionally relied heavily on the autonomy and discretion of foresters to manage their own 
terrains. In Kaufman’s assessment, the U.S. Forest Service has traditionally relied heavily on 
training and indoctrination a tools of integration to counter the apparent tendencies for 
organizational fragmentation. This resulted in a strong cultural and professional identity and 
a strong sense of mission of the FS.  
 
Not unlike the forester, the air traffic controller does his or her work with a great degree of 
autonomy from headquarters and has to rely largely on self-motivation. In addition to the 
physical isolation during work, the professional autonomy of an air traffic controller is 
further strengthened by extensive in-house education and a comparatively direct and 
dramatic impact of failure on the job.  
 
Intrinsic motivation 
The intrinsic motivation and professional culture is an apparent feature that surfaces from 
the case-studies. It has been noted by some that PI use and performance positively correlate 
with intrinsic motivation of employees for the organization’s tasks or public service 
motivation (PSM) as it is often fashionably referred to these days (Perry&Hondeghem 
2008:8, Moynihan & Pandey 2010:11). One might argue that a passion for monitoring the 
results of one’s work perfectly fits any performance management system. It does not seem 
unlikely that an intrinsically motivated person would be interested in the results of policy 
measurement and opportunities for policy improvement.  
 
In an organization where regional management and headquarters traditionally had to rely on 
performance reporting by isolated units, it is not surprising that devoted and self-reliant (if 
not obstinate) individuals fare best. Intrinsic motivation and a clear and stable sense of 
purpose have had to make up for the absence of an intense system of real-time monitoring 
by management because this was never a realistic option.  If one is looking to define result 
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orientation within public sector organizations, intrinsic motivation, self-reliance and a clear 
sense of purpose may be key elements. One might even argue that NPM’s key premise of 
results accountability combined with decentralization (or steering instead of rowing if you 
will) more easily fits an institutional profile of self-reliance and intrinsic motivation.   
 
11.3 Impact of the crisis 
The influence of the fiscal crisis was mentioned in Chapter 9 as a contextual factor and 
deserves some explicit consideration. The relationship between the crisis and PI use has only 
recently been the subject of analysis and requires additional research. The Great Recession 
that kept unfolding during the period that this research took please resulted in significant 
budget cuts hitting all the four agencies examined. No conclusive pattern of coping with this 
crisis emerged from the cases. In the final part of this section agency responses that were 
encountered in the case studies are categorized into four reactions:  
I. View the crisis as an opportunity resulting in performance informed budget cuts  
II. Rely on performance informed coping strategies to deal with budgetary uncertainty   
III. Financial performance incentives become meaningless and loose appeal  
IV. Performance contracts with principals lose their value as a basis for budgeting and 
are replaced by reliance on professionalism in the field  
 
It is important to stress that the effects of the crisis on PI use by agencies does requires 
further study and the classification below should therefore be regarded as a first attempt to 
make sense of the observations. In addition several types of responses could be observed 
within a single case study. 
 
I. An opportunity for performance informed budget cuts 
Like the U.S. Forest Service the FAA has been operating under continuing resolution25 
through most of recent fiscal years. In addition, from 2013 the sequester26 also kicked in for 
the USFS and the FAA, meaning the implementation of automatic spending cuts for all 
discretionary spending starting with a 5.2% cut in FY13. As a consequence an 11 day furlough 
(unpaid leave) was implemented for FAA employees resulting in part of the airspace being 
closed and causing delays at airports. The input based budget cuts from Congress have 
                                                 
25 Operating under a continuous resolution means that there has not been political agreement on one’s budget 
although the fiscal year has already started. In practice this means that the available budget is a conservative 
estimate of last year’s and restrictions apply concerning new spending. 
 
26 The Budget Control Act of 2011 established enforcement mechanisms to reduce federal budget deficits by at 
least $2.1 trillion over 10 years. The act mandated automatic spending cuts for most federal government 
departments and agencies, if the Congress failed to enact balanced deficit reduction legislation. These budget 
reductions, known as sequestration, began on March 1, 2013, and are slated to last 10 years. While exempting 
most mandatory programs such as Social Security, Medicaid, federal pensions, and veterans benefits from cuts, 
the 2013 sequester reduced most discretionary budget accounts by approximately five percent, or $85 billion 
for the government as a whole (source CBO) 
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certainly obscured and further complicated the already difficult relationship between 
funding and performance in FAA/ATO’s case and the long term results for strategy and 
performance of these measures still remains to be seen. On the other hand respondents also 
indicated that the sequestration did challenge some of the existing dynamics when it comes 
to internally allocating funding enabling to settle long lasting debates on for example 
decommissioning old outdated equipment. 
 
With regard to FAA’s strategy to implement these budget cuts, respondents indicated that 
there was a sense in FAA that it would be better to move away from salami-slicing 
techniques and across-the-board cuts. Zero based budgets were not felt to be a serious 
option because this would be too far from political reality. The limited discretionary space in 
a large part of its budget and the need for budget cuts has lead FAA to establishing the 
Strategy Budget and Performance Committee in 2012. The objective of this committee was 
to prioritize between FAA areas and as such gain an agency wide performance perspective 
on the possibilities for budget cuts. By cross-cutting the budgetary and organizational 
stovepipes it was hoped that incremental method to cut budgets, also referred to as salami-
slicing, will be avoided.  
 
At LVNL budget cuts have also been implemented in air traffic control albeit with a more 
active role of LVNL’s principal, the Ministry of Infrastructure. Although performance 
reporting really does seem to fill (or at least ease) an information gap in technical expertise 
between principal and agent, the budgetary relevance of most PI reported to the ministry 
seems to be rather limited on a first glance. This results from the fact that virtually no public 
funds are transferred directly to LVNL. If one takes a second look however, the ministry, 
working closely with other stakeholders, has made a successful effort to curb spending of 
LVNL in support of the policy goals of the government.  In response to the looming financial 
crisis, LVNL’s projected incomes had to be adjusted downwards dramatically during 2009 
due to lower traffic volumes. Out of concern for the aviation sector in the Netherlands and 
the competitive position of Schiphol among surrounding international airports in Europe, the 
Minister decided to restrict the tariff rate development for a number of years. This 
effectively prohibited LVNL from translating operating deficits resulting from lower operating 
volumes of air traffic, into higher tariff levels. To meet the reduced budget, LVNL set in 
motion an unprecedented cost cutting operation that resulted in the reduction of 128 FTE, 
over 12% of staff levels. The reduction in personnel did not affect the number of air traffic 
controllers as it was filled in entirely by the other LVNL units. It can rightly be claimed that 
the ministry did not bring about this efficiency operation at LVNL all by itself as she was 
helped by other powerful stakeholders. On the other hand the Ministry was quick to point 
out that other member states saw the costs of their air traffic service provider gone up in 
spite of the crisis.   
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II. Coping strategies for budgetary uncertainty 
A complicating factor for the performance budgeting system to function for U.S. federal 
agencies is the fact that agencies usually have to wait well into the fiscal year to know what 
their definite allocation of budgets and targets will be. At the regional or local level this delay 
is often even longer as agency headquarters start internal allocation only after a budget deal 
in Congress is finally reached. The U.S. Forest Service has learned to cope with budgetary 
uncertainty using an ingenious system that seems to have been in use throughout the 
regions for a long time at the National Forest level). This system is based on competitively 
prioritizing combinations of targets and funding at different levels of funding and seems to 
prepare the agency well for the additional insecurity brought by the crisis (see Section 7.2.2 
for details). Surprisingly this approach resembles quite closely an innovative technique 
recently proposed in an influential paper by Mario Marcel on creating fiscal space that has 
been extensively discussed in the OECD and World Bank in recent years (Marcel 2013:  32-
33) 
  
At FAA the Operations budget (the largest source of total FAA and ATO funding) was frozen 
by Congress for a number of years prior to the sequester. There was no scaling down of 
ambitions in terms of outputs or policy outcomes. As negotiated pay for air traffic controllers 
went up, modernization programs were starting to get pushed out. To deal with this growing 
asymmetry between ambitions and funding, in 2012 the Operations Review Board was 
initiated. This exercise illustrates FAA’s systematic approach at assessing and reprioritizing 
budget-levels as it prioritized the operations budget into 3 layers:  
x Hard operations which refers to what is needed to keep operations running on an 
everyday bases (lights, electricity, fuels, leases) and is funded 100%.  
x Operations programs that include running and planned modernization and life 
extension programs 
x Operations support: basically consists of everything else, mostly Headquarters and 
contractors.  
Perhaps not surprisingly most cuts were decided in the third category.  
 
III. Financial performance incentives lose their appeal 
Within the U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region 6, the region studied in the USFS 
case, has a reputation of taking performance budgeting quite seriously. A reason for this is 
the development of a local performance budgeting process in which past performance plays 
a role in the distribution of next year’s budget among the region’s forests. According to this 
system, which was implemented in 2007, a unit can slowly increase its share of the total 
budget by repeatedly accomplishing more than their targets. Oppositely, continuous 
underperformance is punished by a decreasing share of the budget. The system is well 
balanced and can have a serious impact on forest management. Due to decreasing budgets 
however, the incentive that results from this tool was reported to be felt less clearly by 
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respondents. Of course one can argue that, rationally speaking, receiving less of a budget cut 
than your colleagues could still stimulate people to perform extra. This was however not 
perceived as such by the employees that were interviewed.  
 
At FAA comparable dynamics were reported. The FAA is the only federal agency that has had 
a relatively longstanding pay-for performance policy towards its personnel. Under a plan 
called Core Compensation the FAA introduced two different programs at the turn of the 
century. The most important one was an Organizational Success Increase (OSI) of 1% for all 
employees if the organization meets 90% of 30 indicated OSI goals. The financial incentive 
from OSI was reduced from up to 4.5% to just 1% after its cost of living adjustment 
component was scrapped due to budget cuts. The impact of the incentive at its current level 
was downplayed by respondents as materially insignificant and unfit to motivate them into 
doing their work any different. Others emphasized that the OSI incentive is more reputation-
driven than financial because of the increased focus on OSI objectives at the executive level.  
 
IV. Performance contracts lose their value for budgeting 
Arguably the most fundamental implication of the crisis on the use of PI for budgeting is that 
budget cuts are by nature input oriented and tend to ignore the intricate system that 
intertwines funding, activities, outputs and expected outcomes. In a sense, policy fields and 
agencies that rely most on rationalizing their budget this way (e.g. the ones selected for this 
study) are most vulnerable to political leaders and principals that have less to spend, but do 
not willingly accept rational implication like reductions in their ‘production orders’. From the 
case studies this became apparent in several ways. 
 
The impact of the fiscal crisis has landed particularly harsh on SBB with intended budget cuts 
of over 25%, understandingly leading to budgetary insecurity. This insecurity was reinforced 
by the move to decentralize most SBB tasks from the Ministry to the 12 provinces leading to 
an increase of the number of primary principals to deal with. This has had a negative impact 
on the interest for output reporting from the side of the Ministry. The system of output 
controls and associated price levels was agreed with the Ministry in 2007 after a few of years 
of conflict during which the system was audited twice to check the validity of cost prices. 
Despite this, the ministry’s annual contribution only covered between 50 and 60% of these 
cost prices since. Ironically, upon completion of the new system of output steering, the 
major budget cuts and decentralization were announced, undermining full implementation 
of this new methodology.  
 
As a compromise to deal with underfunding of desired outputs, the ministry and SBB 
annually specified work that SBB would attempt to deliver but would not will not be held 
accountable for. This output was included in annexes to the annual performance contract. 
This implies that PB methodology is taken seriously by the ministry albeit in a way rather 
different or even inverse from the image of the principal controlling the agent. In response 
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to underfunding the agreed upon targets, SBB managers in the districts and terrains use 
their professional expertise to set their own priorities within the given budget level. The 
scattering of political responsibility in times of budget cuts has been described earlier as an 
effect that occurs in the face of indecisiveness by principal (Posner & Blöndal 2012: 29). 
Using a more pragmatic approach, the central control philosophy relies upon simplicity and 
consistence nowadays using PI only when useful to support the internal dialogue and 
learning processes.  
 
As showed earlier the budgetary process of the U.S. Forest Service seems reasonably well 
prepared for dealing with continuous uncertainty about authorized allocation. Nonetheless 
years of underfunding of output targets have had their impact on the organization. This 
became clear when the Forest Service profited from temporary extra funding from the 
federal recovery program (ARRA). Due to years of underfunding of actual targets, 
respondents indicated this extra money was spent at the forest level more or less in line with 
the squeaky wheel metaphor on things that required immediate attention resulting from 
long overdue maintenance. 
 
The decreasing relevance of PI in budget preparation is not limited to outputs but also goes 
for policy outcomes. For example a Department of Transportation respondent noticed that 
DOT performance plans hardly received any attention from Congress due to the broken 
budget process. This way the budgeting process itself is undermining the performance 
budgeting process. With the analysis of Chapter 1 in mind this may be a less surprising 
observation as the national political arena is not the place to look for PB success in the first 
place.  
 
Conclusion on impact crisis 
Developing performance informed budget cuts as an alternative to across-the-board cuts 
and rationally re-prioritizing budgets in the face of budgetary insecurity were observed in 
the first two categories of responses. This supports the idea that PI will be used more 
intensively for budget reallocation as budgets becomes tighter and seems consistent with 
the observation over 30 years ago by Levine et al. In a study of how local governments 
manage fiscal stress they observed that the deeper a decline in  revenue and the longer this 
lasts,  the higher the likeliness that budget cuts will be targeted and programs will be 
terminated (Levine, Rubin & Wolohojian 1981: 194). On the other hand, the corroding of 
financial performance incentives and performance contracts that specify outputs, activities 
and costs was also observed in the case studies as well as declining interest in performance 
planning from political principals. These observations provide some evidence for the 
assumption that input steering takes over when a budget crisis hits.  
 
In addition, the U.S. cases in particular illustrated how a PB system can function under 
pressure from a chaotic input oriented budgeting process recently seen in D.C. Although 
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these dynamics are observed in both countries, the U.S. sequestration seems to further 
deepen this problem of returning to input controls in the US.  Installing mandatory cuts as a 
percentage of existing budget levels formalizes an input oriented approach towards 
budgeting that completely disregards performance or political priority setting altogether.  In 
a budgeting climate like this, it is hard to claim that a PB approach would have superior 
results for an agency than the traditional approach to public sector budgeting as described 
by Wildavsky over 20 years ago (see Chapter 4.2). Moreover the apparently rational 
budgeting process based on realistic cost prices and workloads as developed by agencies 
throughout the years may have obscured a harsher reality of underfunded targets and more 
random allocation. This form of squeaky wheel budgeting represents a fundamental 
different approach to budgeting than realistic, transparent and predictable cost prices for 
public goods and services that are planned to achieve strategic policy objectives. It remains 
to be seen to what extent a well-developed PB system can be compatible with continuous 
reallocation process that characterizes a long period of fiscal consolidation.  
 
Allen Schick once claimed that PB should not be viewed as the locomotive that drives 
government to change but rather as the caboose that confirms the transformations that 
have been made (Schick 2003: 102). The Great Recession raises the question how durable 
even these transformations are, potentially further diminishing the value of PB as a reform. 
Speculating somewhat further if, apart from favorable institutional agency features that this 
research focused on, an additional factor for PB to work consists of favorable fiscal 
conditions, the working of the PB recipe in terms of gains in efficiency and effectiveness, 
may be even more limited. 
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APPENDIX I  -  BUDGET PROGRAMS NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF  
    AGRICULTURE FOR FUNDING SBB  
 
Article 23 Nature  
Central Government seeks to ensure the biodiversity and the increasing quality of our living 
environment. The decline in the wealth of plants, animals and the ecosystems has to be 
stopped, as these functions would otherwise be lost. Biodiversity has many functions, 
including meeting recreational needs and providing an attractive living environment and 
climate for establishing businesses. Conservation of biodiversity forms part of the 
international agreements as laid down in the Biodiversity Convention 1992. Biodiversity 
conservation therefore has a central place in the nature policies focused on the 2010 
objective, stopping the further decline of all kinds of wealth. 
 
23.12 Acquisition Ecological Basic Structure 
Background Regarding the realization of the EHS, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
and Food Quality makes available financial resources to purchase land on 
behalf of the area management organizations. 
 
23.13 Management Ecological Basic Structure 
Background Management within a related network of existing nature, the allocated Nature 
Conservation Areas and 18 National Parks. An important ancillary management objective is 
to comply with recreational demands and opening up nature managed by private individuals 
and private nature conservation organizations, unless this entails risks to special species or 
ecosystems. The management provides adequate opportunities and guarantees for the 
protection of endangered species that are dependent on the managed areas (in particular 
the species listed in the Multi-year Implementation Species Policy Program). 
 
23.14 Management outside the EHS and protection of international biodiversity 
National 
x Nature management, agricultural nature management and landscape management. 
x Performance of the international obligation to designate one or more nationally or 
internationally important ecosystems as a national park. 
x Providing sustainable protection to all target species of the species policy. 
x Subsidizing the LNV share in the costs of acquiring existing and new nature (the subsidy 
scheme for private area management nature conservation organizations. 
International 
x Performance of the international obligations intended to stop the decline of biodiversity 
across the world. 
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x Contributing to worldwide action for sustainable development and conservation of 
biodiversity. 
x Identifying the PAN-European-Ecological Network. 
 
Article  nr. 24 Landscape and Recreation 
Conservation and development of landscape and making the Netherlands attractive for 
recreation. 
 
24.11 National Landscapes 
Motives Conservation, management and consolidation of the unique landscape, cultural-
historical and natural qualities of 20 National Landscapes. 
 
24.12 Landscape – general 
Background The Central Government has handed over to the provinces responsibility for the 
basic quality of the landscape. This is defined as the conservation and consolidation of the 
natural, cultural, user and perceived quality of the landscape. In this connection the Central 
Government has a facilitating and stimulating role. An example of this is the part played by 
the Central Government landscape advisor. In order to provide further support to provinces 
and local authorities the Central Government drew up the Landscape Quality Agenda Guide 
 
24.14 Recreation – general 
Background The Central Government wants a high-quality level of facilities in recreation 
areas and, to this end, is financing the recreational management tasks of the National Forest 
Service and the Middle Delfland recreational amenities board. The Central Government is 
also creating possibilities for entrepreneurship in the field of recreation. It also wants to link 
492 hectares of regional greenery to major residential building locations in 2010. Important 
here is that these areas are fully open to the public and that entry is free of charge. 
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APPENDIX II FORMAT USED FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS AND      
               INTERVIEWS SCHEDULE 
 
Variable Indicator Result Quotes 
  Absent Present 
to 
some 
extent 
Clearly 
present 
 
PB 1.1 - PB is 
used by the 
AGENCY in 
addition to 
traditional 
budgeting 
     
PB 1.2 - PB is 
used by the 
AGENCY’s 
principal to 
control the 
AGENCY 
PB is expected to be a 
major influence in the 
relation of the AGENCY 
with its principal if (on a 
mounting scale):  
x There is clear 
alignment of the 
information 
monitored and the 
principal’s formal 
goals (1 pt) 
x Monitoring data are 
used frequently in a 
dialogue between 
AGENCY and 
principal (2 pt).  
x This dialogue results 
in concrete 
consequences and 
actions (3 pt) 
x There are provisions 
for financial 
incentives related to 
performance (4pt) 
x These provisions are 
actually used when 
 
0, 1 pt 
 
2,3 pt 
 
4,5 pt 
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targets aren’t met (5 
pt) 
PB 2.1 - A high 
degree of de jure 
PB 
implementation 
Direct or formula 
performance budgeting. 
(1 pt)  In some cases a 
direct link between 
performance results and 
resource allocation and 
accountability is in 
place. 
Performance informed 
budgeting (2 pt). More 
often the link is indirect 
and planned 
performance targets 
and results are used for 
planning and 
accountability purposes 
only.  
Presentational 
performance budgeting 
(1 pt). PB systems that 
have no link between 
performance 
information and funding 
and performance 
information is used for 
accountability only.  
What is the frequency of 
performance 
measurement and 
reporting? This may be 
done only when the 
yearly budget or report 
comes around (0 pt) or 
as part of a monitoring 
cycle with a higher 
frequency (1 pt). 
 
0, 1 pt 
 
2,3 pt 
 
4,5 ,pt 
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Are there measures 
taken to ensure the 
quality and impartiality 
of the reported 
performance 
information? Examples 
are organizational 
checks and balances or 
incidental or systematic 
auditing. If so 1 pt, if not 
0 pt 
PB 2.2 - A high 
degree of de 
facto PB 
implementation 
On a mounting scale de 
facto PB 
implementation can be 
characterized by: 
9 Reporting of the 
required 
performance 
information in a 
complete and timely 
manner (1pt) 
9 Implicit reference to 
performance 
information by 
adopting 
performance lingo in 
communication (2 
pt). 
9 Explicit reference to 
performance 
information in 
communication and 
decision making (3 
pt) 
9 Decision-making 
matches formal 
conclusions and 
recommendations 
 
0, 1 pt 
 
2,3 pt 
 
4,5 pt 
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based on expected 
or demonstrated 
performance (4 pt) 
9 Budgetary 
consequences are 
linked to 
performance based 
decisions (5 pt) 
>= 3 pt only If 
substantiated by 
example 
H 1.1 - Has 
there been a 
critical juncture 
in the 
accountability 
chain or policy 
field? 
     
H 1.2 - If so, has 
this critical 
juncture lead to a 
broadly felt 
problem to which 
PB was seen as a 
solution.   
     
H 2.1 - An 
internal advocate 
or external 
champion of PB 
in a powerful 
position. 
   Relatively 
Powerful 
position 
FEZ 
 
Or other 
PB 
Champion 
 
H 2.2 - A policy 
field in which 
specialists are 
dominant, 
relative to the 
other political 
actors. 
   Policy 
field with 
relatively 
dominant 
expert 
pathway 
 
 S 1.1 –Senge’s 
learning 
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disabilities lacking   
  
 S 1.2 - 
Participative 
openness: 
 Important issues 
are being   
 discussed openly 
and fairly  
     
S 1.3 - Reflective 
openness:The 
ability to 
continually 
challenge one’s 
own thinking 
     
S 2.1 - Shared 
view of the 
meaning of 
measured 
performance 
data expressed 
by 100% fit 
between the 
formal 
performance 
measures and 
the PB system  
     
CX 1.1 - Macro 
economic factors 
     
CX 2.1 - Shifting 
political 
preferences 
     
CX 3.1 - Others      
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SBB (National Forest Service of the Netherlands): Interviews Dec 2011 – Feb 2012 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Sr Advisor Forestry,  Nature Department 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Advisor Forestry, Financial and Economic Affairs Dept. 
SBB, Deputy Director (HQ) 
SBB, Controller (HQ) 
SBB, Specialist – Fauna - ecology (HQ) 
SBB, Sr. ecologist, inventarization and data management specialist (HQ)  
SBB, Director Services Unit 
SBB, Director Eastern Region  
SBB, Controller Eastern Region   
SBB, Chief Forester within Eastern Region 
LVNL (Air Traffic Control Netherlands): Interviews March – November 2012 
Ministry of Infrastructure, DGB, Sr. Advisor Aviation 
Ministry of Infrastructure, DGB, Director Aviation 
LVNL, Director Corporate Development 
LVNL, Manager Strategy 
LVNL, Manager Performance 
LVNL, General Manager Regional Unit 
LVNL, General Manager Strategy and Performance 
LVNL, General Manager Operations 
LVNL, Chief Financial Officer 
LVNL, Manager Quality Assurance 
U.S. Forest Service: Interviews Sept-Oct 2012 & June-July 2013 
Branch Chief, Performance Management  (national level) 
Regional Strategic Budget Coordinator Region 6 (R6) 
Analyst Economist R6 
Budget Analyst R6 
Deputy Forester of NF with R6 
Budget specialist NF within R6 
Silviculturist responsible for timber program NF within R6 
Ecologist responsible for biodiversity programs NF within R6 
Federal Aviation Administration: Interviews  Oct 2012 & July 2013 
Strategic Planning Coordinator, Dept. of Transportation 
Manager Strategic Planning, Office of Aviation Policy and Plans (OAP&P) 
Special Advisor for Planning, OAP&P 
Program Analyst,  OAP&P 
Program Analyst,  OAP&P 
Management and Program Analyst, Office of Budget 
Executive Director Air Traffic Organization (ATO) 
Acting Director Strategic Enterprise Directorate ATO 
Other interviews on general issues US cases (not using semi structured interview format) 
Shelley Metzenbaum, Associate Director for Performance and Personnel Management 
(OMB)  
Mark Bussow, Performance Manager at Office of Management and Budget  
Academics consulted on this study and preliminary results (list is not conclusive) 
Bob Behn, Sr. Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School 
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In November/December 2007 I conducted an independent study at George Mason 
University of the White House’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). This study, 
which was supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Finance and generously hosted by 
GMU’s Paul Posner, proved to be pivotal to this study in several respects. It helped me 
gain familiarity with the particular characteristics of the U.S. Federal Government system 
compared to the Netherlands as well as with U.S. federal performance management and 
performance budgeting initiatives. This knowledge proved to be pivotal for the problem 
analysis leading to this study as well as for assessing the U.S. case studies. In 2007 the 
following people were interviewed (their functions obviously reflect those at the time) 
Paul L. Posner, Professor, Director of MPA Program, Public and International Affairs (Until 
2005 Professor Posner was Managing Director. Federal Budget Analysis and 
Intergovernmental Relations at GAO) 
Jonathan D. Breul, Executive Director IBM Center for the Business of Government. (Mr. Breul 
served earlier as a sr. advisor at OMB) 
Philip G. Joyce, Professor of Public Policy and Public Administration at School of Public Policy 
and Public Administration of George Washington University 
Robert J. Shea, Associate director of administration and government performance at the 
President’s Office of Management and Budget. (Mr. Shea headed the president’s budget 
and performance integration initiative and oversaw PART implementation and use by OMB) 
Maurice P. McTigue, Director Government Accountability Project and Distinguished Visiting 
Fellow at Mercatus Center, George Mason University (Hon. McTigue served as a member of 
parliament and a cabinet minister in New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s ) 
Eileen Norcross, Senior Research Fellow, Government Accountability Project at Mercatus 
Center, George Mason University 
Kyle M. McDonald, Program Associate, Government Accountability Project at Mercatus 
Center, George Mason University 
Denise M. Fantone, Acting Director Health Care at Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
Jacqueline M. Nowicki, Assisting Director Strategic Studies at GAO 
Matthew Dull,  Assistant Professor, Virginia Tech’s Center for Public Administration and 
Policy 
Clinton T. Brass, Analyst in American National Government, Government and Finance 
Division, Congressional Research Service 
Jeffrey Newsome, Director of Program Performance at the Budget Office of the US 
Department of Transportation 
Roald van der Linde, Counselor Finance Department NL Embassy in Washington D.C. 
Dale Morris, Sr. Advisor Economic Affairs NL Embassy in Washington D.C. (Mr. Morris is a 
former budget aide to a member of Congress) 
   
 
Russ Mills, Asst. Professor Pol. Science, Bowling Green State University Ohio (and formerly 
at FAA)  
Aimee Franklin, Professor in Political Science Department, University of Oklahoma  
Matt Dull, Associate Professor Virginia Tech University 
Wouter van Dooren, Associate Professor Public Adm. & Management, Antwerpen 
University 
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APPENDIX III QUESTIONNAIRE (FAA/ATO VERSION) 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey! Before starting the 17 questions, a few 
announcements on the survey itself: 
 
PURPOSE AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
- This questionnaire will be used for a scientific study that is conducted fully independent 
from any executive office or interest group.  
- Results from this questionnaire will be used for academic purposes only.  
- The answers will be treated with strict confidentiality to make sure that publicized data 
cannot be traced to an individual respondent at any time. 
 
EXPLANATORY NOTES 
- Unless stated otherwise, only one answer should be chosen for each question. 
- The term 'performance measurement' as used in this survey, refers to measurement of 
results in the fields of work of FAA/ATO like for instance air traffic safety, delays, airport 
capacity, noise levels.  
- The term 'performance information' as used in this survey, refers to the results of these 
measurements and include both performance indicators as quantitative analysis and 
evaluation. 
 
GENERAL 
 
1. What is your age? 
a) <25 
b) 26-40 
c) 41-55 
d) >55 
 
2. What is your sex? 
a) M 
b) F 
 
3. In which ATO functional area are you employed? 
a) Central Management 
b) Program Management Operations 
c) Safety and Technical training 
d) Operations 
 
4. How many years have you been working for the FAA?  
a) <2 
b) 2-10 
c) 10-25  
d) >25 
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5. What is your line of work? 
a) Management  
b) Staff/Technical Support  
c) Finance  
d) Air traffic control operations 
e) Other:……….. 
 
POLICY AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
6. Which of these factors plays the largest role in helping shape FAA/ATO's policies 
(please prioritize these answers) 
a) Political ideals 
b) Policy priorities from the White House and/or the DOT 
c) Interests of large stakeholders in business and government 
d) Interests as expressed by (groups of) citizens  
 
7. Which of these factors plays the largest role in helping shape FAA/ATO's policies 
(please prioritize these answers) 
a) Political debate 
b) Media (TV, papers) 
c) International professional standards 
d) Technical developments 
 
8. Do you believe that using performance measurement has a positive influence on 
your work effectiveness?  
a) Yes 
b) I am not sure 
c) No 
 
9. Do you believe that using performance measurement has a positive influence on 
the efficiency of FAA/ATO as an organization? 
a) Yes 
b) I am not sure 
c) No 
 
10. How frequently do you use performance information in your work?  
a) Regularly 
b) Occasionally 
c) Hardly ever 
d) Never 
 
11. When performance information is used, for what purpose is it used? (multiple 
answers may be chosen) 
a) Performance reporting for external accountability 
b) Setting program priorities 
c) Strategically reallocate internal resources 
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d) Understand the impact of external events on performance goals  
e) Deciding on outsourcing decisions 
f) Developing and managing contracts  
g) Monitor cost and performance and contract management 
h) Allocate funds to third parties  
i) Coordinating program efforts with other internal or external organizations 
j) Analyzing productivity and funding levels  
k) Allocating internal funds 
l) Identifying service problems and  changing work processes 
m) Adopting new program approaches following evaluation 
n) Motivate staff to act consistent with organizational goals 
o) Setting individual job expectations for staff 
p) Rewarding staff 
 
12. To what extent are you familiar with the performance indicators used for your 
work? 
a) I know the performance indicators as well as the target values used 
b) I know the performance indicators but no target values 
c) I’ve heard something about them but not a lot  
d) I am not familiar with them 
 
13. Who primarily sets performance indicators within FAA/ATO? 
a) Budget and Financial staff 
b) Technical specialists from staff and operations   
c) Answers  a and b jointly  
d) External parties outside FAA/ATO 
e) Other: 
 
CORPORATE CULTURE 
Please react to the following statements by selecting the answer that you feel is most 
appropriate 
 
14. Within FAA/ATO important issues are being discussed openly and fairly 
 
15. FAA/ATO is an organization that is able to continually question and challenge its 
own way of thinking  
 
I totally 
disagree 
I  disagree 
somewhat  
I disagree nor 
agree 
I agree 
somewhat 
I totally agree 
 
 
    
I totally 
disagree 
I  disagree 
somewhat  
I disagree nor 
agree 
I agree 
somewhat 
I totally agree 
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16.  If FAA/ATO is faced with problems, a good problem analysis is usually made before 
taking action.   
 
17.  If things go wrong in FAA/ATO’s field of work,  lessons are usually learned as a 
result.  
 
 
 
  
I totally 
disagree 
I  disagree 
somewhat  
I disagree nor 
agree 
I agree 
somewhat 
I totally agree 
 
 
    
I totally 
disagree 
I  disagree 
somewhat  
I disagree nor 
agree 
I agree 
somewhat 
I totally agree 
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APPENDIX IV CASE SELECTION 
 
As mentioned in CH 2.4 and 4.2 a suitable case for testing the model has to meet a number 
of criteria. These are summarized into 5 conditions that apply to potential case material: 
 
1. It involves a national policy goal and performance targets tied to the national 
budget 
2. Policy execution takes place in principal-agent setting (preferably a National HQ 
and regional agents) with the (plausible) presence of the associated problems of:  
 conflicting goals and  
 superior access to information on the part of the agent 
3. The program and its execution are regarded a PB success27  
4. There is de facto performance steering on the part of the principal (as defined in 
CH.2):  
 PB is used by the agency’s principal to control the agency  
5. There is de facto performance management on the part of  the agent (as defined in 
CH. 4) 
 PB is used in addition to traditional budget preparation  
 
In order to limit the number of independent variables, related programs in terms of policy 
fields were sought.  For the Dutch case selection a shortlist was made way with the help of 
expert opinions.  Because of easy access to a PB database on U.S. national programs, 
potential NL cases could be systematically matched with U.S. programs concerning similar 
policy fields. This resulted in a potential US and a potential NL case that cover a principal-
agent relationship in a single policy field.  Additional factors determining the final case 
selection are obviously the access to reliable information and the ability to establish contacts 
with relevant professionals using the professional network of the committee and the author.  
 
Netherlands (NL) shortlist 
A shortlist of NL cases was constructed based on a variety of sources. Several studies have 
been conducted on the steering relationship between the NL central government and its 
agencies. Some of these covered the entire NL central government while others focused on a 
selection of cases. The main sources used are: 
x De Kruijf, Johan A.M., 2011. Autonomy or compliance in public service provision – Legal 
and economic autonomy and democratic control on service provision by ZBO’s. 
Dissertation University Twente 
x Evaluatie Agentschapsmodel, Ministerie van Financien 2011 (to be published) 
                                                 
27 This condition is met if performance management and output funding occur to a relatively large extent 
according to the Ministry of Finance (or equivalent body) and/or independent experts. 
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x Van Meerkerk, Ingmar & Van Thiel, Sandra 2011. De verborgen eigenaar: De financieel-
economische sturingsrelatie tussen ministeries en zelfstandige bestuursorganen. 
Published in Bestuurswetenschappen 2011-nr. 1 
x Algemene Rekenkamer 2005, Interne notitie over prestatiesturing.  (Author:  Rudi 
Turksema et al.) 
 
In addition to this literature study, the suitability for agencies in the Netherlands was 
discussed with Dr. Sandra van Thiel, Dr Rudi Turksema and the staff of the Minstry of 
Finance tasked with the evaluation of the NL agency steering model. This resulted in a 
shortlist of principal-agent relationships in which output bases funding and de facto 
performance management are claimed to have been dominant in recent years.  
 
Table 1 
 
NL Shortlist   
Principal Agent Policy area/program 
Min van Justitie / 
V&J 
Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen (DJI) Justice- detention 
Min van Justitie / 
V&J 
Integratie & Naturalisatiedienst 
(IND) 
Immigration 
Min van Justitie / 
V&J 
Raden voor de Rechtsbijstand (RVR) Justice 
Min. van OCW Vervangingsfonds/ Participatiefonds Education/ social security 
Min. van Financiën Belastingdienst Tax handling 
Min. van VROM / 
BZK 
Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting 
(CVF) 
Housing 
Min van VenW I&M Rijksdienst voor het Wegverkeer 
(RDW)  
Road transportation (car 
registration) 
Min van VenW / 
I&M 
Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland Aviation (traffic control) 
Min. van EZ/ELenI Nederlandse Mededingings 
Autoriteit (NMA) 
Oversight Economy 
Min van EZ / ELenI Senter Novem / Agentschap NL Government Shared Service 
/ handling of subsidies/ 
grants 
Min van LNV / EL&I Plantenkundige Denst (PD) Plant disease control 
Min van LNV / EL&I Staatsbosbeheer Forestry service 
Min van LNV Nederlandse Algemene 
Keuringsdienst (NAK) 
Food safety 
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The highlighted relationships represents a subset of policy areas where public services are 
believed to be the least likely affected by differences in national context. For this reason 
these associated five policy areas were analyzed for matching U.S. cases. 
 
Matching U.S. Programs 
The level of documentation of PB aspects of U.S. federal programs allows for a systematic 
analysis of potential case-candidates. This goes in particular for conditions 3-5. Conditions 1 
and 2 can be addressed reasonably adequately by examining the organization of the 
program on the agency’s website. Potential cases do however need additional in depth 
analysis once selected. The questions A-G in Table 2 are to be answered for this further 
analysis. For now the presence of these conditions is assumed in all cases. 
 
With regard to conditions 3-5, a major source for analyzing U.S. federal programs, are the 
program assessments made by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget for the 
FY 2002-2008 budget proposals. Known as the Program Assesment Rating Tool (PART), OMB 
used a standardized set of (in most cases) 25 questions to measure program effectiveness of 
over 1000 federal programs. The answers to these questions determined if a program was 
rated as either effective, moderately effective, adequate, inadequate or results not 
demonstrated.  
 
As a Proxy for conditions 3-5, eight PART question bear particular relevance. If these were 
answered with a YES by the OMB examiner, this indicates that the conditions sought are met 
for that particular program. Table 2 shows the PART questions and the conditions to which 
they refer. Two additional restrictions have been applied: 
x A program that is overall rated as ineffective or results not demonstrated by OMB is 
not viewed as an appropriate candidate for representing a good practice in terms of 
PB.  
x Financially less significant programs (< 25 million US$) have been excluded from the 
results  
 
Table 2 
A) Have policy objectives been communicated in the 
national budget/performance plan? 
B) Have these objectives been translated into program 
goals and performance indicators? 
Condition 1 
National policy goal and 
performance targets tied to 
the national budget  
 
C) Is execution of tasks performed by a decentralized 
government organization? 
 
D) Does a national ministry and/or agency headquarter 
act as a principal to the executive agencies? 
Condition 2 
Principal-Agent setting with 
conflicting goals and 
superior access to 
information by agent 
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E) Are different offices (e.g. regional) tasked with 
identical or highly comparable duties?  
F) Can conflicting goals be identified and made plausible? 
G) Can information asymmetry be identified and made 
plausible? 
 
 
Nr. PART question Relevant for condition nr. 
2.4 Does the program have baselines and ambitious 
targets and timeframes for its annual measures? 
 
 
Condition 3  
The program and its 
execution are regarded a PB 
success  
 
 
2.6 Are independent and quality evaluations of 
sufficient scope and quality conducted on a 
regular basis or as needed to support program 
improvements and evaluate effectiveness and 
relevance to the problem, interest, or need? 
2.8 Has the program taken meaningful steps to 
correct its strategic planning deficiencies? 
3.4 Does the program have procedures (e.g., 
competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT  
improvements, appropriate incentives) to 
measure and achieve efficiencies and cost 
effectiveness in program execution? 
 
2.5 Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, 
contractors, cost-sharing partners, etc.) commit to 
and work toward the annual and/or long-term 
goals of the program? 
 
Condition 4                 
PB is used by the agency’s 
principal to control the 
agency 3.1 Does the agency regularly collect timely and 
credible performance information, including 
information from key program partners, and use it 
to manage the program and improve 
performance? 
 
2.7  Are Budget requests explicitly tied to 
accomplishment of the annual and long-term 
performance goals, and are the resource needs 
presented in a complete and transparent manner 
in the program's budget? 
 
Condition 5                  
PB is used in addition to 
traditional budget 
preparation  
3.2 Are Federal managers and program partners 
(grantees, subgrantees, contractors, cost-sharing 
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partners, etc.) held accountable for cost, schedule 
and performance results? 
 
The following five policy areas were examined which are believed to contain a suitable case 
in the Netherlands: 
x Justice - detention 
x Aviation – traffic air control 
x Plant disease control 
x Forestry service 
x Food safety 
 
Despite the fact that the PART analysis takes federal programs as its unit of analysis, the 
questions take into account a number of aspects of the principal agent relationship. The 
relevant principal-agent relationship is also stated in the PART analysis itself. It is therefore 
possible to select relevant principal-agent relationships based on these program reviews. 
Within this relationship, several programs may be managed simultaneously.  
 
A condition is considered to be met if the majority of questions are answered with a YES. For 
condition 3 this may mean that just three out of four questions were answered with a YES 
while for the other two conditions, both associated questions require a yes. A suitable case 
is one in which at least two of conditions 3-5 are met and none on the conditions 3-5 is 
clearly not met.  It should be noted that this analysis for conditions 3-5 and the assumption 
of meeting conditions 1 and 2, is a crude method of case selection. It does however give an 
indication in which direction to look for further analysis.  
The analysis of the PART database revealed that in all five policy areas, programs existed that 
met the criteria. With regard to the activities of the Netherlands Forest Service it should be 
noted that there are four federal U.S. counterparts to choose from (National Park Service, 
Forest Service, Fish and  Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Land Management).  In addition 
to analysis of U.S. studies on performance information use and a discussion with Professor 
and former GAO director Paul Posner, it was decided to approach the FAA and the USFS as 
U.S. candidates. Although, based on the U.S. analysis, plant disease control and food safety 
appeared slightly superior these candidates were abandoned on pragmatic reasons. 
Mastering the essence of the specific and technical aspects of plant disease control was 
considered to require  a large amount of time and therefore represent a  risk compared to 
the other areas. With regard to food safety, the agency in the Netherlands was at the time 
engaged in a problematic merger with other organizations that also entailed the moving of 
headquarters to another city. Therefore it was feared that getting the right people for 
interviews would pose a challenge. 
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APPENDIX V FORMAT FOR CASE DESCRIPTION 
 
Paragraph 1  Description of the Agency and its Principal  
x A description of organization characteristics such as age, size and organizational 
structure with additional focus on the relevant units.  
x Policy field and tasks: the policy area, mission, objectives, tasks and activities of the 
agency and its agent (or relevant unit).  
x Principal-agent relationship: A description of the formal relationship between the 
agency and its agent in formal terms as well as dominant perceptions that may exist 
of one another. 
x A description of the actors in the budgetary process for both agency and the principal 
and of  
factors that dominate the allocation decisions in the policy field 
x Reforms that have been made in the budgetary process, especially PB reforms  
 
Paragraph 2 Degree of PB implementation 
x An analysis of the formal PB system under which the agency operates and 
compliance with its requirements. This includes the link between performance and 
funding. 
x Performance assessment by to principal: The degree to which the principal makes 
use of performance information reported by the agency. 
x Performance management by the agency: the use of PI for program learning or 
enlightenment and what this contributes to improving efficiency or effectiveness. 
Paragraph 3 should provide an answer with regard to these indicators: 
 
Indicator Presence 
PB 1.1 PB is used by the agency in addition to 
traditional budgeting  
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
PB 1.2 PB is used by the  principal to control the 
agency 
  
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
PB 2.1 A high degree of de jure PB implementation 
 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
PB 2.2 A high degree of de facto PB implementation 
 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
 
Paragraph 3 Exploring Neo-Institutionalist Explanations 
x Path dependency: an analysis of important changes within the organization or its 
policy environment that may explain PB implementation.   
x Asymmetry of power: an analysis of possible powerful champions of PB and an 
assessment of the relative importance of policy specialists in the policy field in 
question. 
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x Cultural appropriateness: an analysis of the archetype characteristics of a learning 
organization, applied to the agency and its principal 
x Cognitive frames: An assessment of the fit between the PB indicators and the 
perception of success that organization members hold. 
 
Paragraph 4 should provide an answer with regard to these indicators: 
 
Indicator Presence 
H 1.1 Critical juncture in the accountability chain or 
policy field 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
H 1.2 Problem to which PB was seen as a solution  
 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
H 2.1 An  advocate or champion of PB in a powerful 
position. 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
H.2.2 A policy field in which specialists are dominant. 
 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
S 1.1 Absence learning disabilities    
 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
S 1.2 Participative openness 
 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
S 1.3 Reflective openness 
 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
S 2.1 Shared view of the meaning of measured 
performance  
 
Absent/ present to some 
extent / clearly present 
 
Paragraph 4 Contextual factors 
x What macro-economic factors explain the budgetary or policy decisions? 
x What political preferences explain the budgetary or policy decisions? 
x What other likely factors may explain budgetary or policy decisions? 
 
Paragraph 6 Conclusions 
x Assessment of the overall score on the indicators 
x Which one of the formulated hypotheses does this supports 
x Other relevant observations from the case regarding the central question 
 
Epilogue 
x Additional observations 
x Data collection  
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